Safe Cities: Trust in State Authority in Pakistan Pre-Analysis Plan

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1. Introduction

This research examines how citizens in Pakistan who are experiencing disputes are impacted when provided with enhanced dispute resolution services. Identifying a population that is currently experiencing a dispute, we experimentally introduce interventions that provide information on and/or direct exposure to enhanced services for citizens and measure these interventions' impact on dispute resolution, citizen satisfaction, and engagement with and perceptions of the police and state actors.

Briefly, the interventions to which respondents are experimentally exposed to are: (i) reliable information about recent improvements in policing services, access to the regular services of either (ii) a police complaint helpline called 1787, or (iii) a legal aid call center called the Sindh Legal Aid Call Center (SLACC). Additionally, we also provide access to assistive, more customer friendly access to both (iv) 1787 and (v) SLACC. All surveys and interventions take place over the phone. Data collection is complete as of the end of January 2023. More details about each intervention can be found in the <u>trial registry</u>.

With the two 1787 treatment arms we are looking to measure the effect that accessing state accountability mechanisms – such as a service to file complaints against the police – has on our outcomes of interest. Meanwhile, with the SLACC treatment arms, we are aiming to measure the effect of making it easier for citizens to navigate the dispute resolution system by providing access to free legal aid. Additionally, we examine the impact of both these services in an assistive version, aimed at measuring the additional effect from adding more assistance in service delivery and making it easier for callers to understand and engage with these services.

Our main hypotheses test the following:

- (a) The effect of being exposed to any treatment on respondents' beliefs about dispute resolution services and attitudes toward the state, informal forums, police, and lawyers
- (b) The effect of receiving information only about state improvements on respondents' beliefs on the same outcomes as in (a).
- (c) The effect of having access to the regular existing services of a police complaint and legal aid services on the same outcomes as in (a).
- (d) The additional effect of assistance during service delivery (for police complaints and legal aid services) the same outcomes on as in (a).

This pre-analysis plan aims to look into the imbalance on some covariates and outcomes at baseline, without analyzing any midline or endline outcomes, and to pre-register a set of empirical strategies for the midline and endline outcome analysis.

2. Research Design

2.1. Power and Sample Size

We use data from a pilot conducted in 2019 to run power calculations and estimate the necessary sample size to detect effects. The purpose of the pilot was to test our survey instruments, calibrate the logistics of rolling out phone-based surveys from partner offices (see section 2.2), and collect some data to enable us to run power calculations. The pilot was a simplified version of the study with only three treatment arms: (i) a control group, and regular access to (ii) 1787 and (iii) SLACC. Both the information and assistive treatment arms were added to the final design after this pilot was completed. The pilot resulted in approximately 400 observations¹ and measured a subset of the outcome measures (attitudes towards the state and informal forums) that we use for the full study rollout.

We used data from this pilot to run power calculations. Specifically, we used the standard deviations (SD) from three outcome questions² to estimate the sample size required to detect a minimum detectable effect (MDE) of 0.1 SD^3 with 80% power when comparing any of our treatment groups to the control group. We found that in order to detect effects of this size for all three questions and in all treatment group comparisons (i.e., 1787 vs. control and SLACC vs. control from the pilot data) we needed at least 1,581 observations in each group. In anticipation of the six treatment groups we planned for the full study, we multiplied this figure by six to reach a total sample size of 9,486. To add a little more room for error and aim for a round figure we rounded this to a target sample of 10,000 observations.

2.2. Sampling Framework

We use a sample of citizens who have very recently experienced a crime or engaged in a dispute. We can reliably identify this population through the records of a partner organization, the Punjab Safe Cities Authority (PSCA). PSCA operates Punjab's emergency hotline service called "1-5" (similar to 9-1-1 in the US) and agreed to share this data with us for the duration of our study.

All 1-5 calls made within Punjab are received by phone operators at the central PSCA offices. The details of these calls are recorded by the operators (e.g., caller information, case type) and then forwarded on to dispatchers within PSCA who deploy first responders to the scene of the crime. For the duration of our study, PSCA securely shared details of these daily 1-5 calls with our team. Each day for 136 business days we securely received some limited personally identifiable information (PII) – callers' first names and phone numbers – as well as details about the crime or incident they reported 2 days ago.⁴ To ensure callers' privacy, baseline

¹ For conducting power calculations, we took a subset of the pilot data of 200 observations and resampled iteratively to conduct Montecarlo simulations.

 $^{^{2}}$ The pilot outcome questions measured trust, usage, and accessibility dimensions of government services, each asked separately following the format: i) how likely are you to trust/use government services (0-5), and ii) how easy is it for you to access government services? (0-5)

 $^{^{3}}$ 0.1 SD ranged from about 0.142 points to 0.22 point on a scale from 0-10 depending on which question and treatment group comparison we were using. We decided effect sizes of that range would be satisfactory to detect as anything smaller than that may not be meaningful.

⁴ We found that many cases were resolved in the first 24 hours. As our treatments are not as relevant for cases resolved so quickly, we decided to wait two days after the initial emergency call was made to maximize the number of unresolved cases found in our sampling frame (see section 2.3).

survey activities took place inside PSCA offices and data was shared with our team to a PSCA provided email address through PSCA's intranet.⁵ Following baseline, respondents were identified by a case ID. This daily data transfer formed our sampling frame.

PSCA currently receives 40,000 real (non-hoax) 1-5 calls in a month, giving us a much larger sampling frame than we were logistically able to use. Therefore, we randomly sample callers from the full frame (see section 3.2). The final sample for the study comprises 10,088 individuals in Punjab collected over the course of 8 months and 136 working days.

2.3. Screening Criteria

On average, we received between 300-400 observations in a day (comprising of callers who called PSCA two days before). We conducted a number of screening steps on this sample each day to determine eligibility for the study. The purpose of the screening was to remove any data errors, fake/hoax calls, duplicates, and any callers whose cases have already been resolved and therefore no longer have an active crime or dispute and would not benefit from our treatments.⁶ Screening also included ensuring we identified the correct caller (i.e. the person who had called 1-5 was the one who picked up the phone for our survey) and respondent consent. Appendix Table A1 shows these steps/filters along with the number and percentage of respondents at every step.

The screening criteria was comprised of two stages:

- 1. Pre-call screening using Stata, starting from the raw 1-5 records shared each day:
 - A. We remove bank alarms, fake calls, and records with data entry errors (i.e., unusable phone numbers)
 - B. We drop within-day duplicates and across-day duplicates that have already been surveyed (and potentially treated)
 - C. We remove cases marked as resolved in the police administrative data (i.e., those that the 1-5 operator noted down as resolved while they were on the phone with the caller)

This stage screened out approximately 30% of the data we received. The resulting 70% was randomly assigned to a baseline enumerator and randomized for potential treatment.⁷ Since PSCA receives more calls on a daily basis than we could logistically survey given space limitations in PSCA offices and the number of enumerators we could employ, we further randomly selected a bit over half of the eligible data (at that stage). As we received new data every day, observations that were not called on the day they were assigned to enumerators were pushed down the list (to display new data at the top) and eventually dropped from the sampling frame.⁸ To account for this capacity constraint, we randomized the order in which enumerators surveyed their callers such that the subset of callers they did reach each day was random.

⁵ This process is described in detail in our approved MIT IRB, protocol #1808499100.

⁶ Note that we did survey a small sub-sample of callers with cases already resolved in order to be able to measure any differences between that sample and our sample of respondents with unresolved cases (after two days of calling).

⁷ Please see section 3 for details on the randomization assignment, which was modified a few times in the study.

⁸ This aimed to provide buffer workload, used on rare instances, such as when we did not receive that day's data from PSCA.

On the remaining subsample that enumerators made at least one call attempt to, we conducted another screening:

- 2. In-survey screening:
 - A. We remove people who never picked up (after the 6th attempt), deny having called the helpline, or where the caller was never found (e.g., they provided someone else's phone number)
 - B. We remove people who self-report their case as resolved
 - C. We remove people who did not want to pursue the case, bystanders, and those who did not consent to be surveyed

The final study sample, 10,088 individuals from 136 days of daily samples, consists of any respondents remaining following both stages of screening.⁹ Figure 1 below shows the daily distribution of this sample. Note the increase in daily baseline surveys conducted after October 14th, which corresponds to the increase in enumerator team size as space capacity constraints by our partner were relaxed.



Figure 1. Baseline survey round timeline - daily sample

⁹ Please see Appendix Table A1 for a full illustration of each stage of screening.

3. Randomization Design and Procedures

3.1. Design

Our treatment design randomizes baseline survey respondents into one of six experimental groups: two distinct services, 1787 and SLACC, delivered with two intensity levels (regular or assistive), which make up four treatment arms, a pure information treatment, and a pure control group. Randomization assignment was done daily at the individual level (see section 3.2 below). Participants were surveyed three times through baseline, midline, and endline surveys, each conducted over the phone and recorded in SurveyCTO. Our outcomes of interest are described briefly in section 4.1.

3.2 Procedures

We used a total of four randomization procedures throughout the study. Although we initially planned on equal sized treatment groups with randomization done on-the-fly in SurveyCTO, we encountered a bug that forced us to change randomization a number of times. Specifically, we found SurveyCTO's calculate feature had assigned treatments unequally, systematically over-sampling values below 0.5.¹⁰ Given these issues with SurveyCTO we switched to using Stata for (ex-ante) randomization assignment. Subsequent changes in our partners capacity led us to change the sampling weights twice. Details of each procedure are as follows:

3.2.1 Procedure (1): Within-survey randomization using SurveyCTO's calculate feature

Initially, randomization was done within survey (on-the-fly) after participants passed the screening criteria and completed the baseline survey. For this procedure, we first used Stata to conduct screening protocol 1, then used a random number within Stata to assign all remaining observations to a baseline enumerator to generate their workload for the day. Then, for the subsample of respondents that enumerators were able to call, they went through the second screening criteria within the baseline survey, and for remaining respondents, assignment to treatment happened at the very end of the survey. Specifically, once all baseline questions were answered enumerators were prompted with either the survey completion script (for the control group), a script for the information treatment, or a script for seeking consent to transfer the caller to one of the services (1787 and SLACC) with either the regular variation or assistive variation (the latter had additional instructions for enumerators). The screen that appeared was determined by the underlying calculate feature in SurveyCTO and was determined at the moment enumerators clicked "next" after the last baseline survey were given a treatment status

¹⁰ We suspect this was likely a rounding down error in SurveyCTO software, especially given that we had six treatment groups and therefore had multiple random number cutoffs (e.g., 0-0.167 was treatment 1) that were susceptible to rounding errors. Alternatively, this could be due to the underlying mechanism used to generate and overwrite the random number within the calculate feature that we are not able to access (e.g., when a survey is paused and restarted, or the enumerator goes backwards in the survey). We reached out to SurveyCTO support but they could not help us fix this issue sufficiently fast. They suggested the situation would correct itself with time, especially given that any random drops after randomization (e.g., the call dropping before treatment) could cause the uneven distributions. However, we did not want to take that risk given our logistical and time constraints. Our sample was already fairly large (almost 4,000) at that point, so we are confident this was not a small sample issue. At the time, we also checked for and confirmed we did not see any other issues such as imbalance on demographic variables.

- no one screened out during either screening protocol 1 or 2 was ever assigned to treatment. Note that under this procedure, randomization is effectively stratified by enumerator as each enumerator runs their own session of SurveyCTO, within which treatment assignment is (at least in expectation) random and uniform.

However, a bug in SurveyCTO resulted in unequal numbers assigned to treatment arms, which we identified during implementation. While the survey was programmed to assign respondents into arms evenly (with 1/6 sampling probability), in practice we found that the calculate function was systematically over-sampling values below 0.5, resulting in the following actual sampling probabilities:

Experimental Arm	Sampling probabilities	Sampling probabilities obtained		
Control	16.67%	21.53%		
Information	16.67%	22.02%		
Regular 1787	16.67%	19.88%		
Assistive 1787	16.67%	17.35%		
Regular SLACC	16.67%	9.64%		
Assistive SLACC	16.67%	9.59%		

Table 1. Sampling probabilities programmed vs. obtained for procedure (1)

The unequal assignment was identified roughly one-third of the way into the rollout (once we had a sufficiently large number to confirm this wasn't purely random) and was phased out when 3,879 respondents out of the total 10,088 sample had been collected. To address the within-survey unequal assignment, we switched to pre-assigning randomization with Stata, starting with procedure (2).

3.2.2 Procedure (2): Pre-survey randomization using Stata

Given the unequal assignment to treatment arms from procedure 1, we decided to switch from randomizing using SurveyCTO to randomizing using Stata's r(uniform) command. As we were already using Stata to conduct the first round of screening, this simply included adding one additional step to that process. In this procedure, all observations were assigned to treatment before any screening occurred (even dropping of fake calls and duplicates etc.). Therefore, starting with this procedure, there is a treatment assignment value associated with every observation shared by PSCA, regardless of whether the observation made it into the final baseline sample.¹¹ As before, observations were randomly assigned to enumerators at the end of this screening procedure. We did not stratify randomization by enumerator, therefore, from this procedure onwards it is not necessarily the case that all enumerators had an equal distribution of treatment groups.¹²

The sampling probabilities used for this second procedure were uniform, to confirm that Stata was assigning treatments evenly before we considered changing sampling probabilities to correct for the imbalance. We used this procedure for 1,721 observations and confirmed the protocol was working as expected.

¹¹ Note that we verified that even after both screening procedures randomization remained even.

¹² We account for this in our analysis by using a combination of enumerator and survey day fixed effects for procedure (1) and only survey day fixed effects for procedure (2) onwards (see section 4 for more details).

Experimental Arm	Sampling probabilities	Sampling probabilities
	programmed	obtained
Control	16.67%	18.25%
Information	16.67%	18.83%
Regular 1787	16.67%	14.24%
Assistive 1787	16.67%	16.04%
Regular SLACC	16.67%	17.61%
Assistive SLACC	16.67%	15.05%

Table 2. Sampling probabilities programmed vs. obtained for procedure (2)

Note that this protocol change was not made available or apparent to enumerators since nothing changed on the SurveyCTO interface they used for conducting surveys. The only difference was built into the software (and therefore entirely hidden from the enumerators), where the screen enumerators saw following the last baseline question was determined by the Stata generated random number rather than the SurveyCTO generated random number. Qualitative evidence from the field supervisor's interviews with enumerators confirms that surveyor behavior was not impacted by this change and importantly, that enumerators were not aware of a respondent's treatment status till after the completion of the baseline survey.

3.2.3 Procedures (3) and (4): Pre-survey randomization using Stata with oversampling

As discussed above, procedure (2) was used to check if the sample generated gave observations in equal proportions as was the initial intent. Procedures (3) and (4) then continued the same new procedure as described above but simply changed the sample proportions to oversample some of the treatments that had been undersampled under procedure (1). We needed two different batches (procedures (3) and (4)) because of some unexpected changes in project end date due to the partner's time constraints. While procedure (3) would have corrected the imbalance by the end of the project with the original study end date, the last batch (and smallest set) made further corrections after we were informed that our timeline would be shortened. After both procedures were implemented, there is no differential assignment across arms. For procedure (3), used for 3,722 observations, the oversampling probabilities were:

Experimental Arm	Sampling probabilities	Sampling probabilities
	programmed	obtained
Control	10.4%	13.27%
Information	9.4%	12.04%
Regular 1787	14.11%	15.31%
Assistive 1787	16.14%	14.32%
Regular SLACC	24.37%	21.63%
Assistive SLACC	25.58%	23.43%

Table 3. Sampling probabilities programmed vs. obtained for procedure (3)

For procedure (4), used for 766 observations, the oversampling probabilities were:

Experimental Arm	Sampling probabilities	Sampling probabilities
	programmed	obtained
Control	4.15%	9.14%
Information	6.7%	10.57%
Regular 1787	11.93%	13.19%
Assistive 1787	26.35%	25.98%
Regular SLACC	26.77%	21.15%
Assistive SLACC	24.09%	19.97%

Table 4. Sampling probabilities programmed vs. obtained for procedure (4)

In addition, during procedure (2), we also increased the baseline survey team size from 7 to 14 enumerators to make up for the implementation time constraints that our partner PSCA started facing. Based on these corrections in procedures (3) and (4) our final sample of 10,088 observations has close to equal numbers under each of the 6 arms:

Experimental Arm	erimental Arm Number of observations assigned		
Control	1,713	16.98%	
Information	1,707	16.92%	
Regular 1787	1,687	16.72%	
Assistive 1787	1,681	16.66%	
Regular SLACC	1,644	16.30%	
Assistive SLACC	1.656	16.42%	

Table 5. Final sample and assignment

3.3 Treatment Consent, Receipt, and Survey Attrition

Finally, in addition to randomization balance we also check for treatment consent and receipt as well as survey attrition. We find that consent for treatment is slightly (at most 3 percentage points) lower in SLACC treatment arms than in 1787 treatments but are not differential within each treatment type (i.e., between assistive and regular). Receipt of treatment is differential across all arms with a magnitude of at most 8 percentage points. There is fairly minimal survey attrition in both the midline and endline surveys.

3.3.1 Treatment Consent and Receipt

Of our six treatment groups, control and information mechanically involve perfect compliance post-baseline survey consent (as in the former no further information is provided and in the latter the enumerators simply read a short informational script). On the other hand, the remaining service experience groups include both treatment consent (the respondent agreeing to the treatment offer) and treatment receipt (the respondent receiving the treatment after acceptance). The latter is not the same as the former as sometimes the service did not pick up the phone or the respondent hung up partway through the call transfer. Therefore, we measure compliance and test for differential compliance across these four groups using the following equations. First, we check treatment consent:

$$C_{it} = B_0 + B_1 Treat_{3i} + B_2 Treat_{4i} + B_3 Treat_{5i} + \lambda_t + \epsilon_{it}$$
(1a)

where C_{it} is a dummy marking consent to treatment, $(Treat_{3i} \text{ through } Treat_{5i})$ are dummies taking the value 1 if the respondent was assigned to one of three service/experience groups (regular 1787, assistive 1787, regular SLACC, and/or assistive SLACC, respectively) and the value 0 if they were assigned to a fourth comparison group (e.g., regular 1787, although we show all pairwise comparisons). λ_t are randomization strata fixed effects (see section 3.2). The tests $B_j \neq 0$, where $j = \{1,2,3\}$, indicate whether compliance is correlated with treatment assignment.

Table A2 shows the results. We see the highest consent rates in the 1787 treatment arms and see that consent is not differential within treatment types (i.e., between the regular and assistive versions). Across treatment types, we see that the 1787 treatment arms have between 2 and 3 percentage points higher consent rates than the equivalent SLACC treatment arm. Consent rates are above 94% for all arms.

Second, we check treatment receipt:

$$R_{it} = B_0 + B_1 Treat_{3i} + B_2 Treat_{4i} + B_3 Treat_{5i} + \lambda_t + \epsilon_{it}$$
(1b)

where R_{it} is a dummy marking receipt of treatment conditional on having consented, $(Treat_{3i}$ through $Treat_{5i}$) are dummies taking the value 1 if the respondent consented to one of three service/experience groups (regular 1787, assistive 1787, regular SLACC, and/or assistive SLACC, respectively) and the value 0 if they consented to a fourth comparison group (e.g. regular 1787). Again, we show although we show all pairwise comparisons. The tests $B_j \neq 0$, where $j = \{1,2,3\}$, indicates whether receipt of treatment is correlated with treatment consent.

Table A3 shows the results. Conditional on consent, we see that treatment receipt rates are above 84% for SLACC and 90% for 1787. While receipt rates for 1787 are systematically 4 to 5 percentage points higher than the equivalent SLACC treatment arms, we also see that the assistive variations have a roughly 2 percentage point lower receipt rate than the regular versions.

3.3.2 Attrition by Survey Round

We are able to survey 87% of baseline respondents at the midline survey and 84% of baseline respondents at the endline survey. Since in both rounds, we attempted with all baseline respondents (whether they respondents in an earlier stage or not) we are able to survey 95% of baseline respondents in at least one of the midline/endline rounds. We then check for differential attrition by estimating the following:

$$A_{it} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 Treat_{1i} + \gamma_2 Treat_{2i} + \gamma_3 Treat_{3i} + \gamma_4 Treat_{4i} + \gamma_5 Treat_{5i} + \lambda_t + \epsilon_{it}$$
(2)

where A_{it} is dummy marking whether individual *i* completed that particular survey round. The dummies $(Treat_{1i} \text{ through } Treat_{5i})$ take the value 1 if individual *i* in randomization day *t* was assigned to one of five treatment groups and 0 if they were assigned to control. The tests $\gamma_k \neq 0$, where k = (1, ..., 5), measure whether attrition is correlated with being in any of the five treatment groups.

The results in Tables A4 and A5, midline and endline respectively, show that attrition varies between 11% and 18%. At both midline and especially endline, assistive 1787 has the lowest attrition rate and therefore occasionally shows significantly less attrition than other treatment

arms, although the raw difference is no more than 2 percentage points at midline and 5 percentage points at endline. Table A6 shows attrition across any survey round, showing that we were able to re-survey between 94% and 96% of baseline respondents in all treatments at least once.

From running the above tests for (i) differential treatment compliance and (ii) differential survey attrition by survey round, we do not find differential imbalance that exacerbates the imbalance in baseline covariates we find and outlined in the next section.

4. Empirical strategy

4.1 Outcomes

There are two main categories of primary outcomes we measure: (1) Perceptions about dispute resolution mechanisms like: fairness, timeliness, and likelihood of satisfactory outcome; and (2) Attitudes toward dispute resolution fora across four aspects: usage, trust, effectiveness, and accessibility. The fora are state forums, informal forums, police services, and legal services.

4.2 Balance checks

We find imbalance on some covariates and outcomes at baseline. In this section, we present a series of checks to show the imbalance along with methodological approaches to address it. Note that we have checked and confirmed that this imbalance did not come from a survey programming error nor from enumerators violating survey protocols. As briefly discussed in section 3.2.1, respondents' treatment status was not visible to enumerators before they completed the baseline survey.¹³ Having ruled out such implementation issues we conducted empirical checks to measure and mitigate baseline imbalance.

For all the checks described below, the treatment variable is included in two forms: (1) Pooled treatments, information, and control, (2) separately by each of the 5 treatment arms and control.

We first show standard balance test results with a set of administrative and survey variables. The combined table B across 3 pages in the appendix show results of regressing each observable characteristic on treatment variables individually, for administrative data and survey data. Table B only includes randomization strata fixed effects given that random assignment was conducted daily (Bruhn and Mackenzie, 2009) and under protocol 1 stratified by enumerator. These fixed effects are constructed as follows: for protocol 1, we group enumerator with day to create our randomization strata (since assignment was stratified at the enumerator level). For the remaining protocols 2 through 4, randomization was done at the beginning of the day; therefore, we only use day as our randomization strata.

¹³ Note that each survey question in the 20-minute survey was required, meaning that it is highly unlikely enumerators were able to skip forward in the survey far enough to see the treatment status then skip back to complete the survey. Furthermore, the number of surveys enumerators conducted each day was closely monitored and this process would have slowed them down to their detriment. Similarly, while for a short period of time enumerators could skip backwards in the survey after having completed it and seeing the treatment status (and theoretically edit the responses from callers), we disabled this feature after learning about it. Controlling for this or restricting our data to only after this incident does not change the imbalance. Finally, qualitative evidence from interviews and discussions with the enumerator show it is almost impossible that this imbalance came from a field implementation error.

The table shows higher than expected imbalance across treatments. On further investigation, we found the following factors contributed to the imbalance:

- 1. There are significant enumerator as well as day of survey fixed effects especially on the more subjective primary outcomes of interests.
- 2. Over the course of implementation, we expanded the number of enumerators (from 7 to 14) to reach the target sample size within timeline and as space capacity constraints by our partner were relaxed.
- 3. We changed the sampling probabilities for different treatment groups over the four procedures explained in section 3.2 and as a result, enumerators did not receive the same number of the different treatments.

Given the large sample size, we are also powered to detect effects up to 0.05 standard deviation and so, the imbalance due to the above combination of factors is statistically detectable. Moreover, several of our baseline variables (especially, the primary outcomes of interests) are highly correlated.

To address the above issues, we have included more flexible control for these factors by including enumerator fixed effects interacted with various time periods as well as some additional demographic and baseline controls.

The combined table C interacts enumerator fixed effects with the four procedures explained in section 3.2 and with respondent age grouped in to 20 categories. The additional demographic and baseline controls include respondent district, respondent gender, crime type being robbery and attitude towards accessibility of police.

The combined table D interacts enumerator fixed effects with "batch" where batch is a strict subset of each procedure - a batch is defined as a period where we had the same set of enumerators (enumerators change both due to increase of enumerators over time as well as differential absenteeism of enumerators) and the same sampling probabilities. The additional demographic and baseline controls include respondent gender, crime type being robbery, attitude towards accessibility of police and attitude towards usage of lawyers.

The combined table E only includes a larger set of demographic and baseline controls, which are – respondent gender, crime type being public order, crime type being robbery, perceptions about case resolution timelines, attitude towards accessibility of police, attitude towards usage of police and attitude towards usage of lawyers.

These additional tables show much better balance and suggest that the aforementioned factors were indeed an important reason behind why we saw the initial imbalance. In addition to using randomization strata as shown in combined table B, additional strategies include the other three specifications used in combined table C, D, and E. If required, we may also use randomization inference and seemingly unrelated regressions. However, initial analysis shows that randomization inference and seemingly unrelated regressions do not affect our results in qualitatively meaningful ways.

4.3 Hypotheses and Estimation Strategy

While the previous sections have outlined work completed to date, both this section and section 4.4 lay out how we will conduct our causal inference analysis. Given the baseline imbalance discussed in section 4.2 we consider it important to lay out our empirical strategy before starting our analysis for transparency purposes.

4.3.1 ITT and LATE Specifications

Given the design of our study we use an instrumental variables design to make causal inferences. Our main specification will have no controls except for the daily randomization strata fixed effects required by our randomization protocol. Given concerns with baseline covariate balance described above, we will start with our main specifications (equations 3a through 4b shown below) that exclude any controls beyond strata fixed effects. However, as this may reduce statistical power in our estimates, we also consider two alternative methods to add controls in our secondary specifications, discussed in section 4.3.2.

Our main intent-to-treat (ITT) specification takes the form:

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Treated_i + Y_{i0} + \lambda_t + \epsilon_{it}$$
(3a)

where Y_{it} is an outcome of interest for individual *i* at time (day) *t*, *Treated*_i is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if individual *i* was assigned to any of the five treatment groups and 0 if they were assigned to control. Y_{i0} is the outcome of interest for individual *i* at baseline t = 0. λ_t are randomization strata fixed effects. B_1 captures the ITT effect of the (pooled) treatment assignment on our outcomes. While our primary specification controls for the baseline value of the dependent variable, we will also examine a more parsimonious specification that excludes Y_{i0} , the outcome of interest for individual *i* at baseline t = 0.

Similarly, when we separate the different treatment arms, we get:

$$Y_{it} = \delta_o + \delta_1 Treat_{1i} + \delta_2 Treat_{2i} + \delta_3 Treat_{3i} + \delta_4 Treat_{4i} + \delta_5 Treat_{5i} + Y_{i0} + \lambda_t + \epsilon_{it}$$
(3b)

where Y_{it} is an outcome of interest for individual *i* at time (day) *t*, $Treat_{1i}$ through $Treat_{5i}$ are dummy variables that take the value 1 if individual *i* was assigned to that particular treatment group and 0 if they were assigned to control. δ_1 through δ_5 capture the ITT effect of each treatment on our outcomes.

Finally, we will estimate a variation of equation (3b) where we pool the regular and assistive version of both treatments, such that the three remaining treatment dummies will correspond to Information, pooled 1787, and pooled SLACC respectively.

Then, similar to equation (3a), our specification to estimate the local average treatment effect (LATE), takes the following form:

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Treated_i + Y_{i0} + \lambda_t + \epsilon_{it}$$
(4a)

where Y_{it} is our outcome of interest, $Treated_i$ is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the individual received the treatment (i.e., consented to the treatment and then was able to talk to

1787 or SLACC), and 0 otherwise. Given that this dummy is endogenous, we instrument for it using treatment assignment, $Treated_i$. Hence, B_1 is our LATE estimator.

As with equation (3b), we will separate out the treatment groups for LATE analysis to measure the individual impact of each treatment using dummies for $Treated_{1i}$ through $Treated_{5i}$ and instrumenting for them using the exogenous dummies $Treat_{1i}$ through $Treat_{5i}$. This will be equation (4b).

As with the ITT, here we will also estimate a variation of equation (4b) where we pool the regular and assistive version of both treatments, such that the receipt dummies will correspond to Information, pooled 1787, and pooled SLACC respectively.

4.3.2 Adding Controls: Double Lasso

In addition to our main specifications, we will employ two additional methods to choose controls in light of the imbalance identified. First, we will include the additional fixed effects specified in section 4.2 earlier.

Second, we conduct double-lasso estimation for optimally selecting controls, identifying potential instrumental variables, and avoiding specifications search (Chernozhukov et. al., 2016). We use double-lasso to optimally select controls and improve precision by reducing standard errors.

4.4. Heterogeneity Analysis

We will conduct heterogeneity analysis using the sociodemographic observables at baseline, such as age, gender, education, and crime type. We will do so in two ways. First, as with balance, we will manually explore key variables that we believe are interesting to examine treatment heterogeneity by (e.g., gender, crime type, and education level). Second, we will deploy a split-sample approach with machine learning (Anderson and Magruder, 2017) to complement our analysis and look for heterogeneity. To do so, we will randomly select and hold 20% of the data (the exploratory sample) where we will test a battery of specifications to select the variables most interesting for treatment heterogeneity analysis. The selected set of variables will then be run in the remaining data (the confirmation sample). We will estimate both the ITT and LATE in each case.

The ITT specification for that is as follows:

$$\begin{array}{l}Y_{it} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 Treated_i + \gamma_2 Observable_{it} + \gamma_3 Treated_i \times Observable_{it} + Y_{i0} + \lambda_t + \\ \in_{it} \end{array} \tag{5a}$$

where γ_2 captures the effects of individual level characteristics on outcomes, and γ_3 captures the effect of the treatment interaction with individual level characteristics.

As in the previous sections, we will also separate out the different treatment groups for heterogeneity analysis (equation (5b)) and estimate the LATE as well for both the pooled (equation (6a)) and unpooled treatments (equation (6b)).

As noted in section 4.2, we find both day of survey as well as enumerator fixed effects which impact some of our variables of interests. Since this variation – especially that across time - is likely exogenous to our treatment impact, we can exploit it further to instrument for variation in these (baseline) variables and examine heterogeneous treatment effects.

5. <u>Survey Instruments and Timeline</u>

5.1 Survey Instruments

All surveys are administered over the phone and in Urdu, using SurveyCTO. The survey sections included:

- 1. Confirmation of the 1-5 caller and screening protocol 2
- 2. Consent
- 3. Sociodemographic information
- 4. Outcomes Case resolution beliefs and expectations
- 5. Outcomes Attitudes towards state actors, informal actors, police, and lawyers
- 6. Experience and satisfaction with the 1-5 helpline (baseline survey only)
- 7. Awareness of services

The midline and endline surveys included almost all the same sections, except for Sections 3, 4, and 7.

5.2 Timeline

Data collection started in June 2022 and lasted approximately 8 months. We administered three surveys sequentially in the following order:

- 1. Receive observation data from PSCA Day 0
- 2. Baseline survey Day 2
 - (a) Follow-up call for assistive arms Day 4-5 (see trial registry for more details)(b) Re-treatment (optional) for assistive arms Day 5-6
- 3. Midline survey Day 16
- 4. Endline survey Day 46

We completed data collection in early January 2023 with a final study sample of 10,088 respondents.

Appendix

January 22, 2024

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A Funnel table, survey attrition and treatment compliance

A.1 Funnel - filters during pre-processing and survey call

Table 1: Filters applied during the pre-processing stage and the survey call for enrolling respondents into the study baseline

Filter	# obs remain	%obs remain	Comments
Raw PSCA shared	140,793	100.00	True data after removing "phantom" rows from formatting issues
Removing bank alarms and fake calls	137,491	97.65	0
Removing rows with non-fixable phone numbers	135,552	96.28	These phone numbers cannot be fixed by adding a local code and/or are less than 10-digits
Dropping within-day duplicated numbers and across-day duplicates that have already been surveyed	119,229	84.68	**Approx. 12.04% drop. We use the most recent call for the survey but save all within-day calls. We drop an across- day duplicate only if it has been surveyed already.
Removing numbers marked as re- solved in admin data	97,249	69.07	**Approximately 18.44% resolved-from- admin rate.
Attempted phone numbers by field team	49,948	35.48	We attempt on average 51.36% of the available data.
Removing phone numbers that did not pick up	35,797	25.43	**Approximately 71.67% pickup rate
Removing individuals who deny hav- ing made the 15-call	35,072	24.91	
Removing phone numbers where the person who made the 15-call was never found	32,678	23.21	The person who picked up could not con- nect us to the complainant and did not know the case details either
Dropping phone numbers self- reported as resolved	14,647	10.40	**Approx a 55.18% resolved-on-call rate.
Removing bystanders and people no longer pursuing their case	11,701	8.31	**This is approximately a 20.11% drop.
Removing people who strictly did not provide consent	10,748	7.63	**This is approximately 91.86% strict consent rate. That is, the respondent an- swers 'Yes' at the informed consent point.
Sample in the study (survey completed and randomized into the study)	10,088	7.16	**Note this last filter removes those who withdrew consent during the survey or hung up and never picked up again. In- cluding this, the overall consent rate is 86.26%.

A.2 Consent for Treatment

	(1) Assignment	(2) Consent for treatment	(3) % consented out of assigned	(4) P-val against Regular 1787	(5) P-val against Assistive 1787	(6) P-val against Regular SLACC
Regular 1787	1687	1650	97.81			
Assistive 1787	1681	1637	97.38	0.506		
Regular SLACC	1644	1557	94.71	0.000	0.001	
Assistive SLACC	1656	1576	95.17	0.000	0.006	0.450
Total	6668	6420	96.28			

Note: These tests include daily randomization strata fixed effects

A.3 Received Treatment

	(1) Consent for treatment	(2) Received treatment	(3) % received out of consented to treat	(4) P-val against Regular 1787	(5) P-val against Assistive 1787	(6) P-val against Regular SLACC
Regular 1787	1650	1520	92.12			
Assistive 1787	1637	1475	90.10	0.002		
Regular SLACC	1557	1360	87.35	0.002	0.348	
Assistive SLACC	1576	1334	84.64	0.000	0.002	0.029
Total	6420	5689	88.61			

Note: These tests include daily randomization strata fixed effects

Midline survey attrition A.4

	(1)	(2)	(3) % Resurveyed out	(4) P-val agains	(5) t P-val against	(6) P-val against	(7) P-val against	(8) P-val against
	Assigned	Resurveyed	of assigned	Control	Information	Regular 1787	Assistive 1787	Regular SLACC
Control	1713	1506	87.92					
Information	1707	1483	86.88	0.449				
Regular 1787	1687	1454	86.19	0.308	0.513			
Assistive 1787	1681	1493	88.82	0.523	0.341	0.106		
Regular SLACC	1644	1434	87.23	0.854	0.887	0.305	0.309	
Assistive SLACC	1656	1417	85.57	0.359	0.262	0.679	0.009	0.414
Total	10088	8787	87.10	•	•	•	•	•

Note: These tests include daily randomization strata fixed effects

A.5 Endline survey attrition

	(1)	(2)	(3) Z. Recurrenced out	(4)	(5) D vol aggingt	(6) D val aggingt	(7) D vol accinct	(8) P vol aggingt
	Assigned l	Resurveyed	of assigned	Control	Information	Regular 1787	Assistive 1787	Regular SLACC
Control	1713	1413	82.49					
Information	1707	1441	84.42	0.103				
Regular 1787	1687	1423	84.35	0.151	0.865			
Assistive 1787	1681	1472	87.57	0.001	0.027	0.051		
Regular SLACC	1644	1363	82.91	0.267	0.397	0.629	0.017	
Assistive SLACC	1656	1386	83.70	0.146	0.758	0.524	0.068	0.324
Total	10088	8498	84.24	•	•	•	•	

Note: These tests include daily randomization strata fixed effects

A.6 Attrition in any survey round

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
			% Resurveyed out	P-val agains	t P-val against	P-val against	P-val against	P-val against
	Assigned	Resurveyed	of assigned	Control	Information	Regular 1787	Assistive 1787	Regular SLACC
Control	1713	1629	95.10					
Information	1707	1628	95.37	0.619				
Regular 1787	1687	1592	94.37	0.418	0.254			
Assistive 1787	1681	1618	96.25	0.252	0.331	0.067		
Regular SLACC	1644	1555	94.59	0.801	0.718	0.775	0.319	
Assistive SLACC	1656	1575	95.11	0.634	0.694	0.157	0.388	0.147
Total	10088	9597	95.13		•			•

Note: These tests include daily randomization strata fixed effects

B Balance tables with only randomization strata fixed effects

B.1 With administrative data (1/2)

		Demogr	aphics				Survey				Awa	reness					Respon	dent		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11) Legal Aid	(12)	(13) Feedback	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
	Age	Gender (Female)	Edu (Years)	Highest Edu	Hour	Time (3 Levels)	Dav	Survey Dur.	Phone No.	Legal Aid	Name (Dummy)	Police Feedback	Name (Dummy)	Day	Morning	Afternoon	Night	Time (3 Levels)	15-Resp Gender	Main Complainant
Panel A: Treatme	nts Pool	ed and Inf	ormation	i Data	nour	(o never)	Day	Dur	110.	ma	(Duning)	rooubdolt	(Duniny)	Duj	morning			(o hereis)	Gender	Complainant
Pooled Treatments	$0.046 \\ (0.028) \\ [0.106]$	-0.052* (0.028) [0.066]	-0.009 (0.028) [0.747]	-0.029 (0.029) [0.312]	-0.010 (0.028) [0.727]	-0.003 (0.028) [0.921]	0.007 (0.014) [0.599]	-0.055^{*} (0.028) [0.051]	-0.045 (0.028) [0.109]	$0.002 \\ (0.027) \\ [0.944]$	-0.024 (0.028) [0.387]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.007 \\ (0.029) \\ [0.808] \end{array}$	-0.003 (0.028) [0.906]	-0.002 (0.011) [0.815]	0.064^{**} (0.025) [0.012]	-0.045^{*} (0.025) [0.077]	-0.013 (0.024) [0.570]	-0.044^{*} (0.024) [0.069]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.032 \\ (0.028) \\ [0.248] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.017 \\ (0.028) \\ [0.545] \end{array}$
Information	$\begin{array}{c} 0.044 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.216] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.009 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.787] \end{array}$	-0.030 (0.035) [0.397]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.010 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.781] \end{array}$	-0.030 (0.035) [0.383]	-0.020 (0.035) [0.563]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.027 \\ (0.017) \\ [0.120] \end{array}$	-0.182*** (0.035) [0.000]	-0.024 (0.035) [0.501]	-0.011 (0.034) [0.751]	-0.056 (0.035) [0.107]	-0.009 (0.036) [0.811]	-0.032 (0.035) [0.354]	-0.002 (0.013) [0.907]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.036 \\ (0.032) \\ [0.259] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.001 \\ (0.032) \\ [0.985] \end{array}$	-0.033 (0.029) [0.261]	-0.040 (0.030) [0.181]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.042 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.230] \end{array}$	$0.009 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.788]$
Panel B: All Trea	tments s	eparate																		
Information	$\begin{array}{c} 0.043 \ (0.035) \ [0.218] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.009 \ (0.035) \ [0.796] \end{array}$	-0.030 (0.035) [0.396]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.010 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.771] \end{array}$	-0.031 (0.035) [0.381]	-0.020 (0.035) [0.560]	0.027 (0.017) [0.119]	-0.182^{***} (0.035) [0.000]	-0.024 (0.035) [0.503]	-0.011 (0.034) [0.747]	-0.056 (0.035) [0.108]	-0.009 (0.036) [0.806]	-0.032 (0.035) [0.353]	-0.002 (0.013) [0.909]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.036 \\ (0.032) \\ [0.259] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.000 \\ (0.032) \\ [0.988] \end{array}$	-0.033 (0.029) [0.263]	-0.040 (0.030) [0.182]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.042 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.230] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.009 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.789] \end{array}$
Regular 1787	$\begin{array}{c} 0.069^{**} \\ (0.035) \\ [0.050] \end{array}$	-0.083^{**} (0.035) [0.019]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.047 \ (0.035) \ [0.183] \end{array}$	-0.011 (0.036) [0.756]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.003 \ (0.035) \ [0.935] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.008 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.812] \end{array}$	-0.001 (0.017) [0.974]	-0.056 (0.036) [0.116]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.006 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.864] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.016 \\ (0.034) \\ [0.634] \end{array}$	-0.033 (0.035) [0.352]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.002 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.951] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.014 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.695] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.010 \\ (0.013) \\ [0.450] \end{array}$	0.102^{***} (0.032) [0.001]	-0.088*** (0.032) [0.005]	-0.005 (0.030) [0.854]	-0.060^{**} (0.030) [0.045]	-0.002 (0.035) [0.955]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.052 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.137] \end{array}$
Assistive 1787	$\begin{array}{c} 0.025 \ (0.036) \ [0.486] \end{array}$	-0.098^{***} (0.035) [0.006]	-0.028 (0.036) [0.436]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.022 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.549] \end{array}$	-0.029 (0.035) [0.410]	-0.026 (0.035) [0.455]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.019 \\ (0.017) \\ [0.287] \end{array}$	-0.018 (0.036) [0.609]	-0.047 (0.035) [0.187]	-0.016 (0.034) [0.639]	-0.008 (0.035) [0.820]	-0.010 (0.036) [0.778]	-0.017 (0.035) [0.622]	-0.003 (0.013) [0.847]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.057^{*} \\ (0.032) \\ [0.072] \end{array}$	-0.044 (0.032) [0.168]	-0.008 (0.030) [0.775]	-0.037 (0.030) [0.218]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.047 \ (0.035) \ [0.186] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.010 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.787] \end{array}$
Regular SLACC	$\begin{array}{c} 0.023 \ (0.036) \ [0.532] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.015 \ (0.036) \ [0.670] \end{array}$	-0.044 (0.036) [0.226]	-0.079^{**} (0.037) [0.031]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.002 \ (0.036) \ [0.950] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.010 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.784] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.003 \ (0.018) \ [0.845] \end{array}$	-0.092^{**} (0.037) [0.013]	-0.078^{**} (0.036) [0.030]	-0.011 (0.035) [0.746]	-0.022 (0.036) [0.531]	-0.009 (0.037) [0.798]	-0.008 (0.036) [0.814]	-0.011 (0.013) [0.420]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.029 \\ (0.032) \\ [0.362] \end{array}$	-0.032 (0.032) [0.330]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.005 \ (0.030) \ [0.880] \end{array}$	-0.014 (0.031) [0.657]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.039 \ (0.036) \ [0.270] \end{array}$	-0.016 (0.036) [0.649]
Assistive SLACC	$\begin{array}{c} 0.064^{*} \ (0.036) \ [0.075] \end{array}$	-0.031 (0.036) [0.395]	-0.020 (0.036) [0.584]	-0.057 (0.037) [0.118]	-0.015 (0.036) [0.676]	-0.002 (0.036) [0.959]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.008 \ (0.018) \ [0.663] \end{array}$	-0.061 (0.037) [0.101]	-0.071^{**} (0.036) [0.049]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.018 \ (0.035) \ [0.596] \end{array}$	-0.034 (0.036) [0.337]	$0.048 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.191]$	-0.003 (0.036) [0.944]	-0.009 (0.013) [0.523]	0.060^{*} (0.032) [0.064]	-0.009 (0.032) [0.789]	-0.046 (0.030) [0.127]	-0.062^{**} (0.031) [0.045]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.049 \ (0.036) \ [0.166] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.017 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.632] \end{array}$
Ν	10088	10087	10030	10088	10088	10088	10088	9025	10088	10025	10088	10043	10088	10088	10088	10088	10088	10088	9739	10088

B.2 With administrative data (2/2)

						PSCA (Crime typ	е										PSCA J	usrisdictio	on			
	(1)	(2)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18) Data	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)										
	Assault	Casualties / Murder	Complaints	Consult	Drugs	Fraud	Kidnap	Lost / Found	Other	Public order	Robbery	Sex crime	Traffic	Ravi	Shalamar	Wagha	Aziz Bhatti	Gunj Buksh	Gulberg	Samanabad	Iqbal	Nishtar	Canton -ment
Panel A: Treatme	ents Pool	ed and Inform	nation																				
Pooled Treatments	-0.046 (0.028) [0.104]	0.020 (0.028) [0.483]	-0.051^{*} (0.028) [0.069]	-0.056^{**} (0.028) [0.045]	-0.012 (0.028) [0.669]	-0.020 (0.028) [0.472]	0.046^{*} (0.028) [0.099]	-0.044 (0.028) [0.115]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.001 \\ (0.028) \\ [0.968] \end{array}$	-0.086^{***} (0.028) [0.002]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.112^{***} \\ (0.028) \\ [0.000] \end{array}$	-0.008 (0.028) [0.781]	-0.048^{*} (0.028) [0.087]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.047^{*} \\ (0.028) \\ [0.094] \end{array}$	-0.028 (0.028) [0.317]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.026 \\ (0.028) \\ [0.365] \end{array}$	-0.014 (0.028) [0.612]	-0.027 (0.028) [0.342]	-0.004 (0.028) [0.881]	-0.030 (0.028) [0.291]	$0.008 \\ (0.028) \\ [0.786]$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.007 \\ (0.028) \\ [0.795] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.001 \\ (0.028) \\ [0.971] \end{array}$
Information	$\begin{array}{c} 0.041 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.247] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.024 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.491] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.027 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.440] \end{array}$	-0.074^{**} (0.035) [0.032]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.031 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.378] \end{array}$	-0.027 (0.035) [0.440]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.052 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.141] \end{array}$	-0.036 (0.035) [0.296]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.030 \\ (0.034) \\ [0.380] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.044 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.201] \end{array}$	-0.068^{**} (0.034) [0.047]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.021 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.555] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.004 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.912] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.022 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.532] \end{array}$	-0.009 (0.035) [0.801]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.030 \ (0.035) \ [0.395] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.001 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.977] \end{array}$	-0.004 (0.035) [0.902]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.037 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.298] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.008 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.813] \end{array}$	-0.007 (0.035) [0.841]	-0.037 (0.035) [0.290]	-0.028 (0.035) [0.425]
Panel B: All Trea	tments s	eparate																					
Information	$\begin{array}{c} 0.040 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.250] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.024 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.488] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.027 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.442] \end{array}$	-0.075^{**} (0.035) [0.032]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.031 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.378] \end{array}$	-0.027 (0.035) [0.442]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.052 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.139] \end{array}$	-0.036 (0.035) [0.297]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.030 \\ (0.034) \\ [0.381] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.044 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.202] \end{array}$	-0.068** (0.034) [0.048]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.021 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.551] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.004 \ (0.035) \ [0.907] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.022 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.535] \end{array}$	-0.009 (0.035) [0.806]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.030 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.393] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.001 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.972] \end{array}$	-0.004 (0.035) [0.903]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.037 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.299] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.008 \ (0.035) \ [0.815] \end{array}$	-0.007 (0.035) [0.843]	-0.037 (0.035) [0.288]	-0.028 (0.035) [0.423]
Regular 1787	-0.064* (0.035) [0.068]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.049 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.167] \end{array}$	-0.045 (0.035) [0.196]	-0.008 (0.035) [0.809]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.025 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.485] \end{array}$	-0.000 (0.035) [0.997]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.027 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.439] \end{array}$	-0.025 (0.035) [0.469]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.000 \ (0.035) \ [0.993] \end{array}$	-0.091*** (0.035) [0.009]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.090^{***} \\ (0.035) \\ [0.009] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.037 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.297] \end{array}$	-0.038 (0.035) [0.285]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.023 \ (0.035) \ [0.521] \end{array}$	-0.064^{*} (0.035) [0.071]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.029 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.408] \end{array}$	-0.016 (0.035) [0.643]	-0.010 (0.035) [0.774]	-0.029 (0.035) [0.417]	-0.025 (0.035) [0.479]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.024 \ (0.035) \ [0.505] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.012 \ (0.035) \ [0.743] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.036 \ (0.035) \ [0.317] \end{array}$
Assistive 1787	-0.074^{**} (0.035) [0.037]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.026 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.462] \end{array}$	-0.058^{*} (0.035) [0.096]	-0.102*** (0.035) [0.004]	-0.022 (0.035) [0.532]	-0.015 (0.035) [0.664]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.078^{**} \\ (0.035) \\ [0.028] \end{array}$	-0.051 (0.035) [0.150]	-0.001 (0.035) [0.986]	-0.105*** (0.035) [0.003]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.140^{***} \ (0.035) \ [0.000] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.005 \ (0.035) \ [0.894] \end{array}$	-0.023 (0.035) [0.511]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.033 \ (0.036) \ [0.349] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.004 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.903] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.033 \ (0.036) \ [0.362] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.006 \ (0.035) \ [0.862] \end{array}$	-0.024 (0.035) [0.497]	-0.007 (0.035) [0.844]	-0.043 (0.036) [0.229]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.017 \ (0.036) \ [0.636] \end{array}$	-0.005 (0.036) [0.894]	-0.020 (0.036) [0.573]
Regular SLACC	-0.002 (0.036) [0.953]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.005 \ (0.036) \ [0.883] \end{array}$	-0.091^{**} (0.036) [0.011]	-0.016 (0.036) [0.653]	-0.031 (0.036) [0.384]	-0.012 (0.035) [0.728]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.045 \ (0.036) \ [0.213] \end{array}$	-0.025 (0.036) [0.480]	-0.012 (0.035) [0.725]	-0.041 (0.036) [0.245]	0.088^{**} (0.035) [0.013]	-0.049 (0.036) [0.168]	-0.086^{**} (0.036) [0.017]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.081^{**} \\ (0.036) \\ [0.025] \end{array}$	-0.019 (0.036) [0.598]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.048 \ (0.036) \ [0.188] \end{array}$	-0.003 (0.036) [0.938]	-0.038 (0.036) [0.289]	-0.003 (0.036) [0.927]	-0.026 (0.036) [0.469]	-0.024 (0.036) [0.506]	-0.007 (0.036) [0.851]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.002 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.956] \end{array}$
Assistive SLACC	-0.036 (0.036) [0.316]	-0.007 (0.036) [0.849]	-0.010 (0.036) [0.786]	-0.099*** (0.036) [0.006]	-0.024 (0.036) [0.495]	-0.056 (0.035) [0.113]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.035 \ (0.036) \ [0.324] \end{array}$	-0.077^{**} (0.036) [0.030]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.017 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.623] \end{array}$	-0.104*** (0.036) [0.003]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.130^{***} \ (0.035) \ [0.000] \end{array}$	-0.032 (0.036) [0.364]	-0.051 (0.036) [0.152]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.059 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.104] \end{array}$	-0.033 (0.036) [0.368]	-0.008 (0.036) [0.823]	-0.046 (0.036) [0.199]	-0.038 (0.036) [0.292]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.026 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.462] \end{array}$	-0.025 (0.036) [0.492]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.010 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.779] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.030 \ (0.036) \ [0.408] \end{array}$	-0.017 (0.036) [0.646]
Ν	10088	10088	10088	10088	10088	10088	10088	10088	10088	10088	10088	10088	10088	10078	10078	10078	10078	10078	10078	10078	10078	10078	10078

B.3 With survey data

	Expected Case Resolution							\mathbf{Exp}	erience	with 15			Cas	e Resolu	ition		Percept	ions - St	ate	1	Perceptio	ons - Pol	ice	F	erceptio	ons - Law	yers	Р	erceptio	ns - Info	rmal
	$\binom{(1)}{Own}$	(2) Gen	$_{ m Own}^{ m (3)}$	(4) Gen	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12) Feedback	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)	(31)
	(Lvls)	(Lvls)	(Days)	(Days)Fa	$_{\rm ctors}$	Satis.	Coop.	Polite	Overal	l Timely	Helpful	Call	Timely	Satis.	Fair	Usage	Trust	Effectiv	e Access	Usage	Trust	Effectiv	e Access	Usage	Trust	Effective	e Access	Usage	Trust	Effective	Access
Panel A: T	reatmen	ts Pool	led and	l Informa	ation																										
Pooled Trea	t 0.097**	0.053	0.053	-0.007 0	.008	0.065**	0.051*	0.087**	* 0.015	0.054^{*}	-0.102***	* 0.044	-0.103**	* -0.008	-0.053*	0.064**	-0.004	0.004	-0.112***	0.148***	0.011	0.020	-0.111***	*0.069**	0.018	-0.011	-0.112**	* -0.027	-0.057**	-0.057**	-0.091***
	(0.042) [0.021]	(0.038) [0.163]	(0.051) [0.295]	(0.041)(0) [0.864][0]	.028) .775]	(0.028) [0.020]	(0.028) [0.065]	(0.028) [0.002]	(0.028) [0.599]	(0.028) [0.055]	(0.038) [0.008]	(0.027) [0.106]	(0.027) [0.000]	(0.025) [0.749]	(0.027) [0.052]	(0.027) [0.016]	(0.028) [0.877]	(0.028) [0.874]	(0.027) [0.000]	(0.027) [0.000]	(0.028) [0.691]	(0.027) [0.467]	(0.028) [0.000]	(0.027) [0.011]	(0.029) [0.538]	(0.029) [0.701]	(0.028) [0.000]	(0.028) [0.328]	(0.028) [0.040]	(0.027) [0.038]	(0.028) [0.001]
Info	-0.041 (0.054) [0.449]	-0.026 (0.048) [0.591]	-0.062 (0.065) [0.337]	-0.040 0 (0.053)(0 [0.447][0	.038 .035) .269]	-0.059* (0.034) [0.089]	-0.029 (0.034) [0.402]	-0.027 (0.035) [0.440]	-0.026 (0.035) [0.447]	0.002) (0.035) [0.949]	-0.069 (0.048) [0.150]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.010 \\ (0.034) \\ [0.774] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.000 \\ (0.034) \\ [0.990] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.013 \\ (0.031) \\ [0.681] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.001 \\ (0.034) \\ [0.965] \end{array}$	-0.022 (0.033) [0.499]	-0.068* (0.035) [0.053]	-0.057 (0.035) [0.102]	-0.058^{*} (0.034) [0.091]	-0.027 (0.033) [0.415]	-0.071** (0.035) [0.041]	* -0.057* (0.034) [0.097]	-0.041 (0.035) [0.230]	-0.009 (0.034) [0.787]	-0.072** (0.036) [0.046]	* -0.065* (0.036) [0.067]	-0.057 (0.035) [0.103]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.047 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.172] \end{array}$	-0.006 (0.034) [0.870]	-0.016 (0.034) [0.646]	-0.048 (0.034) [0.163]
Panel B: A	ll Treat	ments s	separat	e																											
Info	-0.040 (0.054) [0.457]	-0.025 (0.048) [0.598]	-0.062 (0.065) [0.339]	-0.039 0)(0.053)(0 [0.461][0	.039 .035) .269]	-0.059* (0.034) [0.087]	-0.029 (0.034) [0.399]	-0.027 (0.035) [0.435]	-0.027 (0.035) [0.441]	0.002 (0.035) [0.951]	-0.069 (0.048) [0.147]	0.009 (0.034) [0.783]	0.000 (0.034) [0.993]	0.013 (0.031) [0.686]	0.001 (0.034) [0.972]	-0.022 (0.033) [0.496]	-0.069* (0.035) [0.051]	-0.058* (0.035) [0.098]	-0.058^{*} (0.034) [0.092]	-0.027 (0.033) [0.413]	-0.071** (0.035) [0.040]	* -0.057* (0.034) [0.094]	-0.041 (0.035) [0.230]	-0.009 (0.034) [0.786]	-0.073** (0.036) [0.044]	* -0.066* (0.035) [0.063]	-0.057 (0.035) [0.106]	0.047 (0.035) [0.172]	-0.006 (0.034) [0.872]	-0.016 (0.034) [0.648]	-0.048 (0.034) [0.163]
Reg 1787	0.050 (0.054) [0.354]	-0.004 (0.048) [0.936]	0.076 (0.066) [0.253]	-0.018 0)(0.052)(0 [0.727][0	.015 .035) .668]	0.042 (0.035) [0.224]	0.057* (0.035) [0.099]	0.072** (0.035) [0.039]	0.035 (0.035) [0.319]	0.047) (0.035) [0.178]	-0.135*** (0.047) [0.004]	* 0.011 (0.034) [0.756]	-0.114*** (0.034) [0.001]	*-0.057* (0.032) [0.070]	-0.048 (0.034) [0.159]	0.068** (0.033) [0.040]	0.005 (0.035) [0.886]	0.014 (0.035) [0.689]	-0.076** (0.034) [0.026]	0.103*** (0.034) [0.002]	0.006 (0.035) [0.862]	0.010 (0.034) [0.760]	-0.062* (0.035) [0.072]	0.070** (0.034) [0.040]	0.024 (0.037) [0.505]	-0.020 (0.036) [0.580]	-0.093*** (0.035) [0.009]	* -0.014 (0.035) [0.693]	-0.046 (0.035) [0.188]	-0.055 (0.034) [0.112]	-0.049 (0.035) [0.156]
Asst 1787	0.109^{**} (0.054) [0.045]	$0.063 \\ (0.048) \\ [0.185]$	0.074 (0.066) [0.261]	$0.039 ext{ 0} 0 \\ (0.052) (0 \\ [0.451] [0 \\] 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 $.012 .035) .727]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.048 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.169] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.025 \ (0.035) \ [0.474] \end{array}$	0.064^{*} (0.035) [0.070]	-0.019 (0.035) [0.583]	0.043 (0.035) [0.219]	-0.093* (0.048) [0.053]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.020 \\ (0.034) \\ [0.568] \end{array}$	-0.109** (0.034) [0.001]	* -0.011 (0.032) [0.729]	-0.077^{**} (0.034) [0.024]	0.050 (0.033) [0.137]	-0.059* (0.036) [0.096]	-0.056 (0.035) [0.115]	-0.107*** (0.035) [0.002]	0.159^{***} (0.034) [0.000]	-0.026 (0.035) [0.456]	-0.020 (0.034) [0.566]	-0.118*** (0.035) [0.001]	* 0.065 * (0.034) [0.055]	-0.040 (0.037) [0.273]	-0.069^{*} (0.036) [0.056]	-0.059* (0.035) [0.094]	-0.032 (0.035) [0.360]	-0.049 (0.035) [0.158]	-0.053 (0.035) [0.128]	-0.104*** (0.035) [0.003]
Reg SLACC	$\begin{array}{c} 0.141^{***} \\ (0.054) \\ [0.009] \end{array}$	$^{*0.094}_{(0.048)}$	$^{\circ}$ 0.021 (0.065) [0.748]	-0.047 -0 (0.052)(0 [0.364][0	.009 .036) .792]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.048 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.172] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.055 \ (0.035) \ [0.118] \end{array}$	0.070^{*} (0.036) [0.050]	-0.027 (0.035) [0.451]	0.076^{**}) (0.036) [0.035]	-0.138*** (0.048) [0.004]	* 0.050 (0.035) [0.154]	-0.135*** (0.035) [0.000]	* -0.012 (0.032) [0.712]	-0.100^{**} (0.035) [0.004]	* 0.057* (0.034) [0.094]	-0.030 (0.036) [0.403]	-0.012 (0.036) [0.740]	-0.140*** (0.035) [0.000]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.119^{***} \\ (0.034) \\ [0.001] \end{array}$	(0.022) (0.036) [0.534]	-0.007 (0.035) [0.839]	-0.157^{**} (0.035) [0.000]	* 0.063 * (0.035) [0.072]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.000 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.998] \end{array}$	-0.010 (0.037) [0.794]	-0.184*** (0.036) [0.000]	* -0.033 (0.036) [0.355]	-0.067^{*} (0.035) [0.057]	-0.042 (0.035) [0.234]	-0.105*** (0.035) [0.003]
Asst SLACC	0.092^{*} (0.054) [0.088]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.063 \\ (0.048) \\ [0.188] \end{array}$	0.043 (0.064) [0.498]	-0.004 0)(0.052)(0 [0.945][0	.012 (.036) .730]	0.126^{***} (0.035) [0.000]	$^{*}0.069^{*}$ (0.035) [0.051]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.147^{**} \\ (0.036) \\ [0.000] \end{array}$	*0.070* (0.035) [0.049]	* 0.051) (0.036) [0.151]	-0.038 (0.048) [0.438]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.105^{***} \\ (0.035) \\ [0.003] \end{array}$	-0.054 (0.035) [0.124]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.056^{*} \\ (0.032) \\ [0.081] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.016 \ (0.035) \ [0.645] \end{array}$	0.083^{**} (0.034) [0.015]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.072^{**} \\ (0.036) \\ [0.047] \end{array}$	0.076^{**} (0.036) [0.033]	(0.130^{***}) (0.035) [0.000]	0.217^{***} (0.034) [0.000]	0.092^{***} (0.036) [0.010]	$^{*0.102}_{(0.035)}^{**}$	*-0.115*** (0.035) [0.001]	$^{*0.079**}_{(0.035)}_{[0.022]}$	0.095^{**} (0.037) [0.011]	0.063^{*} (0.037) [0.085]	-0.125*** (0.036) [0.001]	* -0.032 (0.036) [0.370]	-0.068* (0.035) [0.055]	-0.079** (0.035) [0.025]	-0.110*** (0.036) [0.002]
Ν	4176	5129	2893	3921 9	965	10087	10087	10087	10087	10068	5768	9970	10088	10088	10088	9790	9631	9613	9942	10070	10013	9982	10016	9585	8841	8961	9669	9637	9346	9385	9563

- C Balance tables with fixed effects of randomization strata, enumerator * round interaction, enumerator * respondent age (20 levels) interaction, respondent gender, crime type (robbery), respondent district, and access to police
- C.1 With administrative data (1/2)

		Demogr	aphics				Survey				Awa	areness					Respon	dent		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11) Legal Aid	(12)	(13) Feedback	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
	Age	Gender (Female)	Edu (Years)	Highest Edu	Hour	Time (3 Levels)	Day	Survey Dur.	Phone No.	Legal Aid	Name (Dummy)	Police Feedback	Name (Dummy)	Day	Morning	Afternoon	Night	Time (3 Levels)	15-Resp Gender	Main Complainant
Panel A: Treatme	ents Pool	led and In	formatio	m																
Pooled Treatments	$\begin{array}{c} 0.000 \\ (0.003) \\ [0.968] \end{array}$	-0.000 (.) [.]	$0.008 \\ (0.028) \\ [0.784]$	-0.018 (0.028) [0.530]	-0.013 (0.029) [0.653]	-0.008 (0.029) [0.772]	$0.007 \\ (0.014) \\ [0.613]$	-0.042 (0.028) [0.141]	-0.027 (0.029) [0.345]	-0.002 (0.029) [0.944]	-0.036 (0.029) [0.215]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.002 \\ (0.031) \\ [0.950] \end{array}$	-0.012 (0.029) [0.667]	-0.003 (0.011) [0.761]	0.050^{*} (0.026) [0.056]	-0.040 (0.026) [0.128]	-0.006 (0.024) [0.809]	-0.032 (0.025) [0.204]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.036 \\ (0.030) \\ [0.221] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.038 \\ (0.028) \\ [0.177] \end{array}$
Information	-0.005 (0.004) [0.187]	-0.000 (.) [.]	-0.031 (0.035) [0.375]	-0.010 (0.035) [0.782]	-0.025 (0.036) [0.488]	-0.021 (0.036) [0.561]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.028 \ (0.018) \ [0.109] \end{array}$	-0.179*** (0.035) [0.000]	-0.018 (0.036) [0.621]	-0.014 (0.036) [0.698]	-0.061^{*} (0.036) [0.086]	-0.008 (0.038) [0.823]	-0.036 (0.036) [0.317]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.001 \ (0.013) \ [0.936] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.037 \\ (0.032) \\ [0.250] \end{array}$	-0.001 (0.032) [0.964]	-0.032 (0.030) [0.283]	-0.041 (0.031) [0.186]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.052 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.155] \end{array}$	-0.007 (0.035) [0.847]
Panel B: All Trea	tments s	separate																		
Information	-0.005 (0.004) [0.188]	0.000 (.) [.]	-0.031 (0.035) [0.374]	-0.009 (0.035) [0.794]	-0.025 (0.036) [0.486]	-0.021 (0.036) [0.557]	$0.028 \\ (0.018) \\ [0.108]$	-0.179^{***} (0.035) [0.000]	-0.018 (0.036) [0.623]	-0.014 (0.036) [0.695]	-0.061^{*} (0.036) [0.088]	-0.009 (0.038) [0.818]	-0.036 (0.036) [0.317]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.001 \\ (0.013) \\ [0.935] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.037 \\ (0.032) \\ [0.250] \end{array}$	-0.002 (0.032) [0.960]	-0.032 (0.030) [0.286]	-0.040 (0.031) [0.188]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.052 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.156] \end{array}$	-0.007 (0.035) [0.845]
Regular 1787	$\begin{array}{c} 0.003 \\ (0.004) \\ [0.485] \end{array}$	-0.000 (.) [.]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.052 \ (0.036) \ [0.141] \end{array}$	-0.008 (0.035) [0.826]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.008 \ (0.036) \ [0.825] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.010 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.776] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.002 \\ (0.018) \\ [0.906] \end{array}$	-0.056 (0.036) [0.119]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.032 \ (0.036) \ [0.377] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.012 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.747] \end{array}$	-0.042 (0.036) [0.249]	-0.006 (0.038) [0.869]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.010 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.788] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.008 \ (0.014) \ [0.562] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.082^{**} \\ (0.033) \\ [0.012] \end{array}$	-0.076^{**} (0.033) [0.021]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.001 \\ (0.030) \\ [0.981] \end{array}$	-0.045 (0.031) [0.144]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.004 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.910] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.049 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.167] \end{array}$
Assistive 1787	-0.000 (0.004) [0.980]	-0.000 (.) [.]	-0.016 (0.036) [0.644]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.030 \ (0.036) \ [0.403] \end{array}$	-0.031 (0.036) [0.391]	-0.031 (0.036) [0.388]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.017 \ (0.018) \ [0.343] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.001 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.982] \end{array}$	-0.035 (0.036) [0.338]	-0.021 (0.036) [0.566]	-0.013 (0.036) [0.710]	-0.008 (0.038) [0.830]	-0.021 (0.036) [0.568]	-0.005 (0.014) [0.725]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.040 \\ (0.033) \\ [0.221] \end{array}$	-0.037 (0.033) [0.254]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.001 \\ (0.031) \\ [0.979] \end{array}$	-0.022 (0.031) [0.482]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.052 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.162] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.030 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.397] \end{array}$
Regular SLACC	$\begin{array}{c} 0.001 \\ (0.004) \\ [0.686] \end{array}$	-0.000 (.) [.]	-0.011 (0.036) [0.758]	-0.058 (0.036) [0.111]	-0.011 (0.037) [0.771]	-0.006 (0.037) [0.876]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.004 \ (0.018) \ [0.833] \end{array}$	-0.084** (0.037) [0.025]	-0.068^{*} (0.037) [0.063]	-0.013 (0.037) [0.731]	-0.040 (0.037) [0.279]	-0.017 (0.039) [0.666]	-0.025 (0.037) [0.500]	-0.011 (0.014) [0.423]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.022 \\ (0.033) \\ [0.517] \end{array}$	-0.035 (0.033) [0.291]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.015 \ (0.031) \ [0.620] \end{array}$	-0.003 (0.032) [0.934]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.041 \\ (0.038) \\ [0.281] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.023 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.531] \end{array}$
Assistive SLACC	-0.004 (0.004) [0.281]	-0.000 (.) [.]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.001 \ (0.036) \ [0.985] \end{array}$	-0.045 (0.036) [0.218]	-0.020 (0.037) [0.592]	-0.007 (0.037) [0.845]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.006 \ (0.018) \ [0.761] \end{array}$	-0.034 (0.038) [0.371]	-0.049 (0.037) [0.184]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.014 \ (0.037) \ [0.705] \end{array}$	-0.050 (0.037) [0.172]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.043 \\ (0.039) \\ [0.274] \end{array}$	-0.017 (0.037) [0.641]	-0.007 (0.014) [0.599]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.051 \\ (0.033) \\ [0.124] \end{array}$	-0.003 (0.034) [0.921]	-0.044 (0.031) [0.164]	-0.055^{*} (0.032) [0.082]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.053 \ (0.038) \ [0.164] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.051 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.163] \end{array}$
Ν	9803	9803	9748	9803	9803	9803	9803	8768	9803	9744	9803	9761	9803	9803	9803	9803	9803	9803	9467	9803

C.2 With administrative data (2/2)

						PSCA 0	Crime type											PSCA J	usrisdictio	on			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18) Data	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)									
	Assault	Casualties / Murder	Complaints	Consult	Drugs	Fraud	Kidnap	Lost / Found	Other	Public order	Robbery	Sex crime	Traffic	Ravi	Shalamar	Wagha	Aziz Bhatti	Gunj Buksh	Gulberg	Samanabad	Iqbal	Nishtar	Canton -ment
Panel A: Treatme	ents Pool	led and Infor	mation																				
Pooled Treatments	$\begin{array}{c} 0.022 \\ (0.022) \\ [0.325] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.031 \\ (0.029) \\ [0.289] \end{array}$	-0.044 (0.028) [0.119]	-0.035 (0.029) [0.225]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.004 \\ (0.030) \\ [0.880] \end{array}$	-0.015 (0.028) [0.593]	0.058^{**} (0.029) [0.043]	-0.026 (0.029) [0.368]	$0.041 \\ (0.027) \\ [0.135]$	-0.053^{*} (0.028) [0.059]	-0.000 (.) [.]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.005 \ (0.029) \ [0.863] \end{array}$	-0.033 (0.029) [0.252]	$0.044 \\ (0.029) \\ [0.127]$	-0.042 (0.029) [0.152]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.039 \\ (0.029) \\ [0.189] \end{array}$	-0.003 (0.029) [0.923]	-0.021 (0.029) [0.470]	-0.006 (0.029) [0.847]	-0.040 (0.029) [0.174]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.010 \\ (0.029) \\ [0.726] \end{array}$	-0.001 (0.029) [0.960]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.009 \\ (0.029) \\ [0.762] \end{array}$
Information	-0.006 (0.027) [0.830]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.022 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.546] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.013 \ (0.035) \ [0.713] \end{array}$	-0.076^{**} (0.035) [0.031]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.027 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.461] \end{array}$	-0.044 (0.035) [0.208]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.027 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.455] \end{array}$	-0.043 (0.035) [0.225]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.015 \\ (0.034) \\ [0.652] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.030 \ (0.035) \ [0.390] \end{array}$	0.000 (.) [.]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.021 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.554] \end{array}$	-0.005 (0.036) [0.895]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.034 \ (0.036) \ [0.347] \end{array}$	-0.008 (0.036) [0.823]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.037 \ (0.036) \ [0.305] \end{array}$	-0.001 (0.036) [0.980]	-0.002 (0.036) [0.963]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.029 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.417] \end{array}$	-0.000 (0.036) [0.997]	-0.001 (0.036) [0.974]	-0.046 (0.036) [0.201]	-0.030 (0.036) [0.406]
Panel B: All Trea	tments s	separate																					
Information	-0.006 (0.027) [0.824]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.022 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.541] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.013 \ (0.035) \ [0.716] \end{array}$	-0.076^{**} (0.035) [0.031]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.027 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.461] \end{array}$	-0.044 (0.035) [0.209]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.027 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.450] \end{array}$	-0.043 (0.035) [0.225]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.015 \ (0.034) \ [0.653] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.030 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.391] \end{array}$	-0.000 (.) [.]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.022 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.548] \end{array}$	-0.004 (0.036) [0.901]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.034 \ (0.036) \ [0.350] \end{array}$	-0.008 (0.036) [0.829]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.038 \ (0.036) \ [0.303] \end{array}$	-0.001 (0.036) [0.988]	-0.002 (0.036) [0.964]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.029 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.421] \end{array}$	-0.000 (0.036) [0.994]	-0.001 (0.036) [0.977]	-0.046 (0.036) [0.200]	-0.030 (0.036) [0.405]
Regular 1787	-0.005 (0.028) [0.857]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.054 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.138] \end{array}$	-0.033 (0.036) [0.350]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.006 \ (0.036) \ [0.856] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.043 \ (0.037) \ [0.239] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.008 \ (0.035) \ [0.825] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.030 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.406] \end{array}$	-0.021 (0.036) [0.556]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.031 \\ (0.034) \\ [0.357] \end{array}$	-0.063^{*} (0.035) [0.074]	-0.000 (.) [.]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.042 \ (0.036) \ [0.240] \end{array}$	-0.036 (0.036) [0.314]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.018 \ (0.036) \ [0.610] \end{array}$	-0.072^{**} (0.036) [0.048]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.043 \ (0.037) \ [0.245] \end{array}$	-0.001 (0.036) [0.972]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.006 \ (0.036) \ [0.869] \end{array}$	-0.030 (0.036) [0.415]	-0.036 (0.037) [0.321]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.023 \ (0.036) \ [0.533] \end{array}$	-0.004 (0.037) [0.917]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.041 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.261] \end{array}$
Assistive 1787	$\begin{array}{c} 0.014 \\ (0.028) \\ [0.609] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.046 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.215] \end{array}$	-0.053 (0.036) [0.140]	-0.066^{*} (0.036) [0.064]	-0.007 (0.037) [0.853]	-0.020 (0.036) [0.581]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.100^{***} \\ (0.036) \\ [0.006] \end{array}$	-0.026 (0.036) [0.476]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.043 \ (0.034) \ [0.207] \end{array}$	-0.066^{*} (0.035) [0.060]	-0.000 (.) [.]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.023 \ (0.036) \ [0.535] \end{array}$	-0.002 (0.036) [0.952]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.028 \ (0.036) \ [0.446] \end{array}$	-0.004 (0.037) [0.903]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.048 \ (0.037) \ [0.193] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.024 \ (0.037) \ [0.515] \end{array}$	-0.029 (0.037) [0.435]	-0.015 (0.037) [0.688]	-0.054 (0.037) [0.141]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.023 \ (0.037) \ [0.525] \end{array}$	-0.012 (0.037) [0.753]	-0.011 (0.037) [0.770]
Regular SLACC	$\begin{array}{c} 0.038 \\ (0.028) \\ [0.183] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.016 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.661] \end{array}$	-0.090^{**} (0.036) [0.013]	-0.006 (0.036) [0.873]	-0.018 (0.038) [0.627]	-0.015 (0.036) [0.674]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.053 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.150] \end{array}$	-0.011 (0.037) [0.764]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.035 \ (0.035) \ [0.316] \end{array}$	-0.009 (0.036) [0.795]	-0.000 (.) [.]	-0.036 (0.037) [0.333]	-0.061* (0.037) [0.096]	0.080^{**} (0.037) [0.030]	-0.048 (0.037) [0.193]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.061 \ (0.037) \ [0.103] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.007 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.847] \end{array}$	-0.037 (0.037) [0.320]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.006 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.864] \end{array}$	-0.035 (0.037) [0.346]	-0.022 (0.037) [0.556]	-0.012 (0.037) [0.750]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.009 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.813] \end{array}$
Assistive SLACC	0.047^{*} (0.028) [0.095]	0.001 (0.037) [0.987]	-0.002 (0.036) [0.953]	-0.078** (0.037) [0.034]	-0.007 (0.038) [0.853]	-0.038 (0.036) [0.294]	0.050 (0.037) [0.173]	-0.047 (0.037) [0.202]	0.055 (0.035) [0.113]	-0.071** (0.036) [0.049]	-0.000 (.) [.]	-0.020 (0.037) [0.591]	-0.036 (0.037) [0.324]	$0.059 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.114]$	-0.042 (0.037) [0.265]	-0.000 (0.038) [0.997]	-0.046 (0.037) [0.218]	-0.029 (0.037) [0.431]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.022 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.552] \end{array}$	-0.032 (0.037) [0.392]	0.013 (0.037) [0.737]	$0.024 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.525]$	-0.008 (0.037) [0.835]
Ν	9803	9803	9803	9803	9803	9803	9803	9803	9803	9803	9803	9803	9803	9793	9793	9793	9793	9793	9793	9793	9793	9793	9793

C.3 With survey data

	E	xpected	l Case	Resolut	ion			Ex	perience	with 15	5		Case	Resolut	ion	Р	erceptio	ns - Stat	e	Pe	erception	ns - Polie	ce	Pe	rception	s - Lawye	ers	Pe	rception	s - Infor	mal
	$\binom{(1)}{\text{Own}}$	(2) Gen	(3) Owr	(4) Gen	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12) Feedback	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)	(31)
	(Lvls)	(Lvls)	(Days) (Days)) Factors	Satis	. Coop.	Polite	overall	Timely	Helpful	Call	Timely	Satis.	Fair	Usage	Trust	Effective	e Access	Usage	Trust	Effectiv	e Access	Usage	Trust	Effective	e Access	Usage	Trust	Effective	Access
Panel A: Treatn	nents P	ooled a	and In	formati	on																										
Pooled Treatment	s 0.036 (0.036) [0.330]	-0.004 (0.028) [0.886]	0.042) (0.055 [0.437	(0.006) (0.042) (0.893)	0.007) (0.029)] [0.811]	0.010 (0.027 [0.723	0 0.008 () (0.027 [] [0.771]	0.025) (0.027] [0.361	-0.015) (0.027)] [0.562]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.037 \\ (0.028) \\ [0.192] \end{array}$	-0.081** (0.038) [0.031]	-0.013 (0.026) [0.636]	-0.069^{***} (0.025) [0.007]	-0.016 (0.019) [0.386]	-0.025 (0.024) [0.284]	0.071*** (0.023) [0.002]	(0.008) (0.027) [0.758]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.027 \\ (0.027) \\ [0.304] \end{array}$	$0.005 \\ (0.016) \\ [0.770]$	0.082^{***} (0.023) [0.000]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.007\\ (0.027)\\ [0.804] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.012 \\ (0.025) \\ [0.626] \end{array}$	0.000 (.) [.]	0.089^{***} (0.024) [0.000]	0.025 (0.028) [0.365]	-0.008 (0.027) [0.753]	-0.012 (0.017) [0.485]	$0.034 \\ (0.026) \\ [0.188]$	-0.007 (0.025) [0.776]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.000 \ (0.025) \ [0.996] \end{array}$	-0.018 (0.024) [0.438]
Information	-0.052 (0.046) [0.259]	-0.010 (0.036) [0.779]	-0.04) (0.069 [0.533	$\begin{array}{ccc} 3 & 0.002 \\ 0 & (0.053) \\ 0 & [0.966] \end{array}$	0.040) (0.036)] [0.264]	-0.059 (0.034 [0.081	(0.015) (0.034) (0.651)	-0.024) (0.034] [0.477	-0.006) (0.033)] [0.860]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.021 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.542] \end{array}$	-0.056 (0.047) [0.238]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.014 \\ (0.033) \\ [0.677] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.041 \\ (0.032) \\ [0.189] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.042^{*} \\ (0.023) \\ [0.071] \end{array}$	$0.040 \\ (0.029) \\ [0.175]$	-0.024 (0.029) [0.410]	-0.048 (0.034) [0.155]	-0.044 (0.033) [0.183]	-0.010 (0.019) [0.611]	-0.019 (0.028) [0.495]	-0.047 (0.033) [0.159]	-0.033 (0.031) [0.299]	0.000 (.) [.]	-0.023 (0.030) [0.452]	-0.058* (0.034) [0.090]	-0.064^{*} (0.033) [0.054]	-0.026 (0.021) [0.216]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.056^{*} \\ (0.032) \\ [0.086] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.006 \\ (0.031) \\ [0.856] \end{array}$	-0.006 (0.031) [0.836]	-0.037 (0.029) [0.200]
Panel B: All Tre	eatment	s sepa	rate																												
Information	-0.051 (0.046) [0.262]	-0.010 (0.036) [0.780]	-0.04) (0.069 [0.549	(0.004) (0.053) (0.942)	0.040) (0.036)] [0.263]	-0.059 (0.034 [0.080	* -0.015) (0.034] [0.649]	-0.024) (0.034] [0.475	-0.006) (0.033)] [0.854]	0.021 (0.035) [0.543]	-0.056 (0.047) [0.231]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.013 \\ (0.033) \\ [0.681] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.041 \\ (0.032) \\ [0.190] \end{array}$	0.042^{*} (0.023) [0.071]	0.039 (0.029) [0.178]	-0.024 (0.029) [0.410]	-0.048 (0.034) [0.149]	-0.045 (0.033) [0.177]	-0.010 (0.019) [0.611]	-0.019 (0.028) [0.500]	-0.047 (0.033) [0.156]	-0.033 (0.031) [0.295]	0.000 (.) [.]	-0.023 (0.030) [0.451]	-0.059* (0.034) [0.086]	-0.065* (0.033) [0.051]	-0.026 (0.021) [0.221]	0.055^{*} (0.032) [0.088]	$0.005 \\ (0.031) \\ [0.860]$	-0.007 (0.031) [0.832]	-0.037 (0.029) [0.199]
Regular 1787	-0.007 (0.047) [0.879]	-0.030 (0.035) [0.393]	0.068 (0.070 [0.334	8 0.025 0) (0.053 4] [0.635]	0.017) (0.036)] [0.635]	0.008 (0.034) [0.807]	0.027 (0.034] [0.434]	0.037) (0.034] [0.277	0.011) (0.033)] [0.740]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.033 \ (0.035) \ [0.356] \end{array}$	-0.123*** (0.047) [0.008]	* -0.030 (0.033) [0.366]	-0.094*** (0.032) [0.003]	-0.046** (0.023) [0.049]	(0.037) (0.029) [0.212]	0.080^{***} (0.029) [0.006]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.033 \\ (0.034) \\ [0.333] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.048 \ (0.033) \ [0.150] \end{array}$	-0.001 (0.019) [0.972]	0.078^{***} (0.029) [0.006]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.020 \\ (0.033) \\ [0.553] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.027 \\ (0.032) \\ [0.401] \end{array}$	0.000 (.) [.]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.084^{***} \\ (0.030) \\ [0.005] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.040 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.246] \end{array}$	-0.006 (0.033) [0.854]	-0.029 (0.021) [0.181]	0.069^{**} (0.033) [0.035]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.015 \ (0.031) \ [0.623] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.011 \\ (0.031) \\ [0.728] \end{array}$	-0.011 (0.029) [0.716]
Assistive 1787	$\begin{array}{c} 0.045 \\ (0.047) \\ [0.332] \end{array}$	-0.009 (0.035) [0.797]	0.078 (0.071) [0.272]	$\begin{array}{c} 8 & 0.061 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} (0.052 \\ 2 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 0.245 \end{bmatrix}$	0.014) (0.036)] [0.694]	0.006 (0.034 [0.865	-0.009) (0.034] [0.791]	0.017 (0.034) [0.615]	-0.041) (0.033)] [0.217]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.030 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.395] \end{array}$	-0.094** (0.047) [0.045]	-0.015 (0.033) [0.652]	-0.064^{**} (0.032) [0.044]	-0.012 (0.024) [0.623]	-0.035 (0.030) [0.234]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.073^{**} \\ (0.029) \\ [0.011] \end{array}$	-0.039 (0.034) [0.256]	-0.022 (0.034) [0.522]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.005 \ (0.020) \ [0.796] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.117^{***} \\ (0.029) \\ [0.000] \end{array}$	(0.021) (0.033) [0.520]	-0.011 (0.032) [0.730]	0.000 (.) [.]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.095^{***} \\ (0.030) \\ [0.002] \end{array}$	-0.015 (0.035) [0.676]	-0.056^{*} (0.034) [0.098]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.032 \\ (0.022) \\ [0.134] \end{array}$	-0.005 (0.033) [0.885]	-0.030 (0.032) [0.341]	-0.024 (0.031) [0.445]	-0.032 (0.030) [0.272]
Regular SLACC	$\begin{array}{c} 0.058 \\ (0.046) \\ [0.207] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.031 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.382] \end{array}$	0.002 (0.070 [0.976	(0.057) (0.053) (0.282)	-0.013) (0.037)] [0.733]	-0.008 (0.035 [0.830	(0.007)	0.003) (0.035] [0.923	-0.044) (0.034)] [0.196]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.058 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.109] \end{array}$	-0.085^{*} (0.047) [0.073]	-0.021 (0.034) [0.536]	-0.090*** (0.032) [0.006]	-0.021 (0.024) [0.375]	-0.058^{*} (0.030) [0.053]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.032 \ (0.030) \ [0.275] \end{array}$	-0.016 (0.035) [0.646]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.002 \ (0.034) \ [0.943] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.010 \\ (0.020) \\ [0.602] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.027 \ (0.029) \ [0.363] \end{array}$	-0.026 (0.034) [0.437]	-0.026 (0.032) [0.425]	0.000 (.) [.]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.066^{**} \ (0.031) \ [0.036] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.004 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.903] \end{array}$	-0.005 (0.034) [0.880]	-0.032 (0.022) [0.140]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.027 \\ (0.033) \\ [0.416] \end{array}$	-0.006 (0.032) [0.856]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.018 \ (0.032) \ [0.573] \end{array}$	-0.017 (0.030) [0.581]
Assistive SLACC	0.047 (0.046) [0.310]	-0.004 (0.036) [0.913]	0.023 (0.069 [0.743	(0.015) (0.052) (0.777)	0.006) (0.037)] [0.877]	0.033 (0.035 [0.341	0.006 (0.035) [0.868]	0.041) (0.035] [0.241	0.011) (0.034)] [0.744]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.029 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.428] \end{array}$	-0.009 (0.048) [0.850]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.020 \\ (0.034) \\ [0.552] \end{array}$	-0.023 (0.033) [0.477]	0.020 (0.024) [0.405]	$0.034 \\ (0.030) \\ [0.264]$	0.097^{***} (0.030) [0.001]	$^{\circ}$ 0.058* (0.035) [0.097]	0.084^{**} (0.034) [0.014]	$0.005 \\ (0.020) \\ [0.820]$	0.105*** (0.029) [0.000]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.057^{*} \\ (0.034) \\ [0.094] \end{array}$	0.061^{*} (0.032) [0.061]	0.000 (.) [.]	0.113*** (0.031) [0.000]	0.075^{**} (0.036) [0.036]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.041 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.239] \end{array}$	-0.023 (0.022) [0.300]	$0.045 \\ (0.034) \\ [0.182]$	-0.010 (0.032) [0.765]	-0.003 (0.032) [0.917]	-0.013 (0.030) [0.678]
N	4058	4979	2807	3814	9686	9802	9802	9802	9802	9785	5607	9694	9803	9803	9803	9513	9367	9356	9715	9786	9739	9715	9803	9311	8605	8720	9447	9368	9094	9136	9340

D Balance tables with fixed effects of randomization strata, enumerator * batch interaction, respondent gender, crime type (robbery), access to police, and usage of lawyers

D.1 With administrative data (1/2)

		Demogr	aphics				Survey				Awa	reness					Respond	lent		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11) Legal Aid	(12)	(13) Feedback	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
	Age	Gender (Female)	Edu (Years)	Highest Edu	Hour	Time (3 Levels)	Day	Survey Dur.	Phone No.	Legal Aid	Name (Dummy)	Police Feedback	Name (Dummy)	Day	Morning	Afternoon	Night	Time (3 Levels)	15-Resp Gender	Main Complainant
Panel A: Treatme	nts Poo	led and In	formatic	on																
Pooled Treatments	$\begin{array}{c} 0.042 \\ (0.030) \\ [0.162] \end{array}$	0.000 (.) [.]	-0.002 (0.030) [0.940]	-0.019 (0.030) [0.524]	0.003 (0.029) [0.916]	$0.004 \\ (0.029) \\ [0.888]$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.001 \\ (0.005) \\ [0.819] \end{array}$	-0.032 (0.030) [0.284]	-0.022 (0.030) [0.465]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.000 \\ (0.031) \\ [0.998] \end{array}$	-0.024 (0.029) [0.415]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.008 \\ (0.032) \\ [0.806] \end{array}$	-0.002 (0.030) [0.953]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.006 \\ (0.010) \\ [0.585] \end{array}$	0.060^{**} (0.027) [0.025]	-0.043 (0.027) [0.107]	-0.012 (0.025) [0.638]	-0.041 (0.026) [0.112]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.023 \\ (0.031) \\ [0.455] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.047 \\ (0.029) \\ [0.100] \end{array}$
Information	$\begin{array}{c} 0.042 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.252] \end{array}$	0.000 (.) [.]	-0.019 (0.037) [0.607]	-0.012 (0.037) [0.737]	-0.009 (0.036) [0.801]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.004 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.903] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.001 \\ (0.007) \\ [0.935] \end{array}$	-0.189*** (0.037) [0.000]	-0.031 (0.037) [0.399]	-0.015 (0.038) [0.691]	-0.060^{*} (0.036) [0.096]	-0.010 (0.040) [0.804]	-0.023 (0.037) [0.535]	-0.002 (0.013) [0.862]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.029 \\ (0.033) \\ [0.384] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.014 \\ (0.033) \\ [0.670] \end{array}$	-0.040 (0.031) [0.193]	-0.041 (0.032) [0.197]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.041 \\ (0.038) \\ [0.282] \end{array}$	-0.010 (0.035) [0.781]
Panel B: All Trea	tments :	separate																		
Information	0.042 (0.037) [0.252]	0.000 (.) [.]	-0.019 (0.037) [0.607]	-0.012 (0.037) [0.742]	-0.009 (0.036) [0.799]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.004 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.905] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.001 \\ (0.007) \\ [0.918] \end{array}$	-0.189*** (0.037) [0.000]	-0.031 (0.037) [0.401]	-0.015 (0.038) [0.686]	-0.060^{*} (0.036) [0.097]	-0.010 (0.040) [0.793]	-0.023 (0.037) [0.536]	-0.002 (0.013) [0.865]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.029 \\ (0.033) \\ [0.383] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.014 \\ (0.033) \\ [0.678] \end{array}$	-0.040 (0.031) [0.197]	-0.041 (0.032) [0.199]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.041 \\ (0.038) \\ [0.283] \end{array}$	-0.010 (0.035) [0.775]
Regular 1787	$\begin{array}{c} 0.058 \ (0.037) \ [0.120] \end{array}$	-0.000 (.) [.]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.059 \ (0.037) \ [0.112] \end{array}$	-0.016 (0.037) [0.664]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.025 \ (0.037) \ [0.502] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.027 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.469] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.008 \ (0.007) \ [0.199] \end{array}$	-0.048 (0.037) [0.205]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.022 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.565] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.015 \ (0.038) \ [0.691] \end{array}$	-0.036 (0.037) [0.323]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.002 \\ (0.040) \\ [0.955] \end{array}$	$0.008 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.839]$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.017 \ (0.013) \ [0.188] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.096^{***} \\ (0.034) \\ [0.004] \end{array}$	-0.079^{**} (0.033) [0.019]	-0.009 (0.031) [0.773]	-0.059^{*} (0.032) [0.066]	-0.015 (0.038) [0.701]	0.070^{**} (0.036) [0.050]
Assistive 1787	$\begin{array}{c} 0.037 \ (0.037) \ [0.319] \end{array}$	-0.000 (.) [.]	-0.034 (0.037) [0.356]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.014 \ (0.037) \ [0.701] \end{array}$	-0.021 (0.037) [0.568]	-0.021 (0.037) [0.566]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.013^{**} \\ (0.007) \\ [0.046] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.009 \\ (0.038) \\ [0.819] \end{array}$	-0.025 (0.038) [0.503]	-0.023 (0.039) [0.551]	-0.008 (0.037) [0.818]	-0.010 (0.040) [0.803]	-0.008 (0.038) [0.833]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.008 \ (0.013) \ [0.524] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.049 \\ (0.034) \\ [0.149] \end{array}$	-0.037 (0.034) [0.264]	-0.007 (0.032) [0.823]	-0.031 (0.032) [0.328]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.048 \\ (0.039) \\ [0.216] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.030 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.412] \end{array}$
Regular SLACC	$\begin{array}{c} 0.028 \ (0.039) \ [0.471] \end{array}$	-0.000 (.) [.]	-0.027 (0.039) [0.485]	-0.055 (0.038) [0.150]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.009 \\ (0.038) \\ [0.812] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.010 \\ (0.038) \\ [0.791] \end{array}$	-0.015** (0.007) [0.029]	-0.053 (0.040) [0.184]	-0.064 (0.039) [0.103]	-0.010 (0.040) [0.795]	-0.014 (0.038) [0.705]	-0.013 (0.042) [0.756]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.001 \\ (0.039) \\ [0.976] \end{array}$	-0.009 (0.013) [0.473]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.037 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.283] \end{array}$	-0.046 (0.035) [0.189]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.011 \ (0.033) \ [0.730] \end{array}$	-0.014 (0.033) [0.674]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.025 \ (0.040) \ [0.528] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.019 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.605] \end{array}$
Assistive SLACC	0.041 (0.039) [0.289]	-0.000 (.) [.]	-0.016 (0.039) [0.671]	-0.027 (0.038) [0.479]	-0.001 (0.038) [0.988]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.001 \\ (0.038) \\ [0.988] \end{array}$	-0.007 (0.007) [0.326]	-0.044 (0.040) [0.271]	-0.032 (0.039) [0.404]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.020 \\ (0.040) \\ [0.625] \end{array}$	-0.037 (0.038) [0.332]	$0.058 \\ (0.042) \\ [0.164]$	-0.009 (0.039) [0.814]	0.003 (0.013) [0.812]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.052 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.135] \end{array}$	-0.003 (0.035) [0.930]	-0.045 (0.033) [0.172]	-0.056* (0.033) [0.090]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.039 \\ (0.040) \\ [0.324] \end{array}$	0.068^{*} (0.037) [0.068]
N	9516	9516	9460	9516	9516	9516	9516	8518	9516	9461	9516	9476	9516	9516	9516	9516	9516	9516	9195	9516

D.2 With administrative data (2/2)

						PSCA C	rime type											PSCA J	usrisdicti	on			
	(1)	(2)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18) Data	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)										
	Assault	Casualties / Murder	Complaints	Consult	Drugs	Fraud	Kidnap	Lost / Found	Other	Public order	Robbery	Sex crime	Traffic	Ravi	Shalamar	Wagha	Aziz Bhatti	Gunj Buksh	Gulberg	Samanabad	Iqbal	Nishtar	Canton -ment
Panel A: Treatme	ents Pool	ed and Infor	mation																				
Pooled Treatments	$\begin{array}{c} 0.020 \\ (0.023) \\ [0.376] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.031 \\ (0.030) \\ [0.297] \end{array}$	-0.039 (0.030) [0.182]	-0.043 (0.030) [0.154]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.001 \\ (0.031) \\ [0.970] \end{array}$	-0.005 (0.030) [0.858]	0.066^{**} (0.031) [0.031]	-0.028 (0.028) [0.330]	0.048^{*} (0.028) [0.092]	-0.064** (0.029) [0.029]	0.000 (.) [.]	-0.011 (0.029) [0.713]	-0.027 (0.030) [0.370]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.038 \\ (0.030) \\ [0.198] \end{array}$	-0.036 (0.030) [0.232]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.032 \\ (0.030) \\ [0.282] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.000 \\ (0.030) \\ [0.998] \end{array}$	-0.025 (0.030) [0.405]	-0.013 (0.030) [0.669]	-0.031 (0.030) [0.303]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.002 \\ (0.030) \\ [0.940] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.011 \\ (0.030) \\ [0.713] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.013 \ (0.030) \ [0.670] \end{array}$
Information	$\begin{array}{c} 0.003 \\ (0.028) \\ [0.917] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.022 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.543] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.010 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.791] \end{array}$	-0.089^{**} (0.037) [0.016]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.030 \ (0.038) \ [0.435] \end{array}$	-0.048 (0.036) [0.191]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.037 \ (0.038) \ [0.330] \end{array}$	-0.061* (0.035) [0.082]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.027 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.440] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.012 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.741] \end{array}$	0.000 (.) [.]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.008 \ (0.036) \ [0.826] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.002 \ (0.037) \ [0.950] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.027 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.456] \end{array}$	-0.001 (0.037) [0.973]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.023 \ (0.037) \ [0.537] \end{array}$	-0.007 (0.037) [0.853]	-0.003 (0.037) [0.935]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.045 \ (0.037) \ [0.226] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.011 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.771] \end{array}$	-0.011 (0.037) [0.764]	-0.036 (0.037) [0.333]	-0.037 (0.037) [0.328]
Panel B: All Trea	tments s	separate																					
Information	$\begin{array}{c} 0.003 \\ (0.028) \\ [0.923] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.023 \ (0.037) \ [0.535] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.009 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.804] \end{array}$	-0.089^{**} (0.037) [0.016]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.030 \\ (0.038) \\ [0.433] \end{array}$	-0.047 (0.036) [0.193]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.037 \\ (0.038) \\ [0.327] \end{array}$	-0.060^{*} (0.035) [0.084]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.027 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.443] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.012 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.741] \end{array}$	-0.000 (.) [.]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.008 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.821] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.002 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.949] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.027 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.459] \end{array}$	-0.001 (0.037) [0.979]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.023 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.529] \end{array}$	-0.006 (0.037) [0.863]	-0.003 (0.037) [0.935]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.045 \ (0.037) \ [0.229] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.011 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.774] \end{array}$	-0.011 (0.037) [0.764]	-0.036 (0.037) [0.329]	-0.037 (0.037) [0.329]
Regular 1787	-0.002 (0.029) [0.931]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.055 \ (0.037) \ [0.139] \end{array}$	-0.035 (0.037) [0.336]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.003 \ (0.037) \ [0.938] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.039 \\ (0.038) \\ [0.316] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.003 \ (0.037) \ [0.926] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.034 \\ (0.038) \\ [0.377] \end{array}$	-0.021 (0.035) [0.550]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.044 \ (0.035) \ [0.212] \end{array}$	-0.080^{**} (0.036) [0.027]	-0.000 (.) [.]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.025 \ (0.036) \ [0.491] \end{array}$	-0.024 (0.037) [0.525]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.010 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.782] \end{array}$	-0.057 (0.037) [0.127]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.034 \ (0.037) \ [0.367] \end{array}$	-0.010 (0.038) [0.791]	-0.006 (0.037) [0.882]	-0.028 (0.038) [0.463]	-0.024 (0.038) [0.516]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.020 \ (0.038) \ [0.594] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.007 \ (0.038) \ [0.846] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.040 \\ (0.038) \\ [0.295] \end{array}$
Assistive 1787	$\begin{array}{c} 0.012 \\ (0.029) \\ [0.664] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.050 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.185] \end{array}$	-0.051 (0.037) [0.171]	-0.077^{**} (0.038) [0.041]	-0.009 (0.039) [0.817]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.010 \ (0.037) \ [0.779] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.105^{***} \\ (0.038) \\ [0.006] \end{array}$	-0.019 (0.036) [0.593]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.048 \ (0.035) \ [0.175] \end{array}$	-0.074^{**} (0.036) [0.042]	-0.000 (.) [.]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.003 \ (0.036) \ [0.927] \end{array}$	-0.014 (0.037) [0.708]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.032 \ (0.037) \ [0.393] \end{array}$	-0.000 (0.037) [0.996]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.039 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.291] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.037 \ (0.038) \ [0.330] \end{array}$	-0.031 (0.038) [0.409]	-0.030 (0.038) [0.421]	-0.048 (0.038) [0.201]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.017 \ (0.038) \ [0.657] \end{array}$	-0.004 (0.038) [0.916]	-0.009 (0.038) [0.823]
Regular SLACC	$\begin{array}{c} 0.042 \\ (0.030) \\ [0.161] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.013 \\ (0.039) \\ [0.729] \end{array}$	-0.089^{**} (0.038) [0.020]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.000 \\ (0.039) \\ [0.996] \end{array}$	-0.021 (0.040) [0.605]	-0.013 (0.038) [0.740]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.065 \ (0.040) \ [0.100] \end{array}$	-0.024 (0.037) [0.515]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.037 \ (0.037) \ [0.316] \end{array}$	-0.021 (0.038) [0.578]	-0.000 (.) [.]	-0.060 (0.038) [0.110]	-0.047 (0.039) [0.227]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.072^{*} \ (0.039) \ [0.062] \end{array}$	-0.038 (0.039) [0.323]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.063 \ (0.039) \ [0.105] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.001 \ (0.039) \ [0.984] \end{array}$	-0.038 (0.039) [0.331]	-0.002 (0.039) [0.967]	-0.024 (0.039) [0.531]	-0.048 (0.039) [0.217]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.012 \ (0.039) \ [0.758] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.024 \\ (0.039) \\ [0.542] \end{array}$
Assistive SLACC	$\begin{array}{c} 0.038 \\ (0.030) \\ [0.202] \end{array}$	-0.004 (0.039) [0.910]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.018 \\ (0.038) \\ [0.632] \end{array}$	-0.103*** (0.039) [0.008]	-0.012 (0.040) [0.756]	-0.028 (0.038) [0.460]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.060 \\ (0.039) \\ [0.129] \end{array}$	-0.050 (0.037) [0.170]	0.063^{*} (0.037) [0.083]	-0.073^{*} (0.038) [0.053]	-0.000 (.) [.]	-0.024 (0.037) [0.518]	-0.026 (0.038) [0.491]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.049 \ (0.039) \ [0.204] \end{array}$	-0.050 (0.039) [0.194]	-0.009 (0.039) [0.815]	-0.033 (0.039) [0.398]	-0.030 (0.039) [0.445]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.016 \ (0.039) \ [0.677] \end{array}$	-0.025 (0.039) [0.522]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.012 \ (0.039) \ [0.754] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.034 \ (0.039) \ [0.387] \end{array}$	-0.006 (0.039) [0.880]
Ν	9516	9516	9516	9516	9516	9516	9516	9516	9516	9516	9516	9516	9516	9506	9506	9506	9506	9506	9506	9506	9506	9506	9506

D.3 With survey data

	E	xpected	l Case I	Resolut	ion			Ex	perience	e with 15	5		Case	Resolu	tion	1	Percepti	ons - Sta	ite	Pe	erception	ns - Polio	ce	Р	erceptic	ns - Law	yers	Pe	rceptior	us - Infor	mal
	$\binom{(1)}{Own}$	$^{(2)}_{\mathrm{Gen}}$	$_{\rm Own}^{(3)}$	$_{\rm Gen}^{(4)}$	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12) Feedback	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)	(31)
	(Lvls)	(Lvls)	(Days)	(Days)) Factor:	s Satis.	Coop	Polite	Overal	lTimely	Helpful	Call	Timely	Satis.	Fair	Usage	Trust	Effective	e Access	Usage	Trust	Effective	e Access	Usage	e Trust	Effective	Access	Usage	Trust	Effectiv	e Access
Panel A: Treatm	ents P	ooled a	and Inf	ormati	on																										
Pooled Treatment	s 0.003 (0.038) [0.936]	0.007 (0.029) [0.809]	-0.014) (0.057) [0.810]	-0.003 (0.044 [0.946	0.001 (0.031) [0.962]	0.006) (0.028] [0.822	0.003) (0.028] [0.911	0.027) (0.028)] [0.328]	-0.019) (0.027) [0.478]	0.018 (0.029) [0.534]	-0.114*** (0.039) [0.003]	-0.011 (0.027) [0.674]	-0.068^{**} (0.026) [0.008]	* -0.012 (0.019 [0.544]	-0.014) (0.024) [0.545]	0.004) (0.018) [0.815]	-0.005 (0.027) [0.863]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.013 \\ (0.026) \\ [0.612] \end{array}$	$0.006 \\ (0.016) \\ [0.702]$	0.048** (0.022) [0.029]	$0.004 \\ (0.027) \\ [0.876]$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.005 \ (0.025) \ [0.849] \end{array}$	0.000 · (.) [.]	-0.000 (.) [.]	0.010 (0.026) [0.718]	-0.014 (0.025) [0.585]	-0.016 (0.018) [0.372]	0.020 (0.026) [0.450]	-0.017 (0.025) [0.500]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.012 \\ (0.025) \\ [0.635] \end{array}$	-0.020 (0.024) [0.399]
Information	-0.075 (0.047) [0.112]	-0.004 (0.036) [0.911]	-0.040) (0.071) [0.570]	-0.013 (0.055 [0.812	0.042) (0.038)] [0.266]	-0.047) (0.034] [0.171	' -0.020) (0.034] [0.569	(0.014) (0.034) (0.687]	0.002) (0.034) [0.962]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.001 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.970] \end{array}$	-0.073 (0.048) [0.129]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.014 \\ (0.033) \\ [0.669] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.044 \\ (0.032) \\ [0.163] \end{array}$	0.039^{*} (0.024) [0.095]	0.048*) (0.029) [0.099]	-0.011 (0.022) [0.619]	-0.030 (0.033) [0.360]	-0.032 (0.032) [0.325]	-0.014 (0.020) [0.479]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.001 \\ (0.027) \\ [0.972] \end{array}$	-0.032 (0.033) [0.328]	-0.017 (0.031) [0.581]	0.000 · (.) [.]	-0.000 (.) [.]	0 -0.028 (0.032) [0.389]	-0.033 (0.031) [0.292]	-0.018 (0.022) [0.418]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.051 \\ (0.032) \\ [0.116] \end{array}$	0.010 (0.031) [0.748]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.002 \\ (0.031) \\ [0.938] \end{array}$	-0.029 (0.029) [0.317]
Panel B: All Tre	atment	s sepa	rate																												
Information	-0.076 (0.047) [0.108]	-0.004 (0.036) [0.907]	-0.040) (0.071) [0.576]	-0.012 (0.055 [0.821]	0.042) (0.038)] [0.266]	-0.047) (0.034] [0.169	7 -0.020) (0.034] [0.570	-0.014)(0.034)][0.685]	0.001) (0.034) [0.969]	0.002 (0.036) [0.964]	-0.074 (0.048) [0.125]	0.014 (0.033) [0.674]	0.044 (0.032) [0.167]	0.039* (0.024 [0.097]	0.048) (0.029) [0.103]	-0.011) (0.022) [0.618]	-0.031 (0.033) [0.350]	-0.032 (0.032) [0.316]	-0.014 (0.020) [0.479]	0.001 (0.027) [0.966]	-0.033 (0.033) [0.324]	-0.018 (0.031) [0.573]	-0.000 (.) [.]	-0.000 (.) [.]) -0.029 (0.032) [0.377]	-0.033 (0.031) [0.281]	-0.017 (0.022) [0.423]	0.051 (0.032) [0.117]	0.010 (0.031) [0.746]	0.002 (0.031) [0.935]	-0.029 (0.029) [0.317]
Regular 1787	-0.055 (0.048) [0.256]	-0.006 (0.036) [0.876]	0.039) (0.073) [0.594]	-0.014 (0.055 [0.797]	0.012 (0.038) [0.746]	0.005) (0.035] [0.891	0.026) (0.035] [0.449	0.032) (0.035)] [0.365]	0.001 (0.034) [0.972]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.023 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.533] \end{array}$	-0.140*** (0.048) [0.003]	-0.028 (0.033) [0.410]	-0.083^{**} (0.032) [0.009]	* -0.033 (0.024 [0.160]	-0.019) (0.030) [0.525]	0.021 (0.022) [0.341]	0.014 (0.033) [0.673]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.034 \ (0.032) \ [0.297] \end{array}$	-0.004 (0.020) [0.850]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.052^{*} \\ (0.028) \\ [0.058] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.019 \\ (0.034) \\ [0.578] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.017 \\ (0.032) \\ [0.590] \end{array}$	-0.000 (.) [.]	-0.000 (.) [.]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.019 \\ (0.033) \\ [0.555] \end{array}$	-0.019 (0.031) [0.545]	-0.043* (0.022) [0.051]	0.059^{*} (0.033) [0.070]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.005 \\ (0.031) \\ [0.872] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.024 \\ (0.031) \\ [0.432] \end{array}$	-0.028 (0.030) [0.339]
Assistive 1787	$\begin{array}{c} 0.014 \\ (0.048) \\ [0.768] \end{array}$	-0.014 (0.036) [0.687]	-0.018) (0.073) [0.801]	0.036 (0.055) [0.512]	0.008) (0.038)] [0.834]	0.007) (0.035] [0.841	-0.017) (0.035] [0.626	(0.023) (0.035) (0.513)	-0.045) (0.034) [0.189]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.018 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.630] \end{array}$	-0.110** (0.048) [0.023]	-0.013 (0.034) [0.700]	-0.065^{**} (0.032) [0.043]	-0.010 (0.024 [0.674]	-0.024) (0.030) [0.424]	0.007 (0.022) [0.769]	-0.040 (0.033) [0.231]	-0.027 (0.033) [0.405]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.008 \ (0.020) \ [0.691] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.087^{***} \\ (0.028) \\ [0.002] \end{array}$	* -0.003 (0.034) [0.940]	-0.006 (0.032) [0.855]	-0.000 (.) [.]	-0.000 (.) [.]	(0.020) (0.033) [0.544]	-0.061* (0.032) [0.053]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.033 \\ (0.022) \\ [0.129] \end{array}$	-0.011 (0.033) [0.739]	-0.028 (0.032) [0.372]	-0.007 (0.031) [0.833]	-0.015 (0.030) [0.621]
Regular SLACC	$\begin{array}{c} 0.008 \\ (0.049) \\ [0.864] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.037 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.310] \end{array}$	-0.041) (0.074) [0.584]	-0.043 (0.056 [0.438	-0.024) (0.040)] [0.551]	-0.008) (0.036] [0.834	0.012) (0.036] [0.747	0.017) (0.036)] [0.644]	-0.034) (0.035) [0.331]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.042 \\ (0.038) \\ [0.267] \end{array}$	-0.155^{***} (0.050) [0.002]	-0.011 (0.035) [0.760]	-0.100^{**} (0.033) [0.003]	* -0.021 (0.025 [0.392]	-0.054*) (0.031) [0.078]	* -0.026) (0.023) [0.259]	-0.029 (0.034) [0.400]	-0.010 (0.034) [0.766]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.013 \ (0.021) \ [0.539] \end{array}$	-0.007 (0.029) [0.801]	-0.034 (0.035) [0.326]	-0.031 (0.033) [0.348]	-0.000 (.) [.]	-0.000 (.) [.]	(0.010) (0.034) [0.781]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.005 \ (0.033) \ [0.886] \end{array}$	-0.034 (0.023) [0.141]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.010 \\ (0.034) \\ [0.772] \end{array}$	-0.020 (0.033) [0.550]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.033 \ (0.032) \ [0.305] \end{array}$	-0.013 (0.031) [0.679]
Assistive SLACC	$\begin{array}{c} 0.050 \\ (0.049) \\ [0.312] \end{array}$	0.017 (0.037) [0.647]	-0.039) (0.073) [0.592]	0.006 (0.056 [0.913]	0.005) (0.040)] [0.905]	0.021) (0.036] [0.559	-0.010) (0.036] [0.776	0 0.038 0 (0.036) 0 [0.292]	0.000) (0.035) [0.990]	-0.010 (0.038) [0.780]	-0.039 (0.050) [0.434]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.011 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.756] \end{array}$	-0.020 (0.033) [0.552]	0.024 (0.025 [0.332]	0.042 (0.031) [0.167]	0.010 (0.023) [0.673]	0.039 (0.034) [0.257]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.059^{*} \\ (0.034) \\ [0.078] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.010 \\ (0.021) \\ [0.626] \end{array}$	0.051^{*} (0.029) [0.075]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.032 \ (0.035) \ [0.352] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.038 \ (0.033) \ [0.250] \end{array}$	-0.000 (.) [.]	-0.000 (.) [.]	$0.052 \\ (0.034) \\ [0.127]$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.032 \\ (0.033) \\ [0.320] \end{array}$	-0.024 (0.023) [0.288]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.017 \ (0.034) \ [0.625] \end{array}$	-0.029 (0.033) [0.373]	-0.003 (0.032) [0.926]	-0.023 (0.031) [0.451]
Ν	3928	4883	2753	3766	9408	9515	9515	9515	9515	9499	5423	9413	9516	9516	9516	9501	9264	9244	9445	9511	9462	9443	9516	9516	8609	8697	9230	9254	8959	8990	9085

E Balance tables with fixed effects of randomization strata, respondent gender, crime type (public order and robbery), timeliness of case resolution, access to police, usage of police, and usage of lawyers

E.1 With administrative data (1/2)

		Demog	raphics				Survey				Awa	reness					Respon	dent		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11) Legal Aid	(12)	(13) Feedback	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
	Age	Gender (Female)	Edu (Years)	Highest Edu	Hour	Time (3 Levels)	Day	Survey Dur.	Phone No.	Legal Aid	Name (Dummy)	Police Feedback	Name (Dummy)	Day	Morning	Afternoon	Night	Time (3 Levels)	15-Resp Gender	Main Complainant
Panel A: Treatme	nts Poo	led and In	formatio	n																
Pooled Treatments	$\begin{array}{c} 0.047 \\ (0.029) \\ [0.109] \end{array}$	0.000 (.) [.]	-0.004 (0.029) [0.890]	-0.034 (0.030) [0.254]	-0.015 (0.029) [0.596]	-0.011 (0.029) [0.704]	$0.011 \\ (0.014) \\ [0.437]$	-0.063** (0.029) [0.032]	-0.039 (0.029) [0.182]	$0.004 \\ (0.029) \\ [0.882]$	-0.029 (0.029) [0.314]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.005 \\ (0.031) \\ [0.862] \end{array}$	-0.013 (0.029) [0.649]	-0.000 (0.011) [0.985]	0.065^{**} (0.026) [0.012]	-0.045^{*} (0.026) [0.085]	-0.015 (0.024) [0.546]	-0.046^{*} (0.025) [0.068]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.034 \\ (0.030) \\ [0.257] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.038 \\ (0.028) \\ [0.175] \end{array}$
Information	$\begin{array}{c} 0.038 \ (0.036) \ [0.289] \end{array}$	0.000 (.) [.]	-0.019 (0.036) [0.602]	-0.008 (0.037) [0.835]	-0.022 (0.036) [0.535]	-0.011 (0.036) [0.765]	0.031^{*} (0.018) [0.081]	-0.201*** (0.036) [0.000]	-0.032 (0.036) [0.377]	-0.011 (0.036) [0.753]	-0.059 (0.036) [0.104]	-0.008 (0.038) [0.827]	-0.034 (0.036) [0.346]	-0.001 (0.014) [0.932]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.039 \\ (0.032) \\ [0.233] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.001 \\ (0.032) \\ [0.972] \end{array}$	-0.036 (0.030) [0.229]	-0.044 (0.031) [0.155]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.040 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.276] \end{array}$	-0.004 (0.035) [0.914]
Panel B: All Trea	tments s	separate																		
Information	$\begin{array}{c} 0.038 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.291] \end{array}$	0.000 (.) [.]	-0.019 (0.036) [0.598]	-0.007 (0.037) [0.844]	-0.022 (0.036) [0.533]	-0.011 (0.036) [0.762]	0.031^{*} (0.018) [0.080]	-0.201^{***} (0.036) [0.000]	-0.032 (0.036) [0.376]	-0.011 (0.036) [0.748]	-0.059 (0.036) [0.104]	-0.009 (0.038) [0.823]	-0.034 (0.036) [0.344]	-0.001 (0.014) [0.932]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.039 \\ (0.032) \\ [0.234] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.001 \\ (0.032) \\ [0.972] \end{array}$	-0.036 (0.030) [0.230]	-0.044 (0.031) [0.156]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.040 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.275] \end{array}$	-0.004 (0.035) [0.910]
Regular 1787	0.061^{*} (0.036) [0.096]	-0.000 (.) [.]	0.060^{*} (0.036) [0.097]	-0.015 (0.037) [0.678]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.002 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.951] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.004 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.903] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.008 \ (0.018) \ [0.635] \end{array}$	-0.072** (0.037) [0.048]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.013 \ (0.036) \ [0.729] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.017 \ (0.036) \ [0.628] \end{array}$	-0.040 (0.036) [0.274]	-0.001 (0.039) [0.986]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.000 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.989] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.012 \\ (0.014) \\ [0.396] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.107^{***} \ (0.033) \ [0.001] \end{array}$	-0.087^{***} (0.033) [0.007]	-0.011 (0.031) [0.727]	-0.066^{**} (0.031) [0.033]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.000 \ (0.037) \ [0.995] \end{array}$	0.064^{*} (0.035) [0.068]
Assistive 1787	$\begin{array}{c} 0.038 \ (0.037) \ [0.305] \end{array}$	-0.000 (.) [.]	-0.029 (0.036) [0.428]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.019 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.607] \end{array}$	-0.032 (0.036) [0.375]	-0.033 (0.036) [0.368]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.019 \\ (0.018) \\ [0.294] \end{array}$	-0.020 (0.037) [0.594]	-0.044 (0.037) [0.228]	-0.020 (0.036) [0.586]	-0.018 (0.037) [0.632]	-0.012 (0.039) [0.748]	-0.031 (0.037) [0.394]	-0.000 (0.014) [0.974]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.056^{*} \ (0.033) \ [0.088] \end{array}$	-0.039 (0.033) [0.238]	-0.013 (0.031) [0.684]	-0.039 (0.031) [0.214]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.052 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.168] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.020 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.571] \end{array}$
Regular SLACC	$\begin{array}{c} 0.025 \ (0.037) \ [0.512] \end{array}$	-0.000 (.) [.]	-0.040 (0.037) [0.285]	-0.088^{**} (0.038) [0.021]	-0.006 (0.037) [0.866]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.002 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.963] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.006 \ (0.018) \ [0.731] \end{array}$	-0.105*** (0.039) [0.007]	-0.077^{**} (0.037) [0.039]	-0.005 (0.037) [0.897]	-0.024 (0.037) [0.517]	-0.010 (0.040) [0.810]	-0.010 (0.037) [0.785]	-0.008 (0.014) [0.573]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.040 \\ (0.034) \\ [0.236] \end{array}$	-0.047 (0.034) [0.164]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.010 \\ (0.031) \\ [0.747] \end{array}$	-0.016 (0.032) [0.616]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.038 \ (0.038) \ [0.319] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.013 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.728] \end{array}$
Assistive SLACC	0.063^{*} (0.037) [0.094]	-0.000 (.) [.]	-0.018 (0.037) [0.634]	-0.064* (0.038) [0.094]	-0.026 (0.037) [0.477]	-0.017 (0.037) [0.637]	0.010 (0.018) [0.575]	-0.062 (0.039) [0.113]	-0.057 (0.037) [0.124]	$0.025 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.498]$	-0.035 (0.037) [0.343]	$0.048 \\ (0.040) \\ [0.224]$	-0.012 (0.037) [0.741]	-0.007 (0.014) [0.639]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.051 \\ (0.034) \\ [0.126] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.000 \\ (0.034) \\ [0.992] \end{array}$	-0.047 (0.031) [0.133]	-0.058^{*} (0.032) [0.072]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.050 \\ (0.038) \\ [0.190] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.053 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.142] \end{array}$
Ν	9511	9511	9455	9511	9511	9511	9511	8514	9511	9457	9511	9472	9511	9511	9511	9511	9511	9511	9190	9511

E.2 With administrative data (2/2)

						PSCA C	rime type											PSCA .	Jusrisdicti	on			
	(1)	(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)														(16)	(17)	(18) Data	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)
	Assault	Casualties / Murder	Complaints	Consult	Drugs	Fraud	Kidnap	Lost / Found	Other	Public order	Robbery	Sex crime	Traffic	Ravi	Shalamar	Wagha	Aziz Bhatti	Gunj Buksh	Gulberg	Samanabad	Iqbal	Nishtar	Canton -ment
Panel A: Treatme	ents Poo	led and Infor	mation																				
Pooled Treatments	$0.018 \\ (0.021) \\ [0.411]$	0.016 (0.029) [0.577]	-0.043 (0.028) [0.132]	-0.041 (0.029) [0.162]	-0.012 (0.029) [0.695]	-0.008 (0.028) [0.765]	0.059^{**} (0.029) [0.047]	-0.031 (0.028) [0.267]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.030 \\ (0.027) \\ [0.273] \end{array}$	0.000 (.) [.]	0.000 (.) [.]	-0.013 (0.028) [0.645]	-0.038 (0.029) [0.181]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.035 \\ (0.029) \\ [0.225] \end{array}$	-0.032 (0.029) [0.275]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.036 \\ (0.029) \\ [0.217] \end{array}$	-0.003 (0.029) [0.920]	-0.023 (0.029) [0.439]	-0.012 (0.029) [0.671]	-0.030 (0.029) [0.310]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.005 \\ (0.029) \\ [0.864] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.011 \\ (0.029) \\ [0.699] \end{array}$	$0.004 \\ (0.029) \\ [0.889]$
Information	$\begin{array}{c} 0.006 \\ (0.027) \\ [0.816] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.014 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.696] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.019 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.599] \end{array}$	-0.079^{**} (0.036) [0.028]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.025 \ (0.036) \ [0.489] \end{array}$	-0.042 (0.035) [0.229]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.041 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.262] \end{array}$	-0.051 (0.034) [0.133]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.024 \\ (0.033) \\ [0.477] \end{array}$	0.000 (.) [.]	0.000 (.) [.]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.007 \ (0.035) \ [0.837] \end{array}$	-0.010 (0.036) [0.780]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.020 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.570] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.006 \ (0.036) \ [0.878] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.020 \ (0.036) \ [0.573] \end{array}$	-0.005 (0.036) [0.893]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.007 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.847] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.037 \ (0.036) \ [0.307] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.004 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.911] \end{array}$	-0.010 (0.036) [0.779]	-0.036 (0.036) [0.327]	-0.031 (0.036) [0.398]
Panel B: All Trea	atments :	separate																					
Information	$0.006 \\ (0.027) \\ [0.817]$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.014 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.694] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.018 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.602] \end{array}$	-0.079^{**} (0.036) [0.028]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.025 \ (0.036) \ [0.491] \end{array}$	-0.042 (0.035) [0.230]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.041 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.258] \end{array}$	-0.051 (0.034) [0.133]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.024 \ (0.033) \ [0.478] \end{array}$	-0.000 (.) [.]	-0.000 (.) [.]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.007 \ (0.035) \ [0.833] \end{array}$	-0.010 (0.036) [0.783]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.020 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.571] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.006 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.870] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.020 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.571] \end{array}$	-0.005 (0.036) [0.900]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.007 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.848] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.037 \ (0.036) \ [0.309] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.004 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.914] \end{array}$	-0.010 (0.036) [0.780]	-0.036 (0.036) [0.326]	-0.031 (0.036) [0.396]
Regular 1787	-0.017 (0.027) [0.530]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.037 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.306] \end{array}$	-0.044 (0.036) [0.212]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.005 \ (0.036) \ [0.900] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.028 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.453] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.003 \ (0.035) \ [0.938] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.035 \ (0.037) \ [0.340] \end{array}$	-0.014 (0.034) [0.695]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.025 \ (0.034) \ [0.450] \end{array}$	-0.000 (.) [.]	-0.000 (.) [.]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.023 \ (0.035) \ [0.515] \end{array}$	-0.032 (0.036) [0.367]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.012 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.742] \end{array}$	-0.062^{*} (0.036) [0.087]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.046 \ (0.036) \ [0.206] \end{array}$	-0.008 (0.036) [0.816]	-0.004 (0.036) [0.905]	-0.029 (0.036) [0.418]	-0.026 (0.036) [0.482]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.019 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.603] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.006 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.869] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.037 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.314] \end{array}$
Assistive 1787	$\begin{array}{c} 0.013 \ (0.027) \ [0.618] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.024 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.509] \end{array}$	-0.049 (0.036) [0.171]	-0.082** (0.036) [0.023]	-0.024 (0.037) [0.516]	-0.002 (0.036) [0.958]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.094^{**} \\ (0.037) \\ [0.011] \end{array}$	-0.037 (0.035) [0.279]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.027 \\ (0.034) \\ [0.428] \end{array}$	-0.000 (.) [.]	0.000 (.) [.]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.009 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.787] \end{array}$	-0.018 (0.036) [0.612]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.025 \ (0.036) \ [0.497] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.008 \ (0.037) \ [0.834] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.043 \ (0.037) \ [0.235] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.032 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.383] \end{array}$	-0.029 (0.037) [0.422]	-0.031 (0.037) [0.399]	-0.045 (0.037) [0.220]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.017 \ (0.037) \ [0.646] \end{array}$	-0.002 (0.037) [0.964]	-0.013 (0.037) [0.716]
Regular SLACC	$0.044 \\ (0.027) \\ [0.110]$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.010 \\ (0.038) \\ [0.795] \end{array}$	-0.091^{**} (0.037) [0.013]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.004 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.923] \end{array}$	-0.027 (0.038) [0.473]	-0.000 (0.036) [0.992]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.057 \\ (0.038) \\ [0.135] \end{array}$	-0.016 (0.035) [0.657]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.024 \ (0.035) \ [0.480] \end{array}$	-0.000 (.) [.]	-0.000 (.) [.]	-0.054 (0.036) [0.133]	-0.067^{*} (0.037) [0.069]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.061 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.102] \end{array}$	-0.030 (0.037) [0.418]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.057 \ (0.037) \ [0.129] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.004 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.924] \end{array}$	-0.029 (0.037) [0.443]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.001 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.982] \end{array}$	-0.023 (0.037) [0.539]	-0.038 (0.038) [0.309]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.006 \\ (0.038) \\ [0.873] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.011 \\ (0.038) \\ [0.770] \end{array}$
Assistive SLACC	$\begin{array}{c} 0.038 \\ (0.027) \\ [0.165] \end{array}$	-0.012 (0.037) [0.753]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.014 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.708] \end{array}$	-0.091** (0.037) [0.014]	-0.029 (0.038) [0.438]	-0.038 (0.036) [0.297]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.048 \ (0.038) \ [0.203] \end{array}$	-0.059^{*} (0.035) [0.098]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.043 \ (0.035) \ [0.215] \end{array}$	-0.000 (.) [.]	-0.000 (.) [.]	-0.041 (0.036) [0.251]	-0.041 (0.037) [0.271]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.050 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.178] \end{array}$	-0.042 (0.037) [0.262]	-0.006 (0.037) [0.881]	-0.043 (0.037) [0.251]	-0.031 (0.037) [0.409]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.017 \\ (0.037) \\ [0.658] \end{array}$	-0.024 (0.037) [0.529]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.018 \ (0.038) \ [0.641] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.038 \ (0.038) \ [0.311] \end{array}$	-0.023 (0.038) [0.547]
Ν	9511	9511	9511	9511	9511	9511	9511	9511	9511	9511	9511	9511	9511	9501	9501	9501	9501	9501	9501	9501	9501	9501	9501

E.3 With survey data

	E	Expected	d Case	Resolut	ion			Exp	erience	with 15			Cas	se Resol	ution	1	Percepti	ions - Sta	ite	F	Perceptio	ons - Pol	lice	F	Percepti	ons - Law	yers	Pe	rception	as - Infor	mal
	(1) Own (Lyls)	(2) Gen (Lyls)	(3) Own (Days)	(4) Gen) (Days	(5)) Factor:	(6) Satis	(7) Coop.	(8) Polite	(9) Overall	(10) Timely	(11) Helpful	(12) Feedback Call	(13) k Timely	(14) v Satis.	(15) Fair	(16) Usage	(17) Trust	(18) Effectiv	(19)	(20)	(21) Trust	(22) Effectiv	(23) e Access	(24) s Usage	(25) Trust	(26) Effective	(27) Access	(28) Usage	(29) Trust	(30) Effectiv	(31) e Access
Panel A: Treatn	nents P	ooled a	and Inf	ormat	ion									,		8-								8 -				8-			
Pooled Treatment	s 0.000 (0.036 [0.997]	-0.028) (0.035] [0.415]	0.027 (0.053] [0.615]	-0.019) (0.041] [0.649	9 -0.003) (0.029)] [0.930]	0.040 (0.028) [0.146]	0.030) (0.028) [0.279]	0.056^{**}) (0.028) [0.047]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.001 \\ (0.027) \\ [0.970] \end{array}$	0.042 (0.029) [0.139]	-0.071* (0.039) [0.067]	0.009 (0.027) [0.731]	0.000 (.) [.]	0.017 (0.021] [0.409]	0.010 (0.021) [0.622]	-0.008) (0.020] [0.691]	0.001 (0.026) [0.965]	0.012 (0.026) [0.655]	-0.002 (0.017) [0.902]	0.000) (.) [.]	0.017 (0.025) [0.508]	0.012 (0.025) [0.628]	0.000 (.) [.]	0.000 (.) [.]	0.011 (0.027) [0.681]	-0.016 (0.026) [0.543]	-0.017 (0.017) [0.323]	-0.006 (0.028) [0.832]	-0.036 (0.028) [0.193]	-0.020 (0.027) [0.459]	-0.043* (0.026) [0.092]
Information	-0.059 (0.045) [0.192]	-0.001) (0.044 [0.980]	-0.033) (0.068] [0.627]	-0.020) (0.052] [0.697) 0.035)(0.036)][0.342]	-0.052 (0.034) [0.128]	-0.020) (0.034) [0.567]	-0.021) (0.035) [0.536]	-0.017 (0.034) [0.617]	$0.005 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.877]$	-0.019 (0.048) [0.688]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.009 \ (0.033) \ [0.786] \end{array}$	0.000 (.) [.]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.011 \\ (0.026 \\ [0.677] \end{array}$	0.014 (0.026) [0.580]	-0.017) (0.025] [0.496]	-0.054* (0.033) [0.098]	* -0.050 (0.033) [0.128]	-0.024 (0.021) [0.259]	0.000 (.) [.]	-0.055* (0.031) [0.079]	-0.046 (0.031) [0.136]	0.000 (.) [.]	0.000 (.) [.]	-0.051 (0.033) [0.119]	-0.050 (0.032) [0.120]	-0.025 (0.022) [0.254]	$0.038 \\ (0.034) \\ [0.268]$	-0.003 (0.034) [0.941]	-0.011 (0.034) [0.746]	-0.029 (0.032) [0.363]
Panel B: All Tre	eatmen	ts sepa	rate																												
Information	-0.058 (0.045 [0.198]	-0.001) (0.044] [0.987]	-0.033) (0.068] [0.629]	-0.019) (0.052] [0.712) (0.035) (0.036)] [0.342]	-0.052 (0.034) [0.127]	-0.020) (0.034) [0.563]	-0.022) (0.035) [0.532]	-0.017 (0.034) [0.611]	0.005 (0.035) [0.878]	-0.020 (0.048) [0.680]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.009 \\ (0.033) \\ [0.791] \end{array}$	-0.000 (.) [.]	0.011 (0.026) [0.677]	0.014 (0.026) [0.585]	-0.017) (0.025] [0.493]	-0.055* (0.033) [0.095]	* -0.050) (0.033) [0.124]	-0.024 (0.021) [0.261]	-0.000 (.) [.]	(0.056^{*}) (0.031) [0.077]	-0.046 (0.031) [0.134]	-0.000 (.) [.]	-0.000 (.) [.]) -0.052 (0.033) [0.115]	-0.050 (0.032) [0.116]	-0.024 (0.022) [0.258]	0.038 (0.034) [0.269]	-0.002 (0.034) [0.942]	-0.011 (0.034) [0.746]	-0.029 (0.032) [0.362]
Regular 1787	-0.048 (0.046 [0.290]	-0.064) (0.044 [0.142]	0.044) (0.069] [0.518]	-0.040) (0.052] [0.438	0 0.004 0 (0.037) 0 [0.917]	0.034 (0.035) [0.330]	0.045) (0.035) [0.197]	0.053) (0.035) [0.127]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.022 \\ (0.034) \\ [0.516] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.040 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.262] \end{array}$	-0.115** (0.048) [0.016]	$^{\circ}$ -0.008 (0.034) [0.811]	-0.000 (.) [.]	0 -0.018 (0.026) [0.487]	0.016 (0.026) [0.526]	0.011) (0.026] [0.680]	0.017 (0.033) [0.615]	0.033 (0.033) [0.316]	-0.009 (0.021) [0.677]	-0.000) (.) [.]	$0.027 \\ (0.032) \\ [0.398]$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.020 \\ (0.031) \\ [0.532] \end{array}$	-0.000 (.) [.]	0.000 (.) [.]	0.024 (0.033) [0.472]	-0.018 (0.032) [0.584]	-0.044** (0.022) [0.042]	* 0.012 (0.035) [0.722]	-0.024 (0.034) [0.476]	-0.016 (0.034) [0.629]	-0.030 (0.032) [0.349]
Assistive 1787	0.022 (0.045 [0.624]	-0.013) (0.044 [0.767]	0.040 (0.069) [0.564]	0.021) (0.052] [0.690	0.001) (0.037)] [0.981]	0.023 (0.035) [0.508]	0.004) (0.035) [0.917]	0.034) (0.035) [0.340]	-0.028 (0.034) [0.411]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.031 \\ (0.036) \\ [0.383] \end{array}$	-0.054 (0.048) [0.266]	-0.013 (0.034) [0.710]	-0.000 (.) [.]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.021 \\ (0.026 \\ [0.413] \end{array}$	-0.005 (0.026) [0.844]	-0.022) (0.026] [0.399]	-0.048 (0.033) [0.150]	-0.042 (0.033) [0.205]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.007 \\ (0.021) \\ [0.761] \end{array}$	-0.000) (.) [.]	-0.010 (0.032) [0.748]	-0.016 (0.031) [0.607]	-0.000 (.) [.]	0.000 (.) [.]	-0.029 (0.033) [0.377]	-0.066^{**} (0.032) [0.041]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.027 \\ (0.022) \\ [0.209] \end{array}$	-0.015 (0.035) [0.659]	-0.030 (0.035) [0.388]	-0.023 (0.034) [0.505]	-0.048 (0.032) [0.136]
Regular SLACC	$0.020 \\ (0.045 \\ [0.665]$	-0.006) (0.044 [0.886]	0.003 (0.068] [0.970]	-0.059) (0.052] [0.261	0 -0.021) (0.038)] [0.573]	0.031 (0.036) [0.383]	0.043) (0.036) [0.228]	0.051) (0.036) [0.156]	-0.024 (0.035) [0.496]	0.073^{**} (0.037) [0.047]	(0.049) (0.027]	$^{\circ}$ 0.021 (0.035) [0.544]	-0.000 (.) [.]	$0.025 \\ (0.027) \\ [0.339]$	-0.013 (0.027) [0.634]	-0.003) (0.026] [0.908]	-0.003 (0.034) [0.938]	0.011 (0.034) [0.745]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.005 \\ (0.022) \\ [0.806] \end{array}$	-0.000) (.) [.]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.005 \\ (0.033) \\ [0.885] \end{array}$	-0.003 (0.032) [0.931]	-0.000 (.) [.]	0.000 (.) [.]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.001 \\ (0.034) \\ [0.982] \end{array}$	-0.002 (0.033) [0.943]	-0.039* (0.022) [0.082]	-0.010 (0.036) [0.771]	-0.046 (0.035) [0.190]	-0.004 (0.035) [0.902]	-0.039 (0.033) [0.236]
Assistive SLACC	0.008 (0.045 [0.855]	-0.027) (0.044 [0.538]	(0.021) (0.067) [0.749]	0.002) (0.052] [0.966	0.004) (0.038)] [0.909]	0.078** (0.036) [0.029]	* 0.030) (0.036) [0.400]	0.089^{**}) (0.036) [0.014]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.034 \\ (0.035) \\ [0.333] \end{array}$	0.028 (0.037) [0.451]	$0.002 \\ (0.049) \\ [0.974]$	0.044 (0.035) [0.203]	-0.000 (.) [.]	0.047^{*} (0.027 [0.079]	0.044 (0.027) [0.104]	-0.020) (0.026] [0.439]	0.043 (0.034) [0.208]	0.048 (0.034) [0.155]	-0.011 (0.022) [0.606]	-0.000) (.) [.]	$0.048 \\ (0.033) \\ [0.140]$	0.050 (0.032) [0.116]	-0.000 (.) [.]	0.000 (.) [.]	$0.052 \\ (0.034) \\ [0.125]$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.031 \\ (0.033) \\ [0.345] \end{array}$	-0.015 (0.022) [0.504]	-0.013 (0.036) [0.719]	-0.046 (0.035) [0.191]	-0.037 (0.035) [0.286]	-0.058^{*} (0.033) [0.079]
N	3927	4881	2753	3765	9403	9510	9510	9510	9510	9494	5419	9408	9511	9511	9511	9496	9259	9239	9440	9511	9457	9438	9511	9511	8604	8692	9225	9250	8954	8985	9082