

## PRE-ANALYSIS PLAN

### Citizens at the Council - Phase 1

Malte Lierl (Yale University)

Marcus Holmlund (World Bank)

December 20, 2016

#### **Abstract**

This document describes the research design and the planned results-blind analyses for the first phase of the “Citizens at the Council” experiment in Burkina Faso (Lierl and Holmlund, 2013). In the experiment, municipal administrations personally invite randomly sampled citizens to attend a municipal council meeting as “citizen observers”. We investigate how the presence of ordinary citizens influences the dynamics and outcomes of municipal council meetings, and how the experience of being invited as a “citizen observer” affects voluntary civic participation and citizens’ attitudes towards municipal governance. In the first phase, from November 2015 through May 2016, the experiment is carried out on centrally appointed special delegations, which replaced elected municipal councils in Burkina Faso in the aftermath of the popular insurrection in 2014. Following the municipal elections on May 22nd, 2016, the experiment will be continued with the newly elected municipal councils. A novel aspect of this study is the implementation of a results-blind analysis on a data set with permuted treatment identifiers, prior to researchers’ access to the actual treatment identifiers.

# Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>About this Pre-Analysis Plan</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Research Objectives</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>Experimental Treatment</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>4</b>	<b>Treatment Assignment</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>5</b>	<b>Individual level: Outcomes of Interest and Research Hypotheses</b>	<b>10</b>
5.1	Voluntary civic participation . . . . .	10
5.2	Hypothesized causal chain and intermediate outcomes . . . . .	11
5.3	Heterogeneous effects at the individual level . . . . .	13
5.4	Municipal-level sources of heterogeneity . . . . .	14
5.5	Temporal variation . . . . .	15
<b>6</b>	<b>Municipal Level: Outcomes of Interest and Research Hypotheses</b>	<b>15</b>
6.1	Attendance rates . . . . .	15
6.2	Representation of village-specific concerns . . . . .	16
6.3	Scrutiny of the municipal administration . . . . .	18
<b>7</b>	<b>Results-Blind Analysis</b>	<b>20</b>
7.1	Rationale for results-blind analysis . . . . .	20
7.2	Results-blind analysis procedures . . . . .	21
<b>8</b>	<b>Initial Data Analysis Strategy</b>	<b>21</b>
8.1	Manipulation checks . . . . .	21
8.2	Individual-level outcomes: Intent-to-treat analysis . . . . .	21
8.3	Mediation effect of meeting attendance . . . . .	22
8.4	Municipality-level outcomes . . . . .	23
<b>9</b>	<b>Sampling, External Validity, and Statistical Power (Phase 1)</b>	<b>25</b>

9.1	Sampling for citizen survey . . . . .	25
9.2	Sampling of council meetings . . . . .	27
9.3	Power calculations . . . . .	27
<b>10</b>	<b>Planned Research in Phase 2</b>	<b>29</b>
10.1	Treatment assignment . . . . .	29
10.2	Individual-level outcomes . . . . .	31
10.3	Councilor-level outcomes . . . . .	32
10.4	Municipal-level outcomes . . . . .	33
<b>11</b>	<b>Appendix</b>	<b>35</b>
11.1	Measurement of individual-level outcomes . . . . .	35
11.2	Invitation letter template . . . . .	41
11.3	Measurement of municipal-level outcomes . . . . .	43

## 1 About this Pre-Analysis Plan

This document describes the research design, working hypotheses and data analysis plans for the first phase of the “Citizens at the Council” experiment in Burkina Faso. The document is intended for submission to the AEA experimental design registry after launching the experimental intervention, but prior to the authors’ access to any outcome data. The experiment evaluates the effects of inviting randomly selected adult residents as citizen observers to municipal council meetings. The initial research design and motivation for the experiment were detailed in a comprehensive concept note (Lierl and Holmlund, 2013) that was formally reviewed in a concept note review meeting at the World Bank on November 18, 2013, based on comments obtained from academic reviewers as well as research and operational staff at the World Bank. The concept note was finalized on December 4th, 2013 and published on the World Bank website at <http://wbdocs.worldbank.org/wbdocs/drl/objectId/090224b0847d9998>.

The implementation of the experiment, originally planned for 2014, was delayed by external circum-

stances, that were related, inter alia, to the changing political environment in Burkina Faso. On October 31st, 2014, Burkina Faso's long-time president Blaise Compaoré was ousted in a popular insurrection, which was followed by a period of military control and the formation of a joint military and civilian transition government. In December of 2014, all elected municipal governments were dismissed by the order of the transition government and replaced by centrally appointed special delegations that were tasked with the same responsibilities and operate within the same legal and institutional framework as the previous elected municipal governments. The special delegations were politically neutral and were intended as interim municipal governments until replaced again by elected municipal councils. This highly unusual circumstance opened up the opportunity to carry out the experiment sequentially on externally appointed and locally elected municipal councils.

Burkina Faso's transition towards democracy was abruptly halted in September 2015 by a coup of the presidential guard. The coup prompted mass protests and failed after one week, once the national army had mobilized against the presidential guard. After reinstatement of the transitional government, competitive presidential and parliamentary elections were held on November 29, 2015 and were followed by a peaceful transfer of power to a democratically elected government. Municipal elections were subsequently scheduled for May 22nd, 2016.

In order to adapt the study to the changed context and circumstances, several design modifications were undertaken. First, the experiment was split into two phases. Phase 1 takes place between November 2015 and May 2016 and targets appointed special delegations. Phase 2 runs from September 2016 through January 2017 and targets the newly elected municipal councils. Second, the experimental intervention targets one council meeting per municipality and phase, instead of the originally planned four council meetings per municipality. Third, 40 citizen observers are invited per council meeting, instead of 20. Fourth, the outcomes of interest and research hypotheses were updated to reflect the reduced sample size and the added opportunity of an observational comparison between appointed and elected councils. Fifth, a mid-line data collection was carried out in between the two phases, covering a subset of the treatment and control groups within 44 out of the 58 treatment municipalities.

This document specifies the research hypotheses and analysis plans for Phase 1 of the experiment, based on the midline data. Following the midline analysis, but prior to the authors' access to endline data from the experiment, an updated pre-analysis plan for a comprehensive analysis of both phases of the experiment will be posted. The endline pre-analysis plan will additionally specify a set of research hypotheses for a comparison between the two phases and may incorporate insights gained from the midline results.

## 2 Research Objectives

This study seeks to test (1) how the presence of ordinary citizens at municipal council meetings affects the behavior of municipal decision makers, and (2) how personalized invitations to attend a municipal council meeting as “citizen observer” influences ordinary citizens' voluntary civic participation, as well as their attitudes towards municipal governance.

We are interested in these research questions for two reasons. First, little is known about the impact of direct social interaction between ordinary citizens and local decision makers on local-level governance, especially in contexts with great social distance between local authorities and normal citizens. Can the presence of even just a few “citizen observers” have a measurable impact on the behavior of local councilors, by altering the social context of local council meetings?

Second, from a behavioral perspective, it is not very well understood under what conditions citizens are willing to actively learn about and take part in decentralized local governance processes. Citizen participation and demand for information on local governance are characterized by immense self-selection. If a vast proportion of citizens are uninterested in or feel excluded from local-level decision processes, the existence of *de iure* participation opportunities may contribute very little to improving representation and accountability in local politics, especially towards the vast majority of citizens who would normally not self-select into existing participation opportunities.

To shed light on these questions, we test a very simple and low-cost intervention to increase contact between ordinary citizens and local decision makers. Randomly sampled voting-age citizens receive

personal invitation letters from the mayors in which they are offered the opportunity to attend a local council meeting in the capacity of “citizen observer” and receive information regarding the date and location of the next council meeting. At the council meetings, the citizen observers are formally welcomed. Additionally, the municipal government organizes a question-and-answer session with local councilors for the participating citizen observers, in the style of a townhall meeting, immediately after the council session.

By encouraging citizens to gain first-hand experience with local governance processes (in this case by participating in municipal council meetings as “citizen observers”), the experiment enables us to test whether the presence of even just a few ordinary citizens at municipal council meetings is sufficient to alter the behavior of local council members. This includes both their level of activity (attendance, active participation in the discussion) and the extent to which they defend the interests of ordinary citizens, for example by raising critical questions or articulating specific needs. We hypothesize that the presence of ordinary citizens alters the social dynamics of council meetings by (1) creating or reinforcing the perception among council members of being observed by and accountable to ordinary citizens and (2) altering the relative social position of councilors at the meeting site.

With regard to voluntary civic participation, this experiment enables us to test not only if a simple, personalized invitation letter is sufficient to stimulate citizen participation in local council meetings, but also if it has externalities on other forms of voluntary civic participation and what causal mechanisms might be responsible for that. We hypothesize that such externalities, if they exist, could be caused by changes in motivation, information, or social recognition or could be the product of habit formation. In particular, changes in citizens’ intrinsic motivation for civic participation could be a direct effect of receiving a personal invitation from the mayor, whereas changes in information about local governance processes and in social recognition would plausibly be mediated by actual attendance of a council meeting, as would be the development of a habit of attending council meetings or similar civic participation opportunities. Finally, we aim to evaluate whether being invited as a “citizen observer” has spillover effects on the civic participation of socially proximate individuals, such as family members and co-villagers.

In addition to this basic set of research questions, we are interested in two specific extensions of the study. First, in a downstream experiment conducted in conjunction with the 2016 municipal elections (Lierl and Holmlund 2016), we aim to shed light on the information mechanism by additionally evaluating how being invited as a citizen observer affects citizens' processing of information about the performance of their municipal government and how they moderate the impact of information on voting behavior. This downstream experiment overlaps with a subset of the study population of this study and is described in a separate analysis plan (Lierl and Holmlund, 2016).<sup>1</sup> Second, we carry out the same experiment on two types of local councils: first on centrally appointed special delegations and subsequently on locally elected municipal councils. We take advantage of the unique situation posed by the political transition in Burkina Faso. Municipal councils were dismissed in December 2014 and replaced by centrally appointed special delegations. These special delegations were, in turn, replaced by elected municipal councils after the May 2016 municipal elections. Both institutions fulfill the same role and operate under the same legal framework. However, we hypothesize that citizen observers have a stronger impact on the behavior of elected councilors, especially on those councilors whose constituents are present. The reason is that elected municipal councilors are formally legitimized by and electorally accountable to the villages they represent.

### 3 Experimental Treatment

The experimental intervention consists of issuing personal invitations to randomly selected citizens from different villages within a municipality to attend a municipal council meeting. To implement this intervention, we partner with the *Programme d'appui aux collectivités territoriales* (PACT) in Burkina Faso, six regional NGOs that function as implementing partners for the PACT, and the acting mayors of the municipalities (in Phase 1 of the experiment: the presidents of the special delegations). In Phase 1 of the experiment, until the May 2016 municipal elections, the targeted citizens are invited to meetings of the special delegations. These special delegation meetings serve the same purpose and operate under the same legal framework as the previous meetings of the

---

<sup>1</sup><http://egap.org/registration/1617>

elected municipal councils, but the members of the special delegations are externally appointed and are not candidates in the upcoming municipal elections. By law, the special delegations include representatives of the regional administration, of the municipal service providers, of women, youth and handicapped citizens in the municipality, as well as of local civil society organizations. Elected municipal councils were reconstituted after the municipal elections in May 2016. There are typically four municipal council meetings per year. Prior to the municipal elections, we implement the citizen invitation at one meeting of the delegation speciale per municipality, either in Q4 of 2015 or in Q1 of 2016.

The first phase of the study will be based on a midline data collection immediately prior to the municipal elections. After the municipal elections, the intervention will continue for one regular meeting of the newly elected municipal councils, after their initial constitutive meeting during which the mayor is elected. This second phase will be followed by a more extensive endline data collection.

The targeted citizens receive personal invitation letters from the president of the special delegation, encouraging them to attend the upcoming municipal meeting as “citizen observers” and to share their views at a townhall meeting that will take place in conjunction with the deliberations of the council/special delegation (see an example in the appendix). The invitation letters, signed by the president of the special delegation, are hand-delivered to each selected citizen. At each council meeting, a different sample of voting-age citizens are personally invited to attend.

As “citizen observers”, the invited citizens are formally welcomed by the president of the special delegation and are invited to attend the council session and, where applicable, a lunch break. Additionally, they are invited to attend a townhall meeting during which they are asked to share and discuss their points of view and those of their co-villagers with the delegates. For the targeted citizens, receiving a personal invitation from the president of the special delegation is likely to be an unusual experience. It is expected that the invitations will encourage citizens to actually attend the council session and therefore give them first-hand exposure to municipal decision processes.

A potential constraint to participation is transportation, due to the dispersed nature of many rural



communes and the apparent lack of affordable public transportation. However, transportation did not emerge as a constraint in early pilot tests of the intervention. Furthermore, initial attempts at reimbursing municipal administrations for the provision of need-based free transportation to citizen observers proved to be vulnerable to mistargeting and appeared to create unnecessary administrative burden and accounting challenges. For this reason, very early in the implementation phase the intervention protocol was modified so that the available funds were instead used to provide refreshments to council meeting participants, including the citizen observers.<sup>2</sup> The slight deviation from the final procedure in the first few municipalities to be covered will be controlled for in the analysis. Since the set of municipalities affected by the procedural adjustment was exogenously determined by the meeting schedules of the municipalities and the start date of the study (which was chosen independently of the mechanism by which special delegations scheduled their council meetings, as well as independently of any other observable or unobservable municipality-specific characteristics), there is no reason to be concerned that the procedural adjustment would bias the results.

## 4 Treatment Assignment

The citizen observer intervention has been launched in 58 randomly selected municipalities, out of the 118 rural municipalities that are located within the six regions in which our local partner program (the PACT) operates. At the municipal level, treatment assignment to the citizen invitation intervention was block randomized by region, since in every region a different implementation partner is in charge of training and supporting the municipalities in carrying out the citizen invitations. Within every treatment municipality, five villages are selected into the citizen invitation treatment.<sup>3</sup> At each council meeting, eight randomly selected citizens per village, from each of

---

<sup>2</sup>Official meeting participants and citizen observers alike often travel long distances under difficult conditions to attend and spend up to a whole day at the meeting. Since municipalities do not normally make provisions for refreshments, but citizen observers cannot necessarily anticipate this, we considered it ethically preferable to support the municipalities at providing food and beverages instead of need-based transportation assistance. Additionally, we expect that the availability of refreshments improves the overall experience of the citizen observers and official delegates by reducing the risk of tiredness, inattention or discomfort during the meeting.

<sup>3</sup>In communes with fewer than 10 villages, half of the villages were sampled for implementation of the citizen invitation treatment.

the five villages, receive a personal invitation from the acting mayor (the president of the special delegation) to attend the council meeting. The individuals are randomly selected from a census of village residents aged 18 to 70, carried out in 2014 by the Programme d'Appui aux Collectivités Territoriales (PACT), with technical assistance from the authors of this study and their local team members.<sup>4</sup>

## 5 Individual level: Outcomes of Interest and Research Hypotheses

### 5.1 Voluntary civic participation

At the level of individual citizens, our primary objective is to investigate whether and through what mechanisms the experimental intervention contributes to greater voluntary civic participation. We use the concept of voluntary participation to describe any type of observable, civic-minded activity a citizen might undertake with the intention of contributing to better municipal governance, without being forced to do so. This includes voluntary or quasi-voluntary compliance with local rules, for example by paying local taxes or making in-kind or labor contributions to local projects, as well as any other expressions of loyalty to local governance institutions. It also includes participation in public meetings or activities organized by the municipal authorities. Furthermore, it includes informal activities to publicly voice opinions or concerns about municipal affairs, support civic causes in the municipality, as well as conversations about municipal affairs in private settings. Lastly, it includes electoral participation, including a citizen's voting behavior and interest in running for office.

Since voluntary civic participation can take on many forms, not all of which are easily observable or quantifiable, we decided to focus on selected indicators that can be measured with the resources available to us and that reflect several essential aspects of voluntary civic participation. These indicators include: (1) voting in the 2016 municipal election, (2) attendance of future municipal council meetings, (3) attendance of village meetings, (4) communicating with others about munic-

---

<sup>4</sup>The census was carried out in ten villages per municipality, including the five treatment villages in the treatment municipalities, in all of the 118 rural municipalities of the six regions.

ipal affairs, (5) confidentially stated interest in running for local office, (6) voluntary donation to the municipal treasury. The measurement strategy for these five outcome indicators is detailed in Table A.1 in the appendix.

## 5.2 Hypothesized causal chain and intermediate outcomes

We hypothesize that the experimental intervention could influence citizens' voluntary civic participation at the municipal level through four causal mechanisms: (1) motivation, (2) information, (3) social recognition, and (4) habit formation. Figure 1 visualizes the hypothesized causal chain, along with the intermediate outcomes through which these different causal mechanisms may influence voluntary civic participation.

It is important to note that the experimental treatment has two components: Receiving a personal invitation letter to attend a municipal council/special delegation meeting as a citizen observer and actually attending the meeting. Since participation is voluntary, individuals in the treatment group will self-select into attending or not attending the council meeting. The resulting inferential challenges are discussed in the "Data Analysis" section.

We expect that receiving a personal invitation to a municipal council/delegation speciale meeting is, on its own, an unusual experience that will influence several intermediate outcomes related to a citizens' motivation to engage in voluntary civic participation. First, the personal invitation could be perceived as a signal of local leaders' respect for ordinary citizens and their commitment to transparency and inclusiveness. Feeling respected and included could increase citizens' motivation to voluntarily participate in municipal governance. Second, the invitation could stimulate citizens curiosity and thus their interest in municipal affairs. Third, the invitation could cause citizens to reflect about the role and responsibilities of governments and the impact of municipal decisions on their own living conditions. This could increase their concern for the quality of municipal leaders and of their decisions and actions. Fourth, by offering the recipient a concrete opportunity to participate in municipal governance (as a "citizen observer") and expressing demand for and appreciation of such involvement, the invitation could increase the recipient's perception of self-




Figure 1: Hypothesized causal chain, intermediate outcomes and expected signs of average effects. Measurement strategies for the intermediate outcomes are detailed in Tables A.2 through A.5 in the appendix.

efficacy, which in turn should increase their motivation to participate. An increased motivation to participate in municipal governance could manifest itself in a positive response to the invitation (i.e. actual attendance of the meeting), but also in other forms of voluntary civic participation.

In addition to the direct effects of receiving a personal invitation, the experience of attending a council meeting as a “citizen observer” could influence voluntary civic participation through several additional mechanisms. First, through an informational mechanism. By observing municipal decision processes in action, citizens may update their beliefs about the quality and relevance of municipal governance institutions. Furthermore, citizen observers may update their beliefs about the costs and benefits of participating in municipal governance, for example by learning about the effort expected from municipal councilors and about their influence, by forming beliefs about the impact of their own presence at the council meeting, and by witnessing other voluntary meeting participants, such as representatives of community-based organizations. Second, through a social recognition mechanism. After participating in a municipal council meeting as a citizen observer, individuals may be asked by others to tell them about their experience. Their perceived competence

to speak about municipal affairs may have increased, which could in turn enhance the efficacy of their voluntary civic participation. Additionally, citizen observers will, perhaps for the first time in their lives, personally interact with municipal decision makers. Prior contact with municipal leaders may increase the efficacy of voluntary civic participation, for example by enabling citizens to articulate their opinions towards them at future occasions. Third and finally, participation in a municipal council meeting may be habit forming, causing the invited citizens to attend future meetings as well.

### **5.3 Heterogeneous effects at the individual level**

We expect that effects on individual-level civic participation depend (1) on a citizen's social status and (2) on their ability to understand the proceedings of council meetings and to describe their observations to others.

Social status could moderate treatment effects in ambiguous ways. For lower-status individuals, being invited to serve as citizen observer stands in stronger contrast to their usual social position, which normally contributes to their exclusion from the political sphere. On the one hand, this could mean that being invited is a particularly empowering experience for them and increases their future civic participation through the motivation, information and social recognition mechanisms. On the other hand, lower-status individuals could be more apprehensive about participating in the council meeting and might be more easily dissuaded by others. For higher-status individuals, being invited as a citizen observer is more consistent with their existing social position, which could result in greater participation rates and greater willingness to communicate about the experience and thus in greater effects on future civic participation through the social recognition and habit formation mechanisms.

Cognitive and communication skills could moderate treatment effects, because individuals who find it difficult to follow the council meetings (either because of a lack of knowledge about the topics being discussed, a short attention span, or because of language barriers if a significant portion of the meeting is held in French) might be less likely to increase their interest in municipal affairs

Source of heterogeneity	Observed covariates
<i>Social standing</i>	Gender
	Age
	Local ethnic minority
	Local religious minority
	Prior leadership experience
<i>Cognitive/communication skills</i>	Years of education
	Literacy

Table 1: Anticipated sources of treatment effect heterogeneity at the individual level.

than individuals who have higher prior knowledge, greater curiosity, or prior interest. Moreover, individuals with strong communication skills might be more likely to benefit from the opportunity to ask questions and might be more likely to communicate with others about their experience as citizen observer, or about the fact that they were invited. Subsequent communication with others might reinforce treatment effects on civic participation.

Along the social status and cognitive/communication skills dimensions, we plan to report heterogeneous effects with respect to the covariates described in Table 1. This analysis will be exploratory and may lead to more specific theoretical hypotheses that can be tested in the second phase of the experiment.

#### 5.4 Municipal-level sources of heterogeneity

The effect of the citizen observer invitations on individual-level voluntary civic participation can be expected to vary with municipality-level characteristics. We plan to report heterogeneous effects by (1) summary indicators of the quality of municipal service delivery and institutional capacity, (2) the number of villages in the municipality, (3) municipality-level baseline measures of voluntary civic participation in municipal affairs, and (4) municipality-level baseline measures of confrontation between citizens and municipal authorities.

## 5.5 Temporal variation

Due to the timing of special delegation meetings and of the midline survey, the time gap between experimental treatment and outcome measurement varies across municipalities. Since the timing can be regarded as exogenous to individual-level potential outcomes, we plan to also report average treatment effects as a function of the time that has passed since the citizen observer invitation.

# 6 Municipal Level: Outcomes of Interest and Research Hypotheses

At the municipal level, we evaluate the impact of the presence of ordinary citizens at the special delegation meetings on three outcomes of interest during Phase 1 of the experiment: (1) attendance rates of delegates, (2) representation of village-specific issues in the council deliberations, (3) explicit scrutiny of the municipal administration by the delegates.

## 6.1 Attendance rates

### *Motivation*

Non-attendance of council sessions by municipal councilors or members of the special delegation can potentially undermine the legitimacy of council/special delegation decisions, complicate the formation of a consensus among delegates, and distort majority relations for council votes. The presence of citizen observers could have an effect on delegates' attendance rates by increasing the social observability of their participation (or non-participation).

### *Measurement*

We record attendance in each municipality by cross-checking the list of meeting participants, obtained by a meeting observer, with a list of the members of the special delegation. By law, an attendance quorum of 50 percent of the delegates must be satisfied for a meeting to take place.

Above this quorum, attendance may vary by municipality and by meeting. Our data will thus be truncated at 50 percent attendance.

### *Prior Expectations*

Given that the members of the special delegations do not represent specific villages and are not formally accountable to voters in their commune, we do not expect that the presence of citizen observers at a special delegation meeting will substantively increase session attendance by members of the special delegation in Phase 1.

If, against our initial expectation, the presence of citizen observers has an effect on delegates' attendance in Phase 1, we would not attribute this effect to formal political accountability relations, but rather to a more general effect of social observability, because the members of the special delegations are not formally accountable to voters. However, knowing that citizen observers will be present at the meeting, the members of the special delegations (most of whom were appointed because they have some type of leadership role or public responsibility in their community) might nevertheless regard the meeting as an opportunity to gain attention or to assert or legitimate their position in the community.

## **6.2 Representation of village-specific concerns**

### *Motivation*

The aggregation and arbitration of the needs of different villages within a municipality is an important function of municipal councils. Municipal-level politics therefore often involves potentially contentious distributive bargaining between the different villages of the municipality, for example over the geographic targeting of municipal development projects and the prioritization of the needs of different villages, as well as intervillage competition for the attention of municipal decision makers. Since citizen observers were selected at random from the village population, they effectively represent the population of their village and presence could have an effect on the articulation and consideration of issues related to their villages in the council deliberations. The fact that that the



citizen observer treatment is also randomized at the village level (within treatment municipalities) offers an opportunity to test whether citizen observers increase the accountability of delegates towards the population. If citizen observers do increase the accountability of delegates towards the population, we might expect an increased representation of the specific interests of the treatment villages from which the citizen observers were invited.

### *Measurement*

To measure the representation of village-specific concerns, we count the number of times a meeting participant (broken down by members and non-members of the special delegation) makes a statement that explicitly addresses a village-specific concern. This is done by a paper-based tally sheet, completed by a meeting observer in real time (see *Fiche observation A* in the appendix). The form lists five villages by name and has a sixth row to count the statements addressing village-specific concerns of any other village in the municipality. In the treatment municipalities, the five randomly selected treatment villages are listed on the form. In the control municipalities, five randomly selected villages are listed on the form.

### *Prior Expectations*

While elected councilors formally represent their villages on the municipal council (each village is represented by two council seats), members of a special delegation do not represent specific villages, but rather specific interest groups or sub-populations of the municipalities (such as women, youth, producers, municipal service providers, handicapped individuals, etc.). In Phase 1 of the experiment, we therefore do not expect that the village of origin of the citizen observers has a substantial effect on the representation of village-specific issues on the municipal council, unless the citizen observers themselves raised the issue and the delegates respond to that, or if some delegates happened to be from the treatment villages and thus had a social incentive to demonstrate solidarity with their home villages, because citizen observers from their home village were present. In any other case, we would interpret overproportional attention to the treatment villages as evidence of a general tendency of delegates to pander to citizen observers, regardless of the existence of a village-specific accountability relationship.

### 6.3 Scrutiny of the municipal administration

#### *Motivation*

A primary responsibility of the special delegations is to scrutinize and oversee the activities of the municipal administration and to ensure its functioning until an elected municipal council has been reinstalled. Analogously, after the elections have taken place, it will be a primary responsibility of elected municipal councils to scrutinize and oversee the municipal administration.

It is possible that the citizen observer intervention will affect the extent to which the delegates conform to their responsibility of scrutinizing the municipal administration. The presence of citizen observers could cause the delegates to feel socially observed and confronted with specific normative expectations from the citizen observers. This could increase their motivation to conform to their formal role and create social incentives to do so.

#### *Measurement*

To measure the extent of explicit scrutiny of the municipal administration by members of the special delegation, we focus on the proportion of statements that are critical of the municipal administration, in relation to neutral or supportive statements. All utterances during the meeting are coded by a meeting observer in real time, using tally sheets for critical, neutral and supportive statements, separately for members and non-members of the special delegation (see *Fiche observation B* in the appendix).

#### *Prior Expectations*

There are several reasons to expect that the effect of citizen observers on delegates' scrutiny of the municipal administration could be heterogeneous.

- First, the effects of social observability could depend on whether the delegates socially identify more with the municipal administrators or with ordinary citizens of the municipality (including the citizen observers). If the delegates identify more with the municipal administrators, the presence of citizen observers may prompt them to defend the municipal administration

more, or to have a greater desire to demonstrate agreement with the municipal administration, than they would otherwise be willing to. If the delegates identify more with ordinary citizens than with the municipal administration, then the presence of citizen observers could prompt them to display more critical activism.

- Second, the effects of citizen observers on the delegates' scrutiny of the municipal administration could depend on the social expectations the citizen observers place on the members of the special delegation. Those expectations may in turn be a function of baseline perceptions of municipal corruption, as well as of citizens' prior expectations towards the special delegations. In municipalities where many citizens expect that the appointment of a special delegation will address prior problems of corruption or mismanagement in the municipal administration, delegates may have a particularly strong incentive to make critical inquiries and to demonstrate their willingness to scrutinize the actions of the municipal administration.
- Third, independently of the presence of citizen observers, the extent to which the delegates are critical or supportive of the municipal administration should depend on the municipal administration's actual performance and institutional capacity. A more problematic performance of the municipal administration relative to its capacity should attract more criticism by the delegates. However, it is important to keep in mind that the performance of the municipal administration is endogenous to the willingness of the members of the special delegation to scrutinize its performance. Thus, while we might expect a stronger (positive or negative) effect of the citizen observers on the delegates' explicit scrutiny of the municipal administration in municipalities where the potential for criticism of the municipal administration is greater due to the municipal administration's performance, it is difficult to test this proposition, because the its performance is potentially an endogenous consequence of the delegates' willingness to scrutinize the municipal administration.

Thus, our expectations regarding the effect of citizen observers on delegates' scrutiny of the municipal administration are a priori ambiguous. We expect heterogeneous effects along the delegation members' propensity to identify with ordinary citizens more than with municipal administrators,

along the social expectations of ordinary citizens, as well as along the actual performance of the municipal administration. However, we do not expect to be in a position to directly test these predictions with sufficient power. We therefore focus on testing whether citizen observers have a non-zero average effect on explicit scrutiny of the municipal administration. Depending on the result, purposive follow-up research might be conducted to evaluate specific causal explanations.

## 7 Results-Blind Analysis

### 7.1 Rationale for results-blind analysis

Prior to accessing the actual data, we will first implement the intended data analyses on a data set in which the treatment indicators have been randomly permuted and information has been removed that could allow us to infer the treatment status of an observation. The blind analysis will help us identify appropriate analytical solutions with respect to potential inferential issues that arise after the PIs have gained knowledge of the outcome data. We aim to make these analytical and methodological choices without knowledge of the treatment status of our units of analysis in order to prevent our analytical choices and efforts to be unconsciously biased by prior knowledge of the results. The blind analyses will help us to make results-blind choices with regard to: (1) Data cleaning and data processing. (2) The selection of appropriate statistical model specifications, based on the analytical starting points proposed in this analysis plan. This includes choices regarding data transformation, covariate adjustments and distributional assumptions, as appropriate for the data. (3) The treatment of missing data. (4) Decisions on the appropriate level of disaggregation of results, especially with regard to subgroup analyses. (5) The selection of final research hypotheses, considering the possibility that the statistical power of the experiment may decrease due to implementation or data quality-related observations that become apparent only at the blind analysis stage. If power is diminished, it may be advantageous to reduce the overall number of tests to be conducted, or to prioritize certain tests over others, in order to preserve statistical power for the theoretically most relevant comparisons.

## 7.2 Results-blind analysis procedures

To implement the blind analysis, we will request our data collection partner IPA to produce a dataset in which the treatment indicators have been manipulated accordingly and any identifiers have been obscured that would allow us to infer the treatment assignment and treatment status of the respective units of analysis (individuals, villages and municipalities). On the basis of this blinded dataset, we will decide on the estimation approaches and presentation of the data and results that are most suitable to the data, as well as address any data problems, such as missing data, data entry errors or implausible values, that may come to our attention. After completing this stage, we plan to amend this pre-analysis plan with the program code for the data analysis. Subsequently, we will request IPA to share with us the full data set that includes the actual treatment indicators and implement the data analysis on this real data set.

# 8 Initial Data Analysis Strategy

## 8.1 Manipulation checks

As a manipulation check, we first report the proportion of citizens assigned to receiving an invitation who attended the council meeting. We estimate the effect of assignment to receiving an invitation on attending the council meeting, by cross-checking the attendance lists provided by the meeting observers with the respondent list of the midline survey and comparing the attendance rates between the intent-to-treat group and the control group. We expect that receiving a personal invitation to serve as citizen observer at a municipal council/special delegation session increases the likelihood that individuals attend the municipal council/special delegation session.

## 8.2 Individual-level outcomes: Intent-to-treat analysis

For our main outcome of interest at the individual level, voluntary civic participation, we report the average effect of treatment assignment on the first principal component of our of our six indicators of

voluntary civic participation. Following (Casey et al., 2012), we additionally report the standardized mean effect of treatment assignment on the six outcome indicators, as well as average effects on each of the six indicators.

We plan to estimate average intent-to-treat effects via fixed-effects regression of the following form:

$$y_{vi} = \beta_1 t_{vi} + \beta_2 d_v + \eta_v + \epsilon_{vi} \tag{1}$$

$t_{vi}$  is an indicator of individual-level assignment to receiving an invitation,  $d_v$  is an indicator of village-level treatment status, i.e. whether any citizens from the village were invited as citizen observers, and  $\eta_v$  is a village-specific intercept. Under the assumption of no interference between individuals from different villages in a municipality,  $\beta_2$  captures the average spillover effect on the co-villagers of the individuals assigned to treatment, and  $\beta_1$  the added effect of personally being assigned to receiving an invitation. The average intent-to-treat effect is given by  $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ .

The same analysis strategy will be applied to intermediate outcomes specified in Tables A.2 and A.3. For outcomes that are measured after the information treatment provided to a subset of study participants during the midline survey (see Lierl and Holmlund 2016), the models will also control for whether the respondent received the information treatment or not.

### 8.3 Mediation effect of meeting attendance

A question of particular theoretical interest is to what extent the impact of the experimental treatment is due to actually attending a council meeting as a citizen observer. Since the invited citizens self-select into meeting attendance, but the invitations as such can have direct effects on voluntary civic participation, even if citizens do not actually attend the meeting (Figure 1), the causal mediation effect of meeting attendance is statistically not identifiable without imposing strong structural or distributional assumptions.

In a first approach to analyzing the experimental data, we therefore refrain from causal mediation analysis and descriptively report outcomes for those individuals who were invited and attended and

those individuals who were invited and did not attend.

## 8.4 Municipality-level outcomes

To evaluate the impacts of the citizen observer intervention on the dynamics of special delegation meetings, we use data from meeting observers in all 118 municipalities in the study. At the municipal level, treatment assignment was blocked by region, but with equal assignment probabilities across regions. The treatment and the data collection during the council meetings were implemented by a different partner organization in each region. Blocking at the region level ensures that treatment assignment is balanced with respect to the implementing partner.

### *Attendance of delegates*

To estimate the average effect of citizen observers on attendance rates of delegates, we estimate a linear regression with region fixed effects.

$$p_m = \beta_0 + \beta_1 t_m + r'_m \beta_3 + \epsilon_m \quad (2)$$

$p_m$  is the proportion of delegates in a municipality attending the meeting,  $r_m$  are region indicators, which are included to absorb potential variation in the extent to which the delegates were alerted to the presence of citizen observers ahead of the meeting by the different regional implementation partners.

Additionally, we will report the effect of the citizen observer treatment on the number of non-delegates (other than the invited citizen observers) who are attending the meeting.

### *Representation of village-specific concerns*

To estimate the average effect of citizen observers on the representation of village-specific concerns, data collectors at the council meeting count how many times a village-specific concern has been mentioned by a delegate in the meeting deliberations. This data is available for each of five villages in the municipality (in the treatment municipalities: the five treatment villages), as well as for a

sixth category of “other villages”. We estimate the effect of the council observer treatment on the number of times a village-specific concern is mentioned in the council deliberators via the following linear regression:

$$y_{mv} - \tilde{y}_m = \beta_0 + \beta_1 t_m + r'_m \beta_3 + \epsilon_{mv} \quad (3)$$

In this regression equation,  $\tilde{y}_m$  is the number of times a concern specific to a village in the “other villages” category has been mentioned in the council deliberations, divided by the number of villages in the “other villages” category.  $r_m$  are region indicators, which are included to absorb potential variation in the coding of the meeting deliberations across the different regional implementation partners. Errors are clustered by municipality.  $\beta_1$  captures the average treatment effect of citizen observers from a village being invited on the number of times a concern specific to that village is mentioned by a delegate in the council meeting deliberations.

#### *Scrutiny of the municipal administration*

To estimate the average effect of citizen observers on the extent to which delegates scrutinize the performance of the municipal administration, we focus on the number of statements by delegates that are critical of the municipal administration, as a proportion of the total number of statements recorded. These counts are recorded separately by agenda item, but in a first pass of the data analysis we focus on the total counts across all agenda items and estimate a linear regression of the form:

$$\frac{y_m^{critical}}{y_m^{total}} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 t_m + r'_m \beta_3 + \epsilon_m \quad (4)$$

Depending on the distribution of the outcome variable, a logit transformation or estimation via beta regression may be appropriate. In extensions of this analysis, the different agenda items could be coded into categories, depending on how likely a topic is to bring up criticism of the municipal administration in the control group. Precision of the treatment effect estimates could then potentially be improved by analyzing the proportion of critical remarks separately by category of the agenda item, clustering errors by municipality.



## 9 Sampling, External Validity, and Statistical Power (Phase 1)

### 9.1 Sampling for citizen survey

#### *Selection of municipalities*

For the measurement of individual-level outcomes, a midline survey is conducted after Phase 1 of the study and before the municipal elections. This midline covers 44 out of the 58 treatment municipalities of the citizen observer experiment, but does not cover the control municipalities of the experiment. The 44 municipalities included in the midline survey were purposively selected. In these 44 municipalities, but not in the other treatment municipalities, the municipal government was controlled by the same party after both the 2006 and 2012 municipal elections. The reason for limiting the midline survey to this subset of treatment municipalities were funding constraints. The midline survey was carried out with funding for a study of voters' responsiveness to performance information and was therefore limited to the scope of this study, defined by the aforementioned criteria.<sup>5</sup>

#### *Sampling of villages*

Within each of the 44 treatment municipalities included in the midline survey, three out of five treatment villages of the citizen observer intervention are randomly sampled. In municipalities with fewer than five treatment villages, the number of villages for inclusion in the study is adjusted proportionally. Additionally, in each of the 44 treatment municipalities, the midline survey includes one randomly sampled control village of the citizen observer experiment.

#### *Sampling of individuals*

For the treatment assignment, the midline citizen survey and the endline citizen survey, individuals are sampled from a comprehensive census of village residents aged 18-70 in 2014 that was carried out by the *Programme d'appui aux collectivités territoriales* (PACT) in 2014 with technical support from the authors. The sampling was carried out centrally by sampling index numbers in

---

<sup>5</sup>Lierl and Holmlund (2016). Design registration and pre-analysis plan available at <http://egap.org/registration-details/1617>.

the census booklets with equal probability within a village. The corresponding names and identifying information (gender, age, nickname in the village, hamlet, name of concession head and additional identifying information, such as “shopkeeper” or “daughter of the teacher”) were then double-entered by Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA) Burkina Faso. Survey teams are equipped with detailed name lists for each village that include the supplementary identifying information. Approximately a week prior to the survey date, a messenger is sent to each village to locate the sampled individuals, inform them of the planned survey and agree on a meeting point and time for the survey date. Upon meeting the sampled respondents, the survey teams request to verify their identity via their voter ID card or their national identification card (CNIB) before proceeding with the survey.

#### *Sample size targets and replacement procedures*

In each of the sampled treatment villages, it will be attempted to survey all citizens who were randomly assigned to receiving a council meeting invitation (typically eight individuals per village). Additionally, we will survey half as many co-villagers of the invited citizens as there are invited citizens in the village (i.e. typically four individuals per village). In the control villages, twelve randomly sampled residents are surveyed. The inclusion of control villages of the citizen observer intervention will make it possible to estimate (and, if necessary, correct for) potential within-village spillover effects of the citizen observer intervention.

For the midline survey, the targeted sample size is 2070 citizens, 1029 of whom were assigned to receiving a council meeting invitation during Phase 1 (Table 2). Since the number of individuals assigned to treatment is fixed per village, it is not possible to replace individuals assigned to the invitation treatment who cannot be found by the survey team or who decline to participate in the survey. Individuals not assigned to treatment are replaced by backup respondents to meet the targeted sample size. The backup respondents were randomly sampled from the same sampling frame.

Meeting invitation	Control	Total
<i>114 villages included in the citizen-invitation intervention (up to 3 per municipality)</i>		
1029 (typically 8 per village)	513 (typically 4 per village)	1542
<i>44 villages not included in the citizen-invitation intervention (1 per municipality)</i>		
0 (typically 8 per village)	528 (typically 12 per village)	528
<b>Total</b> $\leq$ 1029 (no replacements)	<b>1041</b>	<b>2070</b>

Table 2: Sample size targets for the midline survey (covering 44 out of 58 treatment municipalities).

## 9.2 Sampling of council meetings

For Phase 1 of the citizen observer experiment, data collectors are sent to one ordinary special delegation meeting in each of the 118 treatment and control municipalities that takes place after November 3rd, 2015 and prior to the municipal elections of May 22nd, 2016. Typically, the first ordinary meeting within this time frame is selected, i.e. either a Q4/2015 or a Q1/2016 meeting. In the treatment communes, the data collectors are sent to the special delegation meeting to which the citizen observers were invited, also typically the first ordinary meeting within that time frame.

## 9.3 Power calculations

### *Individual-level tests*

With the targeted sample size (which is largely a consequence of binding logistical and funding constraints) and at a response rate between 60 and 80 percent, we expect to be able to detect an intent-to-treat effect size of approximately 0.15 standard deviations in our main outcome variable, the index of voluntary civic participation, via a two sided t-test at significance level of 0.05 and with power 0.8. This calculation is conservative, in that it does not account for potential variance reduction through covariate adjustment. Since there are no replacements available for non-responding individuals in the treatment group, non-response will directly reduce the available sample size and

## Power Calculations for Individual-Level Outcomes




Figure 2: Minimum detectable effect size (MDES) for individual-level outcomes at  $\alpha = 0.05$ , under different response rates, assuming random nonresponse. The estimates have been obtained via Monte-Carlo simulation of equation (1), assuming constant treatment effects, no spillover effects within villages and that 10 percent of the variation in the outcome variable can be explained by village fixed effects (the blocking variable).

thus decrease the detectable effect size. Figure 2 plots power as a function of the detectable effect size for different plausible response rates in the midline survey.

### *Municipality-level tests*

Within the study population of 118 municipalities, our discretion over sample size is limited to the choice between a single observation or repeated observations (multiple meetings) per municipality. Time and funding constraints prevented us from carrying out the experiment during more than one meeting per municipality in Phase 1, prior to the 2016 municipal elections. Figures 3.a and 3.b provide approximate estimates of the minimum effect size on municipal-level outcomes that is detectable at power 0.8. These calculations have been made with the Optimal Design software (Raudenbush et al., 2011). We assume Bonferroni correction for three comparisons, fixing the probability of a Type 1 error in at least one of the three hypothesis tests at 0.05. We assume that the blocking variable (region/regional implementing partner) explains between 10 and 40 percent of the variation in our outcomes of interest (attendance rates of delegates, percentage of statements

that are critical of the municipal administration). Figure 3.b presents the analogous calculations for the representation of village-specific concerns in the council deliberations.

## 10 Planned Research in Phase 2

### 10.1 Treatment assignment

The second phase of the experiment will be implemented after the municipal elections of May 22nd, 2016, and after the newly elected municipal councils have held their first constitutive meeting and elected a mayor. The treatment assignment will be as follows.

#### *Municipal Level*

At the municipal level, the 58 treatment and 60 control municipalities are the same as in Phase 1. Since Phase 1 is carried out with the centrally appointed special delegations that will be dissolved after the municipal elections, Phase 2 can be treated as an independent experiment. The municipal government will change completely and the newly elected municipal councils and mayors in Phase 2 will not have been exposed to the treatment in Phase 1. At the level of municipal governments, we do not expect any practically relevant spillovers from Phase 1 to Phase 2.

#### *Village Level*

Within treatment municipalities, it is independently randomized whether villages are included in Phase 1, Phase 2, or both phases (see Table 4).

Treatment status in Phase 1	Treatment status in Phase 2	
	Treatment village	Control village
Treatment village	140	141
Control village	141	140

Table 4: Village-level treatment assignment in Phase 1 and Phase 2. Within the 58 treatment municipalities, a total of 562 villages have been sampled for inclusion in the study.

#### *Individual Level*




Figure 3.a: Minimum detectable effect size vs. effect size variability for municipal-level outcomes.




Figure 3.b: Minimum detectable effect size vs. effect size variability for the number of statements in the council deliberations that address a specific concern of a sampled village. At the municipal level, we assume an intra-cluster correlation of 0.1 and that between 10 and 80 percent of the variation can be explained by the average number of statements per village for the remaining villages in the municipality.

Within the treatment villages, individual-level assignment to receiving a citizen observer invitation is randomized within the following blocks:

- In villages that are assigned to treatment in Phase 2, but not in Phase 1, the individuals to be invited as citizen observers are selected at random, using the same sampling procedure as in Phase 1.
- In villages that are assigned to treatment in both Phase 1 and Phase 2, one of the citizens invited in Phase 1 is also invited in Phase 2. The remaining citizens invited in Phase 2 are randomly selected among those individuals who were not invited in Phase 1.

## 10.2 Individual-level outcomes

As in Phase 1, our main outcomes of interest at the individual level in Phase 2 are meeting attendance and voluntary civic participation. We aim to investigate the following questions:

1. Do individuals who were invited to a session of the locally elected council attend the session with a greater probability than those who were invited to a session of the centrally appointed special delegation?
2. Do invitations to serve as citizen observer for a locally elected council have a stronger effect on voluntary civic participation than invitations to server as citizen observer for a centrally appointed special delegation?
3. Do citizens who were invited to observe a session of the locally elected municipal council have a more favorable impression of municipal governance than citizens who were invited to observe a session of the centrally appointed special delegation?

At the individual level, our prior expectations with regard to differences between Phase 1 and Phase 2 are ambiguous. One the one hand, citizens may be more motivated to observe a session of the elected municipal council than a session of the centrally appointed special delegation, because voters take an active part in the election of the council and may thus feel greater responsibility to monitor the council and to inform themselves. This could increase attendance rates in Phase 2,

as well as impacts on voluntary civic participation. On the other hand, citizens may perceive the centrally appointed special delegations otherwise as less accountable and therefore be particularly interested in monitoring them.

In addition to comparing individual-level effects between Phase 1 and Phase 2, we are interested in whether citizen observer invitations in Phase 1 moderate outcomes in Phase 2.

- What is the added effect of being invited in Phase 2 after having been invited in Phase 1 on attendance rates and voluntary civic participation?
- How do attendance rates and treatment effects differ in villages that had been included in Phase 1?

In treatment villages of Phase 1, and especially among individuals also who received a citizen observer invitation in Phase 1, the novelty value of the citizen observer invitations may have worn off to some extent. This could imply that citizens exposed to Phase 1 are less curious in Phase 2, and thus less motivated to attend the council meeting, because they gain less information and social recognition from it. Alternatively, citizens exposed to Phase 1 could be less apprehensive or have already developed an interest in or a habit of attending council meetings.

### **10.3 Councilor-level outcomes**

The elected municipal councils in Phase 2 differ from the special delegations in Phase 1 in an important respect: Municipal councilors represent individual villages, while members of the special delegation represent different municipality-level interest groups. On the elected municipal councils, every village is typically represented by two councilors. The two councilors per village may be from the same or from different parties, depending on the local election results.

If the citizen observers effectively scrutinize the performance of the councilors, and representing a village's interest is part of their formal role, we would expect that elected councilors from treatment villages are under greater pressure to demonstrate their competence at advocating for their constituents' interest. We therefore expect a greater effect of citizen observers on council members'



activism during the council meeting and their willingness to take critical positions towards the municipal administration among councilors who represent treatment villages.

#### 10.4 Municipal-level outcomes

Compared to Phase 1 of the experiment, we expect a more positive effect of the presence of citizens observers from a particular village on the attention devoted in the council deliberations to issues specific to that village, especially by the councilors who formally represent that village. Greater political competition in a village could further enhance this effect: If the two councilors from a treatment village are from a different party rather than from the same party (which can occur if one party commands a supermajority of the votes in a village), the presence of citizen observers from that village should have an even more positive effect on the attention devoted to the specific interests of that village.

## References

- Casey, K., Glennerster, R., and Miguel, E. (2012). Reshaping Institutions: Evidence on Aid Impacts Using a Preanalysis Plan. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 127(4):1755–1812.
- Lierl, M. and Holmlund, M. (2013). Citizens at the Council: Can First-Hand Experience with Local Governance Processes Cause Lasting Changes in Citizens’ Participation? (Concept Note). Technical report, World Bank, Washington, DC.
- Lierl, M. and Holmlund, M. (2016). Does Personal Exposure to Political Processes Increase Voters’ Receptiveness to Performance Information? (Pre-Analysis Plan).
- Raudenbush, S. W., Bloom, H., Congdon, R., Hill, C., Liu, X., Martinez, A., and Spybrook, J. (2011). Optimal Design Software for Multi-level and Longitudinal Research (Version 3.01).



# 11 Appendix

## 11.1 Measurement of individual-level outcomes

<b>TABLE A.1</b> <i>Outcome</i>	<b>Indicators of voluntary civic participation</b> <i>Measurement</i>
Intent to vote in the 2016 municipal election	(1) How likely is it that you will actually go to vote in the upcoming municipal elections? (2) [if available] Having voted in the 2016 municipal elections, according to official records.
Attendance of future municipal council meetings	(1) Do you plan to attend the next meeting of the municipal council or the delegation speciale in your commune?
Attendance of village meetings	(1) Within the past 3 months, how many village meetings did you attend in your village?
Communicating with others about municipal affairs	(1) Within the past 3 months, have you talked with members of your household about the municipal government? (2) Within the past 3 months, have you talked with people in your village who are not members of your household about the municipal government, at an occasion other than a village meeting? (3) [Within the past 3 months, has the respondent spoken about municipal affairs at a village meeting?]
Confidentially stated interest in running for local office	Would you ever consider becoming a candidate for the municipal council?
Voluntary donation to the municipal treasury	(1) Thank you for participating in this survey. As a token of appreciation, we would like to give you 1500 FCFA. This money comes from an organization outside of Burkina Faso and was given to my organisation to compensate the study participants. It will be yours to keep. You can do with it whatever you want. This money does not come from your municipal government or from the government of Burkina Faso. If you want, you can voluntarily donate any part of these 1500 Francs to your municipal government, to support local development in your municipality. These donations will be handed over to the treasurer of the municipality, and we will ask for a receipt. The donations will be anonymous. We will not tell the treasurer who donated the money, but they will know that it came from donations from citizens in their municipality.

<b>TABLE A.2 Intermediate outcomes: Effect of receiving an invitation</b>	
<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Measurement</i>
Feeling respected by local authorities	(1) I am now going to read two more statements to you. I would like to know if you agree more with the first or more with the second statement. STATEMENT 1: The current municipal decision makers in your commune treat citizens with respect. STATEMENT 2: The current municipal decision makers in your commune treat citizens with arrogance. (2) In your opinion, does the municipal government in your commune take the needs of normal citizens like you seriously?
Interest in municipal affairs (see Table A.4)	(1) [Expressed interest in information about municipal government performance] (2) [Attention paid to information about municipal government performance] (3) [Knowledge about municipal governance]
Concern for municipal governance quality (see Table A.5)	(1) [Performance-based voting] (2) [Willingness to sign a pledge against vote-selling]
Perception of self-efficacy	(1) In your opinion, can a normal citizen like you, if she or he actively engages for a particular cause, have an influence over the decisions of the municipal government of your commune?

<b>TABLE A.3 Intermediate outcomes: Effect of citizen observer experience</b>	
<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Measurement</i>
Perceived quality of municipal institutions	(1) I am now going to read two statements to you. I would like to know if you agree more with the first or more with the second statement. STATEMENT 1: The current municipal decision makers in your commune care more about their own advantage than about the interests of the population. STATEMENT 2: The current municipal decision makers in your commune care more about the interests of the population than about their own advantage. (2) Accuracy of prior beliefs about municipal governance quality
Knowledge of opportunities and efficacy of civic participation	(1) Are all citizens allowed to attend meetings of the municipal council or the delegation speciale of their commune?
Perceived competence to speak about municipal affairs	[not measured in midline survey]
Personal interaction with municipal decision makers	[not measured in midline survey]
Perception of council meetings as a participation opportunity	(1) Do you personally think it would be appropriate for you to attend a municipal council meeting? (2) Would your family think it is appropriate for you to attend a municipal council meeting? (3) Would most other people in your village think it is appropriate for you to attend a municipal council meeting? (4) If you attended a municipal council meeting, do you think you would be able to understand what is talked about at the meeting?

<b>TABLE A.4</b> <i>Indicator</i>	<b>Measuring interest in municipal affairs</b> <i>Measurement</i>
Expressed interest in information about municipal government performance	(1) In your opinion, if a foreign donor was willing to support your commune with 5 million Francs, would it be better if the donor gave this money to your municipal government, or would it be better if the donor used this money to provide regular information to the citizens of your the commune about how well the municipal government is fulfilling its various responsibilities?
Attention paid to information about municipal government performance	(1) DO NOT READ: On a scale from 1 (completely bored) to 10 (extremely attentive and focused), how interested was the respondent in the information treatment? (2) <i>Ability to recall performance information about the municipal government (see Lierl and Holmlund (2016) for details on the information treatment)</i> (3) In all honesty, did you find this information interesting or boring?
Knowledge about municipal governance	(1) Who is being elected in the municipal elections? (2) What do you think are the responsibilities of the municipal council? [a] <i>How many responsibilities were identified correctly?</i> [b] <i>How many responsibilities did the respondent name that were not in the list?</i> (3) Do you know the date of the upcoming municipal elections? (4) Do you know when the previous municipal elections took place? (5) Is the mayor of your municipality still the same as before the popular insurrection in Burkina Faso?

TABLE A.5 <i>Indicator</i>	Measuring concern for municipal governance quality <i>Measurement</i>
Performance-based voting	<p>(1) I am now going to show you a list of 13 things voters might take into consideration when they choose between parties in the municipal elections. I would like you to indicate how important each of these 13 considerations is for your own decision what party you vote for in the upcoming municipal elections. I am going to give you a pile of 30 marbles. In order to indicate how important each consideration is for your decision what party you vote for, I would like you to distribute all of the 30 marbles across the 13 considerations and the additional case, which stands for all the other considerations that may affect your decision what party you vote for. The more important a consideration is for your decision what party you vote for, the more marbles you should allocate to that consideration. If a consideration is not important for your decision, it is ok to put zero marbles on it. However, in the end, you need to have distributed all 30 marbles. <i>[Quantity of interest is the fraction of marbles allocated to expected performance if elected]</i></p> <p>(2) <i>Effect of good news about the performance of the previous elected municipal government on voting for the previous incumbent party (see Lierl and Holmlund, 2016)</i></p> <p>(3) <i>Effect of bad news about the performance of the previous elected municipal government on voting for the previous incumbent party (see Lierl and Holmlund, 2016)</i></p>
Willingness to sign a pledge against vote selling	<p>(1) In a democracy, politicians should not attempt to buy votes. Some people therefore refuse to take any money or gift in exchange for my vote in the 2016 municipal elections. If somebody offered you the opportunity to sign a pledge to refuse to take any money or gift in exchange for your vote in the 2016 municipal elections, would you sign such a pledge?</p>





## 11.2 Invitation letter template

REGION [REGION ]  
COMMUNE DE  
[COMMUNE NAME]



BURKINA FASO  
UNITE – PROGRES – JUSTICE

Téléphone: \_\_\_\_\_

Le Président de la Délégation Spéciale

A

[Gender : M. if (male) and Mme. if (female)] [first name] [last name]

Résident(e) du village de [village name]

**Objet** : Invitation à participer à la réunion de la délégation spéciale

En tant que président de la délégation spéciale de la commune de [commune name], j'ai l'honneur d'inviter [citizen name] à participer comme citoyen observateur à la session de la délégation spéciale qui se tiendra le \_\_\_\_\_ de \_\_\_\_ heures à \_\_\_\_ heures au lieu suivant : \_\_\_\_\_.

A votre arrivée à la mairie, vous serez accueilli par le président de la délégation spéciale en personne et par les autres travailleurs de la mairie.

Votre participation à cette réunion vous permettra d'avoir une compréhension des questions qui sont discutées pendant ces réunions par les représentants de votre commune. A la fin de la réunion, vous auriez l'occasion de poser des questions directement à tous les membres de cette délégation spéciale. En ce moment, vous pourrez soulever les problèmes que votre village rencontre et demander à vos représentants les solutions qu'ils proposent pour résoudre ces problèmes.

Votre participation comme citoyen observateur à cette réunion est importante parce que vous pouvez influencer de cette manière les décisions que les membres de la délégation spéciale vont prendre et qui vont affecter vos conditions de vie dans votre villages. Vous êtes parmi les plus chanceux car vous avez été sélectionnés par hasard parmi tous les autres citoyens de [village name]. Aussi, [village name] et plusieurs autres villages ont été

sélectionné par hasard parmi tous les autres villages de [commune name]. Nous avons fait la sélection de cette manière pour donner une chance égale à tous les citoyens et aussi à tous les villages de [commune name] à recevoir une invitation à la réunion.

Il est important de savoir que vous ne devrez pas vous faire représenter à cette réunion par une autre personne. En venant à la réunion, je vous demande donc d'apporter avec vous cette lettre et aussi votre document d'identification tel que votre CNIB ou tout autre document comme votre carte d'électeur. Je vous encourage à prendre part à la réunion et à la séance de question et réponse qui aura lieu immédiatement après la réunion. Après cette réunion, je vous encourage à partager de manière ouverte vos impressions de la réunion avec votre famille et vos voisins dans votre village.

L'ordre du jour de cette réunion de la délégation spéciale porte sur \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_. Nous vous encourageons à partager ces informations avec les autres personnes dans votre village. Si vous avez des questions, n'hésitez pas à me contacter au numéro suivant : \_\_\_\_\_.

Dans l'attente de vous recevoir à cette réunion de la délégation spéciale, je vous adresse mes salutations distinguées.

[commune name], le \_\_\_\_\_

[signature et cachet

]

L

]

Le président de la délégation spéciale

### 11.3 Measurement of municipal-level outcomes

(1) Tally sheet for mentions of village-specific concerns

<b>FICHE D'OBSERVATION B</b>		
<b>REGION:</b>	<b>COMMUNE:</b>	<b>DATE:</b>
<b>NOM DE L'OBSERVATEUR:</b>		

Compte le nombre de fois qu'une remarque est faite sur des besoins spécifiques d'un village particulier.		
NOM DU VILLAGE	Nombre de fois qu'un/une conseiller(ère) membre du conseil municipal a mentionné un besoin spécifique de ce village	Nombre de fois qu'une personne non-conseiller(ère) membre du conseil municipal a mentionné un besoin spécifique de ce village.
[PRE-FILLED]		
[PRE-FILLED]		
[PRE-FILLED]		
[PRE-FILLED]		
[PRE-FILLED]		
AUTRE VILLAGE		

(2) Tally sheet for critical and uncritical remarks at the council meeting (by agenda item)

<b>SPÉCIMEN</b>						
<b>FICHE D'OBSERVATION A</b>						
REGION:	COMMUNE:					
NOM DE L'ENQUÊTEUR:	DATE:			PAGE  __  DE  __		
SUJET DEBATTU	Questions/remarques des membres du conseil municipal			Questions/remarques de personnes non-conseillers et non-membres du conseil		
	En appui à l'administration municipale	Critique à l'administration municipale	Neutre, procédurale, hors-sujet	En appui à l'administration municipale	Critique à l'administration municipale	Neutre, procédurale, hors-sujet