| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Trial Status | Before in_development | After completed |
| Field Last Published | Before December 02, 2017 07:16 PM | After January 19, 2024 05:14 AM |
| Field Study Withdrawn | Before | After No |
| Field Study Withdrawal Date | Before | After November 30, 2021 |
| Field Intervention Completion Date | Before | After December 15, 2017 |
| Field Data Collection Complete | Before | After Yes |
| Field Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization) | Before | After 168 |
| Field Was attrition correlated with treatment status? | Before | After No |
| Field Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations | Before | After 168 |
| Field Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms | Before | After 42 agents by treatment |
| Field Is there a restricted access data set available on request? | Before | After Yes |
| Field Restricted Data Contact | Before | After [email protected] |
| Field Program Files | Before | After No |
| Field Data Collection Completion Date | Before | After December 15, 2017 |
| Field Is data available for public use? | Before | After No |
| Field Keyword(s) | Before Labor | After Labor |
| Field Building on Existing Work | Before | After No |
| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Paper Abstract | Before | After Loss contracts are rarely observed in practice, although research suggests that they induce higher effort compared to gain contracts. We experimentally examine one potential reason for this scarcity: agents’ reciprocity toward the principal might be negatively affected by loss contracts. First, agents worked on a real effort task under either a gain or a loss contract. Second, principals and agents played a trust game. We find that loss contracts induce more effort, and thus a higher payoff for the principal in the real effort task. However, we do not find a spillover effect of contract framing in the trust game. Differences in reciprocity are small in size and not significant. Thus, they cannot explain the rare use of loss contracts in practice. |
| Field Paper Citation | Before | After von Bieberstein, F. & Essl, A. & Kathrin Friedrich (2020). Gain versus loss contracts: Does contract framing affect agents’ reciprocity?, Economics Letters, 187,108846. |
| Field Paper URL | Before | After https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108846 |