Willingness to pay for fact-checking

Last registered on November 23, 2020
View Trial History

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Willingness to pay for fact-checking
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0006789
Initial registration date
November 20, 2020

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
November 23, 2020, 10:33 AM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country
United States of America
Region

Primary Investigator

Name
Prithvijit Mukherjee
Affiliation
Center for Growth and Opportunity at Utah State University
Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Lucas Renstschler
PI Affiliation
Utah State University
Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2020-11-20
End date
2021-01-31
Keywords
Behavior, Welfare
Additional Keywords
Willingness to pay, Misinformation, Beliefs, Fact Checking
JEL code(s)
C91, D83, D84, D91
Secondary IDs
Abstract
Misinformation is at the center of recent political discourse; in this study, we aim to identify an individual’s willingness to pay for fact-checking misinformation. We are interested in analyzing cognitive and non-cognitive factors that motivate individuals’ willingness to pay. This study is of vital importance given the prevalence of misinformation online, and it is important to determine what factors can motivate individuals to make costly investments of time and energy to ascertain the truth. The experiment studies which cognitive and non-cognitive attributes affect the decision to pay for fact-checking posts shared on social media platforms, and statements made by politicians and news anchors. We use a set of 30 questions which were marked either True or False by the PolitiFact website.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Mukherjee, Prithvijit and Lucas Renstschler. 2020. "Willingness to pay for fact-checking." AEA RCT Registry. November 23. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6789-1.0
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
We give an option to the participants to pay for fact-checking. We elicit their willingness to pay by a multiple price list, and one of the prices are randomly picked.
Intervention Start Date
2020-11-20
Intervention End Date
2021-01-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Factors that determine an individual's willingness to pay.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
In the first decision task, 30 statements have been rated as either True or False by an independent fact-checking organization. Individuals report the probability with which they believe the statement is rated as True. Individuals are incentivized to report their beliefs using a quadratic scoring rule. After reporting their belief, they have the option to pick costs they are willing to pay to see a fact-check. One of these costs is randomly picked by the computer. If the cost randomly chosen is one for which they decided to pay to see a fact-check, then their beliefs will be automatically updated to the result of the fact-check. If the cost randomly chosen is one they decided not to pay to see a fact-check, the belief initially reported would be their final answer. One of the 30 questions is randomly picked for payment for this decision task.

In the second decision task, individuals decide how many boxes to collect out of 100, one of which contains a bomb. For each box an individual collects, they earn 1 cent. Behind one of the boxes hides a bomb that destroys everything that has been collected. The remaining 99 boxes are worth 1 cent each. Individuals do not know where the bomb is located. They only know that the bomb can be in any place with equal probability. If an individual collects the box where the bomb is located, the bomb will explode, earning zero. If the individual stops before collecting the bomb, they gain the amount accumulated that far.

Following the two decisions task, individuals answer a questionnaire which elicits their political preferences, cognitive reflection task, big five, dark triad, and socio-demographic question. At the end of the experiment, they have a choice to donate $0, $1, $2, $3, $4, or $5 towards a fact-checking organization.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Randomization is done by the computer.
Randomization Unit
Individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
200
Sample size: planned number of observations
200
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
200
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Utah State University IRB
IRB Approval Date
2020-10-30
IRB Approval Number
11478
Analysis Plan

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information

Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials