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Attitudes toward Taxation: The Role of Luck and Merit

Last registered on August 06, 2019

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Attitudes toward Taxation: The Role of Luck and Merit
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0004455
Initial registration date
August 05, 2019

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
August 06, 2019, 11:52 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
University of Heidelberg

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
University of Heidelberg

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2019-08-06
End date
2021-09-01
Secondary IDs
C93, H23
Abstract
A growing literature suggests that people are willing to accept more inequality if it is the result of merit rather than the result of luck. However, it is often difficult, if not impossible, to relate economic success or inequality to the relative impact of the luck or merit. In this study, we investigate distributional situations in which the relative impact of luck and merit is uncertain.

External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Fehr, Dietmar and Martin Vollmann. 2019. "Attitudes toward Taxation: The Role of Luck and Merit." AEA RCT Registry. August 06. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4455-1.0
Former Citation
Fehr, Dietmar and Martin Vollmann. 2019. "Attitudes toward Taxation: The Role of Luck and Merit." AEA RCT Registry. August 06. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4455/history/51317
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2019-08-07
Intervention End Date
2019-08-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Tax rate
Belief about Luck/Effort
Belief about Deservingness
Willingness to pay for Information
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We will run a study on Amazon Mturk. Participants are randomly assigned to one of two versions of a real-effort task (RET). They are matched into pairs and paid according to their relative performance (high bonus and low bonus). The RET is designed such that one version always results in getting the high bonus. This allows us to causally identify the impact of the bonus payment on redistribution. Before and after they learn about the performance comparison (ie the bonus payment), they are asked several questions regarding the task and their (relative) performance. After learning about the bonus payment, they decide about a redistributive tax.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Randomization is pre-programmed in the survey program.
Randomization Unit
Randomization on individual level
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
1800 participants recruited on Amazon Mturk
Sample size: planned number of observations
1800 participants recruited on Amazon Mturk
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
900 per treatment
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number
Analysis Plan

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Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials