Incumbent Advantage, Voter Information and Vote Buying

Last registered on April 08, 2015
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Incumbent Advantage, Voter Information and Vote Buying
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0000688
Initial registration date
April 08, 2015

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
April 08, 2015, 2:39 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country
Philippines
Region

Primary Investigator

Name
Julien Labonne
Affiliation
Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford
Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Philip Keefer
PI Affiliation
Inter-American Development Bank
Contact Investigator
PI Name
Cesi Cruz
PI Affiliation
University of British Columbia
Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status
On going
Start date
2013-03-01
End date
2015-06-30
Keywords
Electoral, Governance
Additional Keywords
JEL code(s)
Secondary IDs
Abstract
The project assess the effects of voter information on vote buying and incumbent advantage. The intervention was designed with and implemented by the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (PPCRV). We collected data from candidates on their proposed policies and platforms and distributed that information in brochures to voters in randomly selected villages ahead of the May 13, 2013 mayoral elections in the Philippines. These brochures and the household visits by PPCRV volunteers to distribute and explain the brochures increased voter information about the types of public good provision that mayors could provide and to inform them of the availability of a large fund to finance provision of municipal public goods.

The intervention (and pre-analysis plan) were registered on the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) hypothesis registry on May 12, 2013.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Cruz, Cesi, Philip Keefer and Julien Labonne. 2015. "Incumbent Advantage, Voter Information and Vote Buying." AEA RCT Registry. April 08. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.688-1.0
Former Citation
Cruz, Cesi, Philip Keefer and Julien Labonne. 2015. "Incumbent Advantage, Voter Information and Vote Buying." AEA RCT Registry. April 08. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/688/history/4027
Sponsors & Partners

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Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2013-05-01
Intervention End Date
2013-05-14

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
As specified in the pre-analysis plan the key outcome variables are: political knowledge, salience of local development spending on voting decisions, turnout, vote share and vote buying
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
cf. Pre-Analysis Plan

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
The randomization was done at the village-level (within municipalities).

In April 2013, we interviewed every candidate for mayor in twelve municipalities in the provinces of Ilocos Norte and Ilocos Sur, in the northern reaches of the Philippines. Candi- date names were taken from the official list of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). In the course of the interview, we gave each candidate a worksheet with a list of sectors. Candidates were told the average amount that they would have to spend from their local development fund (LDF) and asked to allocate money across sectors.

PPCRV volunteers distributed that information in brochures to voters in randomly selected villages ahead of the May 13, 2013 mayoral elections. These brochures and the household visits by PPCRV staff to distribute and explain the brochures increased voter information about the types of public good provision that mayors could provide and to inform them of the availability of a large fund to finance provision of municipal public goods.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Randomization done in office by a computer. Within each target municipality, villages were allocated to the treatment and control groups using a pairwise matching algorithm. First, for all potential pairs, the Mahalanobis distance was computed using village-level data on population, number of registered voters, the number of precincts, a rural dummy, turnout in the 2010 municipal election and incumbent vote share in the 2010 elections. Second, among 5,000 randomly selected partitions, the partition that minimized the total sum of Mahalanobis distance between villages in the same pairs was selected. Third, within each pair, a village was randomly selected to be allocated to treatment; the other one serving as control.
Randomization Unit
The randomization unit is the village
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
The sample consists of 284 villages (142 treatment and 142 control) in 12 municipalities
Sample size: planned number of observations
Data were collected on 12 households per village
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
NA
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
University of Oxford
IRB Approval Date
2014-05-01
IRB Approval Number
Econ DREC Ref. No. 1213/0014
Analysis Plan

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Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials