Exploring the continuum between public and private goods: Bidding for soil fertility information in Malawi

Last registered on April 17, 2024
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Exploring the continuum between public and private goods: Bidding for soil fertility information in Malawi
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0004717
Initial registration date
September 17, 2019

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
September 17, 2019, 10:20 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
April 17, 2024, 4:09 PM EDT

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Country
Malawi
Region

Primary Investigator

Name
Julia Berazneva
Affiliation
Middlebury College
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Annemie Maertens
PI Affiliation
University of Sussex
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PI Name
Wezi Mhango
PI Affiliation
LUANAR: Lilongwe University of Agriculture & Natural Resources
PI Name
Hope Michelson
PI Affiliation
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
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Additional Trial Information

Status
Completed
Start date
2019-05-08
End date
2019-08-30
Keywords
Agriculture, Environment & Energy
Additional Keywords
JEL code(s)
O1, Q1, H4
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial is based on or builds upon one or more prior RCTs.
Abstract
We describe the design and analysis plan for a field experiment conducted in the summer of 2019 in Central Malawi. In this lab-in-the-field experiment, we study the willingness to pay (WTP) for information about soil fertility and the accompanying management recommendations. The randomization is set up to explore the degree to which individual contributions towards purchasing soil tests differ depending on the actual and perceived heterogeneity in soils in the village. This pre-analysis plan is being submitted after data collection but before any analysis took place.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Berazneva, Julia et al. 2024. "Exploring the continuum between public and private goods: Bidding for soil fertility information in Malawi ." AEA RCT Registry. April 17. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4717-2.0
Sponsors & Partners

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Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Agricultural information has a public goods nature (it is non-rival and non-excludable) and is often underprovided. How to (cost-)effectively provide such information – whether weather forecasts or management recommendations – is, therefore, an important question for governments. In this research project, we study to what extent information about soil fertility and the accompanying management recommendations can be funded through collective contributions, and the degree to which individual contributions towards purchasing agricultural information will differ depending on the actual and perceived heterogeneity in village soils and on within-village social relationships. To study these questions, we conduct a modified public goods experiment in the Dowa and Kasungu districts of Central Malawi and collect associated survey data and soil samples.
Intervention Start Date
2019-06-18
Intervention End Date
2019-08-30

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Individual and collective contributions (in Malawian Kwacha) towards purchase of a soil fertility test from a maize plot and accompanying management recommendations
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
The fieldwork is designed to study the degree to which individual contributions towards purchasing soil fertility tests and accompanying management recommendations will differ depending on the actual and perceived heterogeneity across sampled plots – both in terms of geography and social networks. Specifically, we conduct a controlled field experiment based on the standard public goods game. We modify the game slightly: farmers decide how much to contribute towards the purchase of a soil fertility test and associated site-specific management recommendations. Farmers play several rounds of the game; in each round they bid on a soil fertility test from a different plot with each plot varying both in terms of geographic distance from the plot of the bidding farmer (geographic heterogeneity) and in terms of farmers’ knowledge of the plot and relationship with the plot’s owner (social networks heterogeneity).

Our study builds on a 2014-2019 research project “Integrated Soil Fertility Management in Malawi” – an impact evaluation of an agricultural extension service in Central Malawi (Maertens, Michelson, and Nourani 2019). The 2014-2019 extension project was carried out in 250 randomly selected villages in two Extension Planning Areas (EPAs) where the implementer had not worked previous to 2014: Mthumtama in Kasungu district and Chibvala in Dowa district. Our project randomly selected 30 of the control villages from the 2014-2019 project villages: 15 in Kasungu district and 15 in Dowa district. In each village, based on the agricultural census obtained from the extension officers, we invited 20 farmers to take part in a public goods game. Only one farmer per household was allowed to participate.

In addition to the public goods game, in order to benchmark our total contributions towards a soil fertility test, we elicited individual willingness to pay (WTP) for soil fertility information following the Random Lottery Incentive System (RLIS) method in four additional villages (two in Kasungu and two in Dowa), interviewing six individuals in each of the villages in their homes.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization Unit
Village
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
30 villages in the public goods game
Sample size: planned number of observations
600 individuals (20 per village)
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
600 individuals or 30 villages
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials

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IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Middlebury Institutional Review Board
IRB Approval Date
2019-04-17
IRB Approval Number
19037
Analysis Plan

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Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
Yes
Intervention Completion Date
July 30, 2019, 12:00 +00:00
Data Collection Complete
Yes
Data Collection Completion Date
July 30, 2019, 12:00 +00:00
Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization)
30 villages.
Was attrition correlated with treatment status?
No
Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations
600 farmers.
Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms
600 farmers, 4 experimental rounds.
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
Yes
Public Data URL
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ALKOCV

Program Files

Program Files
Yes
Program Files URL
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ALKOCV
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Abstract
We examine the relationship between soil heterogeneity and investment in learning among farmers in Malawi using an experimental approach. Soil heterogeneity may both impede social learning and encourage experimentation. In our experiment, farmers contribute towards the purchase of a single soil test in the village in a threshold public goods game. This soil test provides farmers with valuable and actionable information. By randomly varying the plot selected for soil testing we establish the role of soil heterogeneity. We find that farmers contribute more when they perceive soils to be more similar to their own plot, but also free ride on others whose soils they perceive as similar. This free riding increases in larger groups of farmers with similar soils. Despite this, all villages consistently contribute enough to purchase the soil test.
Citation
Berazneva, Julia, Annemie Maertens, Wezi Mhango, and Hope Michelson. 2023. “Paying for Agricultural Information in Malawi: The Role of Soil Heterogeneity.” Journal of Development Economics 165 (October): 103144.
URL
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2023.103144

Reports & Other Materials