Title,Url,Last update date,Published at,First registered on,RCT_ID,DOI Number,Primary Investigator,Status,Start date,End date,Keywords,Country names,Other Primary Investigators,Jel code,Secondary IDs,Abstract,External Links,Sponsors,Partners,Intervention start date,Intervention end date,Intervention,Primary outcome end points,Primary outcome explanation,Secondary outcome end points,Secondary outcome explanation,Experimental design,Experimental design details,Randomization method,Randomization unit,Sample size number clusters,Sample size number observations,Sample size number arms,Minimum effect size,IRB,Analysis Plan Documents,Intervention completion date,Data collection completion,Data collection completion date,Number of clusters,Attrition correlated,Total number of observations,Treatment arms,Public data,Public data url,Program files,Program files url,Post trial documents csv,Relevant papers for csv The effects of financial aid and returns information in selective and less selective schools: Experimental evidence from Chile,http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1196,"March 13, 2017",2017-03-13 11:08:52 -0400,2017-03-13,AEARCTR-0001196,10.1257/rct.1196-1.0,Claudia Martinez A. clmartineza@uc.cl,completed,2013-07-01,2015-12-01,"[""education"", ""information experiment"", ""higher education"", ""financial aid"", ""returns to education"", ""Chile""]",Chile (South America),Dario Romero (darior@iadb.org) Inter-American Development Bank; Matias Busso (mbusso@iadb.org) Inter-American Development Bank; Taryn Dinkelman (Taryn.L.Dinkelman@Dartmouth.edu) Dartmouth College,"I23, I22, I26, D830","","Schools that provide higher education often belong to either a merit-based selective system or an open-access less selective system. Because spaces in the selective system tend to be rationed and contingent on a lifetime of academic preparation, improved access to higher education may be more quickly achieved through interventions relevant to the less selective system. We present the results of a field experiment that provided Grade 12 students in Chile with tailored information about financial aid and average earnings for schools and careers in both types of schools. Treated students are more likely to apply to and enroll in higher education. Effects are concentrated among students who must choose from schools in the less selective system. Treated students choose careers and schools with lower expected wages, lower employment probabilities, and lower quality, but offering shorter degree programs with lower tuition.","Description: J-PAL Evaluation Summary Url: https://www.povertyactionlab.org/node/22727 ","","",2013-10-01,2014-01-01,"(1) Control group: The control group received one email inviting them to learn about possible careers at www.eligecarrera.cl. This publicly accessible official website contains general information on types of careers, loans and scholarships available at different schools, eligibility criteria for these programs and financing options. Students in the treatment group also received a link to the same website in their treatment emails. (2) Financial Aid treatment: We presented all treatment students with information about general types of financial aid and specific financial aid linked to their baseline preferences or background characteristics. PUC volunteers searched for this personalized information on loans and scholarships in the public and private sector. (3) Returns treatment: To construct information for the Returns Treatment, we gathered data from the publicly accessible MiFuturo database (www.MiFuturo.cl) of 2013. This database reports average monthly earnings and average employability rates for recent graduates of specific career-school programs. * Half of the students in the Financial Aid treatment were randomized into receiving the Returns Treatment. ","Access to higher education variables (application to a selective school, acceptance into a selective school, enrollment in a selective school, enrollment in any higher education), variables on the quality of school of enrollment (average wage returns for the career- school, average employability, and years of accreditation), and cost of enrollment variables (annual tuition and program duration). ","",,,"We worked with a Chilean NGO, Por Una Carrera (PUC), to visit over 300 school career fairs in the greater Santiago region between July 2013 and November 2013. At the PUC booths, we collected over 10,000 emails from Grade 12 students, along with their preferences about post- secondary careers and institutions. We invited students to participate in our study by sending them a web link to our baseline survey; respondents had two weeks to complete the online survey. We stratified the sample using baseline information on gender and on whether a student’s parents had completed any tertiary education, or not, or had missing education information. Between October and December 2013, we randomized students into an information treatment and control group on a rolling basis, following a re-randomization protocol to maintain cumulative balance in the combined sample. All treated students received the Financial Aid Treatment: information about financial aid possibilities tailored to their baseline career-school preferences. Half of the treated students also received a Returns Treatment: information about expected returns related to their baseline preferences. ","","Randomization done in office by computer; re-randomization procedure described in text. ",Students (grade 12) ,N/A no cluster,"1,727 Grade 12 students ","Control: 556 students Financial Aid Treatment: 553 Financial Aid and Returns Treatment: 559","","",None,2014-01-31,true,2014-01-31,N/A no cluster,false,"Compliance was high in each of the treatment groups, but take-up was low. We exclude 59 students who fail to graduate from our final analysis sample of 1,668 students.","",false,"",false,"","","Abstract: Schools that provide higher education often belong to either a merit-based selective system or an open-access less selective system. This paper presents the results of a field experiment that provided Grade 12 students in Chile with tailored information about financial aid and average earnings and employment probabilities for schools and careers in both types of schools. No effect is found on the extensive margins of enrollment in the selective or in the less selective sector. Treated students change their intensive margin decisions: they choose careers and schools with lower expected wages and lower employment probabilities, but with higher quality relative to their baseline preferences. Citation: Busso, Martias, Taryn Dinkelman, Claudio A. Martinez, Dario Romero. ""The Effects of Financial Aid and Returns Information in Selective and less Selective Schools: Experimental Evidence from Chile."" IDB Working Paper Nº IDB-WP-743, November 2016. URL: https://www.povertyactionlab.org/sites/default/files/publications/868_The-Effects-of-Financial-Aid-and-Returns-Information-in-Selective-and-Less-Selective-Schools_Chile_November2016.pdf "