Preferences for fairness over losses
Last registered on July 06, 2018

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
Preferences for fairness over losses
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0003131
Initial registration date
July 05, 2018
Last updated
July 06, 2018 5:45 PM EDT
Location(s)
Region
Primary Investigator
Affiliation
University of Wyoming
Other Primary Investigator(s)
Additional Trial Information
Status
On going
Start date
2018-06-05
End date
2018-07-15
Secondary IDs
Abstract
Economists have studied preferences for fairness over gains for decades, often using Dictator games in experimental laboratories. This body of literature suggests Dictators are altruistic, even towards strangers. In this experiment, we aim to examine preferences for fairness over losses. I.e., how do Dictators choose to split losses, as opposed to gains?
External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Thunstrom, Linda. 2018. "Preferences for fairness over losses." AEA RCT Registry. July 06. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3131/history/31564
Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
I design an online Dictator game, with a gain and a loss condition. In the gain condition, Dictators are asked to split a $10 gain with a Recipient (who received no gain). In the loss condition, Dictators are asked to split a $10 loss with a Recipient (who received no loss).
Intervention Start Date
2018-06-05
Intervention End Date
2018-07-15
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
The own payoff chosen by Dictators.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
The experiment will be conducted online, recruiting subjects from Qualtrics panel.
Experimental Design Details
The experiment is conducted online, recruiting subjects from Qualtrics panel. Payoff magnitudes are held constant over both conditions. In other words, in the gain condition, Dictators are asked to split $10, and can do so in one dollar increments. In the loss condition, Dictators are informed both they themselves and the Recipient are endowed with $10, but they now incur a loss of $10. They are asked to split the loss with the Recipient. Further, we investigate if some of our results are explained by Dictators' own payoffs being less transparent under the loss condition than in the gain condition. We repeat the same treatments, but when making the choice of payoffs, it is made salient to Dictators what each choice means in terms of their versus the Recipient's payoff.
Randomization Method
Randomization into treatments is done by computer program.
Randomization Unit
In addition to randomizing subjects into treatments, I randomize the order of Dictator payoff choices, so i can control for any order effect in payoff choice display.
Was the treatment clustered?
No
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
380
Sample size: planned number of observations
380
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
190 in gain condition, 190 in loss condition.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
University of Wyoming
IRB Approval Date
2018-05-23
IRB Approval Number
#20180523LT01992
Post-Trial
Post Trial Information
Study Withdrawal
Intervention
Is the intervention completed?
No
Is data collection complete?
Data Publication
Data Publication
Is public data available?
No
Program Files
Program Files
Reports and Papers
Preliminary Reports
Relevant Papers