Strategic ignorance and discrimination
Last registered on January 17, 2020

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
Strategic ignorance and discrimination
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0005307
Initial registration date
January 15, 2020
Last updated
January 17, 2020 10:47 AM EST
Location(s)
Region
Primary Investigator
Affiliation
University of Wyoming
Other Primary Investigator(s)
Additional Trial Information
Status
In development
Start date
2020-01-25
End date
2020-01-31
Secondary IDs
Abstract
This trial serves to complement results from previously collected data (not pre-registered). We examine the following: Do people have a taste for discrimination? We answer this question in a dictator game, allowing for Dictators to be strategically ignorant of the Recipients' payoffs (see Dana et al., 2007). Recipients are named either James or Mohammed -- names particularly associated with "Caucasian Christian" and "Muslim." We explore if people use the moral wiggle room created by strategic ignorance to discriminate against Mohammed.
External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Thunstrom, Linda. 2020. "Strategic ignorance and discrimination." AEA RCT Registry. January 17. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5307-1.0.
Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
Participants will participate in a dictator game, of the kind developed in Dana et al. (2007), although with smaller amounts. Dictators will be recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk. They will be randomized into one of two treatments: "treatment Mohammed" and "treatment James." If in treatment "Mohammed," they will learn that the Recipient in the game is called Mohammed, and if in treatment "James," they learn the Recipient is called James. They are thereafter offered the opportunity to learn or remain ignorant of the version of the game they are playing together with the Recipient -- they can focus only on their own payoff from the game (by choosing to remain ignorant of the Recipient payoff), or they can focus on both their own and the Recipient's payoff (by choosing to learn the version of the game they are playing).
Intervention Start Date
2020-01-25
Intervention End Date
2020-01-31
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
We are interested in (i) the extent to which Dictators chose to ignore Recipient payoff across the two treatments, and (ii) overall distributions from Dictators to "Mohammed" versus "James."
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
Participants will participate in a dictator game, of the kind developed in Dana et al. (2007), although with smaller amounts. Dictators will be recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk. They will be randomized into one of two treatments: "treatment Mohammed" and "treatment James." If in treatment "Mohammed," they will learn that the Recipient in the game is called Mohammed, and if in treatment "James," they learn the Recipient is called James. They are thereafter offered the opportunity to learn or remain ignorant of the version of the game they are playing together with the Recipient -- they can focus only on their own payoff from the game (by choosing to remain ignorant of the Recipient payoff), or they can focus on both their own and the Recipient's payoff (by choosing to learn the version of the game they are playing).
Experimental Design Details
Participants will participate in a dictator game, of the kind developed in Dana et al. (2007), although with smaller amounts. Dictators will be recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk. They will be randomized into one of two treatments: "treatment Mohammed" and "treatment James." If in treatment "Mohammed," they will learn that the Recipient in the game is called Mohammed, and if in treatment "James," they learn the Recipient is called James. They are thereafter offered the opportunity to learn or remain ignorant of the version of the game they are playing together with the Recipient -- they can focus only on their own payoff from the game (by choosing to remain ignorant of the Recipient payoff), or they can focus on both their own and the Recipient's payoff (by choosing to learn the version of the game they are playing).
Randomization Method
Randomization by computer software.
Randomization Unit
Individual.
Was the treatment clustered?
No
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
0
Sample size: planned number of observations
800
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
400
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
Institutional Review Board, University of Wyoming
IRB Approval Date
2020-01-14
IRB Approval Number
N/A
Post-Trial
Post Trial Information
Study Withdrawal
Intervention
Is the intervention completed?
No
Is data collection complete?
Data Publication
Data Publication
Is public data available?
No
Program Files
Program Files
Reports and Papers
Preliminary Reports
Relevant Papers