Title,Url,Last update date,Published at,First registered on,RCT_ID,DOI Number,Primary Investigator,Status,Start date,End date,Keywords,Country names,Other Primary Investigators,Jel code,Secondary IDs,Abstract,External Links,Sponsors,Partners,Intervention start date,Intervention end date,Intervention,Primary outcome end points,Primary outcome explanation,Secondary outcome end points,Secondary outcome explanation,Experimental design,Experimental design details,Randomization method,Randomization unit,Sample size number clusters,Sample size number observations,Sample size number arms,Minimum effect size,IRB,Analysis Plan Documents,Intervention completion date,Data collection completion,Data collection completion date,Number of clusters,Attrition correlated,Total number of observations,Treatment arms,Public data,Public data url,Program files,Program files url,Post trial documents csv,Relevant papers for csv Effectiveness of provider incentives for anaemia reduction in rural China: a cluster randomised trial,http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1441,"August 23, 2016",2016-08-23 00:32:56 -0400,2016-08-23,AEARCTR-0001441,10.1257/rct.1441-1.0,Grant Miller ngmiller@stanford.edu,completed,2009-09-01,2010-05-31,"[""health"", ""anaemia"", ""incentive pay"", ""pay-for-performance"", ""nutritional supplement"", ""China""]",China (Central and East Asia),"Qiran Zhao () PhD candidate, Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy, Institute of Geographical Sciences and Natural Resources Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China; Scott Rozelle () Helen F Farnsworth senior fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University; Alexis Medina () Project Manager, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University; Reynaldo Martorell () Professor, Hubert Department of Global Health, Rollins School of Public Health, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA; Patricia Foo () PhD candidate, Department of Economics, Stanford University; School of Medicine, Stanford University; Sean Sylvia () PhD candidate, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Maryland, College Park and Northwest Socioeconomic Development Research Center, Northwest University, China; Linxiu Zhang () Deputy Director, Associate professor, Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy, Institute of Geographical Sciences and Natural Resources Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China; Renfu Luo () Associate professor, Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy, Institute of Geographical Sciences and Natural Resources Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China","",ISRCTN76158086,"OBJECTIVE: To test the impact of provider performance pay for anaemia reduction in rural China. DESIGN: A cluster randomised trial of information, subsidies, and incentives for school principals to reduce anaemia among their students. Enumerators and study participants were not informed of study arm assignment. SETTING: 72 randomly selected rural primary schools across northwest China. PARTICIPANTS: 3553 fourth and fifth grade students aged 9-11 years. All fourth and fifth grade students in sample schools participated in the study. INTERVENTIONS: Sample schools were randomly assigned to a control group, with no intervention, or one of three treatment arms: (a) an information arm, in which principals received information about anaemia; (b) a subsidy arm, in which principals received information and unconditional subsidies; and (c) an incentive arm, in which principals received information, subsidies, and financial incentives for reducing anaemia among students. Twenty seven schools were assigned to the control arm (1816 students at baseline, 1623 at end point), 15 were assigned to the information arm (659 students at baseline, 596 at end point), 15 to the subsidy arm (726 students at baseline, 667 at end point), and 15 to the incentive arm (743 students at baseline, 667 at end point). MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Student haemoglobin concentrations. RESULTS s Mean student haemoglobin concentration rose by 1.5 g/L (95% CI –1.1 to 4.1) in information schools, 0.8 g/L (–1.8 to 3.3) in subsidy schools, and 2.4 g/L (0 to 4.9) in incentive schools compared with the control group. This increase in haemoglobin corresponded to a reduction in prevalence of anaemia (Hb<115 g/L) of 24% in a incentive schools. Interactions with pre-existing incentives for principals to achieve good academic performance led to substantially larger gains in the information and incentive arms: when combined with incentives for good academic performance, associated effects on student haemoglobin concentration were 9.8 g/L (4.1 to 15.5) larger in information schools and 8.6 g/L (2.1 to 15.1) larger in incentive schools. CONCLUSIONS: Financial incentives for health improvement were modestly effective. Understanding interactions with other motives and pre-existing incentives is critical. ","Description: J-PAL Evaluation Summary Url: https://www.povertyactionlab.org/evaluation/effectiveness-provider-incentives-anemia-reduction-rural-china ","","",2009-11-01,2010-05-31,"Sample schools were randomly assigned to a control group, with no intervention, or one of three treatment arms: (a) an information arm, in which principals received information about anaemia namely how many students in the school were affected, how to reduce it and the relationship between anemia and academic performance; (b) a subsidy arm, in which principals received the same information as treatment (a) along with subsidies to be spend towards nutritional supplement for reducing anaemia; and (c) an incentive arm, in which principals received information, subsidies, and financial incentives for reducing anaemia among students. ","1) Haemoglobin concentration in students 2) Anaemia status of students after the intervention ","1) Haemoglobin concentration in students: haemoglobin concentration directly using finger prick blood samples (with HemoCue 201+) 2) Anaemia status of students after the intervention : same as above ",,,"Through a canvass survey, a sampling universe of all primary schools in 10 nationally designated poor counties spread across two provinces with high anaemia rates—Ningxia and Qinghai – was created. Schools having six grades (“complete” primary schools) and boarding facilities were shortlisted. A total of 85 schools met these criteria, and 72 were randomly selection for inclusion into the study. Half of the fourth and fifth grade students in sample schools were randomly selected as study participants. Fourth and fifth grade students were chosen because they are old enough for test scores to be relevant but also young enough not to have reached puberty (at which point nutritional requirements differ more markedly from childhood and vary by sex). Baseline and follow-up surveys were conducted for all principals and students in the sample schools. Students were tested for their hemoglobin levels through finger pricks. Household surveys were also conducted for all study participants. ","",Done using STATA 10,School,72 primary schools,3944 students,"Control: 27 schools, 1816 students Treatment 1 (information arm): 15 schools, 659 students Treatment 2 (subsidy arm): 15 schools, 726 students Treatment 3 (incentive arm): 15 schools, 743 students ","Using estimates from previous studies, it was calculated that 30 schools (15 per trial arm) and 55 students per school for each inter-arm comparison was required to detect a standardised effect size of 0.4 for haemoglobin concentration with 80% power at the 5% significance level.","Name: Stanford University Institute Review Board Approval_number: 17071 Approval_date: 2009-07-21 ",None,2010-05-31,true,2010-05-31,72 primary schools,false,3553 students,"Control: 27 schools, 1623 students Treatment 1 (information arm): 15 schools, 596 students Treatment 2 (subsidy arm): 15 schools, 667 students Treatment 3 (incentive arm): 15 schools, 667 students",,"",,"","","Abstract: EFFECTIVENESS OF PROVIDER INCENTIVES FOR ANAEMIA REDUCTION IN RURAL CHINA: A CLUSTER RANDOMISED TRIAL OBJECTIVE: To test the impact of provider performance pay for anaemia reduction in rural China. DESIGN: A cluster randomised trial of information, subsidies, and incentives for school principals to reduce anaemia among their students. Enumerators and study participants were not informed of study arm assignment. SETTING: 72 randomly selected rural primary schools across northwest China. PARTICIPANTS: 3553 fourth and fifth grade students aged 9-11 years. All fourth and fifth grade students in sample schools participated in the study. INTERVENTIONS: Sample schools were randomly assigned to a control group, with no intervention, or one of three treatment arms: (a) an information arm, in which principals received information about anaemia; (b) a subsidy arm, in which principals received information and unconditional subsidies; and (c) an incentive arm, in which principals received information, subsidies, and financial incentives for reducing anaemia among students. Twenty seven schools were assigned to the control arm (1816 students at baseline, 1623 at end point), 15 were assigned to the information arm (659 students at baseline, 596 at end point), 15 to the subsidy arm (726 students at baseline, 667 at end point), and 15 to the incentive arm (743 students at baseline, 667 at end point). MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Student haemoglobin concentrations. RESULTS s Mean student haemoglobin concentration rose by 1.5 g/L (95% CI –1.1 to 4.1) in information schools, 0.8 g/L (–1.8 to 3.3) in subsidy schools, and 2.4 g/L (0 to 4.9) in incentive schools compared with the control group. This increase in haemoglobin corresponded to a reduction in prevalence of anaemia (Hb<115 g/L) of 24% in a incentive schools. Interactions with pre-existing incentives for principals to achieve good academic performance led to substantially larger gains in the information and incentive arms: when combined with incentives for good academic performance, associated effects on student haemoglobin concentration were 9.8 g/L (4.1 to 15.5) larger in information schools and 8.6 g/L (2.1 to 15.1) larger in incentive schools. CONCLUSIONS: Financial incentives for health improvement were modestly effective. Understanding interactions with other motives and pre-existing incentives is critical. Citation: Miller, Grant, Renfu Luo, Linxiu Zhang, Sean Sylvia, Yaojiang Shi, Patricia Foo, Qiran Zhao, Reynaldo Martorell, Alexis Medina, and Scott Rozelle. ""Effectiveness of provider incentives for anaemia reduction in rural China: a cluster randomised trial."" BMJ e:4809 (2012): 1-10. doi: 10.1136/bmj.e4809. URL: http://www.bmj.com/content/bmj/345/bmj.e4809.full.pdf "