

# Year 2 Pre-Analysis Plan for Jharkhand ICDS Cash Transfer Study

*Note: This is the revised version of a previously submitted pre-analysis plan. As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, we are restricted in our ability to collect data on some of the desired outcomes. This revision updates our analysis plan to reflect those restrictions.*

## **I. Introduction**

The prevalence of underweight children in India is among the highest in the world, and "has its origins almost entirely during the first two to three years of life" (World Bank, 2009). In the state of Jharkhand, where this study is based, 43% of children are stunted, 15% are wasted, and 42% are underweight, with particularly acute malnutrition rates among tribal groups. Among women aged 15-49 years, 69.5% are anaemic, and about 43% are classified as "thin" on the Body Mass Index scale (Raykar et al., 2015). Undernutrition affects the poor disproportionately. Among Indian households in the lowest wealth quintile, 51% of children less than five years old are stunted, compared to only 22% for the highest quintile (National Family Health Survey-4).

The government of India is exploring cash transfers as a way of improving early childhood nutrition. One policy option is increased spending on early childhood by augmenting existing initiatives with cash transfers. There is a large evidence base linking cash transfers to reductions in monetary poverty, increases in household expenditure, use of health services, and anthropometric measures (Bastagli et al., 2016), but there is mixed evidence on the overall effect of income on nutrition outcomes (Alderman, 2015; Deaton and Dreze, 2009). Moreover, the impact of cash transfers seems to rest on the particular design features of the programme, such as conditionality or information and awareness building (Thomas, 1990; Duflo, 2003; Benhassine et al., 2015; Adato et al., 2000; Leroy et al., 2009).

Our study adds to the existing global literature on the channels through which increased household income alters early childhood health. We expect this study to be the first of this scale and rigor in India, filling in evidence gaps and providing policy-relevant feedback. We are interested in the following research questions:

1. What is the effect on child development outcomes at age 2 of receiving 2 years of cash transfers (age 0-24 months)?
2. What is the effect on child development outcomes at age 1 and age 2 of receiving a year of cash transfers from age 0-12 months?
3. What is the effect on child development outcomes at age 2 of receiving a year of cash transfers from age 13-24 months?
4. Combining questions 2 and 3, is it more beneficial for child development outcomes to receive a year of cash transfers from age 0-12 months or 13-24 months?

5. What is the additional return from a household receiving two years rather than one year of transfers?
6. Are there complementarities between receiving cash transfers in one year and a second round of transfers in the next year (e.g. Heckman, 2007)?

We also will study the following questions on how households responded to the cash transfer. This analysis will be of particular importance if we do not detect effects on anthropometric outcomes for the children and want to understand the mechanisms that could explain this. The first two questions below, on whether there is a positive relationship between income and nutritional intake, speak directly to work such as Deaton and Dreze (2009) that has observed a muted or even negative relationship between income and nutritional intake. We will use our induced variation in household income to experimentally test the sign of the elasticity of nutritional intake with respect to income. If we did not observe a strong effect on child development but do find that increased nutritional intake for the child, we will investigate other possible mechanisms that could explain this. We will look at possible hypotheses that could explain this, such as poor health environments (Coffey and Spears, 2017) or favoritism towards elder male children (Jayachandran and Pande, 2017) under question 4.

1. What fraction of cash transfers are spent on food, if any?
2. If cash transfers increase total household spending on food, does this translate into increased consumption or improve diet (e.g. dietary diversity) for mother and child?
3. How does receiving cash transfers affect child morbidity?
4. How does the effect of transfers depend on characteristics of beneficiary households, such as health environment, gender of the child, age of mother, birth order of child, and socio-economic status?

Since the income is directly put in the bank account of the female head of household, we will also study impacts on various measures of intra-household welfare including empowerment, and maternal mental health and well being.

5. Do cash transfers to women improve their position within the household or affect other outcomes such as stress/depression/health/financial engagement/use of government services?
6. Does past receipt of a cash transfer have persistent effects? Do the mechanisms at work differ between the first and second year of getting cash transfers?

## **Experimental Design**


ICDS is an Indian central government initiative to improve early childhood health and nutrition through initiatives at anganwadi centres (AWCs). Our intervention was run through the local community health worker at the AWC, known as the sevika. For a period of 2.5 months, sevikas in all of the sampled AWCs (960 AWCs) informed pregnant women in their first and second trimesters that they were eligible to register for the treatment, known as the “Poshan Pahal” scheme. Unlike some other government programs for pregnant women, there were no eligibility requirements, aside from stage of pregnancy.

These women were informed that if they were one of the AWCs selected, they would receive a year of monthly cash transfers of Rs. 500, where half of AWCs will be selected. Transfers would

be made into the bank accounts of the selected women and would not be conditional on the actions of the women, since conditionality can create bottlenecks that slow transfers. In order to register, women needed only to supply their bank account information and fill out a simple form, where assistance was provided to women who did not currently have bank accounts. After the two and a half month registration window ended, women could no longer register for the scheme.

After registration was complete, women were randomized into two groups, with transfers going out to the group selected to receive transfers after randomization. After one year, a second randomization occurred, with half of each group being selected to receive transfers for a second year. These individuals were not aware of this possibility beforehand, and were only informed at the end of the first year. The study sample is composed of 960 randomly selected AWCs from 8 districts and 24 blocks, which were randomly selected to be representative of the entire state of Jharkhand. *Figure 1* summarizes the experimental design.

- Treatment Group 1: Pregnant women from 240 AWCs receive a monthly Rs. 500 cash transfer for two years, starting after the registration window closes (approximately from ages 0 months to 24 months for the child)
- Treatment Group 2: Pregnant women from 240 AWCs receive a monthly Rs. 500 cash transfer for one year, starting after the registration window closes (approximately from ages 0 months to 12 months for the child)
- Treatment Group 3: Pregnant women from 240 AWCs receive a monthly Rs. 500 cash transfer for one year, starting one year after the first round of transfers began for treatment groups 1 and 2 (approximately from ages 12 months to 24 months for the child)
- Control group: 240 AWCs will serve as the control group for the three treatments



**Figure 1 - Study Design and Randomization**

In the treatment arms, the cash transfers are framed as intended for maternal and child nutrition. Cash transfers are made monthly, and at the time of transfer, beneficiaries with cell phones receive an interactive voice response phone call to notify them of the transfer and reinforce the framing.

Due to logistical issues in rolling out this intervention across all 8 districts simultaneously, we split the districts into two groups: the first five districts began receiving cash transfers in March 2018, while the second group of three districts began receiving cash transfers in November 2018. We refer to the first group as "phase 1 districts" and second group as "phase 2" districts.

*COVID-19 note:*

COVID-19 substantially disrupted our data collection operations, as we had intended to collect endline data from the field in February-March 2020 (phase 1 districts) and October-November 2020 (phase 2 districts). Prior to the lockdown beginning, we were able to complete data collection from the field in two of eight districts in February 2020. We then completed surveys over the phone in the remaining three phase 1 districts to collect information on nutrition and consumption. For the phase 2 districts, we will collect data from the phone over August to November 2020 (splitting the survey into two parts due to the length). We hope to return to the field to collect data on anthropometrics and child development in March 2021. This would be around four months after the end of transfers in phase 2 and 9 months after the end of transfers in phase 1. It is possible that we may miss out on treatment effects that have atrophied (e.g. due to health shocks) or that the variance increases over time in a way that diminishes our ability to detect effects. However, important anthropometrics such as height are relatively persistent so effects should still be detectable.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, if we do not detect an effect after such a short gap, that is evidence against the efficacy of cash transfers for persistently improving these outcomes in the Indian context.

Our data collection thus involves a mix of data that is collected in person and over the telephone. Given that response rates are lower over the telephone, there may be bias due to attrition for outcomes that are only collected over the phone. We discuss how we will deal with this issue in detail in the next section.

## **II. Statistical Methods**

### **A. Balance Tests**

Since primary baseline outcomes are impossible to obtain for children (they are not born yet) and very difficult to obtain for mothers (would need to survey immediately after we know they are pregnant), we did not do a baseline survey. Nonetheless, since we randomized after beneficiaries had registered for the program and stratified on the number of registrations in each anganwadi center, we expect our sample to be balanced. We will test for joint balance on three sets of variables using a single joint F-test across all thirteen variables:

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<sup>1</sup> We can measure correlation of height between year 1 and 2 in control to try to get a sense of persistence and how much noise may be generated by the delay in measurement, as well as measuring height again in the two phase 1 districts that have already been surveyed in person for year 1 to get a sense of it.

- I. Time invariant characteristics of treatment and control households (individual-level)
  - a. *BTA1: education of mother (in years);*
  - b. *BTA2: whether household is SC or ST*
  - c. *BTA3: Birth order of child*
- II. AWC-level characteristics:
  - a. *BTA4: Number of women registered for scheme*
- III. Village-level characteristics (2011 census):
  - a. *BTA5: Whether can match the village to the census*
  - b. *BTA6: % of households living in poor condition houses*
  - c. *BTA7: % of households with toilets*
  - d. *BTA8: Area of village in hectares*
  - e. *BTA9: Distance from all-weather road*
  - f. *BTA10: Distance from nearest bank*
  - g. *BTA11: Distance from regular market/mandi*
  - h. *BTA12: % ST+%SC households*
  - i. *BTA13: Village population*

## B. Estimation

We will primarily focus on ITT estimates, which compare average outcomes in treatment and control AWCs among women who registered for the program.<sup>2</sup> Our primary outcomes are defined at the child-level, which is the unit of analysis. Specifications include fixed effects at the level of the sector and will be estimated using inverse sampling probabilities as weights. Standard errors will always be clustered at the unit of randomization (AWC).

### Primary Specifications:

We will estimate different regression specifications depending on the research question of interest. As we discuss the outcomes below, the relevant specification will be listed in brackets next to the relevant outcome of interest.

The first three regression specifications (S1, S1a, S1b) will be used to answer questions about how cash transfers affect child development. In the next section, we describe the outcomes on which we will run these tests.

[S1]

$$y_{ias2} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T1_a + \beta_2 T2_a + \beta_3 T3_a + \gamma X_i + \phi_s + \epsilon_{ias}$$

Where  $i$  is the individual,  $a$  is the AWC,  $s$  is the sector, and the data is from year 2 ( $t=2$ ).  $\delta_{sd}$  is a sector fixed effect. Treatment group status is at the AWC level,  $\phi_s$  is a sector fixed effect.  $X_{iasd}$  is a vector of time invariant characteristics of the household that are predictive of the outcomes. The characteristics to be included in  $X_{iasd}$  will be selected using post double selection LASSO (Belloni et al, 2011).

<sup>2</sup> There are some women in treatment who were registered but did not receive transfers due to administrative issues (e.g. their bank accounts were closed partway through the intervention), so the TOT estimates will differ. For the primary outcomes, we will also look at TOT estimates, but we expect those to be very similar given the high rate of receipt of transfers.

Outcomes are measured in the year 2 endline for the full sample in this specification. Note that children will be somewhat older than 2 years since it was not possible to collect data from the field at that age due to COVID-19 for the majority of our sample. We will test the following hypotheses using randomization inference:

(q1) What is the effect on child development outcomes at age 2 of receiving 2 years of cash transfers (age 0-24 months)?

$$H_0 : \beta_1 = 0; H_a : \beta_1 \neq 0$$

(q2) What is the effect on child development outcomes at age 2 of receiving a year of cash transfers from age 0-12 months?

$$H_0 : \beta_2 = 0; H_a : \beta_2 \neq 0$$

(q3) What is the effect on child development outcomes at age 2 ( $y_{ias2}$ ) of receiving a year of cash transfers from age 13-24 months?

$$H_0 : \beta_3 = 0; H_a : \beta_3 \neq 0$$

(q4) What is the child age group (0-12 months vs. 13-24 months) at which receiving cash transfers has the greatest benefit on child development at age 2?

$$H_0 : \beta_2 = \beta_3, H_a : \beta_2 \neq \beta_3$$

(q5) Are there complementarities between receiving cash transfers in one year and a second round of transfers in the next year (e.g. Heckman, 2007)?

$$H_0 : \beta_1 = \beta_2 + \beta_3; H_a : \beta_1 \neq \beta_2 + \beta_3$$

Where we will conclude that there are complementarities if  $\beta_1 > \beta_2 + \beta_3$  and that the transfers are substitutes if  $\beta_1 < \beta_2 + \beta_3$

We will augment the above specification to examine child development outcomes at the end of year 2 as a function of receiving cash transfers in year 2. In cases where we have data on the outcome of interest from the end of year 1, we will add the year 1 value of the outcome as a control. Using data from the control group and treatment group 3 (which receives transfers in year 2, but not year 1), we will estimate:

**[S1a]**

$$y_{ias2} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 T3_a + \theta y_{ias1} + \gamma X_i + \phi_s + \epsilon_{ias}$$

This specification controls for the value of the outcome variable at the end of year 1 ( $y_{ias1}$ ), which improves our power to test hypotheses about  $\delta_1$  if  $y_{ias1}$  is a strong predictor of  $y_{ias2}$ . While [S1] will be our main focus, this specification may give us more power to test one aspect of the research question (q3)

Finally, we will use the below specification to test our last major hypothesis. This is a restricted version of [S1] in which we impose that  $\beta_2 = \beta_3$ :

**[S1b]**

$$y_{ias2} = \pi_0 + \pi_1 T1_a + \pi_2 T2T3_a + \gamma X_i + \phi_s + \epsilon_{ias}$$

Where the outcomes are measured at the end of year 2 and treatment groups 2 and 3 are pooled. The last major hypothesis is:

(q6) What is the additional return from a household receiving two years rather than one year of transfers?

$$H_{\{0\}}: \pi_{\{1\}} = \pi_{\{2\}}, H_{\{a\}}: \pi_{\{1\}} \neq \pi_{\{2\}}$$

### Measuring mechanisms

The above primary specifications were for understanding how treatment status affects the level of child development at age 2. This can be thought of as a stock commodity that is a function of flows of inputs into the child that may have differed across treatment groups. The next specification is designed to examine flow outcomes that might be affected by treatment status and affect child development, such as spending on food. We will pool survey data from both year 1 and year 2 whenever possible, and then estimate the following pooled regression specification:

[S2]

$$y_{\{iast\}} = \kappa_{\{0\}} + \kappa_{\{1\}} \text{treatment}_{\{at\}} + \kappa_{\{2\}} \text{treatment}_{\{at\}} * 1(t=2) + \kappa_{\{3\}} \text{treatment}_{\{a1\}} * 1(t=2) + \kappa_{\{4\}} \text{treatment}_{\{a2\}} * \text{treatment}_{\{a1\}} * 1(t=2) + \gamma X_{\{i\}} + \phi_{\{s\}} + \lambda 1(t=2) + \epsilon_{\{ias\}}$$

Where  $\text{treatment}_{\{at\}}$  is equal to one if households in AWC  $a$  received transfers in year  $t$  and is equal to zero if they did not. Standard errors are clustered at the AWC level.

The outcomes of interest are the mechanisms through which the treatment might affect the primary outcomes, such as spending on food or consumption of the child. The main coefficient of interest is  $\kappa_{\{1\}}$ , which tests whether being in the treatment group in the year  $t$  is related to the mechanism of interest in year  $t$  ( $H_{\{0\}}: \kappa_{\{1\}} = 0$ ,  $H_{\{a\}}: \kappa_{\{1\}} \neq 0$ ).

We are also interested in testing the following tertiary questions:

Does the response to the treatment of household investment into flow outcomes differ between year 1 and year 2?

$$H_{\{0\}}: \kappa_{\{2\}} = 0, \kappa_{\{2\}} \neq 0$$

Does past receipt of a cash transfer affect flows into child development?

$$H_{\{0\}}: \kappa_{\{3\}} = 0, \kappa_{\{3\}} \neq 0$$

Are there complementarities of receiving a transfer in both years for the flow of inputs?

$$H_{\{0\}}: \kappa_{\{4\}} = 0, \kappa_{\{4\}} \neq 0$$

In cases where we are interested in mechanisms but only have data on the outcome from one of the years, we will use the below specification:

[S3]

$$y_{\{iast\}} = \zeta_{\{0\}} + \psi_{\{1\}} \text{treatment}_{\{at\}} + \gamma X_{\{i\}} + \phi_{\{s\}} + \epsilon_{\{ias\}}$$

Where  $\text{treatment}_{\{at\}}$  is equal to one if AWC  $a$  receives transfers in year  $t$  and zero if it does not.

### C. Attrition

We will check for differential attrition across treatment and control, particularly due to child mortality (which could be a function of the treatment). If there is differential attrition, we will also present Lee bounds on our estimates.

#### **D. Exclusion**

During the registration, some ineligible women may have registered for the experiment. We exclude a household from the analysis in the following cases:

- Individuals were only supposed to be registered if their pregnancy had not reached the third trimester. We will drop individuals from both the treatment and control whose children were past 7 months of gestational age at the beginning of registration
- Incomplete pregnancies: in cases where the pregnancy did not come to term (e.g. miscarriage, terminated pregnancy), we will drop the mothers from the analysis. For many of our valued outcomes of interest (e.g. child height), it is not possible to measure for children who have expired, so it does not make sense to include these women. We will also test for treatment effects on incomplete pregnancies (e.g. assignment to treatment may reduce incentives to terminate pregnancies).

We will not exclude the following cases:

- Sevika herself is registered: it is possible that the sevika herself will be pregnant and register for the transfers. As long as she meets the criteria for inclusion, she will be included.
- Geographically ineligible women: it may be that some women were not eligible for the program because they did not live in the catchment area of the AWC, but they nonetheless registered. We will not drop these women as long as their children are the appropriate age.

We will also check if the rate of ineligibility differs across treatment and control, although this could only be due to chance since treatment status was not known at the time of registration.

#### **E. Attrition in phone-based surveying in year 2**

As a result of phone data collection during the COVID-19 pandemic, there will be a substantial fraction of households for whom we are unable to collect year 2 data. We plan to take the following steps to assess the possibility of non-response generating bias:

- 1) Test for differential response rates over the phone across treatment and control groups, as could arise if treatment respondents are more familiar with use of mobile phones
- 2) Test for differences in response patterns over the phone across treatment and control groups by interacting a treatment dummy with characteristics of the household (year 1 assets index, year 1 endline height-for-age of the child, year 1 endline weight-for-age of child, and education of mother). This will test for more complex patterns of attrition on those characteristics that we suspect will be particularly strongly related to response over the phone.
- 3) The outcomes measured over the phone will typically be consumption and expenditure, since waiting to measure these outcomes in person months after the end of transfers will introduce significant recall problems. A plausible concern is that the sample of

respondents over the phone is unrepresentative and biased towards wealthier households. As a result, our estimates may be conservative since infusions of cash are presumably less influential on food consumption and expenditure for such households.

We will test for heterogeneous treatment effects related to non-response by regressing consumption and expenditure in the year 1 data on treatment status, treatment status interacted with a dummy variable for whether we were able to reach the household in year 2 over the phone, and whether we were able to reach the household in year 2 over the phone. We will also do the same thing with year 2 anthropometric outcomes that are measured in-person, as we will have that for the full sample. If we do not find that there are heterogeneous treatment effects in year 1 in response to the treatment related to phone access, then this suggests that there may also not be in year 2. If there is such heterogeneity, then we will need to rely more heavily on procedures to correct for this issue discussed below.

Regardless of what the above tests find, we will show our estimates both (1) without adjusting for non-response, and (2) reweighted to adjust for non-response using standard methods (inverse probability weighting (IPW) based on estimated probability of being successfully reached over the phone). However, we are currently considering more advanced techniques to correct for non-response that leverage the panel structure of our data. We will compare the performance of those techniques relative to inverse probability weighting in reducing bias (using outcomes for which we observe the full sample) and if we find there is significant improvement using alternative techniques, we will switch to using those.<sup>3</sup>

## **I. Year 2 Primary Outcomes**

### **A. Child health [S1, S1a, S1b]**

*CH1: Child weight for age and sex*

*CH2: Child length for age and sex*

*CH3: Child weight for length for age and sex*

We define weight and length for age in standard deviation units, according to [World Health Organizations guidelines](#). Length and weight will be measured during the endline field survey. For this calculation, child age will be calculated by rounding to the closest integer of fully completed months since their birth. Sex will be defined as biological sex at birth.

For these outcomes, we will use specifications 1, 1a, and 1b to test the primary questions of interest.

### **B. Food consumption by mother and child [S2, S3]**

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<sup>3</sup> We have collected data for nearly the full sample in year 1. We will also collect field data from nearly the full sample after the year 2 transfers are complete and it is safe to return to the field. We can assess the performance of reweighting via IPW or alternative methods with those data sets. In particular, we will take those data sets, exclude those whom we were not able to reach over the phone in year 2, and use the IPW weights or alternative methods to get estimates. We can compare those estimates to the correct estimates based on using the full sample to gauge the performance of our adjustment procedure.

Along with health, we want to see whether the cash transfers change consumption patterns. We consider this separately from anthropometric measures for two reasons. First, anthropometric measures can be noisy measures of health status, and so it may be that even if food consumption was increased, it did not manifest in gains in height/weight (but might in other dimensions of health). Second, it is useful to know whether food consumption is increased. This is one of many inputs into health, and it may be that even if the intervention increased food consumption, complementary efforts are required to see improvements in health (e.g. transfers may be effective alongside improved sanitation to reduce disease-related shocks). Furthermore, these results will speak to a significant literature on the relationship between income and nutritional intake showing declining nutritional intake in India even as the country has grown wealthier (Deaton and Dreze, 2009). We will test whether there is a positive income elasticity of nutrition using our experimental variation in income.

For the two phase 1 districts that were fully surveyed in the field, we collected detailed information on each item of food consumed by the mother and child over the previous day, including the quantity consumed. We will use the [Indian Food Consumption Tables](#) (IFCT) to translate this into calories, macro-nutrients, and micro-nutrients, based on an exhaustive listing of the quantity of each type of food consumed over those periods. For example, if the individual consumed 200g of atta wheat flour, this would be translated into 0.84mg of Thiamine (vitamin B1), 0.3mg of Riboflavin (B2), etc.

For the remaining districts, we will collect information over the phone on whether or not the respondent and/or their child had consumed any of a large list of food items. For a subset of those food items, we will collect an estimate of the quantity consumed of those items.

*CC1 and CC2: Child and Mother Dietary Diversity Score;*

*CC3: Child Minimum Dietary Diversity*

CC1 and CC2 refers to an index between zero and seven, which is equal to the number of the following dietary groups from which the individual has consumed food over the previous day: (1) grains, roots and tubers; (2) legumes and nuts; (3) dairy products (milk, yogurt, cheese); (4) flesh foods (meat, fish, poultry and liver/organ meats); (5) eggs; (6) vitamin A rich fruits and vegetables; (7) other fruits and vegetables. We will follow the [World Health Organization guidelines](#) (pg 7) for categorizing foods into these categories. If we observe effects on the index, we will also report results for individual food items so that the reader understands where the effects are coming from. We will also report a binary measure of *Minimum Dietary Diversity*, whether the child has received food from four or more of those food groups over the previous day.

*CC2: Minimum Meal Frequency: measures overall food consumption of the child*

Following the [World Health Organization guidelines](#), this is a binary indicator for children aged 6-23.9 months of age. It is equal to one if they receive solid, semi-solid, or soft foods or milk feeds the minimum number of times or more over the previous day. That is equal to 2 times a day for breastfed infants 6-8 months, 3 times for breastfed children 9-23 months, and 4 times for non-breastfed children 6-23 months.

*CC3: Child quantity of specific items consumed: rice, roti, egg, milk, daal*

Since we are unable to precisely measure nutritional intake over the phone, we will measure the quantity consumed of these five nutritionally important, commonly eaten and relatively standardized items to get a sense of effects on the intensive margin of consumption. We have not done this for other types of foods since it is harder to get consistent measures of other types of food items. We use different units for each item: rice (spoonfuls), roti (number), egg (number), milk (glasses) and daal (spoonfuls). While these are not standardized across respondents, we anticipate that differences across respondents will roughly cancel out.

*CC5 and CC6: Estimated caloric consumption of mother and child*

*CC7 and CC8: Estimated index of nutrients consumed by the mother*

In the phone data, we primarily only observe whether or not an item is consumed, but not the quantity or the ingredients. However, we can use data from the two phase 1 districts from which we collected detailed consumption information in year 2 to estimate what consuming an item corresponds to on average: e.g. consumption of a potato-based food item on average is associated with 300 calories and 1 gram of protein, etc.<sup>4</sup> We will then multiply our estimates on individual food items to get estimated values of more detailed nutritional outcomes like those specified in the year 1 and the previous year 2 pre-analysis plan.

These outcomes include caloric consumption, macronutrients and minerals (energy, protein, visible fat, calcium, and iron), and micronutrients (thiamine, riboflavin, niacin equivalent, pyridoxine, dietary folate, magnesium, zinc). We will use guidelines from the [National Institute of Nutrition](#) to calculate what percent of the recommended daily quantity of each of the micro and macronutrients that the mother and child<sup>5</sup> consumed, capping this at 100% if the individual is at or in excess of the recommended daily consumption. We will then combine these measures into an index by taking a simple unweighted average, and then evaluate differences between treatment and control groups on this index. This will be more speculative, but is intended to give a sense of the nutritional impacts.

## **II. Year 2 Secondary Outcomes**

For the child health outcomes listed below, we will use specifications 1, 1a, and 1b. For the remaining outcomes, we will use both specifications 1a and 2 in cases where the outcomes are observed in both year 1 and year 2. In cases where the outcomes are not observed in year 1 but are in year 2, we will use specification 3.

### **A. Child Health [S1, S1a, S1b]**

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<sup>4</sup> We will estimate this separately within each treatment group to deal with possible intensive margin differences.

<sup>5</sup> Note that we will be only measuring food consumed at home or purchased for the child by the parent. This does not include meals consumed at the anganwadi center or school, as those would not be possible to measure using our methods. We also cannot measure the extent of nutrition from breastfeeding. This may underestimate total consumption, but the treatment-control comparison will still be informative.

*CH4-5: Whether child is moderately or severely stunted or wasted*

*CH6-8: Mean weight for age/length for age/weight for length z-score among children in the lowest 25% of z-scores.*

We will provide information on the binary outcome of whether the child is stunted or wasted (moderately or severely). These outcome variables are defined using the World Health Organization definition and growth charts (2 standard deviations or more below median length-for-age and weight-for-length respectively). Since our intervention may be the most effective for the most vulnerable children, as a secondary outcome, we focus on the bottom portion of the distribution. For the three main child health outcomes, we will also test for an effect solely among the bottom quarter of treatment and control children on this outcome.

*CH9: Child Cognitive Skills:*

Households are surveyed on whether the child has reached certain cognitive development milestones (e.g. usage of two word sentences, ability to comprehend and follow directions). Our outcome will be equal to the total number of milestones reached. We will collect this at two points: while the households are still receiving transfers (i.e. collected primarily over the phone), as well as on the field when anthropometrics are measured. While the child will be older at that point, we will still be interested in differences in cognitive skills between treatment arms. This will also allow us to evaluate whether there is a fade-out as time since the intervention increases.

## **B. Household Consumption and Spending [S2, S3]**

*S1: Spending on food in last week (in Rs)*

*S2: Spending on all other items over the past month (in Rs)*

When considering the underlying theory of change, one important mechanism is that households may take the cash to spend more on food. We will capture spending on different categories of items using a household expenditure survey. We will compare between treatment and control, and then use that to estimate what fraction of the transfer is going to food versus other ends.<sup>6</sup>

*FH1 and FH2: Weight and height of randomly selected additional child in the household*

We will calculate weight-for-age and height-for-age z-score for one additional child in the household. This child will be randomly selected from all of the children aged 10 years or less who live in the household.

## **C. Child Morbidity [S2, S3]**

A number of conditional cash transfer programs have found positive effects on morbidity, while unconditional programs typically do not. However, this is confounded by geography, since all of those unconditional programs were in Africa. Since illness is an input into long-term health, this is a useful mechanism to investigate as to why cash transfer programs may have an effect.

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<sup>6</sup> They may also spend more on categories such as healthcare that improve child health, but we do not code that as a separate category given the difficulty in parsing which spending items are directly related to child health (e.g. clothing for the child).

*CM1: Number of types of illnesses in the past three months*

On the survey, mothers will be asked if their child experienced an adverse health event during the past three months and the types of illnesses they experienced.

*CM2: Number of days over the past month that child was ill*

*CM3: Likelihood of being taken to a formal medical provider in the event of illness*

For the illness episodes, the respondent will be asked if they took their child to a formal medical provider. We will code this as a continuous variable in the event of illness. If there is no effect on the reported prevalence of illness, we will consider this outcome for the set of children who were sick in treatment and control, and interpret this as related to the direct effect of the treatment.

## **D. Maternal Outcomes [S2, S3]**

*MO1: Empowerment and household decision making*

Using questions on female empowerment from JPAL's "A Practical Guide to Measuring Women's and Girls' Empowerment in Impact Evaluations", we will construct an index based on a simple average of these normalized outcomes. *Ex ante*, it is difficult to know which domain of household decision making will be affected, so we prefer to combine a number that are of interest.<sup>7</sup>

*MO2: Weight for height of mothers:*

*MO3: Maternal labor supply:*

We want to measure this since getting cash may allow women to be more entrepreneurial, which could be an independent mechanism that affects child outcomes.

## **E. Beliefs and Health-seeking Behavior Change [S2, S3]**

It is possible that our intervention not only changes the budget constraints of households, but also their beliefs about the importance of good diet or health-related behaviors. For example, giving money for nutrition may cause households to update their prior beliefs on the value of nutrition for pregnant women.

*BB1: Beliefs and Attitudes towards nutrition*

The outcome of interest will be an index of questions on beliefs and attitudes towards nutrition during pregnancy.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Note that this was found to be too difficult to collect over the phone during piloting, so we will ask this on the field after the transfers have been completed. As a result, since the beneficiaries are no longer receiving transfers, we may not observe hold-over effects on empowerment, which may make this harder to interpret. We can explicitly test for such fade-out with households that received transfers in year 1 but not in year 2.

<sup>8</sup> Note that this was found to be too difficult to collect over the phone during piloting, so we will ask this on the field after the transfers have been completed. As a result, since the beneficiaries are no longer receiving transfers, we may not observe hold-over effects on beliefs, which may make this harder to

*BB2: Whether still breastfeed their child*

Households will be asked if they have breastfed their child within the last 24 hours. Those that have will be considered to be still breastfeeding, while those that did not are considered not to be breastfeeding regularly anymore.

**F. Sevika Behavior and Contact [S2, S3]**

*AWC1: Use of government services*

Participation in the cash transfer program may increase the level of household interaction with anganwadi center and thus crowd-in usage of other types of services. We will collect information on the main services available at the AWC, and construct an additive index of the total number of services used. We will use this to see whether there are differences in take-up across treatment and control AWCs. Given that the take-up of individual service may also be of interest (e.g. vaccinations, preschool, hot cooked meals, deworming, height/weight measurement, information on food and nutrition, iron/calcium tablets, take home rations), we will also report the effects on take-up of each individual service.

**G. Summary Statistics on Program Implementation**

One of the key outputs for policy from this intervention is the success of the cash transfers in reaching target households. We will do a cost-benefit analysis of the effectiveness of the program, where we take our estimates as reduced form estimates of the benefits of the intervention, which may include aspects such as crowd-in/out of other government services. We will include changes in other government allocations as a function of treatment on the cost side of this calculation.

We will collect the following pieces of information from treatment areas.

*P1a,b: Inappropriate Registrations*

A concern with large cash transfer programs is that ineligible individuals will figure out ways to gain access. For example, in this program, it may be that the health workers register women who are not actually pregnant. The first variable, P1a, is equal to the percent of registrees who are necessarily ineligible (those who are not pregnant women). The second variable, P1b, is the percent of registrees who are ineligible under the rules of the experiment, but would be eligible if the program were implemented at scale. The main case for this is if the child is too old to have been included in this scheme. If the scheme were implemented universally, this would be irrelevant.

Since asking about program implementation as part of the main survey could bias the responses (either due to surveyor or respondent effects), the following questions will be asked by the backcheckers to a subset of households.

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interpret. We can explicitly test for such fade-out with households that received transfers in year 1 but not in year 2.

*P2: Receipt of transfers and IVR messaging*

*P3: Payment in order to register for the scheme*

Respondents will be asked whether or not they had to give anything in order to register for the scheme, and if they did, then the value of what they had to give.

*P4: Frequency of pick-up of transfers*

*P5: How they picked up the transfers*

This will measure how they got the transfers, e.g. from a bank/ATM/etc. These outcomes are important to consider in implementation design of future cash transfer programs.

*P6: Delays in transfers*

During the intervention, there were delays (mostly due to governmental factors, such as lack of money in the state treasury or post-election transfer of power between political parties) in sending payments -- we will report these delays.

### **III. Heterogeneity Analysis**

We want to test whether effects of the treatment are heterogeneous depending on the individual characteristics of the beneficiary. We will include relevant interaction terms for these characteristics in the main specifications:

1. Birth order - *Jayachandran and Pande (2016) indicates that lower birth order children are systematically disadvantaged. We will compare the treatment effect among first births against that for children who are a second birth order or higher child.*
2. Child gender - *female children may not benefit from transfers if those resources are allocated to other household members*

For policy purposes, we will also look at a number of other dimensions of heterogeneity, including Below Poverty Line (BPL) status, sanitation in the area, household size and distance to the nearest bank. To better understand the implementation, we will also look at the age of the child at the start of transfers<sup>9</sup> and whether the household was in Phase 1 or Phase 2.<sup>10</sup> However, we do not plan to report these in the paper unless they meaningfully affect the interpretation of our results.

For the heterogeneity analysis on sanitation, we are interested in testing if higher exposure to open defecation affects our results: in particular, if we do not observe that anthropometrics change despite increases in nutritional intake, this could be consistent with health shocks related to sanitation removing any such gains (Coffey and Spears, 2017).

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<sup>9</sup> Kids began receiving transfers across a range of ages. We will test whether the treatment effect varies depending on the initial age of the child when transfers began by splitting the sample at the median.

<sup>10</sup> The intervention occurred in two phases, with implementation in five districts in phase 1 and implementation in an additional three districts in phase 2 (staggered approximately six months). We will test for differences across the phases, which could be related to implementation quality or how the transfers interact with seasonal factors.

## **IV. Sampling**

**Sample Size:** We calculate the intracluster correlation on multiple outcomes of interest using the 2006 wave of the National Family Health Survey. Across the different outcomes, the highest value is 0.09, so we use that in our power calculations in order to be conservative. From comparisons with other cash transfer programs of similar magnitudes, we anticipate and wish to detect effect sizes of around 0.15 standard deviations for all of the questions of interest.

The key to our design is direct comparisons across treatment groups at age 2. In order to have 80% power to detect a difference in outcomes of 0.15 standard deviations between each of the treatment groups, we require a sample size of 240 AWCs within each treatment arm and the control group (based on an estimate of 5 enrollees per AWC). Since there are three unique treatment groups, this is a total of 960 AWCs.

We randomly sampled 960 AWCs across 8 districts. These are selected so that the treatment effect estimates generalize to the entire state of Jharkhand. The sampling had four stages described below. This produced a total sample size of:

- 8 districts (5 districts in phase I, 3 districts in phase II)<sup>11</sup>
- 24 projects - exactly 3 projects per district. A project is the unit of geography below a district, and roughly equivalent to a block/taluk.
- 80 sectors- either 3 or 4 per project. This is the level of geography below a project, where each sector has a single lady supervisor who oversees the work of anganwadi centers in the sector. There were 50 sectors sampled in phase I and 30 in phase II.
- 960 anganwadi centers - exactly 12 centers per sector.

### **District level sampling**

The process for this was:

1. *Exclusion:* Current IGMSY districts (East Singhbhum, Simdega) are excluded since they are currently part of a different cash transfer program.
2. *Construction of index for expected implementation quality/health status:* to define a diverse set of districts, we use the first principal component of a set of district characteristics that are likely related to implementation or health status. Districts are divided based on their percentile rank on this index. These district characteristics were used to form the index:
  - a. Low birth-weight %, # SAM children; CRISIL inclusix scores; birth registrations; under-5 mortality; # of functional AWCs (GoJH administrative data)
  - b. Literacy rate, population density (2011 census)
  - c. % households on salary income as proxy for poverty level (NSS Round 68, 2011-2012)
3. Split the districts into 5 groups ordered from highest to lower on this index, where the number of districts per group makes the total population of each group roughly equal.

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<sup>11</sup> For implementation purposes, the intervention was first rolled out in 5 districts (phase I), and then in another 3 districts (phase II).

4. Sample one district from each group using PPS<sup>12</sup>.
5. Jharkhand is divided into 5 geographical regions called “divisions”. For any divisions that were not been sampled in the first phase of 5 districts, we randomly select one district from that division using PPS.
6. We then split the remaining unsampled districts into groups based on the earlier PCA index. For example, if all divisions were sampled in the first stage, we would have three groups; if one division were not sampled in the second stage, we would have two, etc. The remaining districts are ordered based on the PCA index, and divided into groups in that order, with each group having roughly equal populations.
7. One district is sampled from each group according to PPS.

### **Project-Level Sampling**

1. Match projects to their equivalent “block” in the 2011 Census of India dataset, for the purposes of conducting a stratified sample.
2. Divide each district into two strata. “Projects” within a district are allocated to strata based on a PCA index of census data from the matched block. The following variables were used: % rural population; % literacy; % population that is “working population”; % ST/SC; % main workers that are agricultural / cultivator.<sup>13</sup>
3. Within each strata, one project is selected according to PPS sampling.
4. After removing the selected projects from each district, draw another project from each district according to PPS (without stratification). This yields a total of three sample projects per district.<sup>14</sup>

### **Sector-Level Sampling:**

1. Each selected project is initially allocated three sectors. These are selected via a simple random sample.
2. Based on the overall project and sector numbers, there are some projects that will have an additional sector sampled. To select these projects, we take a simple random sample of X projects, where X is the number of projects that we wish to have four sectors sampled.
3. Within each project, we sample the allocated number of sectors using PPS. The measure of population used for PPS is number of AWCs in the sector, since that is our best measure of population.

### **AWC-level sampling:**

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<sup>12</sup> Another option would have been to take a simple random sample of districts within each strata, and then in the second stage sampling, allocate proportionally more sub-units to larger districts. We elected to use PPS in the first stage because there is a such a small number of districts selected, meaning that with a simple random sample, there is a high probability of undersampling large districts in the first stage due to chance.

<sup>13</sup> Within a district, strata population are as close to equal as possible. For example, if Ranchi district had a population of 18,000 pregnant women, the population of each strata would be as close to 9,000 as possible, maintaining the stratification.

<sup>14</sup> We elected to partially stratify because of the relatively small number of projects per district. This makes it difficult to form three strata with approximately evenly-sized populations, and uneven strata cause a larger coefficient of variation on the sampling weights. By only having two of the projects selected via stratification, the coefficient of variation in sampling probabilities drops by a third.

1. Take a simple random sample of 12 AWC per sampled sector

### **Representativeness**

We compare the selected projects to the universe of other projects in Jharkhand using the 2011 census data (houselisting and PCA datasets). We use a t-test for equality of means. Of the 26 variables tested for differences in means between sampled and non-sampled projects, only one difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. Sex ratio is slightly lower in sample areas, meaning that there are more women relative to men. Another difference is statistically significant at the 10% level, where sampled areas have slightly fewer government middle schools than non-sampled areas. These discrepancies are about what would be expected by chance, and are not along dimensions that we expect to interact significantly with the treatment (e.g. distance to ATM or market). This means that we can comfortably generalize our results to the entire state.

## **V. Randomization**

Registration for the program was done across all 960 AWCs prior to the randomization. This was done because if we had not done registration in AWCs that were allocated to control, it would have been difficult to identify the women who would have registered. We conducted the randomization at the point at which registration was nearly complete, meaning that we had preliminary numbers for the amount of women registered at each AWC, as there were substantial differences across AWCs. To ensure comparability and maximize power, we stratified the randomization by sector and number of women registered in the AWC.

Each sampled sector had 12 AWCs sampled for the experiment, so within each sector, we wished to select 6 AWCs to be treatment and 6 to be control for year 1. Within each sector, we formed three strata (highest 4 in number of registrations, middle 4, and lowest 4). Within each strata, we randomly allocated two of the AWCs to treatment status and two into control. Thus there are a total of  $80 \times 3 = 240$  randomization strata for year 1 of the experiment.

For year 2 of the experiment, we took the same set of 240 strata. Of the two AWCs that had been randomly assigned to treatment in year 1, one was randomly assigned to control and one into treatment for year 2. Of the two AWCs that had been randomly assigned to control in year 1, one was randomly assigned to control and one into treatment for year 2.