| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Last Published | Before July 11, 2019 10:33 AM | After May 13, 2020 01:45 PM |
| Field Study Withdrawn | Before | After No |
| Field Intervention Completion Date | Before | After August 10, 2018 |
| Field Data Collection Complete | Before | After Yes |
| Field Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization) | Before | After 17 960 individuals in treatment groups, 4 791 in control |
| Field Was attrition correlated with treatment status? | Before | After No |
| Field Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations | Before | After 17 937 individuals in treatment groups, 4 791 in the control group |
| Field Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms | Before | After For the treatment arms we have the following number of individuals. - Basic1: 1 988, where 199 were sent the reading task - Basic2: 1 992, - A: 3 986, where 199 were sent the reading task - C: 3 991 - B0: 3 974 - BL,BM,BH: 2 006 (669, 669, 668 for each reward level, respectively) |
| Field Is there a restricted access data set available on request? | Before | After No |
| Field Program Files | Before | After No |
| Field Data Collection Completion Date | Before | After February 10, 2019 |
| Field Is data available for public use? | Before | After No |
| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Paper Abstract | Before | After In this paper we empirically investigate potential causes of imperfect competition in the fund market, as characterized by high price dispersion among comparable funds. We discriminate between three main hypotheses on the demand side: a lack of awareness of price dispersion, search costs, and financial illiteracy. A large-scale field experiment is conducted in the Swedish Premium Pension system. Information letters are sent to pension savers in two index funds, where there exists a cheaper fund with the same index strategy. We show that an information intervention that increases the awareness of a cheaper, dominating fund, and reduces the search costs for finding such an alternative, can significantly improve households’ real investment allocations. Nonetheless, a majority of savers who are sent information about the name of the dominating fund do not switch funds. Thus, the high degree of inertia in pension investments remains even when search frictions for identifying dominating alternatives are eliminated. |
| Field Paper URL | Before | After https://www.dropbox.com/s/kwuu8i4tmxz4jhd/Kinnerud_Lorentzon.pdf?dl=0 |