Primary Outcomes (end points)
Relative incidence of harassment bribes in the total. Looking at the prosecution documents we can first of all form a better idea of whether the presence of improper benefit is actually considered in practice, and so whether harassment bribes are effectively set apart and subject to a different discipline (in particular, the exemption from punishment for the giver). Further, if this is the case, we can observe whether the 1997 reform led to a change in this respect, and hence on the frequency of harassment bribes relative to other types of bribery among the cases detected.
Relative incidence of report by the bribe-giver. Ideally we would want to know whether the case was initiated by a spontaneous report, at least for harassment bribes: after the introduction of asymmetric punishment, we should in general expect a higher frequency of cases in which the (no longer guilty) bribe-givers come forth and report the crime to the authorities. For the other class of bribes, the introduction of leniency can have an ambiguous effect. Among other things this will depend on the severity of sanctions and the actual likelihood of obtaining leniency. Unfortunately the information on how the case was initiated is not available in the case files. There is however some indication of whether the defendant volunteered information if leniency was awarded.
Size of the bribe, size of the return, income or status of the bribe-giver (and the bribe-taker) If the reform, through the introduction of leniency and asymmetric punishment, makes detection easier because of the incentives provided to the bribe-giver, this amounts to an increase in the expected fine for the bribe-taker (even though the actual sanctions decrease). We expect this to lead to an increase of bribe size for distortionary bribes: the threshold to undertake corrupt behavior is now raised, hence individuals will only exchange bribes if the returns from this corrupt agreement are higher. The picture is different though for harassment bribes, when the bribe-giver is not expected to give back the gain. In this case incentives to report increase with the size of the bribe, so the larger bribes will be deterred to a larger extent.