Individual trust and trustworthy behaviours in differentiated organisational structures

Last registered on May 25, 2021

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Individual trust and trustworthy behaviours in differentiated organisational structures
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0007687
Initial registration date
May 25, 2021

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
May 25, 2021, 4:25 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Harbin Institute of Technology

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
Harbin Institute of Technology

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2021-05-30
End date
2021-07-01
Secondary IDs
Abstract
This experiment is mainly based on the classical trust game.
The main aim of this experiment is to explore the trusting and trustworthy behavior in different organizational structures. We would like to test whether the different organizational structures will influence the trustor's trusting behavior and the trustee's truthworthiness.
The experiment contains five experimental groups.
We introduce different organizational structures in the trustees' groups. We used a 2×2 experiment design: parallel × vertical organizational structures, balanced in-group power × unbalanced in-group power. There are five different experiment groups in our design: 1. parallel-balanced, 2. parallel-unbalanced, 3. vertical-balanced, 4. vertical-unbalanced (from high to low), 5. vertical-unbalanced (from low to high).
In each experiment unit, there are three participants, including one trustor and two trustees. The trustors will receive 10 EC when the experiment starts. First, the trustors have to decide the investment number to the trustee group. The investment number range is { 4, 6, 8, 10 } (EC). Then, the investment money will become 3 times the original investment and be given to the trustees. In the parallel groups, trustees will decide the return value at the same time, while in the parallel, one trustee makes a decision in advance, and then the other trustee could see her decision result and then makes her own decision. In the power-balanced groups, two trustees receive an equal amount of investment money, both 1.5 times of the original investment money that the trustor provides. In the power-unbalanced groups, one trustee receives 2 times the original investment money and is assigned as the "high power" trustee, while another trustee receives the investment money equal to the original investment money that the trustor provides and is assigned as the "low power" trustee. The trustor receives the return money from two trustees.
This experiment repeats for 30 periods. The participants' experimental role changes every 10 periods and would not be repeated. It means that each participant will act in all kinds of experimental roles in a unit. In treatment 4, the trustee with low power acts in advance, and in treatment 5, the trustee with high power acts in advance.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Pang, Yudan and Hang Wu. 2021. "Individual trust and trustworthy behaviours in differentiated organisational structures." AEA RCT Registry. May 25. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7687-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
The experiment includes five experimental groups. Each group has a different organizational structure or power balance status. In order to make different organizational structures, the trustees in experimental units are structured as parallel or vertical structures. The differences are constructed with trustees' decision procedures. In the parallel structure, two trustees make their decision at the same time, while in the vertical structure, one trustee in an experimental unit makes a decision in advance, and then another trustee makes a decision. The differences of power balance status are structured with the investment money each trustee could receive. In the balanced groups, each trustee receives an equal amount of investment money from the trustor. In the unbalanced groups, one trustee receives a higher amount of investment money while another trustee receives a lower amount of investment.
Intervention Start Date
2021-05-30
Intervention End Date
2021-06-30

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
trustor's investment value, trustee's return value, differences of investment and return values between periods, individual's total profit, belief to others
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
This experiment is mainly based on the classical trust game. We introduce different organizational structures in the trustees' groups. We used a 2×2 experiment design: parallel × vertical organizational structures, balanced in-group power × unbalanced in-group power. There are five different experiment groups in our design: 1. parallel-balanced, 2. parallel-unbalanced, 3. vertical-balanced, 4. vertical-unbalanced (from high to low), 5. vertical-unbalanced (from low to high).
In each experiment unit, there are three participants, including one trustor and two trustees. The trustors will receive 10 EC when the experiment starts. First, the trustors have to decide the investment number to the trustee group. The investment number range is { 4, 6, 8, 10 } (EC). Then, the investment money will become 3 times the original investment and be given to the trustees. In the parallel groups, trustees will decide the return value at the same time, while in the parallel, one trustee makes decision in advance and then the other trustee could see her decision result and then makes own decision. In the power-balanced groups, two trustees receive equal amount of investment money, both 1.5 times of the original investment money that trustor provides. In the power-unbalanced groups, one trustee receives 2 times of the original investment money and is assigned as the "high power" trustee, while another trustee receives the investment money equal to the original investment money that the trustor provides and is assigned as the "low power" trustee. The trustor receives the return money from two trustees.
This experiment repeats for 30 periods. The participants' experimental role changes every 10 periods and would not be repeated. It means that each participant will act in all kinds of experimental roles in a unit. In treatment 4, the trustee with low power acts in advance, and in treatment 5, the trustee with high power acts in advance.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization Unit
individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
1 university
Sample size: planned number of observations
150-180 university students
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
30-36 participants in treatment 1, 30-36 participants in treatment 2, 30-36 participants in treatment 3, 30-36 participants in treatment 4, and 30-36 participants in treatment 5.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials

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IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
School of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology
IRB Approval Date
2021-05-19
IRB Approval Number
N/A

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials