Can Vouchers Reduce Elite Capture of Local Development Projects? Experimental Evidence from the Solomon Islands

Last registered on November 30, 2016
View Trial History

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Can Vouchers Reduce Elite Capture of Local Development Projects? Experimental Evidence from the Solomon Islands
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0001820
Initial registration date
November 30, 2016

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
November 30, 2016, 8:41 PM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country
Solomon Islands
Region

Primary Investigator

Name
Ariel BenYishay
Affiliation
College of William & Mary
Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Roberto Weber
PI Affiliation
University of Zurich
Contact Investigator
PI Name
Pauline Grosjean
PI Affiliation
University of New South Wales
Contact Investigator
PI Name
Giovanna D'Adda
PI Affiliation
Politecnico di Milano
Contact Investigator
PI Name
Andrew Beath
PI Affiliation
World Bank
Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status
Completed
Start date
2013-06-01
End date
2013-11-01
Keywords
Governance
Additional Keywords
Public goods, decentralization, elite capture, private contributions
JEL code(s)
Secondary IDs
Abstract
By reducing citizen oversight, external financing of public goods in developing countries can exacerbate elite capture and produce sub-optimal outcomes for communities. We test a novel mechanism channeling funds for local public goods via citizens. While control communities are offered block grants to fund local public goods, households in randomly-assigned communities are provided with vouchers that they may contribute to a public good or redeem at a discount for private consumption. Vouchers increase community participation in allocation decisions, satisfaction in decision outcomes, and the probability that allocations reflect the preferences of individuals who had not previously participated in local meetings, when different from those of leaders.

External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Beath, Andrew et al. 2016. "Can Vouchers Reduce Elite Capture of Local Development Projects? Experimental Evidence from the Solomon Islands." AEA RCT Registry. November 30. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1820-1.0
Former Citation
Beath, Andrew et al. 2016. "Can Vouchers Reduce Elite Capture of Local Development Projects? Experimental Evidence from the Solomon Islands." AEA RCT Registry. November 30. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1820/history/12150
Sponsors & Partners

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
In all villages, selected participants were informed that SBD 2,000 (approximately USD 300) had been allocated to fund the improvement of a local non-religious public facility, such as a school, health center, market, toilet, road, well, or irrigation system. The research team gathered a random sample of villagers in a meeting to discuss the type of project that they believed would most benefit the community, with the goal of reaching a consensus on which project to fund. In order to ensure the discussion resembled a community meeting, no structure was imposed on the form of the discussion or on the method of selection of the project. Sample villages were randomly allocated to either the control or treatment group, which differed in the mode of fund allocation. In villages assigned to the control group, facilitators informed participants that a block grant of SBD 2,000 would be allocated to fund the community project. In the treatment group and prior to the discussion, facilitators issued each of the 20 selected participants with 10 paper vouchers and explained that each voucher could either be redeemed for cash or contributed to the fund for the community project. If redeemed, vouchers would be worth SBD 5 each, whereas vouchers contributed to the project would be worth SBD 10 each. Following the discussion and project selection, participants in the treatment group were asked by the facilitator to indicate privately how many of the vouchers they wished to redeem and how many they wished to contribute to the community project.
Intervention Start Date
2013-06-24
Intervention End Date
2013-09-01

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Community members' participation in discussions about project funding, the agreement between community members' preferences and the selected projects, community members' satisfaction with the process and the selected project, and the timing and cost of implementation of the project.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Each of the 80 sample villages was randomly assigned into either a treatment arm and a control arm, with stratification by ward. As discussed in the Treatment description, while control villages were offered block grants to fund local public goods, households in treatment villages were provided with vouchers that they could contribute to a public good or redeem at a discount for private consumption.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Randomization was conducted in an office by a computer, with stratification by ward
Randomization Unit
Villages
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
80 villages
Sample size: planned number of observations
1,600 households
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
40 villages in treatment, 40 villages in control
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
University of New South Wales Human Research Ethics Advisory Panel
IRB Approval Date
2013-06-13
IRB Approval Number
Details not available
Analysis Plan

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information

Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
Yes
Intervention Completion Date
November 01, 2013, 12:00 +00:00
Data Collection Complete
Yes
Data Collection Completion Date
November 01, 2013, 12:00 +00:00
Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization)
80
Was attrition correlated with treatment status?
No
Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations
1548
Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms
40 treatment villages, 40 control villages
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials