The Norwegian Type

Last registered on July 10, 2019
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
The Norwegian Type
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0004390
Initial registration date
June 27, 2019

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
July 10, 2019, 1:24 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country
Norway
Region
Bergen
Country
Norway
Region
Bergen

Primary Investigator

Name
Nina Serdarevic
Affiliation
Department of Economics, UoB
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Oda Sund
PI Affiliation
Norwegian School of Economics
Contact Investigator
PI Name
Oda Sund
PI Affiliation
Norwegian School of Economics
Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2019-06-27
End date
2020-01-31
Keywords
Environment & Energy, Other
Additional Keywords
JEL code(s)
Secondary IDs
Abstract
Keeping incentives fixed and assuming stability of preferences over time –are cooperative preferences
sensitive to context? In particular, do subjects change their behavior when going from a context in
which a new public good has to be created to a context in which one has to maintain an existing
one? We elicit the cooperative preferences of a representative sample of the Norwegian population
at two points in time, and examine whether their preferences are stable between a provision and
maintenance context. Second, in a framed public goods experiment, we randomize subjects into
either an information treatment intended to affect beliefs about others’ behavior or a control group
with no information. We seek to examine whether the elicited types and their degree of stability lead
to heterogeneous effects of the information treatment.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Serdarevic, Nina, Oda Sund and Oda Sund. 2019. "The Norwegian Type." AEA RCT Registry. July 10. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4390-1.0
Former Citation
Serdarevic, Nina, Oda Sund and Oda Sund. 2019. "The Norwegian Type." AEA RCT Registry. July 10. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4390/history/49716
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2019-06-28
Intervention End Date
2019-12-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Beliefs, Contributions to the Rainforest Foundation, Cooperative types, Public goods size, Attitudes
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Stable cooperator: Classified as cooperators in both situations.Stable reciprocator: Classified as reciprocator in both situations.Stable free-rider: Classified as free-rider in both situations.Unstable type: An individual who has a context specific cooperative type. Cooperator, reciprocator and free rider will be constructed using a pre-specified classification procedure.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We elicit the cooperative preferences of a representative sample of the Norwegian population
at two points in time, and examine whether their preferences are stable between a provision and
maintenance context. Second, in a framed public goods experiment, we randomize subjects into
either an information treatment intended to affect beliefs about others’ behavior or a control group
with no information. We seek to examine whether the elicited types and their degree of stability lead
to heterogeneous effects of the information treatment.
Experimental Design Details
Provision: To elicit cooperative types, we follow the design outlined by Fischbacher et al. (2001) in which
subjects submit a contribution schedule as a function of another person’s hypothetical contributions.
Subjects are first asked to choose how much they want to contribute unconditional of the choices of
another person. Second, using the strategy method, subjects are asked to how much they want to contribute
conditional on 11 hypothetical contribution choices of another person.

Maintenance: Also, in a one-shot two-person public goods game, we examine subjects’ willingness to refrain from
exploiting an existing public good.We use the same classification procedure as in the Provision game.
Randomization Method
Randomization done by fielding company.
Randomization Unit
individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
Approx 2000
Sample size: planned number of observations
Approx 2000
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
Approx 2000
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials

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IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number
Analysis Plan

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Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials