

# The Effects of Information on the Impact of Development Interventions in Fragile States\*

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## Abstract

Prior research shows that the beneficiaries of foreign aid often lack basic information on development projects in their communities—in terms of the initiators of the interventions or the rationale of aid distribution. This lack of transparency can undermine citizens’ political efficacy and nurture perceptions of unfair aid distribution. Customized aid information campaigns may avert these effects and impact positively on state-society and inter-group relations. We aim to investigate these potential effects of information in a randomized controlled trial among 10,000 respondents of a three-wave panel survey in Mali and Niger. We focus on 20 community-based infrastructure projects per country. In the baseline wave, members of the treatment group will receive customized information on ongoing aid projects in their vicinity (e.g., type, volume, and formal rules of project selection). In the mid-line, we repeat this information. In addition, half of the treatment group will have the opportunity to provide feedback on the project to the government and responsible aid agency. In the end line, we estimate the effects of these two elements of the information campaign on peoples’ evaluation of political efficacy, distributional fairness, engagement with political institutions and inter-group relations. This pre-analysis plan describes our hypotheses, research design and planned data collection.

**Keywords**— Development aid, information, state-society relations, fragile states

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# 1 Background

Foreign aid to conflict-affected countries is often supposed to serve a dual objective: (1) providing basic services to address the humanitarian needs of the population and (2) strengthening state-society relations and social cohesion through attribution of beneficial socioeconomic developments to the state and cooperation in the context of development projects. Prior impact evaluations demonstrate that aid projects often realize the first objective. However, the same projects also often fail to shape political and social attitudes (Di Maro, Evans, Khemani and Scot, 2021; Humphreys, de la Sierra and Van der Windt, 2015; Humphreys, Sánchez de la Sierra and Van der Windt, 2019).

We investigate one potential obstacle to the realization of such attitudinal effects: lack of transparency and locally-customized information. Household surveys conducted in contexts of conflict and violence in Afghanistan, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) or Peru indicate that on average 25 percent of the local population does not know why certain aid projects are being implemented in their own villages—in many areas the share rises to more than 80 percent. Similar proportions of the population are convinced that aid projects have solely been selected because individual powerful households wanted the project.<sup>1</sup>

These surveys demonstrate that aid beneficiaries often lack even basic information on aid interventions in their respective communities (Anderson, Brown and Jean, 2012; Mcloughlin, 2015). While many aid projects entail information activities in targeted areas, many others do not foresee any systematic and customized information campaigns. Moreover, aid interventions very rarely extend customized information measures beyond the narrowly-defined target areas of the respective projects. Consequently, many beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries may be aware of aid activities in their communities but also lack reliable information on the initiators of the interventions, properties of the projects or the rationale of aid distribution.

Case studies suggest that a lack of credible information on aid projects may have at least two adverse effects: first, it deprives citizens of the ability to assess aid-related political decisions and to hold local institutions accountable. Political elites can more easily capture aid projects, claim responsibility for beneficial aid effects and thereby reduce attribution of ben-

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<sup>1</sup>(Numbers are based on data from household surveys conducted by the research team in 2015 and 2016 on behalf of KfW Development Bank and the German Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development).

official socioeconomic developments to the state. This can undermine potential positive aid effects on state-society relations. Second, a lack of information on the rules and processes of aid allocation can nurture perceptions of favoritism and unfair treatment which can damage inter-group relations, eventually fostering latent or actual conflict ([Anderson, Brown and Jean, 2012](#); [Crost, Felter and Johnston, 2014](#)). Thus, lack of transparency may not only impair the intended positive contributions of aid projects but also generate unintended negative effects on peacebuilding and statebuilding.

## 2 Research questions

In this project, we seek to investigate the effects of customized aid information campaigns on political and social attitudes. We define information campaigns in line with [Rogers and Storey \(1987, 821\)](#) as “intended mass communication to generate specific outcomes or effects in a relatively large number of individuals, usually within a specified period of time, through an organized set of communication activities.” While public information campaigns can do a lot of harm when used to spread ideologies, prejudices, or other harmful political agendas, they also have a value in contributing to democratic values. As [Weiss and Tschirhart \(1994\)](#) note, “public information campaigns can enrich the possibilities for democratic participation. Better-informed citizens may participate more knowledgeably and effectively in all democratic processes.”

We focus on the effects of information campaigns that entail two inter-related elements: the first component is the provision of information on aid projects. This “aid project information” comprises details on i) the responsible funding institutions, ii) formal rules for the distribution of funding across communities, iii) the process of identifying community needs, iv) the actual project selection procedure, v) the type of selected project (e.g., two class rooms, an extension of a health post), the duration of project implementation and vii) the costs of the selected project. Note that the treatment merely provides real information on local aid projects and does not include any positive prime towards the state or government.

The second component of the campaign is the provision of feedback opportunities on the properties of aid projects and the formal rules of aid distribution. We understand feedback opportunities as one specific channel for citizens’ participation in the context of development aid. Participation in development has generally been viewed as a pre-planning component that

aims to ensure the preferences of the target population are considered (Botes and Van Rensburg, 2000; Finsterbusch and Van Wicklin III, 1989). Our analysis does not focus on pre-project participation (which is formally incorporated in the project sites our study draws on) but post-planning and implementation feedback.

Specifically, we seek to answer the following questions related to these two elements of the information campaign:

- *Q1*: How does the provision of *information* affect state-society relations and inter-group relations?
- *Q2*: How does the joint provision of *information and feedback opportunities* affect state-society relations and inter-group relations?
- *Q3*: Do effects of information and feedback opportunities vary between (i) beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, (ii) individuals with high vs. low prior information on development projects as well as (iii) individuals with high or low trust in rule adherence of local institutions?

In answering these questions, we seek to advance research on the social and political impacts of foreign aid-funded development in conflict-affected states, particularly the extent to which customized information campaigns can increase citizens' engagement with state institutions and intergroup trust and cooperation. From a policy perspective, we aim to assess the potential of embedding customized (mobile phone) information campaigns into development programs to increase intended positive and avert unintended negative aid effects.

### 3 Theory and hypotheses

Many development projects in conflict-affected states rest on the assumption that the effective improvement of people's living conditions contributes to more positive attitudes towards state institutions and other communal/ethnic groups (Moss, Pettersson Gelandar and Van de Walle, 2006; Rachel, 2017). This assumption is based on the logic of a social contract: aid and development signal the state's willingness and ability to care for the needs of the citizens. This, in turn, increases state legitimacy and citizens' willingness to interact with the state (e.g., in terms of voting or paying taxes). Moreover, an improvement of socio-economic living conditions

may reduce inter-group distributional conflicts while joint planning and implementation of aid activities foster social cohesion (e.g., [Mezzerà, Sogge and Lister, 2016](#)).

While these assumptions are plausible from a social contract perspective, the empirical record on the impact of aid programs on state-society relations is ambiguous (e.g., [Waddington, Sonnenfeld, Finetti, Gaarder and Stevenson, 2019](#)). While some impact evaluations find a positive effect of aid on measures of state society relations or social cohesion ([Beath, Christia and Enikolopov, 2017](#); [Böhnke, Koehler and Zürcher, 2013](#); [Casey, Glennerster and Miguel, 2013](#)), many others find no such effect ([Barron, Humphreys, Paler and Weinstein, 2009](#); [Blattman, Fiala and Martinez, 2012](#)).

Still other studies indicate that development interventions can foster violence in contexts of conflict and distrust ([Croft, Felter and Johnston, 2014](#); [Weintraub, 2016](#)). Aid projects target specific areas, leaving-out others. Even if programming decisions are well-reasoned from a development perspective they may be perceived as unfair by certain groups ([Anderson, Brown and Jean, 2012](#)). This can generate inter-community tensions or state-centered grievances—most notably when people interpret patterns of distribution in the light of preexisting state-based discrimination ([Stewart, 2005](#)).

These mixed findings indicate that the effects of aid on state-society relations and social cohesion are not straightforward but moderated by a variety of factors such as context-specific conflict dynamics and characteristics of aid interventions. Many of these factors are beyond a donor’s and often even the state’s immediate sphere of influence (e.g., security, supply of materials). However, donors, states and aid organizations have leverage over *how* aid interventions are planned and implemented. We focus on one specific project element and its effects on state-society and inter-group relations: transparency and customized information with regard to aid projects.

We are aware of one only empirical study with a similar empirical focus and approach.<sup>2</sup> [Nussio, García-Sánchez, Oppenheim and Pantoja-Barrios \(2020\)](#) assess the effects of *generic* text messages regarding development interventions on people’s basic service satisfaction and institutional trust. While they do not find an effect in their full sample, they show a positive

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
<sup>2</sup>While we are not aware of any other study that investigates how systematic information and communication campaigns can amplify the impact of development interventions, a recent meta-analysis of more than 30 participation and accountability programs finds that such programs are often effective in engaging citizens in service delivery and in improving the quality of these services ([Waddington et al., 2019](#)).

effect for people who self-identify as being interested in politics.

We believe that comprehensive and customized (i.e., location-specific) information with regard to aid projects coupled with feedback opportunities may qualify as a more valuable communication from a citizen’s perspective, yielding more substantive effects on state-society and intergroup relations.

We translate this general assumption into seven specific hypotheses related to the (i) main effects of information campaigns and feedback opportunities on state-society relations and intergroup relations (H1, H2), (ii) potential mechanisms linking information and feedback channels to these outcomes (H3, H4) and (iii) the heterogeneity of these effects across different baseline conditions (H5-H7). We illustrate the theoretical framework of the study in Figure 1 and describe our main hypotheses in the following subsections.

Figure 1: Theoretical framework



### 3.1 Main effects

We expect that the provision of aid project information improves state-society and inter-group relations. We define “state-society relations” as citizens’ evaluation of the state and their resulting willingness to interact with the state; including their willingness to vote, pay taxes, and demand governmental response to meet citizens’ needs.<sup>3</sup> We understand “inter-group relations” as mutual trust, willingness to cooperate and altruism across social groups. The term “social groups” refers to ethnic, religious, or regional group (e.g., [Dovidio, Piliavin, Schroeder and Penner, 2017](#)).

<sup>3</sup>To that end, we do not suggest that the supply of information automatically increases people’s trust into often illegitimately perceived state institutions, but rather that the information provided gives can increase people’s willingness to engage – both critically and supportively – with local government institutions.

Information provides the basis for understanding and assessing the performance of state institutions. It also signals that the state and aid agencies are taking beneficiaries seriously as “citizens” who should be in the position to critically evaluate aid activities and to hold the responsible institutions accountable. Moreover, a better understanding of development-related decisions can also counter social tensions related to (perceived) competition over access to aid resources. Awareness of the formal (needs-based) rules of aid allocation may reduce perceptions of unfair and clientelistic aid distribution. This, in turn, may reduce suspicion and improve inter-group relations.

**H1:** *The provision of aid project-specific information improves state-society and intergroup relations compared to individuals that receive no information.*

Information provision alone is a unidirectional form of communication that does not take into account citizens’ preferences and perspectives. Thus, we expect that the additional provision of feedback opportunities can provide important signals to the citizens that their views matter to the government and aid institutions. A more reciprocal communication may also foster engagement with the state and local government in the future. Finally, opportunities for providing anonymous feedback allow citizens to ventilate grievances related to the inter-group distribution of aid benefits and may thereby mitigate concerns that other social groups are (unfairly) advantaged in the allocation of aid activities. Therefore, we argue that the joint contribution of information and feedback opportunities will not only have larger effects on state-society relations and intergroup relations compared to no information at all, but also compared to mere information provision.

**H2:** *The provision of aid project-specific information and feedback opportunities improves state-society and intergroup relations compared to individuals that receive no information and those receiving only information but no feedback opportunity.*

## 3.2 Mechanisms

**Political efficacy:** We expect that these main effects materialize through two main mediating factors. The first mediating factor is people’s political efficacy. In line with prior research, we differentiate between two dimensions of political efficacy. Internal efficacy refers to the confidence of the individual in her own abilities to understand politics and to act politically. External

efficacy refers to the expected responsiveness of the political system, i.e. rules and processes of decision-making in line with citizens' preferences. We expect that access to information and feedback opportunities increase people's internal and external efficacy: access to reliable information and an elevated understanding of project selection and output increase people's confidence in their ability to understand important (development-related) issues. The provision of feedback opportunities increases their perception that the (local) government cares about their interests and provides communication channels that allow citizens to shape (development-related) political decisions. Higher levels of efficacy may then increase people's willingness to engage with state institutions (state-society relations).

**H3:** *The provision of aid project-specific information (and feedback opportunities) improves perceptions of political efficacy compared to individuals that receive no information (or that receive only information but no feedback opportunity).*

**Distributional fairness:** An additional channel linking the information and feedback treatments to state-society and intergroup relations may operate through perceptions of distributional fairness. We assume that two elements of these perceptions are particularly important. The first element is people's assessment of the *formal* rules of distribution of development funds/projects. The second element goes a step further and refers to respondents' personal perceptions of the *actual* processes of distribution. We hypothesize that access to information on aid projects and feedback opportunities can shape both elements of perceived fairness: information prevents the development of misconceptions about the determinants of aid allocation (e.g., needs-based vs. clientelistic) while feedback opportunities provide avenues for expressing potential frustrations related to (perceived) deviations from formal rules and unfair allocation outcomes. Taken together, both elements may lead to more willingness to engage constructively with state institutions as well as to more trustful/cooperative intergroup relations.

**H4:** *The provision of aid project-specific information (and feedback opportunities) improves perceptions of distributional fairness compared to individuals that receive no information (or that receive only information but no feedback opportunity).*

### 3.3 Heterogeneous effects

**Expected individual benefit:** The expected benefit of aid projects may influence the effect of access to information and feedback opportunities. People that are aware of aid projects

but do not benefit directly (e.g., because they live farther away from aid project locations) will (a) tend to have less information on development efforts and (b) tend to more easily develop grievances related to their perceived exclusion from aid benefits. Therefore, they might be particularly prone to building their opinions on rumours, hear-say and envy. Thus, we expect information and feedback opportunities to have stronger positive effects on state-society and intergroup relations among non-beneficiaries than among beneficiaries.

**H5:** *The effects of provision of aid project-specific information (and feedback opportunities) on state-society and intergroup relations is stronger among non-beneficiaries than among beneficiaries of aid projects.*

**Prior beliefs:** The effect of information campaigns may also depend on people’s prior beliefs about the respective aid projects. We assume that access to reliable information on aid interventions is relatively weak among beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of most aid projects. Nonetheless, some parts of the population may have a sound understanding of aid projects based on information received from aid agencies or state institutions. Without access to reliable information, citizens may also develop inaccurate beliefs about the aid projects—based on rumours, hearsay or prior experiences. We expect that the type (accurate/inaccurate) and strength of prior beliefs condition the effects of information campaigns. We expect that strong *accurate* beliefs about project dampen the treatment effect because the contribution of additional information is more marginal. Similarly, we also expect that strong *inaccurate* beliefs reduce the effect of the campaign. In this case, the additional information clashes with prior convictions, reducing the likelihood that individuals update their beliefs.

**H6:** *The effects of provision of aid project-specific information (and feedback opportunities) on state-society and intergroup relations is stronger among individuals with weak baseline beliefs on properties of aid projects.*

**Rule adherence:** Information campaigns focus on providing information on the *intended* design of interventions, such as the formal rules of project distribution. This information may clash with people’s general understanding of the degree to which state actors and institutions actually follow formal rules. The more people are convinced that state institutions do not adhere to formal rules anyway, the weaker will be the effect of informing them about the specific

(non-discriminatory) design of these rules. Thus, we expect that the effect of the provision of information and feedback opportunities will be strongest among individuals that expect that formal rules do, indeed, shape the behaviour of state institutions and actors.

*H7: The effects of provision of aid project-specific information (and feedback opportunities) on state-society and intergroup relations is stronger among individuals with higher baseline expectations that state institutions adhere to formal rules.*

## 4 Setting of the study

The following subsections present the context and main characteristics of the data collection before we move on to elaborating on the design and delivery of the treatment, the measurement of the main variables of interest, as well as our empirical strategy.

### 4.1 The aid programs: Improving public service delivery in Mali and Niger

Our study focuses on two similar aid projects in Mali and Niger, both funded by German development cooperation: the *Programme d'Appui aux Collectivités Territoriales (PACT)* in Mali and the *Programme d'Investissement et de Capacitation pour les Collectivités Territoriales (PICCT)* in Niger. Both projects are funded by the German KfW Development Bank on behalf of the German Federal Government. They aim at supporting local public service delivery and local governance through financial contributions to communal investment funds as well as accompanying investment-related measures (i.e., training and technical/financial control).

Both projects follow a similar operational approach. KfW cooperates with state institutions that manage national-level funds for municipal investments into local public service delivery. The available development funds are allocated to municipalities based on a set of pre-defined needs and performance criteria (e.g., population size, poverty rates). Municipal institutions (i.e., elected mayors and village councils) then prioritize and select local development projects to be implemented with the available funds. In identifying project priorities, they are supposed to draw on local development plans that have been prepared with the active participation of the local population. They prepare and submit funding proposals (i.e., for local infrastructures and equipment) to the managing national-level institutions that evaluate the proposals'

financial viability and technical feasibility. If needed, managing institutions provide support to communities in revising funding proposals in terms of technical and financial specifications. Upon approval, municipalities implement the projects, while the national-level institutions are in charge of regular financial and technical controls.

The research project focuses on the fifth phase of the PACT and the third phase of the PICCT. The PACT has a national scope (i.e., no specific geographical concentration) and a total funding volume of 25 million EUR; the PICCT focuses on the regions of Tillabéri, Tahoua and Agadez, with a total funding volume of 20 million EUR.

## 4.2 Design of the data collection

Our empirical analysis of the effects of information campaigns in the context of these programs will rely on a panel survey that will be rolled out in three waves. The time period between each wave will be approximately 1-2 months long. The objectives, components and structure of the three waves differ (we provide an overview of the main survey sections across waves and a reference to the survey instrument in Appendix A):

**Wave 1:** Wave 1 will be implemented as a face-to-face survey through computer-assisted personal interviews (CAPI). Wave 1 serves four central objectives. First, it serves to draw the sample of respondents for all three survey waves. Phone numbers will be collected from each participating respondent in order to re-contact them again in wave 2 and 3. This initial construction of the within-village sample and the collection of phone numbers are also the primary reason for implementing the first wave face-to-face rather than via mobile phone as in waves 2 and 3. Second, wave 1 will be used to collect pre-treatment socio-demographic background data, data on people’s information needs, attitudes on local service provision, outcome measures as well as respondents’ prior knowledge on aid projects in their vicinity. Third, respondents will be randomly assigned to one of the three treatment conditions and given the respective component of the treatment (information and announcement of feedback opportunity in wave 2). Fourth, we will collect short-term post-treatment attitudes on our outcomes of interest.

**Wave 2:** The second wave data collection will be implemented via telephone through computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI) using telephone numbers collected in wave 1. Wave 2 serves two main objectives. First, it allows us to estimate the medium-term effects of the first treatment component delivered in wave 1. Therefore, contrary to wave 1, it begins with a battery

of outcome questions (the same as in wave 1) so that we can estimate the effects of the wave 1 treatment before we deliver the second component of the treatment. Second, wave 2 serves to deliver the second component of the treatment (repetition of information provided in wave 1 and actual collection of respondents' feedback on aid projects). We will not collect post-treatment outcome measures in this wave.

**Wave 3:** The third wave will also be implemented through CATI. Its primary purpose is to collect end-line data on the main outcome measures of interest. This allows us to estimate the medium-term effects of the combined two components of the treatment included in wave 2. Moreover, we will use the third wave to deliver the full information and feedback treatment to the control group (after the outcome battery) to avoid any potential negative repercussions of unequal treatment delivery in waves 1 and 2—for example, feelings of neglect among members of the control group that have heard about information provided to members of the treatment group.

This three-way panel design has important advantages over one-time surveys or two-wave panels. First, it allows us to assess the effects of the information treatment in the short term (within-survey wave at baseline) and in the medium term (from one survey wave to the next wave) combining the advantages of both approaches: avoiding attrition bias and spillover effects in within-survey comparisons while considering more meaningful (in terms of persisting) treatment effects in across-wave analyses.

Second, it allows us to increase the expected treatment effect by extending the treatment delivery over two waves. Previous research demonstrates that the repetition of information increases both, the extent to which individuals can process and correctly recall information, as well as the perceived truthfulness of the information (Cacioppo and Petty, 1979). Thus, while the one-time provision of information may have little impact on the outcomes described above, the delivery of information in wave 1 and the repetition of information in wave 2 is likely to increase the effectiveness of the treatment. Similarly, splitting the feedback treatment (announcement in wave 1 and actual feedback collection in wave 2) is likely to increase its effect. Respondents have time between survey waves to form an opinion on the project, visit the project site and/or talk to other people about the project. This may help crystallizing their opinions and increasing their willingness to provide feedback and their appreciation of the feedback opportunity.

### 4.3 Sampling


**Sampling locations:** Both in Mali and Niger, we focus on 20 administrative units (“communes”, administrative level three) receiving funding from the PACT and PICCT programs, respectively (see section 4). We select these communes based on three criteria: first, we consider only communes that plan PACT/PICCT infrastructure projects in education, water or health. We exclude all communes that plan to use funds for the construction of administrative buildings or equipment only (we expect these projects to have a lower public visibility and/or perceived direct use to beneficiaries). Second, we only consider communes that invest PACT/PICCT funds into projects in one single village—in order to reduce the complexity of the information treatment. Amongst the remaining communes, we select those with the highest numbers of households close to project sites (i.e., in a 6.5km radius, see below). Within the selected administrative units, we differentiate between two types of villages:

- Aid project villages: the village wherein an aid project will be implemented
- Surrounding villages: villages in a 6.5km radius of the aid project village—within the same commune as the aid project village

For each administrative unit, we select the aid project village itself and as well as all surrounding villages that are located within a certain distance to the aid village and have a certain minimum size (see detailed information on sampling below). Sampling aid villages and surrounding villages ensures a certain variation in the extent to which respondents actually benefit from aid projects.

**Sample size:** Our data collection stretches over three survey waves. Our targeted minimum sample size in our final wave 3 is 1,500 respondents. Attrition is a known challenge in panel data collections—in particular, in phone surveys (Roemer and Rosenbaum, 2021; Özler and Facundo, 2019). Based on our partners’ prior experience, we expect an attrition rate of 20 percent from wave 1 to 2, and another 20 percent from wave 2 to 3. Based on these considerations we start with a sample of 5,200 respondents in wave 1, targeting a sample size of 3,000 respondents in wave 2 and of 1,500 respondents in wave 3. We illustrate sample sizes across waves in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Sample size across survey waves



**Wave 1:** In wave 1, we will randomly sample 5,200 respondents in Mali and Niger, respectively. We first geo-code the location of the 20 selected aid project villages. We then rely on data provided by the Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) at Columbia University to identify settlements in a 6.5km radius around each aid project village.

<sup>4</sup> We aim to ensure that the sample includes substantive shares of both, beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Based on aid policy reports on basic services in Mali (Lehman, 2013; World Bank, 2018), we expect access to basic services to extend over a distance of around 5km around aid project locations. We add another 1.5km (one third of the main distance) to ensure that the sample includes a sufficient number of non-beneficiaries. In addition to providing information on the extent of settlements, the CIESIN data also provide settlement-level population estimates.<sup>5</sup> In the absence of recent micro-level census data, we use these estimates to exclude particularly small villages with less than 20 households (to reduce the risk that we “lose” entire villages due to attrition across waves). From among all remaining villages, we sample 5,200 households proportional to village/settlement size. Within villages, we rely on random walk patterns to select individual households. We add pre-selected replacement villages to the main sample, if (1) we need to replace entire villages due to security concerns or (2) we are not able to secure the foreseen number of interviews per aid project clusters. Replacements take place within individual aid project clusters. The replacement sample consists of two types of villages: (1)

<sup>4</sup>Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Columbia University and Novel-T. 2021. GRID3 Republic of Mali Settlement Extents, Version 01.01. Palisades, NY: Geo-Referenced Infrastructure and Demographic Data for Development (GRID3). Accessed on 27th February 2022. We exclude urban areas and small hamlets that encompass only a small number of households.

<sup>5</sup>Based on Bondarenko M., Kerr D., Sorichetta A., and Tatem, A.J. 2020. Census/projection-disaggregated gridded population datasets for 51 countries across sub-Saharan

small villages with less than 20 households with the 6.5km radius around aid project locations and (2) villages with more than 20 households located outside of the 6.5km radius (but still within the same communes as the respective aid projects). Smaller villages of type (1) are first selected for replacement.


**Wave 2:** In the second wave, we will draw on the sample from the first wave. In total, we will randomly select 3,000 respondents from the wave 1-sampling frame (5,000), making sure that the proportions across key dimensions (aid project villages vs. surrounding villages, treatment statuses, gender) remain balanced.

**Wave 3:** In wave 3, we will sample 1,500 respondents from the remaining wave 2 sample, again making sure that the balance across key dimensions remains stable.

## 5 Treatments and treatment assignment

As described above, in wave 1 respondents will be randomly assigned to one of three treatment conditions and will keep their treatment status throughout the panel survey; the information and feedback treatments are administered across the first two waves of the panel. Figure 3) illustrates the setup of the treatment assignment; the following subsections provide more information on the individual treatment arms.<sup>6</sup>

Figure 3: Treatment across survey waves



<sup>6</sup>All details on the survey instrument including pre-treatment, treatment and post-treatment measures can be found in appendix section A.

## 5.1 Information condition (T1)

In this condition, respondents receive information on an aid project in their vicinity. This information focuses on several key defining features of the process of project selection as well as the project output itself. In terms of project selection, we provide information on (1) how funding volumes are allocated across communes, (2) provisions for the identification of development needs, and (3) procedures for the selection of concrete aid projects. In terms of the projects themselves, we focus on (1) who is responsible for the funding program, (2) the type of project, (3) the costs and (4) the expected duration of the project. Note that we conceive of these individual pieces of information as elements of one single compound treatment; i.e., we are interested in the effects of being informed (or not) about key characteristics of aid projects rather in the (potentially heterogeneous) effects of any specific pieces of information.

The information included in the treatment is as much as possible customized to the concrete aid project in the respective respondent’s vicinity.<sup>7</sup> This information will be delivered to the respondent in the form of questions and answers—for three main reasons: First, it allows us to separate information texts into smaller pieces that may be easier for respondents to process. Second, the questions are supposed to increase respondents’ attention to certain issues (i.e., project characteristics) before the respective information is being delivered. Again, we expect that this process increases respondents’ attention to the information that is being provided. Third, respondents’ answers to the questions allow us to measure their prior knowledge about the respective project.

**Wave 1** We start by indicating to the respondents the project on which the subsequent information treatment will focus: “*Now, we would like to talk to you about a development project in the village of [name of aid project location]. The project is funded this year by the Programme d’Appui aux Collectivités Territoriales – PACT.*” We then ask the respondents a battery of questions related to the features of the project selection and project output mentioned above. Across most questions, we provide respondents with two response statements—one reflecting the actual project design and one not. We then ask respondents to evaluate these statements: “For the following questions, we would like you to indicate if you think a statement is definitely true, probably true, probably false, or definitely false.” The actual treatment consists of the

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<sup>7</sup>These customized information are provided to us by our government partners in Mali and Niger.

“correct” response provided by the enumerator after the respective answer of the interviewee.

Table 1 shows the set up of the information treatment for Mali, the treatment is the same in Niger with the names of authorities replaced by the relevant one.

Table 1: Information treatment in wave 1 (Mali)

No.	Project characteristic	Question	Answer
1	Project responsibility	(1) The national government of Mali and international donors are in charge of the PACT project. (2) Non-governmental organizations and influential individuals are in charge of the PACT project.	Actually The PACT is directed by the government of Mali and supported by international partners like Germany
2	Funding volume	(1) Each year, some communes receive more money than others from the PACT because their mayors have stronger political ties that help them to get more money from the PACT for their community. (2) Each year, some communes receive more money than others from the PACT because of a mathematical equation distributes the PACT money based on the needs and local governance of communes	Actually, each year, the amount that each commune receives is calculated with a mathematical formula. It considers the people’s needs – for example, how poor a commune is. And it considers the performance of local councils and mayors – for example, how often they meet.
3	Identification of needs	(1) International donors, are responsible for identifying the development needs of this commune. (2) The people of the communes, are responsible for identifying the development needs of this commune.	In fact, The mayor and local council have to organize a planning process that allows the people of [Village] to express their needs in the PDSEC, the Plan de Developpement Social, Economique et Culturel. PACT projects are then selected from the PDSEC.
4	Project selection	(1) The mayor and the local council, are in charge of selecting which project will be funded with the money available from the PACT. (2) The most influential individuals and families of the commune, are in charge of selecting which project will be funded with the money available from the PACT.	Actually, most of the time there is not enough funding available in the commune for all projects in the PDSEC. The elected local council and mayor select projects from the PDSEC that are the most pressing, the most feasible, and the most sustainable.
5	Type of project	(1) This year, in this commune, a PACT project has been selected that aims to improve social services such as water, education or health in the commune. (2) This year, in this commune, a PACT project has been selected that aims to improve economic services such as markets, roads or bridges in the commune.	In fact, The PACT is currently funding [short description varies across project location sites; e.g. “two additional class rooms in elementary school”] in the village of [village].
6	Duration of project	The planned duration of the main construction works of the project is more than [number] months.	So, your commune submitted a project proposal to the PACT and indicated that start is in [month] this year and that it should take [number] months to finish the project.
7	Cost of project	The PACT project costs more than [number] million FCFA.	In fact, the expected costs of the PACT project amount to [number] million FCFA.

**Wave 2** We administer the same question and answer battery in the second wave of the survey. This approach serves two main functions: first, we want to repeat key elements of the treatment to refresh information and strengthen its internalization by respondents. Second,

the questions and respondents' answers allow us to assess to what extent respondents have remembered the information provided to them in the first wave of the survey and to what extent they have adapted their beliefs about the project.

Again, we begin with a short introduction of the battery: “*You may remember that in our first interview, we have talked about a PACT development project in the village of [name of village]. I would now like to come back to some characteristics of this project.*” We then administer the same treatment battery as in wave 1.

## 5.2 Information and feedback condition (T2)

Respondents in this condition receive the full information treatment (T1) and in addition are given the opportunity to share their opinion as described above. Note that we do not aim to assess the effect of the feedback without information provision, for that reason we decided against a factorial design. Similar to the pure information condition, we deliver the feedback treatment across two waves:

**Wave 1** In wave 1, we announce to individuals in this treatment condition that they will have the opportunity to provide feedback on the aid project to the government and international aid agencies in wave 2. Respondents will be informed that this information will be anonymously summarized in a report and shared with the governments of Mali/Niger and development partners (we note here that this report will indeed be shared after wave 3):

*“Now that we have provided you with this information, we want to invite you to tell us what you think about this project, when we contact you again in 1 or 2 months. We will collect information from many people, write a report and share it with the government. This way, we could inform the government about the perceptions of the people of your commune. Importantly, neither your name or identity nor the name of your village or commune will be mentioned anywhere in this report.”*

**Wave 2** In wave 2, we will ask respondents in this treatment condition to provide their feedback on the project—again after the provision of the wave 2 information treatment. We start with a short introduction before we move on to asking respondents for their feedback on the project selection as well as the project output:

*Remember, we also announced to ask about your feedback on the project*

- *Is there anything specific about the selection of the project you would want us to include*

*in our report to the government and its international partners—without mentioning your name and the name of your commune?*

- *Is there anything about the project, for instance type and location, you would want us to include in our report—without mentioning your name and the name of your commune?*
- *Is there anything else you would want us to include in our report—without mentioning your name and the name of your commune?*

### **5.3 Control condition (C)**

In waves 1 and 2 respondents in the control condition receive the same introductory message to the treatment section and are asked to evaluate the same statements related to the aid project as described in section 5.1. However, they do not receive any specific project information in response to these questions. Moreover, we do not provide respondents the opportunity to provide feedback on the projects.

Remember that the introductory message in the treatment section includes references to the project location and the name of the project. We include this basic information in the control condition to make sure that treatment and control groups do not differ in the general awareness of the project. As we are interested in the effects of information and feedback opportunities we want to block any treatment effects (positive or negative) that may result from the fact that some individuals are aware that a project is being implemented in their vicinity while others are not. In particular, we want to prevent heterogeneous treatment effects among non-beneficiaries: including hints at the presence of a development project in another village in the treatment group only may create grievances that compensate the positive effects of information provision relative to members of the control group that are not aware of any aid project that does not benefit them personally.

Including aid-related questions in the control condition serves two main purposes: first, we aim to keep interviews in the control condition as similar as possible to interviews in the treatment condition—net of the actual information and feedback opportunities included in the treatment conditions. This includes similarity in terms of interview duration, topics addressed and emphasis put on international aid projects. Second, respondents' answers to these questions allow us to gauge their beliefs about the project. This way, we can also track changes in respondents' beliefs over time that are not influenced by our information treatment (i.e., information provided by other sources such as local government institutions).

## 5.4 Treatment assignment

The actual randomization takes place in real-time through the survey software during wave 1 at the respondent level<sup>8</sup> using tablet computers. We randomly assign 1/3 of respondents to each of the three conditions.

# 6 Measurement

Below we describe which measures we collect during the survey. The individual paragraphs and respective survey items refer to the main elements of our theoretical framework illustrated in Figure 1 above. In our understanding of mechanisms, we differentiate between *mediators* and *moderators* (Falleti and Lynch, 2009; Gerring, 2010). Mediators relate to the internal process of a causal mechanism. Moderators refer to variables in the social, economic and political context that can affect an intervention, but are essentially pre-treatment, often external, conditions outside the intervention.

## 6.1 Outcomes

**State-society relations (index):** Rather than explicitly asking respondents about their “trust” or “confidence” in institutions, we gauge their willingness to engage (or not) with state institutions. Three considerations inform this decision: first, we expect that concrete activities are easier to assess for respondents than abstract notions like “trust”. Second, from an aid-policy perspective, (intended) behavior seems more relevant than general attitudes. Thus, we rely on four survey items related to voting, taxation, contacting and complaining. Respondents can answer to each item on a four-option Likert scale ranging between “very likely” (4), “likely” (3), “unlikely” (2), or “very unlikely” (1). Responses to each of the four item will be standardized, combined into an index and standardized again:

*Which of the following actions do you consider taking in the near future if you had the chance?*

- *Vote in the next elections in your commune*
- *Pay a tax or fee to the local government so that it can improve the provision of public basic services in your commune*
- *Contact the mayor or members of the local council of your commune to inquire about development needs and projects*

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<sup>8</sup>We choose to randomize at the individual level as compared to the village level by balancing advantages and disadvantages in terms of statistical power and potential spillover effects. We discuss how we will deal with spillover effects in section 8.3.

- *File complaints if you notice that development projects in your commune have not been selected according to the formal rules*

**Intergroup relations (index):** To measure our second main outcome, we rely on vignettes that confront respondents with hypothetical distributional decisions in zero-sum situations. Again, our main motive for relying on vignettes rather than standard questions related to “trust in others” is to make survey items as concrete as possible. Specifically, we rely on two types of scenarios: the first one focuses on the inter-village distribution of a resource surplus, the second one focuses on political support for discriminatory political campaigns. In both cases, we ask for respondents’ own distributional preferences as well as their expectations of other villages’ preferences. Responses to each of the four items will be standardized, combined into an index and standardized again:

*Please imagine the following situations and think about how you would behave:*

- *Imagine an aid agency would provide you with 1 million FCFA. You can decide to split this amount for the benefit of your village or that of another village in your commune. How much of that amount would you contribute to a project in another village in your commune?*
- *Imagine that in local elections a political candidate would promise to reduce the number of development projects in other villages in your commune in order to increase the number of projects in your village. How likely is it that you would support the candidate?*

*Now I would like to ask you about how people in other villages in you commune may behave in similar situations:*

- *Imagine an aid agency would provide someone in another village in your commune with 1 million FCFA. This person can decide to split this amount for the benefit of her village or that of your village. How much of that amount would that person contribute to a project in your village?*
- *Imagine that in local elections a political candidate would promise to reduce the number of development projects in your village in order to increase the number of projects in another village in your commune. How likely is it that people in this other village would support the candidate?*

**Civic engagement (index) - *exploratory*:** In addition to our two main outcomes, we register a civil engagement index for an exploratory analysis. We understand civil engagement as people’s voluntary contribution to a public good in terms of investing some of their *time* and *money* to upkeep the service and infrastructure. We believe that customized information and feedback opportunities can potentially increase civic engagement. The provision of information signals to the respondents that they are taken seriously as beneficiaries and stakeholders of

the respective projects. This may, in turn, increase people’s awareness and commitment to contribute to sustainability of the service. We rely on two items that ask respondents about the likelihood to voluntarily contribute some of their time and money. Respondents can answer to each item on a four-option Likert scale ranging between “very likely” (4), “likely” (3), “unlikely” (2), or “very unlikely” (1). Responses to each of the four item will be standardized, combined into an index and standardized again:

*I would like to ask you about your potential involvement in the upkeeping of the PACT project in the village of [name of aid project location].*

- *How likely is it that you would contribute unpaid time to help maintain the project in the future?*
- *How likely is it that you would donate money to help maintaining the project in the future?*

## 6.2 Mediators

**Political efficacy (index):** We rely on four survey items to create our indicator of political efficacy– two indicators of internal efficacy (items 1 and 2) and two measures of external efficacy (items 3 and 4). Responses to each of the four item will be standardized, combined into an index and standardized again:

*To what extent do you agree with the following statements?*

- *I have a pretty good understanding of the most important development issues and projects in my commune*
- *I am often uncomfortable when talking with other people about development issues in my commune*
- *The government is willing to provide me with sufficient information on decisions on development in my commune*
- *The government is interested in what people like me think about development in my commune*

**Distributional fairness (index):** We rely on four survey items to create our indicator of perceived distributional fairness – two indicators related to formal rules (items 1 and 2) and two indicators related to actual outcomes of distribution (items 3 and 4). Responses to each of the four item will be standardized, combined into an index and standardized again:

*To what extent do you agree with the following statements?*

- *There a formal rules in place that ensure that development funds are distributed fairly between villages in my commune*
- *There a formal rules in place that ensure that the distribution of development projects considers the needs and interests of all villages in this commune*
- *Some villages always get more than their fair share of the development projects.*
- *When it comes to the distribution of aid projects in my commune, the needs of the people weigh more heavily than their political connections*

In addition to these main outcome variables according to the theoretical framework sketched above, we also gauge respondents’ general basic service satisfaction in the areas of health, education and water provision as well their assessment of the government’s willingness and ability to improve the living conditions of the citizens. These indicators aim to measure elements of the formal monitoring frameworks of the aid projects under investigation. We therefore analyze these variables alongside the main outcomes in the models presented below.

### 6.3 Moderators (interaction)

**Expected individual benefit:** In order to assess the moderating role of the degree to which respondents expect to profit from the aid interventions in their vicinity, we rely on pre-treatment survey items that ask interviewees to assess the utility of different types of “hypothetical” projects in the respective aid project location—including the actual aid interventions. We use responses to the single item related to the “true” project implemented in the respondent’s vicinity as a measure of aid benefit.

*Imagine that a development project was implemented in the village of [name of project village]. Please indicate how you or other members of your household would personally benefit from different types of projects in this village:*

- *A project that improves health services—for example, a new health post*
- *A project that improves education service—for example, new class rooms*
- *A project that improves water provision—for example, a new well*

**Prior beliefs:** In order to assess respondents’ prior beliefs about the aid project in their vicinity (i.e., the extent to which the information provided with the treatment is new to respondents) we rely on responses to questions integrated in the information treatment. The information treatment consists of several questions related to characteristics of the respective project and project selection procedures (see table 1). The questions will be administered to both, control and treatment group, while actual information related to these questions will only be provided to members treatment group after they have answered the respective question. We

use the respondents' *wave 1 answers* to these questions as a measure of prior information on aid projects. Specifically, we sum response scores of "correct statements" (4 "definitely true", 3 "probably true", 2 "probably false", 1 "definitely false") and deduct response scores of incorrect statements.

**Perceptions on institutions' rule adherence:** To gauge the extent to which respondents are convinced that political actors and institutions follow formal rules and regulations, we rely on three pre-treatment survey item that will be administered in wave 1. The responses to these items will be standardized, added together, and standardized again:

- *Consider the following common situation. The mayor and local council receive 50 million FCFA for a development project in your commune. How much of that money would they cut for themselves instead of spending it on the project?*
- *Out of 10 politicians, mayors, and civil servants in your commune how many do think always behave according to the law, i.e. formal written rules? You can tell me a number between 0 and 10.*
- *To what extent do you agree with the following statement: there are many rules on how aid projects should be distributed and how people like me should be involved. But these rules are meaningless because no one sticks to these rules, anyway.*

**Timing of the campaign:** In addition to the main moderators specified in the theoretical framework described above, we also explore the extent to which the timing of the information campaign influences the effects on our outcomes. There is little prior knowledge that would inform our theoretical expectations. Common sense would suggest people appreciate information early during the planning phase. However, one could also argue that information, and specifically feedback mechanisms, becomes more important if the project has already been finalized. This allows people to more accurately assess the information with the actually realized aid project.

We leverage variation in the planned finalization dates of the construction phases of the aid projects. Some projects are estimated to be finalized before and some after our baseline surveys. We will use two measures to account for the timing of the campaign. First, we will calculate the difference in days between the finalization date and the baseline survey date. If projects have already been finalized, we will use negative values, if projects will be finalized after the baseline survey we use positive values. As a second measure *project ongoing*, we will use a simple dummy variable indicating "0" if the project has been finalized (incl. the day of the baseline survey date) and "1" if the project is still ongoing.

## 6.4 Pre-treatment covariates

In our preferred model specification we include baseline pre-treatment individual level covariates to reduce noise in the outcome measures. Specifically, we will include the following variables:

**Socio-demographic variables:** We will include standard measures for gender, age, education, number of children below 16, length of residence, formal employment, and an asset index.

# 7 Empirical analyses

## 7.1 Main effects

The design of our three-wave panel allows us to implement three types of analyses summarized in table 2. First, we estimate the short-term effect of the wave 1 treatment (i.e., one-time information and announcement of feedback opportunity) on outcomes gauged directly after the treatment section. The main advantage of this within-survey analysis is that it is statistically highly powered and does not suffer from attrition or spillover effects. The main downside is its very short-term horizon and the resulting relatively low practical relevance.

Second, we estimate the effects of the wave 1 treatment (i.e., one-time information and announcement of feedback opportunity) responses on wave 2 outcome questions that will be administered prior to the respective treatment section in wave 2. This allows us to estimate the medium-term persistence of the effects observed in the first analysis described above. Thus, while the risk of attrition bias and spillover is higher and statistical power is lower than in wave 1 analyses, results are more relevant in terms of assessing to what extent treatment effects last beyond the interviews themselves.

Third, we estimate the effects of the complete/combined wave 1 and wave 2 treatment (repeated information and combined feedback announcement) on outcomes measured in wave 3. In terms of the main research interest of the project, this is the most relevant analysis, as it considers all elements of the treatment and estimates the persistence of effects over several months (i.e., the period between waves 2 and 3). On the other hand, this analysis also faces the highest risk of attrition bias and spillover effects as well as the lowest statistical power (see further discussion in section 7.5).

Table 2: Comparisons, advantages and disadvantages

No.	Comparison	Treatment	Outcome	Time horizon	Attrition bias	Spillover	Power	Relevance
1	Control/ treat- ment	Wave 1: one-time information and feedback announcement	Wave 1 post- treatment	Short	Low	Low	High	Low
2	Control/ treat- ment	Wave 1: one-time information and feedback announcement	Wave 2 pre- treatment	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium
3	Control/ treat- ment	Wave 2: repeated information and combined feedback announcement/ opportunity	Wave 3	Medium	High	High	Low	High

We use a linear model (OLS) with the following specification to estimate the intention-to-treat (ITT) effect for all three comparisons sketched in table 2:

$$Y_{iww} = \alpha + \beta_1 T_i + \mu_x \mathbb{X}_i + \epsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

where  $Y_{iww}$  is one of our outcomes of interest (state-society relations index or intergroup relations index, see section 6.1) of individual  $i$  in village  $v$  in wave  $w$ .  $T_i$  is the individual-level treatment status assigned in wave 1,  $\mathbb{X}_i$  is a vector of individual-level pre-treatment covariates (see section 6.4) and an aid project village dummy, and  $e_{it}$  is the normally distributed error term. Standard errors will be clustered at the village-level. In addition, we will run the same model without pre-treatment covariates  $\mathbb{X}_i$ . While we expect similar point estimates due to random assignment, standard errors may be larger and may result in insignificant results in case the ITT effect is relatively small.

## 7.2 Mediation analysis

Assuming we find treatment effects on our outcomes of interest, how can these effects be explained? In hypotheses 3 and 4 we proposed that the treatment effect operates via two separate mechanisms: political efficacy and perceptions of distributional fairness. To assess these hypotheses, we will employ the following specification in a linear model:

$$M_{iww} = \alpha + \beta_1 T_i + \mu_x \mathbb{X}_i + \epsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

where  $M_{iww}$  is one of our mediators of interest (political efficacy index or distributional

fairness index, see section 6.2) of individual  $i$  in village  $v$  in wave  $w$ .  $T_i$  is the individual-level treatment status assigned in wave 1,  $\mathbb{X}_i$  is a vector of individual-level pre-treatment covariates (gender, age, education, children, length of residence, formal employment, asset index) and an aid project village dummy, and  $e_{it}$  is the normally distributed error term. Standard errors will be clustered at the village-level. In addition, we will run the same model without pre-treatment covariates  $\mathbb{X}_i$ . We are aware of current methodologies (e.g., causal mediation analyses) to estimate the direct and mediator effects of the treatment on outcomes (Imai, Keele, Tingley and Yamamoto, 2011), but refrain from that in our analyses given the criticism of strong assumption, e.g., regarding sequential ignorability, that could potential bias mediation estimates (Green, Ha and Bullock, 2010).

### 7.3 Heterogeneous treatment effects

In hypotheses 5 to 7, we suggest that the effect of our treatments varies with several pre-treatment conditions. To assess this heterogeneity, we employ the following specification in a linear model:

$$Y_{iww} = \alpha + \beta_1 T_i + \gamma Z_{i,wave1} + \omega T_i * Z_{i,wave1} + \mu_x \mathbb{X}_i + \epsilon_{it} \quad (3)$$

where  $Y_{iww}$  is our outcome measure of individual  $i$  in village  $v$  wave  $w$ .  $T_i$  is the individual-level treatment status,  $Z_{i,wave1}$  is one of our individual-level pre-treatment moderators (expected individual benefit, prior information, or perceptions of institutions' rule adherence, see section 6.3) collected at baseline, and  $T_i * Z_{i,wave1}$  is the treatment effect conditional on pre-treatment moderators. In addition, we will run the same model without pre-treatment covariates  $\mathbb{X}_i$ .

### 7.4 Multiple comparisons

Given the number of hypotheses (2) and outcome variable indexes (2) in the study, multiple comparison testing is a concern. We will report both uncorrected p-values and results from the Romano and Wolf (2016) familywise error rate (FWER) correction. This procedure is more conservative than false discovery rate (FDR) such as for instance the one proposed by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995). We consider the following families for each group of analyses:

- Main analysis: 2 hypotheses, 2 outcome indexes = 4 families
- Mediation analysis: 2 hypotheses, 2 mediation indexes = 4 families

- Heterogeneous treatment effects: 5 hypotheses, 2 outcome indexes = 10 families

## 7.5 Power calculations

Our power calculations need to take into account multiple treatment arms and the comparisons we aim to assess. In our case, we have one control group and two treatments (T1: information only, T2: information and feedback). We aim to conduct the following three comparisons: i) Control vs. Treatment 1, ii) Control vs. Treatment 2, and iii) Treatment 1 vs Treatment 2. Note that the randomization occurs at the respondent-level, i.e. we do not take into account a clustered design.

We employ EGAP’s power analysis for multiple treatments to our expectations.<sup>9</sup> We make the following assumptions: We assume a standard distribution in our outcome variables with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. For the average treatment effect of treatment 1, we assume a 0.2 standard deviation change (two-tailed) and for treatment 2, we assume a 0.4 standard deviation change in the outcome, compared to the control group.

Figure 4 shows the relationship between power (y-axis) and sample size (x-axis). The black dots indicate the power for recovering at least one significant hypotheses. The red dots shows the power curve for identifying two significant hypotheses and suggests that due to the Bonferroni correction the sample size needed is more demanding. Our goal, identifying all three hypotheses is identified with the blue dots and requires around 1,600 respondents to achieve 80% power.

Our study is thereby well powered for wave 1 (5,200) and wave 2 (3,000). In wave 3 (1,500), we are close to 80% power.

## 8 Threats to causal inference


### 8.1 Ineffective treatment

Our treatment is meant to increase respondents’ knowledge of aid project selection and aid outputs. Moreover, it provides opportunities for giving feedback to the government and/or international aid agencies. In the light of the pure survey-based nature of the treatment, there is a certain risk that its manipulating effect is too weak to induce any changes. This risk is particularly pronounced for the information component of the treatment. Information may not be sufficiently relevant to respondents, they may not be paying sufficient attention or may

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<sup>9</sup><https://egap.org/resource/script-power-analysis-simulations-in-r/>

Figure 4: Statistical power for three treatment arms



not be able to memorize and process information that is given to them. We seek to address these problems in several ways. First, we rely on customized information on aid projects in respondents' respective communities. This information is arguably more relevant, concrete and interesting to respondents than generic program-level or policy-level information. Second, the question and answer design of the treatment increases interaction during the delivery of the information treatment, arguably increasing attention of the respondents. Third, in order to strengthen the expected manipulating effects of the treatments, we repeat the treatments across two survey waves. Specifically, we expect that the wave 2 information treatment increases the likelihood that individuals memorize and process the information provided to them. Fourth, we use the question and answer format of the information treatment in wave 2 as a manipulation check that allows us to assess if the treatment has in fact changed respondents' beliefs about the project. Specifically, we estimate the effect of the information treatment on the difference between wave 1 and wave 2 "belief scores" (see 6.3).

## 8.2 Unintended treatment

While we try to keep the treatment and control conditions as similar as possible, we cannot rule out that variation beyond the provision of information or feedback opportunities may drive correlations between treatment status and outcome measures. In particular, observable treatment effects may result from three main differences in between the control and the two treatment conditions:

First, the control condition, relative to the treatment condition is shorter because respondents do not receive project information. Thus, we expect interviews to last longer for respondents in the treatment condition, potentially reducing attention towards the end of the interviews. This may then also increase the likelihood that interviewees resort to certain response patterns (e.g., “yea-saying”). Second, the fact that respondents in the control condition are asked questions without receiving information subsequently, may create a sense of frustration, reducing motivation in the remainder of the interview. Conversely, confronting individuals in the treatment group with information that deviate from their initial responses may create feelings of ignorance and lack of efficacy. Third, the fact that interviewers spend more time discussing development-related issues with the respondents in the treatment conditions may raise hopes that interviews will materialize in some kind of development benefits to the community. Conversely, respondents may fear that “wrong” answers may impact on future access to aid. These consideration may induce unequal social desirability bias across treatment arms. Fourth, the fact that we are telling respondents in the feedback condition about the possibility of (anonymously) providing information to the government and aid agencies, may raise suspicion regarding the confidentiality of the general interview. The resulting self-censure may bias the estimates of the treatment effects if it is unequally prevalent in the treatment group as compared to the control group.

We aim to assess these unintended effects of the treatment design with a set of “placebo” outcomes for which we do not expect any effects of our actual treatments (information provision and feedback opportunities). The responses to each of the following items will be standardized, combined into an index and standardized again:

*Now we would like to ask you some questions about interviews like the one we did today. How much do you agree with the following statements:*

- *You sometimes feel uncomfortable when you cannot answer questions correctly in interviews like this one.*
- *Interviews like this one are sometimes so long that you cannot concentrate the entire time.*
- *If you give the right answers in this interview, the government and aid agencies may be more willing support our village.*

### 8.3 Spillover effects

If the information provided in the treatment conditions is perceived as relevant, we should assume that at least some respondents share this information with other people in their communities. If the receivers of this “new” information are in the control group or treatment 1 group (receiving information about the feedback possibility in treatment 2), then this might bias our estimations.

There are two possible scenarios. First, if respondents in the control group receive (parts of) the treatment via friends, it may—as hypothesized—improve their political interest and social cohesion outcomes. However, we would not be able to attribute the improvement in outcomes to the treatment. In this case we would underestimate the treatment effect. In the other scenario, respondents in the control group may wonder and even feel angry as to why they have not received the treatment information which may be reflected in lower outcome measures. In this case, we would overestimate the treatment effect.

From a practical (aid policy) perspective, spillover effects can be an important multiplying mechanism through which information can be distributed to as many people as possible. This is why we do not want to implement measures to prevent the spread of information altogether. However, for the purpose of this study, we want to be able to separate the actual treatment effect from potential spillover effects.

We deal with this challenge in the following ways: first, we estimate within-survey treatment effects in wave 1. This allows us to assess short-term effects net of any spillover effects. Moreover, during the baseline survey we will ask all respondents to share the phone numbers of five people that they chat with regularly. Comparing these phone numbers with the phone numbers of our sample of respondents will allow us to cross-check whether respondents have chatted with friends that are also included in our sample. Specifically, we can identify if respondents in the control group frequently discuss with respondents in treatment 1 or 2, and whether respondents

in the control or treatment 1 group frequently discuss with those in treatment 2. Moreover, this approach would allow us to implement a follow-up survey among chatting friends of survey respondents to investigate spillover patterns and effects in more detail—using the treatment status of the respective respondents as explanatory variable and questions gauging knowledge of development projects as outcomes.

While this approach will allow us to broadly proxy frequent direct interactions, it arguably does not capture communication and spill-over effects that occur through more complex indirect interactions.

## 8.4 Attrition

Attrition can occur in two forms: item non-response for outcome variables in wave 1, 2 or 3, and unit non-response in wave 2 or 3. Both types of attrition threaten causal inference if attrition is systematically correlated with treatment status and/or individual pre-treatment covariates.

Across-wave attrition is an issue that concerns our design in the following way. Our wave-specific sample sizes (W1: 5,200, W2: 3,000, W3: 1,500) take into account attrition at the sample size level. Moreover, for wave 2 and 3, we block our sample based on treatment status, gender, village, etc. While these procedures force a balanced sample across key dimension, it is still possible that sampled individuals in wave 2 and 3 cannot be contacted or refuse to participate. This incorporates uncertainty to what extent unobserved individual traits might explain systematic attrition. While we will—with high certainty—end up with a balanced data in wave 2 and 3, systematic individual-level attrition cannot a priori be ruled out.

We will perform the following tests. First, we will test the hypothesis that item non-response for outcome variables (wave 1, 2, 3) and unit non-response (wave 2, 3) is not affected by the treatment status. Second, to explore potential attrition patterns, we will use treatment status, baseline covariates, and treatment-covariate interactions to test their effect on an attrition indicator for the i) contacted and completed and ii) contacted and not completed interviews in wave 2 and 3 samples compared to the wave 1 sample.

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# Appendix

## A Survey instrument

Below we describe the sequence of item batteries in the survey. Table 3 shows the section and its order for each survey wave. For the central components of our survey. While we introduced the components of the main modules (treatment, outcomes, mediators, etc.) in this PAP, the detailed and latest version of the question wording and response options are available at the following link: [paste link].

Table 3: Item modules across survey waves

Sequence	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3
1	Informed consent (B)	Informed consent (B)	Informed consent (B)
2	Pre-treatment covariates (6.4)	Mediators (6.2)	Mediators (6.2)
3	Chatting network (8.3)	Outcomes (6.1)	Outcomes (6.1)
4	Moderators (6.3)	Unintended treatment (8.2)	Unintended treatment (8.2)
5	Treatment (5)	Treatment (5)	Treatment to control* (5)
6	Mediators (6.2)		
7	Outcomes (6.1)		
8	Unintended treatment (8.2)		

*Note:* \* We provide the treatment to the control group participants at the end of the last survey wave to avoid withholding this information.

## B Informed consent

### B.1 Participant information (only wave 1)

"Good day, my name is ENUMERATOR and I am working with redacted, a company carrying out opinion surveys in Niger/Mali. You are invited to participate in a research study undertaken by researchers at the University of Osnabrück in Germany and the University of Bergen in Norway. This study aims to help governments to be more responsive to citizens' needs and interests and is funded by the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.

In this poll, we would like to know more on your opinions about access to basic services such as health and education, development projects, the responsiveness of state institutions and social relations in your commune. We will use this information to write research articles and reports on how to best implement development projects for the governments of Mali, Niger and Germany as well as for other researchers in other countries.

The study consists of three interviews. The first interview takes place in person today. For the following two interviews, we will call you on your mobile phone over the next months. We would highly value your participation to make sure that this research study represents the views of people like you.

In each interview I will read aloud to you questions followed by a list of possible responses. You will then be asked to select what you personally think is the most appropriate response. Some questions will be about your opinions on access to basic services, development projects and your assessment of the state, other questions will ask about your education or occupation. Each interview should take around 20-30 minutes. Please note that parts of the mobile phone interviews may be recorded for quality purposes. You have been invited to participate in this study because you were selected by chance. That means you are one of many thousands who will be interviewed in Mali/Niger. While your participation in this study is important, it is completely voluntary and you may decline to participate. You may refuse to answer any of the questions and stop the survey at any time.

It is important for you to know that we are obliged to protect your privacy according to the General Data Protection Regulation, a law which all researcher in the European Union need to obey. We will analyze all the thousands of interviews together with statistical methods and not refer to you and your responses individually. Any information you provide will be kept confidential, that means no one will be able to identify you personally.

Note that we will use your phone number only to call you for the two following interviews and not for any other purposes. We will not share your phone number with anyone outside of the project team. After the end of the project, we will no longer retain your number.

## **B.2 Consent form**

The following section will be only added to wave 2 and 3 since the participant information will not be repeated.

**Only wave 2 and 3:** Good day, my name is [ENUMERATOR NAME] and I am working with redacted, a company carrying out opinion surveys in Niger. May I speak to [RESPONDENT NAME (recorded in wave 1)].

[ENUMERATOR: i) CONTINUE IF RESPONDENT IS ON THE PHONE, ii) WAIT FOR RESPONDENT AND REPEAT PREVIOUS, iii) CALL LATER IF NOT PRESENT]

You remember that you talked with [ENUMERATOR NAME of first interview], who is one of my colleagues on [DATE OF FIRST INTERVIEW] in your home in [VILLAGE NAME]. [ENUMERATOR NAME of first interview] announced that we would call again to talk with you about development projects in your area. This is the purpose of this call.

**All waves:** We would now like to ask you for your consent to participate in the survey as explained to you in the previous participant information.

- I confirm that I understand the objectives and scope of the survey. I know and understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw from the survey at any time, without having to give a reason, and without any consequences.
- I understand that the survey involves one face-to-face survey and two mobile-phone surveys and I agree to take part in these surveys and answer your questions. I agree to give you my phone number so that you can call me for the purpose of these interviews only.
- I agree that the information I share in the interviews will be published in a way that it cannot be linked with my name.
- I agree to give the research team the right to use and make available the information I share for reports to the German government and publications in academic journals.

Do you agree to participate in this survey under the terms as described?

- Yes
- No (If no: “May I ask why you are not interested in participating? Perhaps I can provide you with more detailed information.”)

## C Survey Instrument

Below is the tablet-based survey instrument, in French and English. The language options also include a local language, but this redacted in this rendering. Some information has been redacted or shortened for privacy reason/readability. When information is redacted this is shown in curly braces.

Q #	Q Name	English	fr_French	Q Type	Conditional	Skip Pattern
NA	Optin	Optin	Optin	Open Ended	NA	Any Response = Cluster
1	Cluster	WHICH AID CLUSTER ARE YOU IN? [ENUMERATOR: CONFIRM THE CLUSTER YOU ARE IN AND SELECT APPROPRIATELY, SINGLE RESPONSE] (list of clusters)	DANS QUEL CLUSTER D'AIDE ÊTES-VOUS? [ENUMÉRATEUR : CONFIRMEZ LE CLUSTER DANS LEQUEL VOUS VOUS TROUVEZ ET SÉLECTIONNEZ APPROPRIÉMENT, RÉPONSE UNIQUE] (list of clusters)	Single Choice	NA	
2	Cluster(clustername)	AND WHICH EA IN {Cluster} ARE YOU IN? [ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE] (List of enumeration areas in cluster)	ET DANS QUEL EA DU {Cluster} ÊTES-VOUS ? [ENUMÉRATEUR : RÉPONSE UNIQUE] (list of enumeration areas in cluster)	Single Choice	NA	1-19 = IC_Language1
22	IC_Language1	Which language do you wish to proceed with? [ENUMERATOR: READ ANSWER CHOICES, SINGLE RESPONSE] 1)English [For Testing Purposes] 2)Bambara 3)French	Dans quelle langue souhaitez-vous continuer ? [ENUMÉRATEUR : LIRE LES CHOIX DE RÉPONSE, RÉPONSE UNIQUE] 1)Anglais [À des fins de test] 2)Bambara 3)Français	Single Choice	NA	1 = IC_information [English] 2 = IC_information [Bambara] 3 = IC_information [French]
23	IC_information	Good day, my name is #ENUMERATOR# and I am working with GeoPoll, a company carrying out opinion surveys in Niger/Mali. You are invited to participate in a research study undertaken by researchers at the University of Osnabrück in Germany and the University of Bergen in Norway. This study aims to help governments to be more responsive to citizens' needs and interests and is funded by the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.  In this poll, we would like to know more on your opinions about access to basic services such as health and education, development projects, the responsiveness of state institutions and social relations in your commune. We will use this information to write research articles and reports on how to best implement development projects for the governments of Mali, Niger and Germany as well as for other researchers in other countries.  The study consists of three interviews. The first interview takes place in person today. For the following two interviews, we will call you on your mobile phone over the next months. We would highly value your participation to make sure that this research study represents the views of people like you.  In each interview I will read aloud to you questions followed by a list of possible responses. You will then be asked to select what you personally think is the most appropriate response. Some questions will be about your opinions on access to basic services, development projects and your assessment of the state, other questions will ask about your education or occupation. Each interview should take around 20-30 minutes. Please note that parts of the mobile phone interviews may be recorded for quality purposes.  You have been invited to participate in this study because you were selected by chance. That means you are one of many thousands who will be interviewed in Mali/Niger. While your participation in this study is important, it is completely voluntary and you may decline to participate. You may refuse to answer any of the questions and stop the survey at any time.	Bonjour, je m'appelle #ENUMERATOR# et je travaille avec GeoPoll, une entreprise réalisant des enquêtes d'opinion au Niger/Mali. Vous êtes invité à participer à une étude de recherche entreprise par des chercheurs de l'Université d'Osnabrück en Allemagne et de l'Université de Bergen en Norvège. Cette étude vise à aider les gouvernements à mieux répondre aux besoins et aux intérêts des citoyens et est financée par le ministère allemand de la coopération économique et du développement.  Dans ce enquête, nous aimerions en savoir plus sur vos opinions concernant l'accès aux services de base tels que la santé et l'éducation, les projets de développement, la réactivité des institutions étatiques et les relations sociales dans votre commune. Nous utiliserons ces informations pour rédiger des articles de recherche et des rapports sur la meilleure façon de mettre en œuvre des projets de développement pour les gouvernements du Mali, du Niger et de l'Allemagne ainsi que pour d'autres chercheurs dans d'autres pays.  L'étude se compose de trois enquêtes. La première entrevue a lieu en personne aujourd'hui. Pour les deux enquêtes suivantes, nous vous appellerons sur votre téléphone portable au cours des prochains mois. Nous apprécierions grandement votre participation pour nous assurer que cette étude de recherche représente les points de vue de personnes comme vous.  Lors de chaque enquête, je vous lirai à haute voix des questions suivies d'une liste de réponses possibles. Il vous sera ensuite demandé de sélectionner ce que vous pensez personnellement être la réponse la plus appropriée. Certaines questions porteront sur vos opinions sur l'accès aux services de base, les projets de développement et votre évaluation de l'état, d'autres questions porteront sur votre formation ou votre profession. Chaque enquête devrait durer environ 20 à 30 minutes. Veuillez noter que certaines parties des enquêtes par téléphone portable peuvent être enregistrées à des fins de qualité.  Vous avez été invité à participer à cette étude car vous avez été sélectionné par hasard. Cela signifie que vous faites partie des milliers de personnes qui seront interviewées au Mali/Niger. Bien que votre participation à cette étude soit importante, elle est entièrement volontaire et vous pouvez refuser d'y participer. Vous pouvez refuser de répondre à l'une des questions et arrêter l'enquête à tout moment.	StartRecording	NA	1 = IC_consent
		It is important for you to know that we are obliged to protect your privacy according to the General Data Protection Regulation, a law which all researcher in the European Union need to obey. We will analyze all the thousands of interviews together with statistical methods and not refer to you and your responses individually. Any information you provide will be kept confidential, that means no one will be able to identify you personally.  Note that we will use your phone number only to call you for the two following interviews and not for any other purposes. We will not share your phone number with anyone outside of the project team. After the end of the project, we will no longer retain your number.  1)NEXT	Il est important que vous sachiez que nous sommes tenus de protéger votre vie privée conformément au règlement général sur la protection des données, une loi à laquelle tous les chercheurs de l'Union européenne doivent obéir. Nous analyserons tous les milliers d'enquêtes avec des méthodes statistiques et ne nous référerons pas à vous et à vos réponses individuellement. Toutes les informations que vous fournissez resteront confidentielles, ce qui signifie que personne ne pourra vous identifier personnellement.  Notez que nous utiliserons votre numéro de téléphone uniquement pour vous appeler pour les deux entrevues suivantes et non à d'autres fins. Nous ne partagerons votre numéro de téléphone avec personne en dehors de l'équipe du projet. Après la fin du projet, nous ne conserverons plus votre numéro.  1) SUIVANT			
24	IC_consent	We would now like to ask you for your consent to participate in the survey as explained to you in the previous participant information. I confirm that I understand the objectives and scope of the survey. I know and understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw from the survey at any time, without having to give a reason, and without any consequences, I understand that the survey involves one face-to-face survey and two mobile-phone surveys and I agree to take part in these surveys and answer your questions. I agree to give you my phone number so that you can call me for the purpose of these interviews only. I agree that the information I share in the interviews will be published in a way that it cannot be linked with my name, I agree to give the research team the right to use and make available the information I share for reports to the German government and publications in academic journals.  Do you agree to participate in this survey under the terms as described? [ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE] 1)YES 2)NO	Nous aimerions maintenant vous demander votre consentement pour participer à l'enquête, comme cela vous a été expliqué dans les informations précédentes sur les participants. Je confirme avoir compris les objectifs et la portée de l'enquête. Je sais et comprends que ma participation est volontaire et que je suis libre de me retirer de l'enquête à tout moment, sans avoir à donner de motif, et sans aucune conséquence, Je comprends que l'enquête implique une enquête en face à face et deux enquêtes sur téléphone mobile et j'accepte de participer à ces enquêtes et de répondre à vos questions. Je m'engage à vous donner mon numéro de téléphone afin que vous puissiez m'appeler dans le cadre de ces enquêtes uniquement. J'accepte que les informations que je partage dans les interviews soient publiées de manière à ne pas être liées à mon nom, J'accepte de donner à l'équipe de recherche le droit d'utiliser et de mettre à disposition les informations que je partage pour les rapports au gouvernement allemand et les publications dans des revues académiques.  Acceptez-vous de participer à cette enquête dans les conditions décrites ? [ENQUÊTEUR : RÉPONSE UNIQUE] 1)OUI 2) NON	Single Choice	NA	1 = Location 2 = Refusal
NA	Ineligible	You are ineligible for this survey. Thank you for your time (redacted)	Vous n'êtes pas éligible pour cette enquête. Merci pour votre temps (redacted)	NA	NA	End Poll Ineligible
NA	Refusal	Thank you for your time, you will be removed from today's survey.	Merci pour votre temps, vous serez retiré de l'enquête d'aujourd'hui.	NA	NA	End poll declined

NA	Location	Please ensure your location services are turned on for the duration of this survey	Veillez vous assurer que vos services de localisation sont activés pendant toute la durée de cette enquête	GetLocation	NA	1 = StartTime
NA	StartTime	[PRESS NEXT TO START THE SURVEY] 1)NEXT	[APPUYEZ SUR SUIVANT POUR COMMENCER L'ENQUÊTE] 1)SUIVANT	Single Choice	NA	1 = Cov_age
25	Cov_age	How old are you? [ENUMERATOR: RECORD THE AGE IN YEARS – ROUND UP TO NEAREST WHOLE NUMBER. IF THE RESPONDENT GIVES BIRTH YEAR, REPEAT THE QUESTION. ENTER 00 for DON'T KNOW]	Quel âge avez-vous? [ENREGISTREUR : ENREGISTREZ L'ÂGE EN ANNÉES – ARRONDI AU NOMBRE ENTIER LE PLUS PROCHE. SI LE RÉPONDANT DONNE SON ANNÉE DE NAISSANCE, RÉPÉTEZ LA QUESTION. ENTREZ 00 pour NE SAIT PAS]	Range	NA	0-17 = Ineligible 18-100 = MSISDN1 00 = Ineligible
26	MSISDN1	We explained that in this study we will contact all participants two more time by phone. Could you therefore share your phone number?  If you have a second phone number, could you share this as well?  Your data will be stored in confidence. [ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE]  1)YES 2)NO	Nous avons expliqué que dans cette étude, nous contacterons tous les participants deux fois de plus par téléphone. Pourriez-vous donc partager votre numéro de téléphone ?  Si vous avez un deuxième numéro de téléphone, pourriez-vous également le partager ?  Vos données seront stockées en toute confidentialité. [ENQUÊTEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE]  1)OUI 2) NON	Single Choice	NA	1 = MSISDN2_1 2 = MSISDN1Message
27	MSISDN1Message	We are sorry, but if you do not have a phone number or do not want to share it, You cannot participate in this survey 1)CONTINUE	Nous sommes désolés, mais si vous n'avez pas de numéro de téléphone ou ne souhaitez pas le partager, vous ne pouvez pas participer à cette enquête 1)CONTINUER	Single Choice	NA	1 = Ineligible
28	MSISDN2_1	Kindly read out your mobile number 1. [ENUMERATOR: RECORD THE RESPONDENT'S MOBILE NUMBER]	Veillez lire votre numéro de portable 1. [ENQUÊTEUR : ENREGISTRER LE NUMÉRO DE PORTABLE DU RÉPONDANT]	Range	NA	100000-999999999999 = PhoneNumberCheck1
29	PhoneNumberCheck1	Let us make sure that I recorded your phone numbers correctly. I will call the number you just shared. Hold on for a second, let's see if your phone rings. #MSISDN2_1# [ENUMERATOR: CALL THE FIRST NUMBER AND RECORD WHETHER IT RINGS]  1)The phone rings 2)The phone does not ring	Assurons-nous que j'ai correctement enregistré vos numéros de téléphone. Je vais appeler le numéro que vous venez de partager. Attendez une seconde, voyons si votre téléphone sonne. #MSISDN2_1# [ENNUMÉRATEUR : APPELEZ LE PREMIER NUMÉRO ET NOTEZ S'IL SONNE]  1) Le téléphone sonne 2) Le téléphone ne sonne pas	Single Choice	NA	1 = PhoneNumber2 2 = PhoneCheckReason1
30	PhoneCheckReason1	Please double check the first phone number with the respondent and call again, if it doesn't go through please select reason below. #MSISDN2_1# [ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE]  1)Mobile network not available 2)Respondent phone not charged 3)Enumerator phone not charged 4)Other [specify]	Veillez vérifier le premier numéro de téléphone avec le répondant et rappeler. Si cela ne passe pas, veuillez sélectionner la raison ci-dessous. #MSISDN2_1# [ENQUÊTEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE]  1)Réseau mobile non disponible 2)Téléphone du répondant non chargé 3)Téléphone de l'enquêteur non chargé 4)Autre [préciser]	Open Ended-Single Choice	NA	1-4 = PhoneWork1
31	PhoneWork1	Since we were not able to reach your first phone, can you tell me how many call you made or received during the past two weeks? [ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE]  1)One or more 2)None	Pouvez-vous me dire combien d'appels vous avez passés ou reçus au cours des deux dernières semaines ? [ENQUÊTEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE]  1)Un ou plusieurs 2)Aucun	Single Choice	NA	1-2= PhoneNumber2
32	PhoneNumber2	Do you have a second phone number? [ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE]  1)YES 2)NO	Avez-vous un deuxième numéro de téléphone ? [ENQUÊTEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE]  1)OUI 2)NON	Single Choice	NA	1 = MSISDN2_2 2 = ADM1
33	MSISDN2_2	Kindly read out your mobile number 2. [ENUMERATOR: RECORD THE RESPONDENT'S MOBILE NUMBER]	Veillez lire votre numéro de portable 2. [ENQUÊTEUR : ENREGISTRER LE NUMÉRO DE PORTABLE DU RÉPONDANT]	Range	NA	100000-999999999999 = PhoneNumberCheck2
34	PhoneNumberCheck2	Let us make sure that I recorded your phone numbers correctly. I will call the number you just shared. Hold on for a second, let's see if your phone rings. #MSISDN2_2# [ENUMERATOR: CALL THE SECOND NUMBER AND RECORD WHETHER IT RINGS]  1)The phone rings 2)The phone does not ring	Assurons-nous que j'ai correctement enregistré vos numéros de téléphone. Je vais appeler le numéro que vous venez de partager. Attendez une seconde, voyons si votre téléphone sonne. #MSISDN2_2# [ENNUMÉRATEUR : APPELEZ LE DEUXIÈME NUMÉRO ET NOTEZ S'IL SONNE]  1) Le téléphone sonne 2) Le téléphone ne sonne pas	Single Choice	NA	1 = ADM1 2 = PhoneCheckReason2

35	PhoneCheckReason2	Please double check the phone number with the respondent and call again, if it doesn't go through please select reason below. #MSISDN2_2# [ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE] 1)Mobile network not available 2)Respondent phone not charged 3)Enumerator phone not charged 4)Other [specify]	Veillez vérifier le numéro de téléphone avec le répondant et appeler à nouveau. Si cela ne passe pas, veuillez sélectionner la raison ci-dessous. #MSISDN2_2# [ENQUÊTEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE] 1)Réseau mobile non disponible 2)Téléphone du répondant non chargé 3)Téléphone de l'enquêteur non chargé 4)Autre [préciser]	Open Ended-Single Choice	NA	1-4 = PhoneWork2
	PhoneWork2	Since we were not able to reach your second phone, can you tell me how many call you made or received during the past two weeks? [ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE] 1)One or more 2)none	Pouvez-vous me dire combien d'appels vous avez passés ou reçus au cours des deux dernières semaines ? [ENQUÊTEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE] 1)Un ou plusieurs 2)Aucun	Single Choice	NA	1-2 = ADM1
36	ADM1	[ENUMERATOR: DO NOT READ. CAPTURE REGION BELOW] PLEASE CAPTURE REGION 1)BAMAKO 2)GAO 3)KAYES 4)KIDAL 5)KOULIKORO 6)MOPTI 7)SÉGOU 8)SIKASSO 9)TOMBOUCTOU	[ENQUÊTEUR : NE PAS LIRE. CAPTURER LA RÉGION CI-DESSOUS] VEUILLEZ SAISIR LA RÉGION 1)BAMAKO 2)GAO 3)KAYES 4)KIDAL 5)KOULIKORO 6)MOPTI 7)SÉGOU 8)SIKASSO 9)TOMBOUCTOU	Single Choice	Send if "PhoneWork1" "Equals" "One or more" Or "PhoneWork2" "Equals" "One or more" Or "PhoneNumberCheck1" "Equals" "The phone rings" Or "PhoneNumberCheck2" "Equals" "The phone rings" if not satisfied go to "IneligibleMessage"	1 = Ineligible 2-4 = Ineligible 5-7 = Ineligible 8 = ADM2_SIKASSO 9 = Ineligible
NA	IneligibleMessage	You are ineligible for this survey. Thank you for your time and please look out for future GeoPoll surveys! For more information visit <a href="http://gpl.cc/co">http://gpl.cc/co</a> 1)CONTINUE	Vous n'êtes pas éligible pour cette enquête. Merci pour votre temps et soyez attentifs aux futures enquêtes GeoPoll ! Pour plus d'informations, visitez <a href="http://gpl.cc/co">http://gpl.cc/co</a> 1)CONTINUER	Single Choice	NA	1=End Poll Ineligible
37	ADM2_SIKASSO	[ENUMERATOR: RECORD THE DEPARTMENT YOU ARE CONDUCTING THE SURVEY IN. SELECT ONE OPTION ONLY] [ENUMERATOR: DO NOT READ THE OPTIONS. SINGLE SELECTION. CHECK THE ANSWER] 1)BOUGOUNI 2)SIKASSO 3)YANFOLILA 4)KOUTIALA 5)KOLONDIÉBA 6)YOROSSO 7)KADIOLO 8)DON'T KNOW 9)REFUSED	[ENQUÊTEUR : ENREGISTREZ LE DÉPARTEMENT DANS LEQUEL VOUS RÉALISEZ L'ENQUÊTE. SÉLECTIONNER UNE SEULE OPTION] [ENQUÊTEUR : NE LISEZ PAS LES OPTIONS. SÉLECTION UNIQUE. VÉRIFIEZ LA RÉPONSE] 1)BOUGOUNI 2)SIKASSO 3)YANFOLILA 4)KOUTIALA 5)KOLONDIÉBA 6)YOROSSO 7)KADIOLO 8) NE SAIT PAS 9) REFUSÉ	Single Choice	NA	1 = ADM3_BOUGOUNI 2 = ADM3_SIKASSO 3 = ADM3_YANFOLILA 4 = ADM3_KOUTIALA 5 = ADM3_KOLONDIÉBA 6 = ADM3_YOROSSO 7 = ADM3_KADIOLO 8,9 = Ineligible
38	ADM3_{name}	[ENUMERATOR: RECORD THE COMMUNE YOU ARE CONDUCTING THE SURVEY IN. SELECT ONE OPTION ONLY] [ENUMERATOR: DO NOT READ THE OPTIONS. SINGLE SELECTION. CHECK THE ANSWER] {List of aid cluster villages in commune}	[ENQUÊTEUR : ENREGISTREZ LA COMMUNE DANS LAQUELLE VOUS RÉALISEZ L'ENQUÊTE. SÉLECTIONNER UNE SEULE OPTION] [ENQUÊTEUR : NE LISEZ PAS LES OPTIONS. SÉLECTION UNIQUE. VÉRIFIEZ LA RÉPONSE] {List of aid cluster villages in commune}	Single Choice	NA	
45	Village{name}	[ENUMERATOR: RECORD THE AID PROJECT VILLAGE THAT IS CLOSEST TO THE VILLAGE THAT YOU ARE CONDUCTING THE SURVEY IN] 1){name}	[ENREGISTREUR : ENREGISTRER LE VILLAGE DU PROJET D'AIDE QUI EST LE PLUS PROCHE DU VILLAGE DANS LEQUEL VOUS RÉALISEZ L'ENQUÊTE] 1){name}	Single Choice	NA	1 = Check_adm3_respondent
65	Check_adm3_respondent	Could you please tell me the name of the commune we are currently in? [ENUMERATOR: RECORD THE COMMUNE GIVEN]	Pourriez-vous s'il vous plaît me dire le nom de la commune dans laquelle nous sommes actuellement? [ENREGISTREUR : ENREGISTRER LA COMMUNE DONNÉE]	Open Ended	NA	Any Response = Check_adm3_match
66	Check_adm3_match	[ENUMERATOR: BELOW YOU SEE THE COMMUNE YOU HAVE SELECTED AS WELL AS THE ONE REPORTED BY THE RESPONDENT. THESE MUST MATCH. PLEASE CHECK CAREFULLY AND RESPOND BELOW. Commune reported by respondent: {Check_adm3_respondent} Commune selected by you: {ADM3} Do the commune names match? 1)YES 2)NO	[ENQUÊTEUR : CI-DESSOUS VOUS VOYEZ LA COMMUNE QUE VOUS AVEZ SÉLECTIONNÉE AINSI QUE CELLE INDICUÉE PAR LE RÉPONDANT. CES DOIVENT CORRESPONDRE. VEUILLEZ VÉRIFIER ATTENTIVEMENT ET RÉPONDRE CI-DESSOUS. Commune signalée par le répondant : {Check_adm3_respondent} Commune sélectionnée par vous : {ADM3} Les noms de communes correspondent-ils ? 1)OUI 2)NON	Single Choice	NA	1 = Check_village_respondent 2 = ADM_info

67	ADM_Info	The commune name you entered does not match with the commune name indicated by the respondent. Please check carefully in which commune you are situated in. If you made a mistake in entering the commune name you may correct it. If in doubt please contact your supervisor to make sure that you are in the right commune. 1) CONTINUE	Le nom de commune que vous avez entré ne correspond pas au nom de commune indiqué par le répondant. Veuillez bien vérifier dans quelle commune vous vous situez. Si vous avez fait une erreur dans la saisie du nom de la commune, vous pouvez le corriger. En cas de doute, veuillez contacter votre superviseur pour vous assurer que vous êtes dans la bonne commune. 1) CONTINUER	Single Choice	NA	1 = ADM1
68	Check_village_respondent	Could you please tell me the name of the village we are currently in? [ENUMERATOR: RECORD THE VILLAGE GIVEN]	Pourriez-vous s'il vous plaît me dire le nom du village où nous sommes actuellement? [ENREGISTREUR : ENREGISTRER LE VILLAGE DONNÉ]	Open Ended	NA	Any Response = Cov_gender
69	Cov_gender	[ENUMERATOR: CHECK THE BOX WHETHER THE RESPONDENT IS MALE OR FEMALE] 1)MALE 2)FEMALE	[ENUMÉRATEUR : COCHEZ LA CASE SI LE RÉPONDANT EST UN HOMME OU UNE FEMME] 1)MÂLE 2)FEMELLE	Single Choice	NA	1-2 = Cov_education
70	Cov_education	What is your highest level of education? [ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE; DON'T READ OPTIONS DON'T KNOW AND REFUSED] 1)No formal education 2)Completed primary 3)Completed secondary 4)Completed post-secondary 5)DON'T KNOW 6)REFUSED	Quel est votre plus haut niveau d'éducation? [ENQUÊTEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE ; NE PAS LIRE LES OPTIONS NE SAIT PAS ET REFUSE] 1)Pas d'éducation formelle 2)Primaire pas terminé [1-9eme année] 3)Primaire terminé [Lycée/professionnelle] 4)Secondaire pas terminé [Lycée/Professionnelle] 5)Secondaire terminé [Lycée/Professionnelle] 6)Études postsecondaires pas terminées [Université/pos-université] 7)Études postsecondaires terminées [Université/pos-université] 8)NE SAIT PAS 9)REFUSÉ	Single Choice	NA	1-6 = Cov_mother tongue
71	Cov_mother tongue	What is your mother tongue? [ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE; DON'T READ OPTIONS DON'T KNOW AND REFUSED] 1)Supyire 2)Minyanka 3)Peulh/Fulfude 4)Senufo 5)French 6)Bambara 7)Other 8)DON'T KNOW 9)REFUSED	Quelle est votre langue maternelle? [ENQUÊTEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE ; NE PAS LIRE LES OPTIONS NE SAIT PAS ET REFUSE] 1)Supyire 2)Minyanka 3)Peulh/Fulfude 4)Sénoufo 5)Français 6)Bambara 7)Autre 8)NE SAIT PAS 9)REFUSÉ	Single Choice	NA	1-9 = Cov_children
72	Cov_children	How many children below the age of 16 live in your household? A household is a group of people who live in the same house/compound and eat from the same pot [ENUMERATOR: RECORD THE RESPONSE GIVEN, ENTER 88 IF DON'T KNOW AND 99 IF REFUSED]	Combien d'enfants de moins de 16 ans vivent dans votre ménage ? Un ménage est un groupe de personnes qui vivent dans la même maison/enceinte et mangent dans la même marmite [ENQUÊTEUR : ENREGISTRER LA RÉPONSE DONNÉE, ENTRER 88 SI NE SAIT PAS ET 99 SI REFUSÉ]	Range	NA	0-20 = Cov_residence 88-88 = Cov_residence 99-99 = Cov_residence
73	Cov_residence	For how many years have you been living in this town? [ENUMERATOR: RECORD THE RESPONSE GIVEN, ENTER RESPONDENT'S AGE IF S/HE ANSWERS "FOR MY WHOLE LIFE" OR SIMILAR]	Depuis combien d'années habitez-vous cette ville ? [ENREGISTREUR : ENREGISTRER LA RÉPONSE DONNÉE, ENTRER L'ÂGE DU RÉPONDANT S'IL RÉPOND "POUR TOUTE MA VIE" OU SIMILAIRE]	Range	NA	0-99 = Cov_WithoutFood
74	Cov_WithoutFood	In the last 2 weeks, how many days have you or anyone in your family gone without enough food to eat? [ENUMERATOR: RECORD THE NUMBER OF DAYS GIVEN, ENTER 88 FOR DON'T KNOW AND 99 FOR REFUSED]	Au cours des 2 dernières semaines, combien de jours vous ou un membre de votre famille avez-vous manqué de nourriture ? [ENQUÊTEUR : INSCRIRE LE NOMBRE DE JOURS DONNÉS, ENTRER 88 POUR NE SAIT PAS ET 99 POUR REFUSÉ]	Range	NA	0-14 = Cov_occupation 88-88 = Cov_occupation 99-99 = Cov_occupation
75	Cov_occupation	What is the main occupation of the head of this household? [ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE] 1)Farming 2)Civil service [e.g. doctor / teacher] 3)Sales [e.g. shop owner] 4)Worker [e.g. electrician / bus driver] 5)Professional [e.g. lawyer / consultant] 6)Other [specify] 7)DON'T KNOW 8)REFUSED	Quelle est l'occupation principale du chef de ce ménage ? [ENQUÊTEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE] 1)Agriculture 2)Fonction publique [par ex. médecin / enseignant] 3)Ventes [par ex. propriétaire du magasin] 4)Travailleur [par ex. électricien / chauffeur de bus] 5)Professionnel [par ex. avocat / consultant] 6)Autre [préciser] 7)NE SAIT PAS 8)REFUSÉ	Open Ended-Single Choice	NA	1-8 = Cov_violence

76	Cov_violence	Have you or someone in your household been a victim of violence in the past 24 months? [ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE] 1)YES 2)NO 3)DON'T KNOW 4)REFUSED	Avez-vous ou quelqu'un de votre ménage été victime de violence au cours des 24 derniers mois ? [ENQUETEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE] 1)OUI 2) NON 3)NE SAIT PAS 4)REFUSÉ	Single Choice	NA	1-4 = Cov_DevptProjects
77	Cov_DevptProjects	How many development projects – like construction of classrooms, health posts or roads – have been implemented in your village in the past two years? [ENUMERATOR: RECORD THE RESPONSE GIVEN, ENTER 888 IF DON'T KNOW AND 999 IF REFUSED]	Combien de projets de développement – comme la construction de salles de classe, de postes de santé ou de routes – ont été mis en œuvre dans votre village au cours des deux dernières années ? [ENREGISTREUR : ENREGISTRER LA RÉPONSE DONNÉE, ENTRER 888 SI NE SAIT PAS ET 999 SI REFUSÉ]	Range	NA	0-99 = Cov_RelevantInfo 888-888 = Cov_RelevantInfo 999-999 = Cov_RelevantInfo
78	Cov_RelevantInfo	Imagine a development project is planned in the village of {Village}. Which type of information about the project would be the most relevant for you? [ENUMERATOR: RECORD THE RESPONSE GIVEN. CONCENTRATE ON TERMS INDICATING ON WHICH CHARACTERISTIC THE RESPONDENT WOULD LIKE TO BE INFORMED [E.G., "COSTS" "DURATION" "PROJECT SELECTION": ENTER 88 IF DON'T KNOW AND 99 IF REFUSED]	Imaginez qu'un projet de développement soit prévu dans le village de {Village}. Quel type d'information sur le projet serait le plus pertinent pour vous ? [ENQUETEUR : ENREGISTREZ LA RÉPONSE DONNÉE. CONCENTREZ-VOUS SUR LES TERMES INDIQUANT SUR QUELLE CARACTÉRISTIQUE LE RÉPONDANT SOUHAITE ÊTRE INFORMÉ [EX., « COÛTS » « DURÉE » « SÉLECTION DE PROJET » : ENTRER 88 SI NE SAIT PAS ET 99 SI REFUSÉ]	Open Ended	NA	Any Response = Chat_intro
79	Chat_intro	In our study, we are interested in how information is shared among friends and relatives. We therefore would like to ask you if you would share the names and phone numbers of five people with whom you often chat about day events. We may call some of them to ask them about their knowledge about development issues in their communities. Be assured that we will not share these numbers with anyone else. Would that be ok with you? [ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE] 1)YES 2)NO 3)DON'T KNOW 4)REFUSED	Dans notre étude, nous nous intéressons à la façon dont l'information est partagée entre amis et parents. Nous voudrions donc vous demander si vous accepteriez de partager les noms et numéros de téléphone de cinq personnes avec qui vous discutez souvent des événements de la journée. Nous pouvons appeler certains d'entre eux pour leur demander quelles sont leurs connaissances sur les questions de développement dans leurs communautés. Soyez assuré que nous ne partagerons ces chiffres avec personne d'autre. Est-ce que ça vous irait ? [ENQUETEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE] 1)OUI 2) NON 3)NE SAIT PAS 4)REFUSÉ	Single Choice	NA	1 = NumOfPeopleChat 2-4 = Mod_state_intro
80	NumOfPeopleChat	How many people, do you often chat with about day to day events? [ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE] 1)0 persons 2)1 person 3)2 people 4)3 people 5)4 people 6)5 or more people	Avec combien de personnes discutez-vous souvent des événements quotidiens ? [ENQUETEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE] 1)0 personnes 2)1 personne 3)2 personnes 4)3 personnes 5)4 personnes 6)5 personnes ou plus	Single Choice	NA	1 = Mod_state_intro 2-6 = Chat_1Name
81	Chat_1Name	Please share the name of the first person with whom you often chat about the day events. [ENUMERATOR: RECORD THE NAME GIVEN]	Veuillez partager le nom de la première personne avec qui vous discutez souvent des événements de la journée. [ENQUETEUR : ENREGISTRER LE NOM DONNÉ]	Open Ended	STANDARD "NumOfPeopleChat" "Equals" "1 person" Or "NumOfPeopleChat"	Any Response = Chat_1Number
82	Chat_1Number	Please share the phone number of the first person with whom you often chat about the day events. [ENUMERATOR: RECORD THE PHONE NUMBER GIVEN]	Veuillez partager le numéro de téléphone de la première personne avec qui vous discutez souvent des événements de la journée. [ENQUETEUR : ENREGISTREZ LE NUMÉRO DE TÉLÉPHONE DONNÉ]	Range	NA	100000-999999999999 = Chat_2Name
83	Chat_2Name	Please share the name of the second person with whom you often chat about the day events. [ENUMERATOR: RECORD THE NAME GIVEN, ENTER 88 IF DON'T KNOW AND 99 IF REFUSED]	Veuillez partager le nom de la deuxième personne avec qui vous discutez souvent des événements de la journée. [ENQUETEUR : ENREGISTRER LE NOM DONNÉ, ENTRER 88 SI NE SAIT PAS ET 99 SI REFUSÉ]	Open Ended	STANDARD "NumOfPeopleChat" "Equals" "2 people" Or "NumOfPeopleChat"	Any Response = Chat_2Number
84	Chat_2Number	Please share the phone number of the second person with whom you often chat about the day events. [ENUMERATOR: RECORD THE PHONE NUMBER GIVEN, ENTER 88 IF DON'T KNOW AND 99 IF REFUSED]	Veuillez partager le numéro de téléphone de la deuxième personne avec qui vous discutez souvent des événements de la journée. [ENQUETEUR : ENREGISTREZ LE NUMÉRO DE TÉLÉPHONE DONNÉ, ENTRER 88 SI NE SAIT PAS ET 99 SI REFUSÉ]	Range	NA	100000-999999999999 = Chat_3Name 88-88= Chat_3Name 99-99= Chat_3Name
85	Chat_3Name	Please share the name of the third person with whom you often chat about the day events. [ENUMERATOR: RECORD THE NAME GIVEN, ENTER 88 IF DON'T KNOW AND 99 IF REFUSED]	Veuillez partager le nom de la troisième personne avec qui vous discutez souvent des événements de la journée. [ENQUETEUR : ENREGISTRER LE NOM DONNÉ, ENTRER 88 SI NE SAIT PAS ET 99 SI REFUSÉ]	Open Ended	STANDARD "NumOfPeopleChat" "Equals" "3 people" Or "NumOfPeopleChat"	Any Response = Chat_3Number
86	Chat_3Number	Please share the phone number of the third person with whom you often chat about the day events. [ENUMERATOR: RECORD THE PHONE NUMBER GIVEN, ENTER 88 IF DON'T KNOW AND 99 IF REFUSED]	Veuillez partager le numéro de téléphone de la troisième personne avec qui vous discutez souvent des événements de la journée. [ENQUETEUR : ENREGISTREZ LE NUMÉRO DE TÉLÉPHONE DONNÉ, ENTRER 88 SI NE SAIT PAS ET 99 SI REFUSÉ]	Range	NA	100000-999999999999 = Chat_4Name 88-88= Chat_4Name 99-99= Chat_4Name
87	Chat_4Name	Please share the name of the fourth person with whom you often chat about the day events. [ENUMERATOR: RECORD THE NAME GIVEN, ENTER 88 IF DON'T KNOW AND 99 IF REFUSED]	Veuillez partager le nom de la quatrième personne avec qui vous discutez souvent des événements de la journée. [ENQUETEUR : ENREGISTRER LE NOM DONNÉ, ENTRER 88 SI NE SAIT PAS ET 99 SI REFUSÉ]	Open Ended	STANDARD "NumOfPeopleChat" "Equals" "4 people" Or "NumOfPeopleChat"	Any Response = Chat_4Number

88	Chat_4Number	Please share the phone number of the fourth person with whom you often chat about the day events. [ENUMERATOR: RECORD THE PHONE NUMBER GIVEN, ENTER 88 IF DON'T KNOW AND 99 IF REFUSED]	Veillez partager le numéro de téléphone de la quatrième personne avec qui vous discutez souvent des événements de la journée. [ENQUÊTEUR : ENREGISTREZ LE NUMÉRO DE TÉLÉPHONE DONNÉ, ENTRER 888888888888 SI NE SAIT PAS ET 999999999999 SI REFUSÉ]	Range	NA	100000-999999999999 = Chat_5Name 88-88= Chat_5Name 99-99= Chat_5Name
89	Chat_5Name	Please share the name of the fifth person with whom you often chat about the day events. [ENUMERATOR: RECORD THE NAME GIVEN, ENTER 88 IF DON'T KNOW AND 99 IF REFUSED]	Veillez partager le nom de la cinquième personne avec qui vous discutez souvent des événements de la journée. [ENQUÊTEUR : ENREGISTRER LE NOM DONNÉ, ENTRER 88 SI NE SAIT PAS ET 99 SI REFUSÉ]	Open Ended	Set of 11 "NumOfPeopleChat" "Equals" "5 or more"	Any Response = Chat_5Number
90	Chat_5Number	Please share the phone number of the fifth person with whom you often chat about the day events. [ENUMERATOR: RECORD THE PHONE NUMBER GIVEN, ENTER 88 IF DON'T KNOW AND 99 IF REFUSED]	Veillez partager le numéro de téléphone de la cinquième personne avec qui vous discutez souvent des événements de la journée. [ENQUÊTEUR : ENREGISTREZ LE NUMÉRO DE TÉLÉPHONE DONNÉ, ENTRER 88 SI NE SAIT PAS ET 99 SI REFUSÉ]	Range	NA	100000-999999999999 = Mod_state_intro 88-88= Mod_state_intro 99-99= Mod_state_intro
91	Mod_state_intro	The next few questions aim to get a bit of a feeling of how you assess the extent of politicians adherence to formal rules here in your area. 1) CONTINUE	Les quelques questions suivantes visent à avoir une idée de la façon dont vous évaluez le degré d'adhésion des politiciens aux règles formelles ici dans votre région. 1) CONTINUER	Single Choice	NA	1 = Mod_state_genrules
92	Mod_state_genrules	Out of 10 politicians, mayors, and civil servants in your commune how many do you think always behave according to the law, i.e. formal written rules? You can tell me a number between 0 and 10. [ENUMERATOR: RECORD THE RESPONSE GIVEN, ENTER 88 IF DON'T KNOW AND 99 IF REFUSED]	Sur 10 politiciens, maires et fonctionnaires de votre commune, combien pensez-vous, se comportent conformément à la loi, c'est-à-dire aux règles formelles écrites ? Vous pouvez me dire un nombre entre 0 et 10. [ENQUÊTEUR : ENREGISTRER LA RÉPONSE DONNÉE, ENTRER 88 SI NE SAIT PAS ET 99 SI REFUSÉ]	Range	NA	0-10 = Mod_state_aidrules 88-88= Mod_state_aidrules 99-99 = Mod_state_aidrules
93	Mod_state_aidrules	To what extent do you agree with the following statement: The rules on how aid projects should be distributed and how people's like me should be involved are meaningless because no one sticks to these rules anyway [ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE] 1)A lot 2)Somewhat 3)Little 4)Not at all 5)DON'T KNOW 6)REFUSED	Dans quelle mesure êtes-vous d'accord avec l'affirmation suivante : Les règles sur la manière dont les projets d'aide doivent être distribués et la manière dont les gens comme moi doivent être impliqués n'ont aucun sens car personne ne respecte ces règles de toute façon 1)Tout à fait d'accord 2)D'accord 3)Pas d'accord 4)Pas du tout d'accord 5)NE SAIT PAS 6)REFUSÉ	Single Choice	NA	1-6 = Bel_state_corruption
94	Bel_state_corruption	Consider the following common situation. The mayor and local council receive 50 million FCFA for a development project in your commune. How much of that money would they cut for themselves instead of spending it on the project? [ENUMERATOR: RECORD THE RESPONSE GIVEN IN MILLIONS E.G FOR 25 MILLION ENTER 25, ENTER 88 IF DON'T KNOW AND 99 IF REFUSED]	Considérez la situation courante suivante. Le maire et le conseil local reçoivent 50 millions de FCFA pour un projet de développement dans votre commune. Combien de cet argent prendraient-ils pour eux-mêmes au lieu de le dépenser pour le projet ? [ENQUÊTEUR : ENREGISTREZ LA RÉPONSE DONNÉE EN MILLIONS, PAR EXEMPLE POUR 25 MILLIONS, ENTREZ 25, ENTRER 88 SI NE SAIT PAS ET 99 SI REFUSÉ]	Range	NA	0-50 = Mod_benefit_Intro 88-88 = Mod_benefit_Intro 99-99 = Mod_benefit_Intro
95	Mod_benefit_Intro	Let us talk about development projects in your community. 1)NEXT	Parlons des projets de développement dans votre communauté. 1) SUIVANT	Single Choice	NA	1 = Mod_benefit
96	Mod_benefit	Imagine that a development project was implemented in (Village). Please indicate how much you or other members of your household would personally benefit from different types of projects in this village [ENUMERATOR: SELECT ONE RESPONSE PER STATEMENT] 1)A project that improves health services-for example- a new health post 2)A project that improves education service-for example- new class rooms 3)A project that improves water provision-for example- a new well	Imaginez qu'un projet de développement a été mis en œuvre dans (Village). Veuillez indiquer combien vous ou d'autres membres de votre ménage bénéficieriez personnellement de différents types de projets dans ce village [ENUMÉRATEUR : SÉLECTIONNER UNE RÉPONSE PAR ÉNONCÉ] 1) Un projet qui améliore les services de santé - par exemple - un nouveau poste de santé 2) Un projet qui améliore le service éducatif - par exemple - de nouvelles salles de classe 3) Un projet qui améliore l'approvisionnement en eau - par exemple - un nouveau puits	MatrixTable	NA	1-3 = Next Random Question
<b>Section: START OF RNADOMIZATION MODULE</b>						
97	TreatmentStatus1	ENUMERATOR: PLEASE RECORD THE TREATMENT STATUS OF THE RESPONDENT 1)CONTROL	RECENSEUR : VEUILLEZ ENREGISTRER LE STATUT DU TRAITEMENT DU RÉPONDANT 1) CONTRÔLE	Single Choice	NA	1 = T_intro_ALL
98	TreatmentStatus2	ENUMERATOR: PLEASE RECORD THE TREATMENT STATUS OF THE RESPONDENT 1)TREATMENT 1	RECENSEUR : VEUILLEZ ENREGISTRER LE STATUT DU TRAITEMENT DU RÉPONDANT 1) TRAITEMENT 1	Single Choice	NA	1 = T_intro_ALL
99	TreatmentStatus3	ENUMERATOR: PLEASE RECORD THE TREATMENT STATUS OF THE RESPONDENT 1)TREATMENT 2	RECENSEUR : VEUILLEZ ENREGISTRER LE STATUT DU TRAITEMENT DU RÉPONDANT 1) TRAITEMENT 2	Single Choice	NA	1 = T_intro_ALL
<b>END OF RANDOMISATION MODULE</b>						
100	T_intro_ALL	Now, we would like to talk to you about a development project in the village of (Village). The project is funded this year by the Programme d'Appui aux Collectivités Territoriales – PACT. 1)CONTINUE	Maintenant, nous aimerions vous parler d'un projet de développement dans le village de (Village). Le projet est financé cette année par le Programme d'Appui aux Collectivités Territoriales – PACT. 1)CONTINUER	Single Choice	NA	1 = T_aware_ALL
101	T_aware_ALL	Were you actually aware of this new PACT development project in the village of (Village) ? [ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE] 1)YES 2)NO 3)DON'T KNOW 4)REFUSED	Étiez-vous réellement au courant de ce nouveau projet de développement PACT dans le village de (Village) ? [ENQUÊTEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE] 1)OUI 2) NON 3)NE SAIT PAS 4)REFUSÉ	Single Choice	NA	1-4 = T_responsibility_ALL1

102	T_responsibility_ALL1	<p>For the following questions, we would like you to indicate if you think a statement is definitely true, probably true, probably false, or definitely false. The first statement is;</p> <p>The national government of Mali and international donors are in charge of the PACT project</p> <p>[ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE]</p> <p>1)Definitely True 2)Probably True 3)Probably False 4)Definitely False 5)DON'T KNOW 6)REFUSED</p>	<p>Pour les questions suivantes, nous aimerions que vous indiquiez si vous pensez qu'un énoncé est définitivement vrai, probablement vrai, probablement faux ou définitivement faux. La première déclaration est;</p> <p>Le gouvernement national du Mali et bailleurs de fonds internationaux sont en charge du projet PACT</p> <p>[ENQUÊTEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE]</p> <p>1) Certainement vrai 2) Probablement vrai 3)Probablement faux 4)Certainement faux 5)NE SAIT PAS 6)REFUSÉ</p>	Single Choice	NA	1-6 = T_responsibility_ALL2
103	T_responsibility_ALL2	<p>The second statement is:</p> <p>Non-governmental organizations and influential individuals are in charge of the PACT project</p> <p>[ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE]</p> <p>1)Definitely True 2)Probably True 3)Probably False 4)Definitely False 5)DON'T KNOW 6)REFUSED</p>	<p>La deuxième déclaration est :</p> <p>Des organisations non gouvernementales et des personnalités influentes sont en charge du projet PACT</p> <p>[ENQUÊTEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE]</p> <p>1) Certainement vrai 2) Probablement vrai 3)Probablement faux 4)Certainement faux 5)NE SAIT PAS 6)REFUSÉ</p>	Single Choice	NA	1-6 = T_responsibility_T12
104	T_responsibility_T12	<p>[ENUMERATOR: READ THE ANSWER]</p> <p>Actually The PACT is directed by the government of Mali and supported by international partners like Germany</p> <p>1)CONTINUE</p>	<p>[ENQUÊTEUR : LIRE LA RÉPONSE]</p> <p>En fait, le PACT est dirigé par le gouvernement du Mali et soutenu par des partenaires internationaux comme l'Allemagne</p> <p>1)CONTINUER</p>	Single Choice	Send if "TreatmentStatus2" "Equals" "TREATMENT 1" Or "TreatmentStatus3" "Equals" "TREATMENT 2" if not satisfied go to	1 = T_volume_ALL1
105	T_volume_ALL1	<p>The next statement is:</p> <p>Each year, some communes receive more money than others from the PACT because their mayors have stronger political ties than others</p> <p>[ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE]</p> <p>1)Definitely True 2)Probably True 3)Probably False 4)Definitely False 5)DON'T KNOW 6)REFUSED</p>	<p>La déclaration suivante est :</p> <p>Chaque année, certaines communes reçoivent plus d'argent que d'autres du PACT parce que leurs maires ont des liens politiques plus forts que d'autres.</p> <p>[ENQUÊTEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE]</p> <p>1) Certainement vrai 2) Probablement vrai 3)Probablement faux 4)Certainement faux 5)NE SAIT PAS 6)REFUSÉ</p>	Single Choice	NA	1-6 = T_volume_ALL2
106	T_volume_ALL2	<p>The next statement is:</p> <p>Each year, some communes receive more money than others from the PACT because of a mathematical equation distributes the PACT money based on the needs and local governance of communes</p> <p>[ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE]</p> <p>1)Definitely True 2)Probably True 3)Probably False 4)Definitely False 5)DON'T KNOW 6)REFUSED</p>	<p>La déclaration suivante est :</p> <p>Chaque année, certaines communes reçoivent plus d'argent que d'autres du PACT car une équation mathématique distribue l'argent du PACT en fonction des besoins et de la gouvernance locale des communes</p> <p>[ENQUÊTEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE]</p> <p>1) Certainement vrai 2) Probablement vrai 3)Probablement faux 4)Certainement faux 5)NE SAIT PAS 6)REFUSÉ</p>	Single Choice	NA	1-6 = T_volume_T12
107	T_volume_T12	<p>[ENUMERATOR: READ THE ANSWER]</p> <p>Actually, Each year, the amount that each commune receives is calculated with a mathematical formula. It considers the people's needs – for example, how poor a commune is. And it considers the performance of local councils and mayors – for example, how often they meet.</p> <p>1)CONTINUE</p>	<p>[ENQUÊTEUR : LIRE LA RÉPONSE]</p> <p>En effet, chaque année, le montant que reçoit chaque commune est calculé avec une formule mathématique. Il tient compte des besoins des gens - par exemple, comment pauvre est une commune. Et il tient compte de la performance des conseils et les maires – par exemple, la fréquence à laquelle ils se réunissent.</p> <p>1)CONTINUER</p>	Single Choice	Send if "TreatmentStatus2" "Equals" "TREATMENT 1" Or "TreatmentStatus3" "Equals" "TREATMENT 2" if not satisfied go to "T_needs_ALL1"	1 = T_needs_ALL1

108	T_needs_ALL1	<p>Let us move to the next statement</p> <p>International donors, are responsible for identifying the development needs of this commune</p> <p>[ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE]</p> <p>1)Definitely True 2)Probably True 3)Probably False 4)Definitely False 5)DON'T KNOW 6)REFUSED</p>	<p>Passons à l'énoncé suivant</p> <p>Les bailleurs de fonds internationaux sont chargés d'identifier les besoins de développement de cette commune</p> <p>[ENQUÊTEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE]</p> <p>1) Certainement vrai 2) Probablement vrai 3)Probablement faux 4)Certainement faux 5)NE SAIT PAS 6)REFUSÉ</p>	Single Choice	NA	1-6 = T_needs_ALL2
109	T_needs_ALL2	<p>What about the next statement?</p> <p>The people of the communes, are responsible for identifying the development needs of this commune</p> <p>[ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE]</p> <p>1)Definitely True 2)Probably True 3)Probably False 4)Definitely False 5)DON'T KNOW 6)REFUSED</p>	<p>Qu'en est-il de la prochaine déclaration ?</p> <p>Les gens des communes sont chargés d'identifier les besoins de développement de cette commune</p> <p>[ENQUÊTEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE]</p> <p>1) Certainement vrai 2) Probablement vrai 3)Probablement faux 4)Certainement faux 5)NE SAIT PAS 6)REFUSÉ</p>	Single Choice	NA	1-6 = T_needs_T12
110	T_needs_T12	<p>[ENUMERATOR: READ THE ANSWER]</p> <p>In fact, The mayor and local council have to organize a planning process that allows the people of (Village) to express their needs in the PDSEC, the Plan de Développement Social, Economique et Culturel. PACT projects are then selected from the PDSEC.</p> <p>1)CONTINUE</p>	<p>[ENQUÊTEUR : LIRE LA RÉPONSE]</p> <p>En fait, le maire et le conseil local doivent organiser un processus de planification qui permet aux habitants de (Village) d'exprimer leurs besoins en le PDSEC, le Plan de Développement Social, Economique et Culturel. Les projets PACT sont ensuite sélectionnés à partir du PDSEC.</p> <p>1)CONTINUER</p>	Single Choice	Send if "TreatmentStatus2" Equals "TREATMENT 1" Or "TreatmentStatus3" Equals "TREATMENT 2" if not satisfied go to "T_selection_ALL1"	1 = T_selection_ALL1
111	T_selection_ALL1	<p>The next statement is:</p> <p>The mayor and the local council, are in charge of selecting which project will be funded with the money available from the PACT</p> <p>[ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE]</p> <p>1)Definitely True 2)Probably True 3)Probably False 4)Definitely False 5)DON'T KNOW 6)REFUSED</p>	<p>La déclaration suivante est:</p> <p>Le maire et le conseil local sont chargés de sélectionner le projet qui sera financé avec l'argent disponible du PACT</p> <p>[ENQUÊTEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE]</p> <p>1) Certainement vrai 2) Probablement vrai 3)Probablement faux 4)Certainement faux 5)NE SAIT PAS 6)REFUSÉ</p>	Single Choice	NA	1-6 = T_selection_ALL2
112	T_selection_ALL2	<p>What about this statement?</p> <p>The most influential individuals and families of the commune, are in charge of selecting which project will be funded with the money available from the PACT</p> <p>[ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE]</p> <p>1)Definitely True 2)Probably True 3)Probably False 4)Definitely False 5)DON'T KNOW 6)REFUSED</p>	<p>Qu'en est-il de cette déclaration ?</p> <p>Les personnes et les familles les plus influentes de la commune sont chargées de sélectionner le projet qui sera financé avec l'argent disponible du PACT</p> <p>[ENQUÊTEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE]</p> <p>1) Certainement vrai 2) Probablement vrai 3)Probablement faux 4)Certainement faux 5)NE SAIT PAS 6)REFUSÉ</p>	Single Choice	NA	1-6 = T_selection_T12
113	T_selection_T12	<p>[ENUMERATOR: READ THE ANSWER]</p> <p>Actually, Most of the time there is not enough funding available in the commune for all projects in the PDSEC. The elected local council and mayor are responsible for selecting those projects from the PDSEC that are the most pressing, the most feasible, and the most sustainable.</p> <p>1)CONTINUE</p>	<p>[ENQUÊTEUR : LIRE LA RÉPONSE]</p> <p>En fait, la plupart du temps, il n'y a pas assez de financement disponible dans la commune pour tous les projets du PDSEC. Le conseil municipal élu et le maire sont chargés de sélectionner les projets du PDSEC les plus urgents, le plus faisable et le plus durable.</p> <p>1)CONTINUER</p>	Single Choice	Send if "TreatmentStatus2" Equals "TREATMENT 1" Or "TreatmentStatus3" Equals "TREATMENT 2" if not satisfied go to "T_type_ALL1"	1 = T_type_ALL1

114	T_type_ALL1	<p>The next statement is:</p> <p>This year, in this commune, a PACT project has been selected that aims to improve social services such as water/ education or health in the commune</p> <p>[ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE]</p> <p>1)Definitely True 2)Probably True 3)Probably False 4)Definitely False 5)DON'T KNOW 6)REFUSED</p>	<p>La déclaration suivante est:</p> <p>Cette année, dans cette commune, un projet PACT a été sélectionné qui vise à améliorer les services sociaux comme l'eau/l'éducation ou la santé dans la commune</p> <p>[ENQUÊTEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE]</p> <p>1) Certainement vrai 2) Probablement vrai 3)Probablement faux 4)Certainement faux 5)NE SAIT PAS 6)REFUSÉ</p>	Single Choice	NA	1-6 = T_type_ALL2
115	T_type_ALL2	<p>The next statement is:</p> <p>This year, in this commune, a PACT project has been selected that aims to improve economic services such as markets/ roads or bridges in the commune?</p> <p>[ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE]</p> <p>1)Definitely True 2)Probably True 3)Probably False 4)Definitely False 5)DON'T KNOW 6)REFUSED</p>	<p>La déclaration suivante est:</p> <p>Cette année, dans cette commune, un projet PACT a été sélectionné qui vise à améliorer les services économiques tels que les marchés/routes ou ponts dans la commune ?</p> <p>[ENQUÊTEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE]</p> <p>1) Certainement vrai 2) Probablement vrai 3)Probablement faux 4)Certainement faux 5)NE SAIT PAS 6)REFUSÉ</p>	Single Choice	NA	1-6 = T_type_T12BOUGOULA
116	T_type_T12BOUGOULA	<p>[ENUMERATOR: READ THE ANSWER]</p> <p>In fact, The PACT is currently funding the drilling of a borehole and the construction of a water pump in the village of BOUGOULA.</p> <p>1)CONTINUE</p>	<p>[ENNUMÉRATEUR : LIRE LA RÉPONSE]</p> <p>En effet, le PACT finance actuellement la construction d'un forage et d'une pompe à eau dans le village de BOUGOULA.</p> <p>1)CONTINUER</p>	Single Choice	Send if "VillageBOUGOULA" "Equals" "BOUGOULA" And "TreatmentStatus2" "Equals" "TREATMENT 1" Or "VillageBOUGOULA" "Equals" "BOUGOULA" And "TreatmentStatus2"	1 = T_date_ALL1BOUGOULA
117	T_date_ALL1BOUGOULA	<p>What do you think about the following statement?</p> <p>The planned duration of the main construction works of the project is more than 5 months</p> <p>[ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE]</p> <p>1)Definitely True 2)Probably True 3)Probably False 4)Definitely False 5)DON'T KNOW 6)REFUSED</p>	<p>Que pensez-vous de l'énoncé suivant ?</p> <p>La durée prévue des principaux travaux de construction du projet est supérieure à 5 mois</p> <p>[ENQUÊTEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE]</p> <p>1) Certainement vrai 2) Probablement vrai 3)Probablement faux 4)Certainement faux 5)NE SAIT PAS 6)REFUSÉ</p>	Single Choice	Send if "VillageBOUGOULA" "Equals" "BOUGOULA" if not satisfied go to "T_date_T12BOUGOULA"	1-6 = T_date_T12BOUGOULA
118	T_date_T12BOUGOULA	<p>[ENUMERATOR: READ THE ANSWER]</p> <p>Actually, your commune submitted a project proposal to the PACT and indicated that start is in January this year and that it should take 3 months to finish the project.</p> <p>1)CONTINUE</p>	<p>[ENQUÊTEUR : LIRE LA RÉPONSE]</p> <p>Réellement, votre commune a soumis une proposition de projet au PACT et a indiqué que le démarrage est en janvier de cette année et qu'il devrait prendre 3 mois pour terminer le projet.</p> <p>1)CONTINUER</p>	Single Choice	Send if "VillageBOUGOULA" "Equals" "BOUGOULA" And "TreatmentStatus2" "Equals" "TREATMENT 1" Or "VillageBOUGOULA" "Equals" "BOUGOULA"	1 = T_cost_ALL1BOUGOULA
119	T_cost_ALL1BOUGOULA	<p>The next statement is:</p> <p>The PACT project cost More than 7.8 million FCFA</p> <p>[ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE]</p> <p>1)Definitely True 2)Probably True 3)Probably False 4)Definitely False 5)DON'T KNOW 6)REFUSED</p>	<p>La déclaration suivante est:</p> <p>Le projet PACT a coûté Plus de 7.8 millions de FCFA</p> <p>[ENQUÊTEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE]</p> <p>1) Certainement vrai 2) Probablement vrai 3)Probablement faux 4)Certainement faux 5)NE SAIT PAS 6)REFUSÉ</p>	Single Choice	Send if "VillageBOUGOULA" "Equals" "BOUGOULA" if not satisfied go to "T_cost_T12BOUGOULA"	1-6 = T_cost_T12BOUGOULA
120	T_cost_T12BOUGOULA	<p>[ENUMERATOR: READ THE ANSWER]</p> <p>In fact, The expected costs of the PACT project amount to 11.2 million FCFA.</p> <p>1)CONTINUE</p>	<p>[ENQUÊTEUR : LIRE LA RÉPONSE]</p> <p>En effet, les coûts attendus du projet PACT s'élèvent à 11,2 millions de FCFA.</p> <p>1)CONTINUER</p>	Single Choice	Send if "VillageBOUGOULA" "Equals" "BOUGOULA" And "TreatmentStatus2" "Equals" "TREATMENT 1" Or "VillageBOUGOULA" "Equals" "BOUGOULA"	1 = T_type_T12DEFINA
221	T_feedbackAnnounce_T2	<p>Now that we have provided you with this information, we want to invite you to tell us what you think about this project, When we contact you again in 1 or 2 months you will have the opportunity to tell us about your opinion about the project and how it has been selected. We will collect information from many people, write a report and share it with the government. This way, we could inform the government about the perceptions of the people of your commune. Importantly, neither your name or identity nor the name of your village or commune will be mentioned anywhere in this report.</p> <p>1)CONTINUE</p>	<p>Maintenant que nous vous avons fourni ces informations, nous voulons vous inviter à nous dire ce que vous pensez de ce projet, Lorsque nous vous recontacterons dans 1 ou 2 mois, vous aurez l'occasion de nous faire part de votre avis sur le projet et comment il a été sélectionné. Nous allons collecter des informations auprès de nombreuses personnes, rédiger un rapport et le partager avec le gouvernement. De cette façon, nous pourrions informer le gouvernement sur les perceptions des gens de votre commune. Il est important de noter que ni votre nom ou votre identité ni le nom de votre village ou de votre commune ne seront mentionnés nulle part dans ce rapport.</p> <p>1)CONTINUER</p>	Single Choice	Send if "TreatmentStatus3" "Equals" "TREATMENT 2" if not satisfied go to "Med_PE_intro_1"	1 = Med_PE_intro_1

222	Med_PE_intro_1	<p>Ok, great. Now I would like to turn to questions about information. Specifically, how well you feel informed about development in your commune.</p> <p>I will read to you some statements and would like to ask you to what extent you agree with them.</p> <p>[ENUMERATOR: SELECT ONE RESPONSE PER STATEMENT]</p> <p>1) You have a pretty good understanding of the most important development issues and projects in your commune  2) You are often uncomfortable when talking with other people about development issues in your commune  3) The government is willing to provide you with sufficient information on decisions on development in your commune  4) The government is interested in what people like you think about development in your commune</p>	<p>OK super. J'aimerais maintenant passer aux questions sur l'information. Plus précisément, dans quelle mesure vous vous sentez informé sur le développement de votre commune.</p> <p>Je vais vous lire quelques déclarations et je voudrais vous demander dans quelle mesure vous êtes d'accord avec elles.</p> <p>[ENUMÉRATEUR : SÉLECTIONNER UNE RÉPONSE PAR ÉNONCÉ]</p> <p>1) Vous avez une assez bonne compréhension des enjeux et projets de développement les plus importants de votre commune  2) Vous êtes souvent mal à l'aise lorsque vous parlez avec d'autres personnes des problèmes de développement dans votre commune  3) Le gouvernement est disposé à vous fournir des informations suffisantes sur les décisions de développement de votre commune  4) Le gouvernement s'intéresse à ce que les gens comme vous pensent du développement de votre commune</p>	MatrixTable	NA	1-4 = Med_DF_intro_1
223	Med_DF_intro_1	<p>Thank you. In the next section, let us turn to how fair you find the distribution of development projects.</p> <p>1)CONTINUE</p>	<p>Merci. Dans la section suivante, examinons dans quelle mesure vous trouvez équitable la répartition des projets de développement.</p> <p>1)CONTINUER</p>	Single Choice	NA	1 =Med_DF_intro_2
224	Med_DF_intro_2	<p>To what extent do you agree with the following statements?</p> <p>[ENUMERATOR: SELECT ONE RESPONSE PER STATEMENT]</p> <p>1) There are formal rules in place that ensure that development funds are distributed fairly between villages in my commune  2) There are formal rules in place that ensure that the distribution of development projects considers the needs and interests of all villages in this commune  3) Some villages always get more than their fair share of the development projects  4) When it comes to the distribution of aid projects in my commune- the needs of the people weigh more heavily than their political connections</p>	<p>Dans quelle mesure êtes-vous d'accord avec les affirmations suivantes ?</p> <p>[ENUMÉRATEUR : SÉLECTIONNER UNE RÉPONSE PAR ÉNONCÉ]</p> <p>1) Il y a des règles formelles en place qui garantissent que les fonds de développement sont répartis équitablement entre les villages de ma commune  2) Il existe des règles formelles en place qui garantissent que la répartition des projets de développement tient compte des besoins et des intérêts de tous les villages de cette commune  3) Certains villages obtiennent toujours plus que leur juste part des projets de développement  4) En ce qui concerne la distribution des projets d'aide dans ma commune - les besoins des gens pèsent plus lourd que leurs relations politiques</p>	MatrixTable	NA	1-4 = CE_intro
225	CE_intro	<p>I would like to ask you about your potential involvement in the upkeeping of the PACT project in the village of {Village}</p> <p>1)CONTINUE</p>	<p>Je voudrais vous poser des questions sur votre éventuelle implication dans le maintien du projet PACT dans le village de {Village}</p> <p>1)CONTINUER</p>	Single Choice	NA	1 = CE_time
226	CE_time	<p>How likely is it that you would contribute unpaid time to help maintain the project in the future?</p> <p>[ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE]</p> <p>1) Very likely  2) Likely  3) Unlikely  4) Very unlikely  5) DON'T KNOW  6) REFUSED</p>	<p>Quelle est la probabilité que vous donniez du temps non rémunéré pour aider à maintenir le projet à l'avenir ?</p> <p>[ENQUÊTEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE]</p> <p>1) Très probable  2) Probable  3) Peu probable  4) Très peu probable  5) NE SAIT PAS  6) REFUSÉ</p>	Single Choice	NA	1-6 = CE_donate
227	CE_donate	<p>How likely is it that you would donate money to help maintaining the project in the future?</p> <p>[ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE]</p> <p>1) Very likely  2) Likely  3) Unlikely  4) Very unlikely  5) DON'T KNOW  6) REFUSED</p>	<p>Quelle est la probabilité que vous donniez de l'argent pour aider à maintenir le projet à l'avenir ?</p> <p>[ENQUÊTEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE]</p> <p>1) Très probable  2) Probable  3) Peu probable  4) Très peu probable  5) NE SAIT PAS  6) REFUSÉ</p>	Single Choice	NA	1-6 = SS_intro_1
228	SS_intro_1	<p>You are doing great. We are getting close to the end of this interview. In this section, I would like to ask you about what people sometimes see as duties of a citizen.</p> <p>1)CONTINUE</p>	<p>Vous faites du bon travail. Nous approchons de la fin de cet enquête. Dans cette section, j'aimerais vous interroger sur ce que les gens considèrent parfois comme des devoirs d'un citoyen.</p> <p>1)CONTINUER</p>	Single Choice	NA	1 =SS_intro_2
229	SS_intro_2	<p>Which of the following actions do you consider taking in the near future if you had the chance?</p> <p>[ENUMERATOR: SELECT ONE RESPONSE PER STATEMENT]</p> <p>1) Vote in the next election in your commune  2) Pay a tax or fee to the local government so that it can improve the provision of public basic services in your commune  3) Contact the mayor or members of the local council of your commune to inquire about development needs and projects  4) File complaints if you notice that development projects in your commune have not been selected according to the formal rules</p>	<p>Parmi les actions suivantes, lesquelles envisageriez-vous de prendre dans un avenir proche si vous en aviez l'occasion ?</p> <p>[ENUMÉRATEUR : SÉLECTIONNER UNE RÉPONSE PAR ÉNONCÉ]</p> <p>1) Voter aux prochaines élections dans votre commune  2) Payer une taxe ou une redevance au gouvernement local afin qu'il puisse améliorer la fourniture des services publics de base dans votre commune  3) Contacter le maire ou les membres du conseil local de votre commune pour vous renseigner sur les besoins et projets de développement  4) Porter plainte si vous constatez que les projets de développement de votre commune n'ont pas été sélectionnés selon les règles formelles</p>	MatrixTable	NA	1-4 = IG_intro_1
230	IG_intro_1	<p>In the final questions, I would be interested in your perceptions of relations between people in your village and people of other villages. Please imagine the following situations and give a response.</p> <p>1)CONTINUE</p>	<p>Dans les questions finales, je serais intéressé par vos perceptions des relations entre les gens de votre village et les gens des autres villages. Veuillez imaginer les situations suivantes et donner une réponse.</p> <p>1)CONTINUER</p>	Single Choice	NA	1 =IG_own_give

231	IG_own_give	<p>Imagine an aid agency would provide you with 5 million FCFA. You can decide to split this amount for the benefit of your village or that of another village in your commune. How much of that amount would you contribute to a project in another village in your commune?</p> <p>[ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE]</p> <p>1) would not give any money to the other village in my commune  2) would give 1 million to other commune  3) would give 2 million to other commune  4) would give 3 million to other commune  5) would give 4 million to other commune  6) would give all of the money to the other village in my commune  7)DON'T KNOW  8)REFUSED</p>	<p>Imaginez qu'une agence d'aide vous accorde 5 million de FCFA. Vous pouvez décider de répartir ce montant au profit de votre village ou de celui d'un autre village de votre commune. Quelle part de ce montant contribueriez-vous à un projet dans un autre village de votre commune ?</p> <p>[ENQUETEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE]</p> <p>1)Je ne donnerais pas d'argent à l'autre village de ma commune  2) Je donnerais 1 million à l'autre village de ma commune  3)Je donnerais 2 millions à l'autre village de ma commune  4)Je donnerais 3 millions à l'autre village de ma commune  5)Je donnerais 4 millions à l'autre village de ma commune  6) Je donnerais tout l'argent à l'autre village de ma commune  7)NE SAIT PAS  8)REFUSÉ</p>	Single Choice	NA	1-8 =IG_own_cand
232	IG_own_cand	<p>Imagine that in a local election a political candidate would promise to reduce the number of development projects in other villages in your commune in order to increase the number of projects in your village. How likely is it that you would support the candidate?</p> <p>[ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE]</p> <p>1)Very likely  2)Likely  3)Unlikely  4)Very unlikely  5)DON'T KNOW  6)REFUSED</p>	<p>Imaginez que lors d'une élection locale, un candidat politique promette de réduire le nombre de projets de développement dans d'autres villages de votre commune afin d'augmenter le nombre de projets dans votre village. Quelle est la probabilité que vous soutenez le candidat ?</p> <p>[ENQUETEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE]</p> <p>1)Très probable  2)Probable  3)Peu probable  4) Très peu probable  5)NE SAIT PAS  6)REFUSÉ</p>	Single Choice	NA	1-6 =IG_intro_2
233	IG_intro_2	<p>Now I would like to ask you about how you think people in other villages in your commune may behave in similar situations:</p> <p>1)CONTINUE</p>	<p>Maintenant, je voudrais vous demander comment, selon vous, les habitants d'autres villages de votre commune peuvent se comporter dans des situations similaires :</p> <p>1)CONTINUER</p>	Single Choice	NA	1 =IG_other_give
234	IG_other_give	<p>Imagine an aid agency would provide someone in another village in your commune with 5 million FCFA. This person can decide to split this amount for the benefit of her village or that of your village. How much of that amount would that person contribute to a project in your village?</p> <p>[ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE]</p> <p>1)That person would not give any money to my village  2)That person would give 1 million to my village  3)That person would give 2 million to my village  4)That person would give 3 million to my village  5)That person would give 4 million to my village  6)That person would give all of the money to my village  7)DON'T KNOW  8)REFUSED</p>	<p>Imaginez qu'une agence d'aide fournisse à quelqu'un d'un autre village de votre commune 5 million de FCFA. Cette personne peut décider de partager ce montant au profit de son village ou de celui de votre village. Quelle part de ce montant cette personne contribuerait-elle à un projet dans votre village ?</p> <p>[ENQUETEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE]</p> <p>1)Cette personne ne donnerait pas d'argent à mon village  2) Cette personne donnerait 1 million à mon village  3) Cette personne donnerait 2 millions à mon village  4) Cette personne donnerait 3 millions à mon village  5) Cette personne donnerait 4 millions à mon village  6) Cette personne donnerait tout l'argent à mon village  7)NE SAIT PAS  8)REFUSÉ</p>	Single Choice	NA	1-8 =IG_other_cand
235	IG_other_cand	<p>Imagine that in a local election a political candidate would promise to reduce the number of development projects in your village in order to increase the number of projects in another village in your commune. How likely is it that people in this other village would support the candidate?</p> <p>[ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE]</p> <p>1)Very likely  2)Likely  3)Unlikely  4)Very unlikely  5)DON'T KNOW  6)REFUSED</p>	<p>Imaginez que lors d'une élection locale, un candidat politique promette de réduire le nombre de projets de développement dans votre village afin d'augmenter le nombre de projets dans un autre village de votre commune. Quelle est la probabilité que les habitants de cet autre village soutiennent le candidat ?</p> <p>[ENQUETEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE]</p> <p>1)Très probable  2)Probable  3)Peu probable  4) Très peu probable  5)NE SAIT PAS  6)REFUSÉ</p>	Single Choice	NA	1-6 =kfw_service_sat
236	kfw_service_sat	<p>In general, would you say that you are satisfied with the following services in your village</p> <p>[ENUMERATOR: SELECT ONE ANSWER OPTION FOR EACH SERVICE]</p> <p>1)Schooling  2)Water provision  3)Health services</p>	<p>En général, diriez-vous que vous êtes satisfait des services suivants dans votre village</p> <p>[ENUMERATEUR : SÉLECTIONNER UNE OPTION DE RÉPONSE POUR CHAQUE SERVICE]</p> <p>1) Scolarité  2) Approvisionnement en eau  3) Services de santé</p>	MatrixTable	NA	1-3 = kfw_gov_ability
237	kfw_gov_ability	<p>How do you rate the ability of the government to improve living conditions in your village?</p> <p>[ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE]</p> <p>1)High  2)Low  3)DON'T KNOW  4)REFUSED</p>	<p>Comment évaluez-vous la capacité du gouvernement à améliorer les conditions de vie dans votre village ?</p> <p>[ENQUETEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE]</p> <p>1)Élevé  2)Faible  3)NE SAIT PAS  4)REFUSÉ</p>	Single Choice	NA	1-4 = kfw_state_willing

238	kfw_state_willing	How do you rate the willingness of the government to improve living conditions in your village? [ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE] 1)High 2)Low 3)DON'T KNOW 4)REFUSED	Comment évaluez-vous la volonté du gouvernement d'améliorer les conditions de vie dans votre village ? [ENQUÊTEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE] 1)Élevée 2)Faible 3)NE SAIT PAS 4)REFUSÉ	Single Choice	NA	1-4 = Unint_intro
239	Unint_intro	Now I would like to ask you some questions about interviews like the one we did today. How much do you agree with the following statements 1)CONTINUE	Maintenant, je voudrais vous poser quelques questions sur des enquêtes comme celle que nous avons fait aujourd'hui. Dans quelle mesure êtes-vous d'accord avec les affirmations suivantes 1)CONTINUER	Single Choice	NA	1 = Unint_answer
240	Unint_answer	You sometimes feel uncomfortable when you cannot answer questions correctly in interviews like this one [ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE] 1)Fully agree 2)Agree 3)Disagree 4)Fully disagree 5)DON'T KNOW 6)REFUSED	Vous vous sentez parfois mal à l'aise lorsque vous ne pouvez pas répondre correctement aux questions lors d'enquêtes comme celle-ci [ENQUÊTEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE] 1) Entièrement d'accord 2) D'accord 3) Pas d'accord 4) Totalement en désaccord 5)NE SAIT PAS 6)REFUSÉ	Single Choice	NA	1-6 = Unint_concentrate
241	Unint_concentrate	Interviews like this one are sometimes so long that you cannot concentrate the entire time [ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE] 1)Fully agree 2)Agree 3)Disagree 4)Fully disagree 5)DON'T KNOW 6)REFUSED	Des enquêtes comme celle-ci sont parfois si longues que vous ne pouvez pas vous concentrer tout le temps [ENQUÊTEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE] 1) Entièrement d'accord 2) D'accord 3) Pas d'accord 4) Totalement en désaccord 5)NE SAIT PAS 6)REFUSÉ	Single Choice	NA	1-6 = Unint_help
242	Unint_help	If you give the right answers in this interview, the government and aid agencies may be more willing support your village [ENUMERATOR: SINGLE RESPONSE] 1)Fully agree 2)Agree 3)Disagree 4)Fully disagree 5)DON'T KNOW 6)REFUSED	Si vous donnez les bonnes réponses dans cette interview, le gouvernement et les agences d'aide peuvent être plus disposés à soutenir votre village [ENQUÊTEUR : REPONSE UNIQUE] 1) Entièrement d'accord 2) D'accord 3) Pas d'accord 4) Totalement en désaccord 5)NE SAIT PAS 6)REFUSÉ	Single Choice	NA	1-6 = ThankYouNote
243	ThankYouNote	[ENUMERATOR: READ OUT] Thank you for taking the time to participate in the interview and to support our study. Remember that we will call you on your mobile phone in a few weeks for a short follow-up interview. 1)CONTINUE	[ENUMÉRATEUR : LIRE] Merci d'avoir pris le temps de participer à l'interview et de soutenir notre étude. N'oubliez pas que nous vous appellerons sur votre téléphone portable dans quelques semaines pour un court entretien de suivi. 1)CONTINUER	Single Choice	NA	1 = OtherPeoplePresent
244	OtherPeoplePresent	ENUMERATOR: WAS THERE SOMEONE ELSE PRESENT WHILE THE INTERVIEW WAS CONDUCTED? [ANOTHER ADULT] 1)YES 2)NO	RECENSEUR : Y AVAIT-IL QUELQU'UN D'AUTRE PRÉSENT PENDANT QUE L'ENQUÊTE A ÉTÉ RÉALISÉ ? [UN AUTRE ADULTE] 1)OUI 2) NON	Single Choice	NA	1-2 = Language2
245	Language2	Select the language that was mostly used to complete the interview. [ENUMERATOR: DO NOT READ OPTIONS. CHOOSE ONLY ONE OPTION] 1)ENGLISH 2)FRENCH 3)BAMBARA	Sélectionnez la langue qui a été principalement utilisée pour mener à bien l'enquête. [ENUMÉRATEUR : NE PAS LIRE LES OPTIONS. CHOISISSEZ UNE SEULE OPTION] 1)ANGLAIS 2) FRANÇAIS 3) BAMBARA	Single Choice	NA	1-3 = Close-Out
NA	Close-Out	Thank you for your time. The interview has come to an end.	Merci pour votre temps. L'enquête est terminée.	NA	NA	NA