Experimental Design
We match participants with a co-player to play a game of chicken. The eventual payoff of the players depends on their play in the game and on the draw of a lottery. That is, when a "red ball" is drawn in the lottery, or when both players choose "action B" in the chicken game, they receive a payoff of zero. When a participant chooses "action A" in the chicken game, and a "green ball" is drawn in the lottery, she receives a payoff of 1 USD and when a participant chooses "action B" in the chicken game, while her co-player chooses "A", and a "green ball" is drawn in the lottery, she receives a payoff of 3 USD.
We play two rounds of this game and randomly rematch players (perfect stranger matching). After the first round, full information about the outcome of the lottery and the choice of the matched co-player is provided. Participants receiving a payoff of zero will therefore know exactly whether the event can be attributed to the unfortunate realization of the natural uncertainty, or the strategic uncertainty, or both. In round two, participants are tasked to again choose between A and B. Finally, we ask participants not only to make payoff-relevant choices, we also elicit their perceptions about the cause of the outcome. We do so at two points in time: first, after they have made their first choice but before they know the outcome, and second, after they have learned the outcome from the first round and before they make their second choice.