

IMPACT EVALUATION CONCEPT NOTE

Performance Targets and Public Pressure: Innovative Approaches to Local Government Accountability in Burkina Faso

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This concept note proposes an experimental impact evaluation to test whether community-based organizations (CBOs) can be motivated to use their social influence to demand accountability from municipal governments in Burkina Faso and to lobby for better local public service delivery.¹ This experiment is carried out in the context of Component 3 of the World Bank-assisted Burkina Faso Local Government Support Project (*Projet d'Appui aux Collectivités Territoriales*, or PACT), which focuses on strengthening the accountability linkages between citizens and local governments. The experiment has been developed in a collaborative effort by the PACT, the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (MATD) in Burkina Faso, the World Bank's Africa Public Sector Unit (AFTP4), the World Bank's Development Impact Evaluation (DIME) unit (DECIE), and an external research collaborator at Yale University.

The purpose of the experiment is to inform strategies through which, in the future, the PACT and similar projects can become more effective at building bottom-up accountability structures for municipal governments. It will contribute answers to the more general question, "Are there ways to strengthen accountability linkages between municipal authorities and citizens, over and above the standard set of PACT interventions?" In particular, this IE will inform our understanding of whether it is possible to improve municipal performance by leveraging the influence of existing community-based organizations.

The experiment is not an evaluation of the PACT as a whole, nor will it evaluate whether Component 3 in its entirety is achieving its objectives. Rather, it will test ways of complementing the existing approaches within Component 3 to improve the project's performance in the future. If successful, the experimental interventions can be scaled up and fully integrated into the project's operations in future project phases. However, even if the interventions as such are unsuccessful, the experiment will nonetheless produce valuable evidence about the possibility of harnessing the social influence of CBOs to increase local government accountability that are informative beyond the project and the country context.

Community-based organizations often have considerable social influence, local knowledge and proven collective action capacity in their community. This would make them excellent candidates to mount social accountability pressure on municipal administrations. However, their potential remains unused, because CBOs typically have a narrow scope of activities and no direct motivation to become more involved in municipal governance. Especially when it becomes difficult to confront local leaders about their performance, CBOs would need a strong and specific reason to do so.

To address this problem, the proposed experiment will test three interventions which, in combination, are expected to increase the demand of CBOs for municipal government accountability: First, the dissemination of an annually updated scorecard that captures municipal administration performance on key indicators of service delivery and institutional capacity. Second, partnerships with influential local CBOs to encourage them to hold municipal governments accountable to their performance scorecards.

¹ CBOs are locally rooted groups, associations or organizations that facilitate collective action among their members for a specific purpose. They include for example producers' organizations, savings groups, self-help groups, parent-teacher associations, diaspora associations, etc.

Third, an incentive scheme that motivates the partner CBOs to identify efficient ways of lobbying for better municipal government performance. This incentive scheme consists of promising financial rewards to selected CBOs that solely depend on improvements in the municipal administration's effort and performance (as measured by annual changes in the scorecard indicators). The experiment will test whether such a reward scheme can effectively give the CBOs a stake in local government performance, prompt them to start lobbying and exerting accountability pressure for better municipal governance, while at the same time circumventing some of the pitfalls of performance pay schemes, such as the crowding out of voluntary collective action.

To test these interventions, we propose a series of three consecutive experiments. In the first experiment, set to begin in 2014, performance scorecards will be disseminated to municipalities to test their feasibility and effectiveness. In the second experiment, scheduled for 2015, this initial treatment will be combined with the CBO partnerships and the financial reward scheme for CBOs. A small proof-of-concept pilot of the CBO partnerships and reward scheme will be carried out already in 2014. Finally, in a provisional third experiment, scheduled for 2016, the sustainability of the approach will be tested by selectively removing the incentive scheme in a random subset of municipalities.

2. EXPERIMENTAL INTERVENTIONS

The proposed impact evaluation will test three interventions that complement each other: (1) The dissemination of performance scorecards to municipal administrations, (2) partnership agreements with one selected, influential community-based organization (CBO) per municipality that is encouraged to hold its municipal administration accountable for its performance scores, (3) a reward schedule for the partner CBO that depends on the municipal administration's annual improvements in performance scores. Each of the three interventions is described in detail below.

All three experimental interventions complement the existing activities under component 3 of the PACT which focuses on strengthening the accountability of municipal governments towards the local population. The overall objective of these experimental interventions is to harness the mobilization capacity and social influence of CBOs to improve local government accountability by sensitizing CBOs about local government performance and motivating them to lobby for better local governance. For that purpose, it is necessary to develop a reliable performance metric, to establish contact with influential local CBOs and to motivate them to find their own ways and means of influencing municipal governance.

The purpose the proposed impact evaluation is to test the suitability of the experimental interventions for inclusion into the PACT's core operations during future project phases, and to produce basic knowledge about their effectiveness that can inform similar projects in other countries. The interventions have been under development since June 2013 and their operational processes are currently being refined through preliminary field testing. The scorecard intervention will be tested through a randomized controlled trial in 2014, while the CBO-level interventions will first undergo a proof of concept phase at very small scale in 2014, before being evaluated through a full randomized controlled trial beginning in 2015.

Performance scorecards

The performance scorecard intervention consists of disseminating information about municipal administration performance to local administrators in the form of posters (“scorecards”). The score cards focus on indicators that reflect national standards for municipal administration performance in areas in which the municipal administrations hold the legal and factual responsibility for service provision. Two families of indicators are included. First, indicators of basic public service delivery by the municipalities (in the areas of primary education, health care, water supply and civil services). Second, indicators of institutional capacity and governance procedures at the level of municipal administrations (in the areas of human resources, governance and financial management). For each specific indicator, a target value and a progress metric (in the form of a point rating system) are specified. Performance ratings on each of the indicators are calculated using pre-existing and annually updated data that is being collected through the monitoring exercises of the relevant line ministries and through the PACT’s ongoing M&E data collection activities. From year to year, the municipality’s progress with respect to each of the performance indicators will be visualized through posters (“scorecards”) that are disseminated to the municipal administration. The dissemination activities include a formal presentation to municipal leaders and other stakeholders. Each municipality will receive two posters every year. One poster visualizes the municipality’s performance with respect to the service delivery indicators; the other poster visualizes the municipality’s performance with respect to governance procedures and institutional capacity.

In the definition of the performance indicators and in the development of the performance rating system, careful consideration has been given to choosing indicators that not only provide a comprehensive picture of municipal service delivery and governance performance, but are also under the immediate control of the municipal administrations or can plausibly be influenced by the municipal administrations’ effort. Further design criteria were the comparability of the indicators across municipalities (especially their equal applicability in wealthier and poorer municipalities), the availability of inexpensive and accurate annual data, and their simplicity and parsimony. An iterative process was used to design and validate the performance indicators, including a review of the relevant background documents, consultation with stakeholders, and the use of key planning and evaluation documents. Most importantly, all indicators were run by mayors and municipal M&E staff during consultations held in June 2013 in the Sahel region and in September 2013 in the Plateau Central Region, with a total of approximately 40 mayors consulted. Feedback has also been received repeatedly from the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Water, as well as from the PACT and the PNGT (a sister project). The relevant statistical directorates have been consulted at the national, regional and district levels on the availability and quality of data. As a result, a set of indicators has been identified for which the competencies have effectively been transferred to municipalities and which mostly reflect national standards. Pilot tests of the indicators which are currently underway provide additional opportunities to check the indicators against the reality on the ground. A detailed description of the intervention design process for the municipal performance scorecards can be found in the appendix to this concept note.

Partnership agreements with local CBOs

The partnership agreements with local CBOs serve to sensitize influential local collective action groups about their municipal administration's performance and to motivate them to actively hold their municipal administration accountable to certain performance targets. The partnership agreements are established through a memorandum of understanding between the partner CBO and the PACT via its regional NGO subcontractors. Besides the signing of a formal memorandum of understanding as a result of which the CBO receives the status of an official PACT partner, the partnership agreements also involve a training workshop and access to a permanent contact point at PACT. Additionally, the partner CBOs are provided with a small door-opener gift, such as a cell phone and credit, printed T-shirts, or other merchandise. During the training workshop, the CBOs learn about the municipal performance scorecards, the point rating system for municipal administration performance, their municipality's current level of performance, the structures and responsibilities within the municipal administration, and the legal provisions for the formal participation of CBOs in local governance processes. Additionally, the partner CBOs will be asked to brainstorm about ways of lobbying and exerting pressure for better municipal governance.

The selection of the partner CBOs will be carried out by the PACT with the help of its regional operating NGOs. The selection procedure will target CBOs with a large member base within the municipality, a local focus (excluding, for example, regional and national organizations), and proven collective action and mobilization capacity. A wide range of different groups and organizations will be considered, for example women's groups, producer associations, farmers' groups, savings groups, *groupes de ressortissants* etc. These CBOs tend to have narrowly focused activities, but a broad member base, immense local knowledge and proven collective action capacity. In each municipality, the PACT will try to identify and work with the CBO that has the greatest influence, mobilization capacity, and motivation to explore possibilities of getting more involved in municipal affairs. To identify the partner CBOs, a three-stage process will be used. First, the PACT operating NGOs will circulate a call for expressions of interest with a self-administered questionnaire to eligible CBOs. Second, eligible CBOs will send in their applications to the operating NGOs. Third, the capacity and local influence of the potential partner CBOs will be assessed through a standardized evaluation procedure, and the potential partner CBOs will be ranked based on how well they fit the selection criteria. The CBO selection process and the applicable selection criteria are being refined during the pre-testing and proof-of-concept phase. A detailed description of the eligibility criteria the evaluation of potential partner CBOs is included in the appendix.

Reward schedules for partner CBOs

The reward schedule for partner CBOs serves to motivate the CBOs to become active in local governance and to care about the performance of their municipal administrations. At the beginning of the partnership agreement, the partner CBOs are promised a financial reward that solely depends on the improvements in their municipal administration's performance ratings from one year to the next. These performance ratings are calculated using the municipal performance scorecards and initial training will ensure that the partner CBOs understand the scorecard mechanism well. By making CBOs eligible for a financial reward that solely depends on their municipal administration's performance, the CBOs acquire an actual stake in the performance of the municipal administration and are motivated to

hold the local leaders accountable to the performance indicators. Each point by which the municipality improves its performance rating during the subsequent year over the status quo will correspond to a certain amount of money the CBO will receive at the end of that year.

Importantly, the financial rewards will be disbursed regardless of the CBOs' own activities. The CBOs will not be constrained in their use of the reward, nor will they be audited for how they have used the reward, nor will they face laborious reporting requirements. Thus, the CBOs have the possibility of realizing an attractive rent, if they are able to somehow induce the municipal administration to actually improve its performance.² No prescriptions will be made as to how the CBO should accomplish this. Instead, the partner CBOs are encouraged to brainstorm and identify their own strategies of lobbying for better municipal government performance and influencing the municipal administration. Since the CBOs can maximize their financial rewards by maximizing their own impact on the municipal administration's effort, each partner CBOs will have a powerful incentive to find the most efficient way of exerting influence for better municipal performance.

3. POLICY AND OPERATIONAL RELEVANCE

Policy Background

Burkina Faso has undertaken various steps towards administrative and political decentralization since the early 1990s. The 1991 Constitution organized the local government system into territorial units (*collectivités territoriales*). The 2004 *Code General des Collectivites Territoriales* consolidated the role of regions and municipalities as the two levels of decentralized local government and shifted certain responsibilities for basic public service provision (for example in the health, education and water sectors) to the municipal level (Mahieu & Yilmaz, 2010). The transition of legal responsibilities and decision authority for local service provision from the central government to local jurisdictions created a number of practical challenges, including insufficient capacity and decision autonomy of municipal governments and a lack of timely availability of budgetary resources.³ At the same time, accountability structures for municipal governments continued to be dominated by top-down oversight practices (*tutelage*), a legacy of French colonialism. Despite the existence of elected municipal councils, the direct accountability of municipal administrations towards their communities is perceived as weak or inexistent (*ibid.*), and citizen involvement in municipal governance processes is lacking.

Several donor organizations, including the World Bank, the European Union, and the Swiss and German governments, have sought to support the decentralization process in Burkina Faso by addressing some of these challenges (World Bank, 2011, p. 60). The World Bank-assisted Community-Based Rural

² Under the reward scheme, a CBO's lobbying for better municipal administration performance or mounting of accountability pressure can adequately be characterized as a rent seeking activity. This is intended. The design of the performance scorecards and point rating systems ensure that the CBOs can maximize rents only by actually focusing on increasing overall municipal administration effort and performance, and not by persuading the municipality to shift efforts from one activity to another, or by providing services through alternate means where the municipal administration is failing. The greater the CBOs' impulse to seek rents, the more forcefully will they seek to advance municipal accountability.

³ Interviews with mayors in the Plateau Central Region, Sept 11, 2013.

Development Project (*Programme National de Gestion de Terroirs*; PNGT), first approved in 2000 and currently in its third phase, aims to enhance the capacity of rural communities and decentralized institutions for the implementation of local development plans (World Bank, 2013). In 2005, the Administrative Capacity Building Project (*Programme de Renforcement des Capacités Administratives*) was introduced to strengthen the central government's capacity in the planning, organization, and monitoring of the decentralization process. In 2008, the Local Government Competition of Excellence (*Compétition pour l'Excellence dans la Gouvernance Locale*, or COPEGOL) was introduced to further promote good local governance by financially rewarding high-performing municipal administrations.

The Burkina Faso Local Government Support Project (*Projet d'Appui aux Collectivités Territoriales*, or PACT), which is carrying out the proposed impact evaluation, was approved in 2011 with the goal of alleviating the capacity constraints of municipal governments and creating the policy ramifications for successful decentralization over a 10-year horizon.⁴ The PACT intervenes at three levels: At the national level by establishing the foundations of robust administrative and fiscal intergovernmental institutions (Component 1, US\$ 9.8 million); at the level of municipal administrations, by strengthening their capacity to manage local development (Component 2, US\$37.98 million); and at the level of stakeholders within the municipalities to improve accountability linkages between local level policymakers and citizens (Component 3, US\$ 5.94 million). The first five-year phase of the PACT (2012-2016) is currently being rolled out in six regions (Cascades, Sahel, Centre Nord, Centre Sud, Centre Est and Plateau Central). The second phase of the project (2017-2021) will scale up the project to the country's remaining seven regions.

Component 3 of the PACT reflects the lessons learned from previous Bank-assisted operations that “the achievements of supply-side capacity building measures aimed at local governments in the absence of demand-side incentives have been limited.” (World Bank 2011, p.22). It seeks to strengthen the demand for municipal government accountability from local actors, including elected councils, civil society representatives and the residents in general. Similar to projects in other countries, the PACT pursues this objective through capacity building efforts that are targeted at municipal councils, municipal decision makers, and management committees of local public services that include civil society representatives, as well as through information campaigns. These capacity building activities are carried out by NGOs that have been contracted by the PACT at the regional level. Additionally, the PACT is supporting the continuation of the Competition for Excellence in Local Governance Project (COPEGOL) as a way of promoting open, transparent, and participatory local governance activities. Beyond these efforts however, the PACT is also using two experimental impact evaluations (policy experiments) to test new approaches to stimulating the demand for municipal government accountability that can, if

⁴ The PACT is a US\$65 million project funded by the Government of Burkina Faso (US\$ 5 million) and through a US\$60 million World Bank adaptable loan. The project is implemented by the Prime Minister's Office. The project development objective is “to build the central government's capacity for decentralization and the institutional and administrative capacities of municipalities (communes), and to improve accountability linkages between local policymakers and citizens in said municipalities” (World Bank, 2011, p. 8). The major investment under the PACT is in strengthening municipal-level governance structures under Component 2, including the transfer of resources to implement sub-projects based on municipal institutional development plans. These sub-projects will provide physical infrastructure or equipment to municipal administrations, and training for staff. This addresses both a lack of physical (e.g. office space, furniture, computers, transportation) and human capital (a majority of communes are lacking key personnel, such as an accountant, municipal surveyor, etc.).

successful, be scaled up in the second phase of the PACT or replicated in other Bank-assisted projects. This concept note describes one of these policy experiments.

Objectives of the Proposed Impact Evaluation

This concept note proposes a rigorous, scientific test of an intervention to leverage the social influence and local knowledge of community-based organizations (CBOs) to create bottom-up accountability pressure on municipal governments in Burkina Faso. This test is carried out in an experimental manner, i.e. by randomly assigning municipalities into treatment groups (that receive the intervention or components thereof) and control groups (that do not receive the intervention, or receive a placebo intervention). This activity, called a randomized controlled trial (RCT), an experimental impact evaluation (IE), or a policy experiment, serves to measure the causal effect of an operational innovation on the outcome of interest, in this case the effect of an incentive scheme for community-based organizations on their willingness to actively hold municipal governments accountable to certain performance standards.

Thus, the objective of this proposed impact evaluation is to reliably measure the effectiveness of a new approach to creating bottom-up accountability structures for municipal governments. This intervention, if successful, could be scaled up nationally in future project phases of the PACT and could also inform strategic decisions of programs in other countries that are undergoing decentralization reform. It is important to note that the intervention that is being tested has been designed to *complement* the existing PACT operations. If it proves successful and is scaled up in the future, then it would not directly replace the project's current operations, but rather extend and enhance the project's operational portfolio. Moreover, even if the intervention turns out to be unsuccessful, the proposed experiment will generate valuable scientific evidence, data and operational knowledge that can be used in future strategic project decisions and in the design of future operations in Burkina Faso and in other countries.

By generating data and robust scientific evidence on a new approach to creating a bottom-up accountability structure for municipal governments, the impact evaluation also contributes to incorporating a systematic policy learning agenda into the PACT project. This is important, because such a policy learning agenda constitutes secondary output that is independent of the success or failure of the other project deliverables. By developing, testing and evaluating innovative approaches alongside its primary operations, the project opens up potential future policy options and augments the knowledge and evidence base for future operational innovations and policy decisions with regard to local governance support in Burkina Faso.

Operational, Policy and Sector Policy Relevance

Operational Relevance for the PACT

In the context of the PACT, this impact evaluation fulfills several important functions. First, it tests a new and complementary intervention, which, if successful, can be replicated and scaled up during the second phase of the project to improve the overall project impact. Second, it addresses the current lack of comprehensive and comparable data on municipal administration performance and local-level citizen-authority relations, by producing annual data for 140 of Burkina Faso's 351 municipalities. This data will

be essential for the identification of problems, trends and potential solutions and will be available to government agencies, local research institutions and other stakeholders in Burkina Faso.⁵ Third, the impact evaluation contributes to instituting a culture of evidence-based policy making on local governance support in Burkina Faso. Together with two other ongoing policy experiments, it will have an important demonstration effect on the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, the PACT's sister program PNGT, and other government agencies in Burkina Faso.⁶ It will demonstrate a practical way of integrating the implementation of current best practices with prospective, exploratory research and innovation that can inform future strategic and operational decisions in the field of local governance support. Fourth, the impact evaluation contributes to developing the capacity of project and government staff for evidence-based policy making, through learning-by-doing and through a range of targeted capacity building activities that are described in further detail below. Fifth, the impact evaluation provides a platform to connect the project with external expertise and academic research, and integrates it into a community of practice of researchers and policy makers that are pursuing policy experiments on local government support in the Africa region. Sixth, the impact evaluation will enhance the visibility of the project and its recognition as a leader in innovation and evidence-based program design.

Country and Regional Policy Relevance

Beyond the immediate context of the PACT, the work described in this concept note helps address an important cross-sectorial policy challenge that exists not only in Burkina Faso, but in numerous other low-income countries with decentralized governance structures as well. While local government accountability is frequently regarded as a problem, it is only inadequately understood by what means it can be improved in situations in which classical accountability mechanisms such as electoral competition and central government oversight have proven insufficient. Within the World Bank and among its partner organizations, there is an immediate need for innovation and the development of alternative approaches to promoting local government accountability. Systematic efforts to build an evidence base on the effectiveness of different approaches are only at their beginning. At this stage, the greatest contribution can be made by investments in high-risk and highly innovative policy experiments that not only develop and test new approaches, but also generate broader information on the underlying causal mechanisms that lead to changes in the demand for local government accountability.

Sector Policy Relevance

The proposed impact evaluation helps address this strategic knowledge gap by testing a way of leveraging the potential of community-based organizations to increase bottom-up accountability pressures on local governments. In contrast to local governments, community-based organizations are often functioning well, have good practices of internal governance and high accountability towards their members. Moreover, some community-based organizations have strong and proven collective action

⁵ Results and analyses are expected in Q1 of 2015, Q1 of 2016 and (provisionally) Q1 of 2017), while the Phase 1 of the project will run through end-2016 and Phase 2 will run through end-2021.

⁶ This includes another policy experiment to be carried out in the context of the PACT which considers an intervention to directly engage individual citizens in local governance processes (P148392) and an impact evaluation of a community monitoring scheme for better health and education service delivery (P146952).

and mobilization capacity. This would put them in a strong position to hold local governments accountable if they had an incentive to do so. The proposed impact evaluation tests whether community based organizations can effectively be incentivized to demand accountability from municipal governments.

This experiment's focus on community-based organizations provides an alternative to more heavy-handed approaches to promoting local government accountability, such as broad-based citizen participation, community monitoring, or civic education efforts. Many Bank-supported programs currently favor broad-based citizen participation as a way of improving local government accountability. Over the past decade the Bank has allocated some \$85 billion to local participatory approaches (Mansuri & Rao, 2013). Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of participatory approaches is very mixed (ibid. for a comprehensive review) and they have been shown to be vulnerable to sometimes extreme levels of elite capture and corruption (Ensminger, 2012). Additionally, participatory approaches often entail a considerable burden on citizens (Khwaja, 2004). Alternative approaches to improving the social accountability of local governments include community-based monitoring and transparency interventions. More often than not, these structured approaches either create purpose-specific organizations that may dissolve after the end of the program, or ask existing groups to carry out certain tasks on behalf of an external program.⁷ The intervention presented in this concept note, on the other hand, build on existing formal and informal institutions, social relationships, mobilization capacity and indigenous knowledge, by motivating pre-existing and successful local CBOs to demand accountability on issues of local governance. Compared to community-monitoring and other mobilization-based approaches, the intervention is hands-off and low-cost. It relies on existing collective action structures instead of attempting to form new group structures and institutions at the local level.

At the heart of the intervention is also the feature that community organizations participating in the intervention will not be instructed on *how* to exert influence on municipal administrations; rather, they will encouraged to find the best means of doing so through the potential of earning a monetary incentive, tied to improvements in their municipality's performance. Thus, the impact evaluation will also reveal what strategies of influence local actors choose to adopt and why. This information alone will be immensely useful to understand the constraints and opportunities for bottom-up accountability mechanisms in local governance.

The proposed operational research will therefore not only contribute to our understanding of how to better engage local collective action groups in the management of local affairs. It will also provide fundamental insights into the mechanisms bottom-up accountability and, if successful, it will demonstrate an intervention strategy that can then be replicated and transferred to similar projects in other countries.

⁷ The applicability and effectiveness of community monitoring is currently being evaluated in a different study in Burkina Faso (P121714). The impact evaluation described in this note complements this effort by testing an alternative strategy concurrently and thereby broadening the evidence base in Burkina Faso and contributing to the larger agenda of identifying the next generation of local-level accountability mechanisms in the region and beyond.

Knowledge Dissemination Strategy

The primary target audience of this research collaboration is the Government of Burkina Faso and, within that, the PACT team housed the Prime Minister's office and Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (MATD). As the core operational and research partner, PACT will have access to evidence and results produced through the IE on an ongoing basis. The second target audience is World Bank staff, including but not limited to those working in governance, decentralization, and sustainable development.

The purpose of the experimental IE described in this note is to test an innovative potential solution to the problem of creating bottom-up demand for local government accountability and to build client capacity for evidence-based policy making in the field of local governance support. The intervention and study design presented in this concept note are the product of a collaborative effort by the PACT, World Bank, and an external research collaborator at Yale University. The idea of carrying out an experimental impact evaluations to test policy innovations in the context of the PACT was first discussed with the PACT stakeholders in June 2012, and the specific intervention and design presented in this note stem from a workshop organized by the IE team in February 2013, in which the PACT, the PNGT2, the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, the Ministry of Finance, and World Bank Country Office Staff participated. Since then, the design has been further developed together with the PACT and MATD through technical missions and ongoing communications, including a DIME-led workshop focusing on the use of IE to improve governance policies ("leGovern: Impact Evaluation for Public Sector Governance and Justice", Dakar, Senegal, June 24-27). Day-to-day operational and technical assistance is provided by a Ouagadougou-based field coordinator, in place since June 2013. This process of collaboration and engagement has ensured that the proposed research is practically feasible and relevant both for the Government of Burkina Faso and the World Bank. The PACT was selected for IE as part of fulfilling the Bank's IDA 16 IE commitment.⁸

Targeted dissemination activities will be organized in Burkina Faso for the MATD, local policy research institutions, and development partners. At the level of the PACT and its main stakeholders, continuous exchange will be maintained throughout the implementation process through periodic impact evaluation supervision missions and through a dedicated field coordinator in Ouagadougou who works from within the PACT, provides technical assistance and maintains the day-to-day liaison between the PACT and the IE team. A broader circle of local stakeholders (donors, international organizations, diplomatic missions, NGOs, universities/research institutes, and the private sector) will be reached through periodic in-country workshops and conferences during which results and analyses are shared.

Outside Burkina Faso, the dissemination of research findings will take place at academic conferences and at international workshops organized by the World Bank's DIME team which routinely bring together multiple project teams and policy decisions makers from multiple countries. Global long-term accessibility of the research findings will be ensured through the publication of the results and replication data in peer-reviewed academic journals.

⁸ As part of IDA's effort to sharpen its focus on results, and as agreed with the IDA Deputies during the IDA16 Replenishment, Bank management has developed a strategic selection framework for the use of impact evaluations (IE) to enhance learning from IDA operations.

Finally, dissemination activities to reach the wider global development community will be carried out. In addition to broad dissemination at World Bank headquarters and country offices, the wider dissemination strategy includes press releases, websites (DIME's website, DME's Facebook page IEknow, Development Impact Evaluation blog, etc.), BBLs with live online streaming, and policy and technical notes.

Potential Risks and Their Mitigation

Four types of risks to the policy impact of this impact evaluation have been addressed in the discussions leading up to this concept note. First, risks concerning the feasibility of the approach, considering that the intervention is a hitherto untested innovation. Second, risks concerning the scalability and cost-effectiveness of the intervention. Third, potential adverse consequences of the intervention. Fourth, the risk of failing to generate informative research findings through the impact evaluation.

Risks concerning the feasibility of the impact evaluation are judged to be low. The interventions require only moderate additions to the work program of the PACT operating NGOs which can be incorporated in the renewed contracts with the operating NGOs in December 2013. The PACT has taken ownership of the intervention and its stakeholders in the government of Burkina Faso have at various points signaled their support. The PACT's implementation capacity is considered sufficient, and the task team leader has expressed support for the recruitment of an additional staff member at PACT to coordinate the implementation of the experimental interventions. Furthermore, before implementing the CBO-level interventions in a sample of 70 communes, it will be tested in six communes during the proof-of-concept phase. That way, implementation risks can be detected early on and remedied before they affect the success of the impact evaluation.

Risks concerning the scalability and cost-effectiveness of the interventions have been addressed during the design phase. Both interventions – performance scorecards and CBO-partnerships – have been kept as simple as possible to improve their scalability. Risks to the cost-effectiveness of the CBO-level intervention are inherently low, because financial rewards are only going to be paid if there is actually an improvement in the municipal administration's performance ratings. Risks to the cost effectiveness of the performance scorecard intervention have been minimized by relying mostly on existing data sources which are accessible at low cost. If the interventions prove effective, the marginal costs of expanding them to other municipalities are going to be considerably lower than the costs of implementing the experimental treatments, because the necessary structures within PACT will already be in place and the operating NGOs will already have been trained and have acquired implementation experience.

Potential adverse consequences of the CBO-level interventions include the risk of distracting the partner CBOs from their usual activities and the risk of conflict between the CBOs and the municipal administrations. To minimize adverse consequences for the partner CBOs, it must be clearly communicated to them that they are not responsible for actually implementing the procedural or service-delivery activities that the municipalities will be rated on, but rather to exercise upwards pressure on their municipalities. In the design of the performance indicators, emphasis is placed on indicators with respect to which the CBOs can effectively hold the municipal governments accountable

and which the CBOs cannot directly influence without pressuring or motivating their municipalities to perform. To minimize the potential for tensions between the CBOs and the municipal governments, the municipalities will be informed about the intervention and that it is supported by the PACT and the central government as a legitimate way of enriching the governance process at the local level.

4. RESEARCH DESIGN

Research questions

The experiments described in this concept note have been designed to address five distinct research questions:

- Does the dissemination of performance scorecards to municipal administrations (without further consequences) increase their performance the indicators featured in the performance scorecards?
- Does the prospect of earning a financial reward if the municipal administration performs well increase local CBOs' demand for accountability activism on issues of local governance?
- Does the provision of information and incentives to influential local CBOs lead to improved performance by the municipal administrations?
- To what extent can the effect of the CBO-level intervention on the CBO's activism be attributed to the financial incentives, as opposed to information and encouragement?
- How does the provision of financial incentives to CBOs affect their intrinsic motivation to lobby for better municipal governance?

Existing evidence

The proposed experiments will test two innovations in the context of local governance support in low-income countries: the dissemination and tracking of municipal administration performance targets and an incentive scheme for local CBOs to encourage their demand for local government accountability. Both interventions will be tested and evaluated for the first time.

The interventions have in common that they potentially offer low-cost, hands-off alternatives to participatory approaches to local government accountability. Participatory approaches to local government accountability are currently favored in many Bank projects (Mansuri & Rao, 2013). They seek to institutionalize collective participation of the beneficiaries of local development projects in local-level decision processes, through community-driven development (CDD) and other participatory mechanisms.⁹ The empirical evidence on the effectiveness of these approaches is mixed. Meta-analyses of existing impact evaluations (King, Samii, & Snilstveit, 2010; Mansuri & Rao, 2013) emphasize several recurrent problems, including high opportunity costs of participation, the absence of lasting

⁹ Mansuri and Rao (2012) distinguish between “induced” and “organic” forms of participation, where the former refers to external mobilization and facilitation of collective action and the latter to civic participation and collective action that arises endogenously and often in opposition to local authorities. Most community-driven development (CDD) programs and most community monitoring programs fall into the category of induced participation, meaning that they rely on external mobilization and facilitation to build structures for deliberation or collective action.

improvements in social cohesion and institutional capacity (Casey, Glennerster, & Miguel, 2012; Humphreys et al. , 2012), the formation of groups and networks that are sustained solely by the prospect of distributing the resources provided by the program (Mansuri & Rao, 2012: 12), elite capture of program benefits (Ensminger, 2007, 2012), and the lack of sustainability of participatory institutions after external facilitation has been discontinued. Randomized controlled trials of community monitoring programs are much less available, but the existing studies suggest that while community monitoring can be effective at increasing the effort of local service providers (Björkman & Svensson, 2009), the problem of sustaining voluntary participation and the risk of capture of the processes remain salient (Banerjee et al., 2010; Björkman & Svensson, 2010).

The proposed experiments seek to circumvent the evident risks of induced participation by testing an approach that builds on the pre-existing, organic collective action capacity and social influence of local CBOs. CBOs are incentivized to use their local influence beyond their normal scope of operation, by the possibility of earning financial rewards that are dependent on the municipal administration's progress towards pre-defined performance targets. At the individual level, participation in the group's activities to hold the municipal administrations accountable remains voluntary, norm-based and oriented towards collective goods.

Aside from contributing to the literature on bottom-up accountability in local governance, the experiments also address a problem in behavioral economics. A large body of experimental evidence suggests that monetary incentives can destroy individuals' intrinsic motivation to contribute to collective goods (Fehr & Falk, 2002; Kerr et al., 2012) and to perform other tasks for which they are intrinsically motivated (Deci et al., 1999; Deci, 1971; Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000; Pritchard et al., 1977). Monetary incentives can crowd out voluntary participation and have lasting adverse effects on people's willingness to voluntarily perform tasks for which they have been paid in the past. The proposed experiment provides an opportunity to test whether some of the adverse effects of monetary incentives may be avoided when they are targeted to groups which internally continue to rely on voluntary participation and collective action. These insights into the sustainability of targeting monetary incentives to voluntary-participation groups will not only be relevant for this specific policy innovation in Burkina Faso. They can also inform local governance support programs in other countries, and other policy contexts in which the provision of incentives to groups is an option, such as for example pay-for-environmental-services (PES) schemes that are currently being explored in many developing countries (Engel et al., 2008; Vatn, 2010).

Finally, the study also evaluates the impact of disseminating performance targets and progress updates to municipal administrations on their administrative and service delivery performance. Prior experiments on the effect of performance scorecards or similar interventions on local public service delivery in low-income countries have either evaluated the effect of these interventions in conjunction with community monitoring (Björkman & Svensson, 2009) or with broad-based transparency initiatives (Pande, 2011; Gottlieb, 2012; Chong et al., 2013). At the same time, research on local government performance tracking in high-income, democratic states suggests that the dissemination of performance targets to local governments can have direct effects on their performance, by contributing to organizational learning (Sanderson, 2001; Boyne & Chen, 2006), or by being a useful resource for local

councilors (Askim, 2007). This impact evaluation investigates whether merely making municipal governments aware of their performance relative to a set of national norms can increase and focus their effort on these performance targets.

Treatment Assignment

The evaluation questions will be addressed by experimentally phasing in the different components of the intervention over the course of three years, each time retaining an experimental control group for evaluation. Figure 2 illustrates the experimental design.

During the **first phase** of the experiment, the dissemination of the performance dashboards to municipal administrations is implemented in half of the 140 municipalities covered by the PACT. The treatment municipalities are selected at random, stratified by region and rural/urban status. At the same time, the CBO-level intervention is pilot tested in six randomly selected municipalities (one per region) as a proof of concept.¹⁰ The analytical objective of the first phase is to estimate the separate impact of the performance target intervention and to obtain qualitative insights into the process of the CBO-level intervention in the proof-of-concept municipalities.

During the **second phase**, updated performance dashboards are disseminated to all of the 140 municipalities, while the CBO-level intervention (partnership agreements and reward schedule) is tested in 70 randomly selected communes, stratified by treatment status in the first phase. The analytical objective of the second phase is to estimate the added impact of the CBO-level intervention on CBO activism and municipal administration performance.

If the first two phases of the experiment suggest that the intervention has a positive impact, then a **third phase** will be implemented in which the full intervention (performance rating system and CBO-level interventions) is tested with and without the financial reward scheme, stratified by treatment condition in the second phase. This third phase will make it possible to examine to what extent the effect of the intervention can be attributed to the financial reward scheme or to the other aspects of the CBO partnerships (in the former control municipalities) and to how the financial rewards affect the CBO's voluntary participation and demand for accountability (in the former treatment municipalities), especially whether the discontinuation of the reward scheme reduces the CBOs' activism.

This sequential design appears optimal in view of three important operational constraints: (1) the design and preparation of the CBO-level interventions takes longer than the preparation of the performance target interventions. The sequential design will give the PACT enough time to build its implementation capacity for the CBO-level interventions, while already benefitting from experience with the roll-out of the performance target intervention and the lessons learned from the small-scale "proof of concept" study on the sub-interventions. (2) The partnership agreements and reward schedules are innovative mechanisms that have to be newly developed. A proof of concept or pilot study of these interventions in only a single municipality per region will allow the PACT to refine and optimize the approach before testing it at scale. It will also act as a safeguard against unintended adverse consequences of the

¹⁰ The six randomly selected municipalities are the following: Dakori (Cascades Region, Leraba Province); Sanga (Centre-Est region, Koulpelogo Province); Rouko (Centre-Nord Region, Bam Province); Gogo (Centre-Sud, Zoundweogo Province); Niou (Plateau Central Region; Kourweogo Province); Dori (Sahel Region, Seno Province).

intervention. (3) Since the interventions take place at the commune level, the number of units in the study population is limited (140 communes in the six regions covered by PACT). An experiment that evaluates the three different elements of the intervention simultaneously would have insufficient statistical power. Nevertheless, causal attribution of the effects to the different elements of the intervention is of interest. This is best addressed by phasing in the different elements sequentially over a period of three years and focusing on the added effect of phasing in the CBO-level intervention in the second phase and phasing out the reward schedule in the third phase.




Figure 1: Experimental interventions and treatment assignment in the three phases of the study.

Internal Validity

Statistical identification of the average treatment effects of the different intervention components stems from the random assignment of the different treatment components, under the standard assumptions of stable unit treatment values and exogenous measurement error. Several potential threats to causal inference have been considered in the design of the experiment, including noncompliance, spillovers, externalities and higher-order effects, Hawthorne-, and John Henry effects and these are discussed below. Issues pertaining to the validity of outcome measurement and data collection are discussed in a separate section.

Noncompliance: Since the treatments will be administered by PACT’s operating NGOs as part of their agreed-on work plans, the PACT has almost perfect control over compliance with the experimental treatments.¹¹

- With regard to the communication of performance targets to municipal administrations, it is unlikely that failures to treat will occur. Additionally, the operating NGOs will be instructed (and monitored) not to carry out any of the experimental treatments in the control group.
- Noncompliance at the level of prospective partner CBOs is a possibility, if the selected local CBOs decline the offer of a partnership agreement. For the intervention to work, non-complying CBOs will have to be replaced by another CBO from the same commune. For that purpose, all pre-screened, eligible CBOs in the treatment and control groups will be ranked, so that replacement options are readily available. While, in the presence of non-compliance, the data analysis would primarily focus on intent-to-treat effects at the CBO level, different observational techniques could be used to correct for non-compliance, such as propensity score matching or inverse propensity score weighting.

Spillovers and externalities: Substantial spillover effects to other municipalities are not anticipated, primarily because the intervention is randomized at a relatively high level of aggregation (municipalities).

- With regard to the dissemination of performance dashboards, there is little reason to expect that the communication of Municipality A’s performance rating to Municipality A will alter Municipality B’s actual performance or potential outcomes. Nonetheless, the communication of specific municipalities’ performance ratings to other municipalities will be avoided by the PACT for the duration of the experiment to limit the risk of spillover effects.
- With regard to the CBO-level intervention, the treatment of one local CBO into could have externalities for the activism of other CBOs that are working within the same commune. These externalities could be positive or negative. However, the presence of such externalities would not violate the stable unit treatment value assumption, because the main experimental comparison is between the treated CBOs in the treatment communes and untreated CBOs in the control communes, not between treated and untreated CBOs in the same commune. More specifically, the comparison will be between the partner CBOs in the treatment municipalities and those CBOs in the control municipalities that would have been selected as partner CBOs (based on the initial screening of local CBOs), if the control municipality had been assigned to the treatment group. The randomized treatment assignment will take place after the screening of CBOs, so the selection of the CBOs is double-blind with respect to treatment assignment. Additional comparisons between partner and non-partner CBOs within the same municipality could help estimate the magnitude of externalities. For that purpose, each partner CBOs will be randomly selected from among the two top candidates identified through the screening in each

¹¹ Sensitization of the partner NGOs has already begun, and they will undergo further training where the importance of complying with the random assignment of treatment will be emphasized. Furthermore, both the PACT and IE teams will monitor implementation.

municipality, provided these are sufficiently close in terms of their qualification to participate in the intervention.

- It is not expected that the CBO-level intervention has externalities or spillover effects with respect to the municipal performance outcomes, because only CBOs will be targeted whose scope of operation is at the commune level. It is not expected that the partner CBOs will begin to carry out activities in other communes that could have an influence on municipal administrations other than that of their own commune. To further guard against this, partnership agreements with CBOs will specify that the partnership is in relation to a single commune only, and that rewards (where included) are tied exclusively to the performance of that commune.

Hawthorne effects: Hawthorne effects refer to the problem that observed treatment effects might be attributable to the fact that subjects in the treatment group are aware that they are being studied or observed.

- It is possible that the mere awareness of the existence of performance targets prompts municipal administrations to increase their effort and performance. For the investigation of whether the incentives to local CBOs are effective at increasing local government performance, the existence of such effects would make causal attribution difficult. This problem has been anticipated in the research design. During the first phase of the experiment, the independent effect of communicating performance targets to commune administrations will be evaluated, by comparing the municipalities that receive information about the performance targets (but no other intervention), to a pure control group of municipalities that receive no information. During the second phase, the experiment will compare communication of performance targets plus CBO-level interventions (partnership agreements and reward schedules) to communication of performance targets without CBO-level interventions. This sequential approach makes causal attribution of the second-phase results unambiguous and thus protects against the risk that Hawthorne effects at the level of municipal administrations would confound results about the effectiveness of the CBO-level intervention.
- Hawthorne effects at the level of CBOs are thinkable as well, but difficult to address. CBOs in both the treatment and control groups will be surveyed at baseline and follow-up and undergo the same selection procedure. There will be no ongoing monitoring of CBO activities beyond the initial training and brainstorming exercise with the treatment CBOs. Thus, while the intensity of monitoring is relatively low, there is a theoretical possibility that CBOs in the control group could change their behavior because they are aware of being studied. This type of Hawthorne effect would bias the treatment effect estimates towards zero. The extent of this bias could be evaluated by comparing a placebo group to a pure control group. At the level of CBOs however, this would be difficult and costly to implement. Therefore, the possibility of attenuation of treatment effects through Hawthorne effects will be kept in mind during the interpretation of the results.

John Henry effects: John Henry effects refer to efforts by units in the control group who are aware of their status and therefore work harder to compensate against the “disadvantage” of being in the control group.

- John Henry effects would occur if CBOs in the control group were induced to increase their involvement in municipal affairs or control municipalities were induced to increase their performance scores to an extent that would make the outcomes in the treatment and control groups indistinguishable, even if the intervention had a substantive causal effect on the behavior of the treatment group. Thus, John Henry effects would increase the probability of false negatives. Considering that treatment and control units are geographically separated, John Henry effects are not expected to be a major concern to the internal validity of the proposed experiment. As a further precautionary measure, the operating NGOs will be instructed and monitored not to make actors in the control municipalities aware of their status and not to publicize the activities nationally while the study is in progress.

External Validity

In a narrow sense, the external validity of the experiment is limited to the 140 beneficiary municipalities of the PACT within which the experimental treatments are randomly assigned. This population would be the immediately relevant target group if the PACT decides to scale up and perpetuate the interventions in future project phases. Moreover, there are reasons to expect that the results of the experiment are generalizable at least qualitatively to the remaining 211 municipalities of Burkina Faso.

The 140 municipalities covered by the experiment constitute six out of Burkina Faso’s thirteen administrative regions. At the inception of the PACT, the program’s six target regions were purposely selected based on geographic diversity and to complement a European Union project which focuses on the same six regions.¹² Even though the six regions may differ systematically from the remaining seven regions, it is not anticipated that these differences would fundamentally alter the implementation modalities of the interventions or bias their potential impacts relative to the rest of the country.

Besides its broad geographic stratification, several other attributes of the experiment also contribute to the expectation that its results would be broadly generalizable and informative for other contexts, even if in a strict sense the experiment’s external validity is limited.

- The institutional environment and the levels of institutional development at the municipal level are relatively similar throughout the country. There is no reason to believe that the intervention would not be replicable in or scalable to other regions of Burkina Faso.
- The intervention promotes a hands-off approach that does not require intensive external facilitation or institution building efforts. Instead, it relies on pre-existing collective action structures, some of which exist in every locality. The procedures for selecting and engaging with partner CBOs are going to be harmonized and replicable in other regions.

¹² The European Union is implementing the Programme d’Appui à la Décentralisation et aux investissements communaux (PADIC), which supports the *Ministère de l’Administration Territoriale de la Décentralisation* (MATD) / Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization in establishing regional offices and regional level local governments in the six identified regions.

- The definition of municipal performance indicators is harmonized across municipalities. The existing variation among the municipalities that are included into the experiment made it necessary to select indicators that are of universal importance and equally measurable and comparable across municipalities. All indicators are based on national norms, equally applicable to the 6 PACT regions and remaining 7 non-PACT regions.

Thus, the nature of the intervention favors replicability and scalability across very different types of municipalities. Additionally, the level of abstraction of the research questions is high and the experiment tests the different components of the intervention separately. If the experiment is able to reveal whether and why the intervention had an effect on the outcomes of interest, then it is plausible that the same causal logic would apply in other municipalities if the intervention were to be expanded. Finally, the intervention is innovative and the value of the experiment partly lies in breaking new ground. This will make the results informative for other countries and regions as well. At this early stage in the innovation cycle and provided that the intervention has very low costs, the primary research objective is not necessarily the accurate quantification of treatment effects, but rather the qualitative insights into whether a positive treatment effect exists and whether the intervention has any adverse consequences. In that respect, the constrained study population is not expected to limit the relevance and generality of the experimental findings.

Measurement and Data Analysis

Outcome measures

The experiment has two groups of primary outcomes of interest. The first relates to performance of municipal administrations with regard to service delivery and governance processes. The second relates to activism and influence of community-based organizations (CBOs).

Municipal administration performance will be measured through the same rating system that is also used for the performance target intervention. The relevant indicators are

- The commune's overall point rating on service delivery.
- The commune's overall point rating on institutional capacity and the quality of governance procedures.

A prototype of the performance dashboards that includes the relevant indicators can be found in the appendix. This data will be collected in all 140 municipalities and updated annually at the beginning of each phase of the experiment.

At the level of **community-based organizations** the outcomes of interest are their level of activism in municipal affairs and their perceived influence over matters of local governance. Indicators of **CBO activism** will be:

- The number of thematic consultations – or *cadre de concertation*¹³ (CdC) – meetings at the municipal level in which the CBO has participated.

¹³ The CdC meetings provide a framework for (1) exchanges between different actors on the development and implementation of community development plans; (2) information and training of different actors; (3) mobilizing

- The number of inquiries the CBO has made to the municipal administration.
- The number of internal and public meetings the CBO has organized on matters of municipal governance.
- The knowledge of CBO leaders about municipal affairs, as measured by a knowledge test.¹⁴
- The perception of CBO influence in the municipality.

The data on the indicators of CBO activism will be collected through a survey of CBOs at the beginning and at the end of the second phase of the experiment, as well as at the end of the third phase if the third phase is implemented. These surveys will be administered to a focus group of CBO leaders and members at each of the organizations that have been selected as potential partner CBOs in the treatment and control municipalities as well as at one additional comparison CBO per municipality.

The **perceived influence of the CBOs** will be measured through surveys of local administrators and residents of the municipality. The survey items on the influence of the CBOs will be included in surveys of citizens and municipal administrators that are going to be implemented for another impact evaluation that the PACT is carrying out in the same municipalities at the level of municipal councils.

Data collection round	Municipal Administration Performance	CBO activism	Perceptions of CBO influence
February 2014	Data collection for municipal performance scorecards in 140 communes	(Pilot survey of 12 CBOs)	
February 2015	Data collection for municipal performance scorecards in 140 communes	Survey of 280 CBOs	Survey of local administrators and residents
February 2016	Data collection for municipal performance scorecards in 140 communes	Survey of 280 CBOs	Survey of local administrators and residents
February 2017	Data collection for municipal performance scorecards in 140 communes	Survey of 280 CBOs	Survey of local administrators and residents

Table 1 Data collection schedule

The data collection will be carried out by data collectors that are contracted by the PACT and supervised by DIME, primarily through the impact evaluation field coordinator.¹⁵

human, technical, financial and material resources to implement the communal development plans; (4) harmonizing interventions in the commune and the collection and dissemination of statistics; and (5) capitalizing good practice in local development.

¹⁴ The knowledge test will be administered during the endline data collection only, not at the baseline. It is expected that otherwise the observable effects could be attenuated as a consequence of panel conditioning.

¹⁵ No conflicts of interest are anticipated on the part of the data collectors. Both the PACT and DIME have an interest in high-quality and accurate data from this impact evaluation to inform future strategic decisions. It is important to note that the PACT itself is not being evaluated through this exercise – rather, this impact evaluation is testing an innovative accountability mechanism in the context of the broader project, and this willingness to experiment is a credit to the PACT regardless of the eventual results.

In addition to the baseline and outcome measures, **process data** will be collected during the implementation of the CBO-level intervention. In particular, the operating NGOs will be asked to keep detailed records of the CBOs' brainstorming meetings and to share these with the research team. This collection of ideas from local CBOs on how to exert influence on municipal administrations for better local government performance is expected to be an interesting output of the study in its own right and can also be used to refine the measures of CBO activism before the follow-up data collection.

Data analysis

The data analysis has a different focus in each of the three phases of the experiment. In the first phase, the outcomes of interest will be the municipal administration performance ratings (in the areas of service delivery and institutional capacity/governance procedures). In the second phase, the analysis will focus on the activism of the partner CBOs in municipal governance, as well as on municipal administration performance. In the third phase, the outcome of interest will be the partner CBOs' effort.

The results of the **first phase** of the experiment will be evaluated on the same indicators which are used to update the municipality's performance ratings. Baseline data will be available from the municipal performance assessments at the beginning of the intervention in early 2014, and follow-up data in early 2015 once the performance information has been updated.

Estimating the average effect of the treatment on the municipality's performance ratings constitutes a meaningful way of circumventing the problem of multiple comparisons, as the point ratings reflect the relative emphasis the PACT places on the different performance indicators from a policy perspective. Given the separate treatment of service delivery and institutional capacity ratings in the intervention, it appears appropriate to estimate the treatment effect on both ratings separately, using a Bonferroni correction for two comparisons. The null hypothesis is that the dissemination of performance dashboard has no effect on the municipal performance rating. The intended effect is an increase in the performance rating.

The possibility of estimating treatment effects on specific performance indicators using adjustments for multiple comparisons or the use of an omnibus test for each set of performance outcomes will be discussed in the process of elaborating a specific pre-analysis plan for the first phase after baseline data has become available.

A pre-analysis plan for the **second phase** of the experiment will be elaborated once qualitative observations from the proof of concept of the CBO-level intervention and baseline data from the CBO survey are available. This will make it possible to prioritize certain CBO-level outcomes and to formulate hypotheses that are based on a deeper understanding of the likely behavioral responses of the CBOs to the intervention. At the time of the initial study design, the null hypothesis is that the CBO partnership combined with the reward scheme have no influence on the CBOs' activities. The intended effect is an increase in the activities the CBO undertakes to exert accountability pressure on the municipal administration. Treatment effect heterogeneity may be explored across the different types of CBOs (for example farmers' groups, women's' groups, parent-teacher associations, etc.).

Both the experimental design and the choice of research hypotheses for the **third phase** of the experiment will be reconsidered once insights have been gained from the implementation experience

during the second phase of the experiment. The availability of data from the second phase will make more reliable power calculations possible, so that the most pertinent hypothesis tests can be selected for the pre-analysis plan.

All pre-analysis plans will be submitted to an appropriate registry, for example the experimental design registry of the Experiments in Governance and Politics (EGAP) network.

Sampling and statistical power

The number of units in the experiment is constrained by the small size of the study population, namely the 140 municipalities covered by the PACT. Thus, the study naturally has low statistical power. The research design objective is to maximize the statistical power given the operational constraints.

For that reason, a three-phase sequential design is adopted. In the first phase, the separate effect of disseminating performance targets to municipal administrations is evaluated on the maximal number of units (64 treatment and 70 control municipalities out of 134 municipalities in total¹⁶) which are stratified by region and rural/urban status. In the second phase, the added impact of the CBO-level intervention is evaluated on the maximal number of units (70 treatment and 70 control municipalities), stratified by treatment status in the first phase. Eventually, the data from the second phase can inform the feasibility and sample size calculations for the third phase of the experiment, which uses the same outcome measures that are used in the second phase.

For both the municipal administration performance and the CBO-level outcomes baseline data will be collected in the process of creating the performance dashboards and in the process of selecting the targeted partner CBOs. For the municipal performance outcomes in the second phase of the experiment two waves of baseline data will be available, originating from the baseline and the follow-up data of the first phase of the experiment.

Estimates of the statistical power of the **first phase** of the experiment are reported below for different effect sizes and correlations between baseline and follow-up data. These estimates are conservative, because they do not take into consideration the gains in statistical power achieved by stratification of the treatment assignment and make moderate assumptions about correlations and effect sizes.

¹⁶ Six municipalities will be selected for the CBO intervention proof-of-concept phase and are therefore excluded from phase 1 of the IE.

Correlation between baseline and follow-up data	Standardized Effect Size		
	0.2 SD	0.4 SD	0.6 SD
0.4	0.12	0.47	0.84
0.6	0.18	0.66	0.96
0.8	0.36	0.93	1.00

Table 2: Statistical power of the comparisons of changes in the municipal performance scores (service delivery and institutional capacity scores) across treatment and control groups, by effect size and correlation between baseline and follow-up data. Assumptions: Treatment group: 70 municipalities, control group: 70 municipalities, significance level: 0.025 (Bonferroni correction for two comparisons).

The statistical power for the comparisons of CBO-level outcomes in the **second phase** will have to be evaluated relative to the final specifications of the outcome measures and hypothesis tests. These will be developed during the proof of concept phase in 2014. Where appropriate, detailed power calculations will be included in the pre-analysis plan.

Research ethics

Institutional Review Board clearance for the study will be requested from the Yale University Human Subjects Committee. For both the experimental interventions and the planned data collection, the risks for the populations and individuals who are included in the study are expected to be minimal. The participation of community-based organizations in the intervention is strictly voluntary and the requests made to the participating organizations are minimal. The data collection plans are parsimonious and are not expected to be an excessive burden on community-based organizations or municipalities. Vulnerable populations are not specifically targeted, neither by the intervention, nor by the data collection.

5. WORK PLAN, TEAM AND BUDGET

Workplan and Deliverables (Timeline)

ACTIVITY	RESPONSIBLE PARTY	TIMING
Pre-tests and finalization of data collection instruments for municipal administration performance dashboards	DIME/PACT	Sept-Dec 2013
Ethical review	DIME/Yale IRB	Dec 2013
Concept Note Review	DIME	Oct/Nov 2013
Training of operating NGOs on the interventions	PACT	Feb 2014
Pilot tests of the dissemination procedure for municipal performance dashboards	PACT	Jan/Feb 2014
Stocktaking of local CBOs in six proof-of-concept	operating NGOs	Feb 2014

municipalities		
Data collection for municipal performance dashboards	PACT	Ongoing
Selection of treatment and control municipalities	DIME	Jan/Feb 2014
Screening and selection of partner CBOs in six proof-of-concept municipalities	operating NGOs/PACT	Feb 2014
Establishment of CBO partnerships and training workshops in six municipalities	operating NGOs	Feb 2014
Dissemination of performance dashboards to municipal administrations	operating NGOs	Feb 2014
Monitoring of intervention roll-out	PACT	Feb 2014
Ongoing contact with partner CBOs and process evaluation	PACT	Feb-Dec 2014
Baseline data analysis	DIME	Mar 2014
Development of data collection instruments for CBO-level outcomes	DIME	Mar-May 2014
Pre-testing of data collection instruments for CBO-level outcomes	DIME/PACT	May 2014
Preparation of intervention plans for CBO-level intervention in 70 municipalities	PACT	May-Dec 2014
Follow-up data collection on municipal performance indicators	PACT	Jan 2015
CBO-level baseline data collection	PACT	Jan 2015
Dissemination of updated performance dashboards to 140 municipal administrations	operating NGOs	Feb 2015
Partnership agreements and training workshops with CBOs in 70 municipalities	operating NGOs/PACT	Feb 2015
Data analysis of the first-phase results	DIME	Mar 2015
Writing and dissemination of research outputs from the first phase	DIME	Mar-Aug 2015
Ongoing monitoring of CBO-level intervention	PACT	Mar-Dec 2015
Follow-up data collection on municipal performance indicators	PACT	Jan 2016
Follow-up data collection on CBO-level outcomes	PACT	Jan 2016
Data analysis of the second-phase results	DIME	Mar 2016
Writing and dissemination of research outputs from the second phase	DIME	Mar-Aug 2016

Budget

The estimated budget for this impact evaluation is given in the table below. Data collection and operational activities for this impact evaluation will be carried out alongside those for a complementary intervention which is also subject to an impact evaluation, described in a separate concept note (P148392). Please note that figures in the table below represent the marginal cost of activities associated with this impact evaluation. The budget below includes the third optional phase of the IE.¹⁷

¹⁷ If the IE is discontinued after the second phase, the total cost will decrease by an estimated \$222,000.

	<i>Year (January- December 2014)</i>	<i>Year (January- December 2015)</i>	<i>Year (January- December 2016)</i>	<i>Year (January- June 2017)</i>	Total
1. Operational budget	\$16,300	\$63,000	\$63,000	\$0	\$142,300
2. Data collection budget	\$28,600	\$112,000	\$112,000	\$112,000	\$364,600
3. Research and analytical services; IE coordination	\$50,000	\$50,000	\$50,000	\$25,000	\$175,000
Total	\$94,900	\$225,000	\$225,000	\$137,000	\$681,900

Table 3: Provisional impact evaluation budget

Line items 1 (operational budget) and 2 (data collection budget) will be financed directly by the PACT. Line item 3 (research and analytical services; IE coordination) will be financed through trust funds (including the Knowledge for Change Program 2 and i2i, the new Impact Evaluation Umbrella Fund) and BB allocated by the Burkina Faso CMU.

Evaluation Team

The impact evaluation team will consist of the Project Task Team Leader from the World Bank, Serdar Yilmaz, the Impact Evaluation Task Team Leader from the World Bank, Vincenzo Di Maro, the National Coordinator of PACT, Idrissa Sore, the M&E Specialist of PACT, Oulla André Ouattara, the Impact Evaluation Coordinator and co-investigator from DIME, Marcus Holmlund, the Impact Evaluation Field Coordinator, Aimée Miller (DIME), and the principal investigator, Malte Lierl (Yale University). The impact evaluation team is supported by Melanie Melindji (Program Assistant, DIME, Washington DC) and Catherine Ouedraogo (Program Assistant, PACT, Burkina Faso).

The Impact Evaluation will be carried out in close collaboration between the Government of Burkina Faso through the PACT project and the World Bank. The Government of Burkina Faso will also be represented by the Directorate of Research and Planning (*Direction des Etudes et de la Planification*), the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization and Security (*Ministère de l'Administration Territoriale de la Décentralisation et de la Sécurité*), the Ministry of Economy and Finance (*Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances*), and the Directorate of Cooperation (*Direction Générale de la Coopération*). The PNGT 2, the second phase of the Community-Based Rural Development Program (*Programme National de Gestion des Terroirs*) will also be closely consulted for the roll-out of activities.

The research design, methodology and analysis of the impact evaluation will be led by Malte Lierl (Yale University, principal investigator) and Marcus Holmlund (World Bank, co-investigator). The

operationalization and implementation of the experimental interventions and the data collection will be coordinated by Oulla André Ouattara (PACT) in cooperation with the field coordinator Aimée Miller (World Bank). The field coordinator also leads the technical assistance provided to the PACT, the day-to-day coordination of the activities, and the liaison between the PACT and DIME.

The research team will receive strategic guidance and operational support from Serdar Yilmaz (Principal Economist, World Bank, TTL of the PACT) and Vincenzo di Maro (Economist, DIME, TTL of the Impact Evaluation), who will work with colleagues involved in PACT and PNGT, including Claude Bationo Claude Bationo (Operations Officer). The team will also receive high-level guidance from Mercy Tembon (Resident Representative of the World Bank in Burkina Faso) and Arianna Legovini (Head of DIME).

As outlined in the timeline, PACT will be responsible for the conception and roll-out of the experimental interventions, the ongoing monitoring and evaluation, including the collection of administrative data, and the indicators related to the project ; the participation in the conception, roll-out and given their interest, the data analysis for the IE ; and local and international dissemination. DIME will be responsible for technical support to PACT, support in the conception of novel interventions and their roll-out, the intermediate and final analysis, and the local and international dissemination.

The responsibilities of each member of the team are summarized in the table below.

NAME	TITLE/ INSTITUTION	ROLE
Sore, Idrissa	National Coordinator, PACT	Operational and strategic Guidance
Ouattara, Oulla André	M&E Specialist, PACT	Primary focal point at the PACT; conception and roll-out of IE interventions
Tembon, Mercy	Resident Representative of the World Bank, Burkina Faso	High-level strategic guidance
Legovini, Arianna	Head of DIME World Bank	High-level strategic guidance
Yilmaz, Serdar	Task Team Leader, World Bank	Operational and strategic guidance
Di Maro, Vincenzo	Impact Evaluation Task Team Leader, World Bank	Technical guidance
Lierl, Malte	Researcher, Yale University	Principal Investigator
Holmlund, Marcus	DIME Economist, World Bank	Co-investigator; Coordinator of Impact Evaluation, DIME
Miller, Aimée	DIME Field Coordinator, World Bank	Technical assistance, capacity development support and day-to-day coordination
Claude Bationo	Operations Officer, World Bank Burkina Faso	Operational guidance
Melanie Melindi	Program Assistant, DIME, Washington DC	Administrative support
Catherine Ouedraogo	Program Assistant, PACT, Burkina Faso	Administrative support

Table 4: Evaluation team

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
8. APPENDIX

APPENDIX 1: MUNICIPAL PERFORMANCE SCORECARDS

I. Process for Developing the Municipal Performance Scorecards

The following steps were used for the development of the municipal performance scorecards:

1. Desk Review
2. Consultation with national, Regional, Province, District and commune-level stakeholders
3. Iterative development of Scorecards
4. Interviews with Mayors
5. Field Visits to Cross-check Availability of Data



II. Criteria for Performance Indicators Retained

- ☒ Indicators must be, at least partially, under the influence of municipalities so as to fairly measure municipal performance. Both procedural indicators municipal service delivery indicators have been identified. The latter focus on the competencies that are in the process of being transferred to municipalities, i.e. education, health, and water and sanitation.
- ☒ Comparable across communes and reflecting national standards
- ☒ Simple and easy to communicate to municipalities
- ☒ Not requiring a burdensome and excessively heavy data collection process¹⁸

¹⁸ For the intervention to be low-cost, hands and sustainable as purported, the indicators will not require a heavy data collection process, but will largely rely on data available at the municipal, health facility and schools levels.

III. Municipal Control over Performance Indicators

During the confirmation process for the performance scorecards, indicators which are, at least partially, under the control of municipalities have been retained.

We have made a conscious effort to include service-delivery indicators over which municipalities have maximal control. The intervention aims to be low-cost and sustainable, and therefore we have simultaneously needed to consider indicators for which data collection will not be an excessively burdensome process, and for which indicators will be as objective and standardized as possible. We have largely relied on indicators that are reported in the PACT M&E framework and on administrative indicators that are routinely collected by the deconcentrated entities. For the administrative data, during the pre-test phase, we have cross-checked the methodology used and the accuracy of the collection of this data.

Exclusion of Indicators: Indicators that are beyond the influence of municipalities have been excluded. For example, indicators such as “the accessibility of health facilities or schools” have been excluded since municipalities do not have the capacity to build health facilities or schools.

Inclusion of Indicators: Indicators which are directly under the influence of municipalities, such as ordering health and academic supplies, have been retained and prioritized. Some retained indicators are under the partial control of municipalities, such as academic results, percentage of assisted births, or vaccinations administered. Interviews with stakeholders have revealed that municipalities have a role to play in sensitizing citizens to seek and utilize services and in creating an enabling environment for the achievement of these indicators. The municipalities can influence these indicators by working with and guiding the deconcentrated structures and the service providers. During interviews held at the national, deconcentrated, municipal, and facility levels, stakeholders have acknowledged that academic results (education) or percentage of assisted births and percentage of children vaccinated (health) are only partially under the jurisdiction of the municipality, but they have noted that municipal authorities have a role to play in positively affecting these indicators and over time, municipalities will gain increasing control over these results.

IV. Description of Indicators

Procedural Indicators:

Municipal Administration:

- Personnel fulfilling the standard municipal administration organogram
Municipalities have direct control over this indicator. They are in charge of recruiting needed personnel. The PACT is directly supporting the municipalities, by providing financial and technical support for municipal administrations to recruit necessary personnel.
- # of reports completed by the M&E unit
Municipalities have direct control over this indicator. The PACT is providing municipalities with technical support to create their M&E units.

Municipal Council:

- # of Municipal Council sessions held per year

Municipalities have direct control over this indicator. The municipal administration organizes municipal council meetings.

- **Average % of Municipal Councilor participation in ordinary municipal council meetings held per year**
Municipalities have direct control over this indicator.
- **# of thematic consultation (cadre de concertations) meetings held per year**
Municipalities have direct control over this indicator. The PACT is providing technical and operational support to municipalities to re-activate their thematic consultation meetings so they will occur 4 times a year as per the regulation.
- **Average % of Municipal Councilor and technical service participation in cadre de concertation meetings held per year**
Municipalities have direct control over this indicator. They organize the cadre de concertation meetings.

Financial Management:

- **Increase in the local tax recovery**
Municipalities have Control over this indicator. Under the PACT, municipal capacity is being built for tax recovery.
- **Execution of procurement plan**
Municipalities have Control over this indicator. Under the PACT, municipal capacity to strengthen their capacity for procurement processes, which is historically a lengthy and heavy process in Burkina Faso.

Service-delivery Indicators:

Education:

- **% students passing the Primary School certification exam in the commune as compared to the national average**
*Municipalities have *Partial control* over this indicator. Municipalities can organize education campaigns to encourage parents to send their children to school. Municipalities have a role in overseeing and coordinating the work of school personnel, to ensure that the curriculum being taught is up-to-date and students are prepared for examinations. Municipalities also contribute to transport fees for students to attend examinations. Therefore, even though different factors affect this indicator, municipalities have a role to play in preparing students for examinations, consequently leading to improved primary school examination results.*
- **% schools with functional latrines and**
- **% schools with functional wells**
*Municipalities have *Partial control* over these indicators. In their 5 year communal development plans and their annual budgets, they note the need for the construction or repair of latrines or wells. The communal development plan is sent to the central government, which will communicate its funding commitments to the municipality for the construction and rehabilitation of latrines and for the*

rehabilitation of wells. (It should be noted that this decision of central government funding commitment is made at the central level).

However, municipalities can “pitch” the communal development plan to partners, donors, and NGOs to fund their needs. Also, municipalities have a role in hiring and overseeing the work of technicians in charge of maintaining and fixing water sources. Therefore, through these indicators we are also measuring i. a municipal administration’s ability to mobilize external funding for municipal needs and ii. a municipal administration’s ability to coordinate the activities of water and sanitation technicians to build, repair and maintain water points and latrines.

- **Timing of receipt of school supplies at the deconcentrated education facility**

Municipalities have **Partial control** over this indicator. The responsibility of placing orders for school supplies was officially transferred to municipalities since 2009. The deconcentrated educational entity (Circonscription d’Education de Base) sends its needs for the upcoming school year to the municipality. The municipality then places its orders with a supplier. If the municipal administration coordinates this process and sends the request early, the supplies are more likely to arrive before the start of the school year, however if the municipal administration sends the order late, the supplies will surely arrive after the start of the school year. The more the delay in the receipt of school supplies, the more of a disruption this creates in student learning.

Health:

- **% of health facilities having received a stock of gas from the municipality within the last 6 months**

Municipalities have **Partial control** over this indicator. The responsibility for ordering gas for the health facilities has been officially transferred to municipalities since Q2 of 2013. Regular supplies of gas are necessary to run refrigerators and keep vaccinations cold. If the municipality coordinates properly and places orders of gas in time, the health facilities should receive regular supplies. However, if the municipality does not plan ahead, bottles of gas may arrive late, and the health management committees may need to intervene to stock health facilities. For this indicator, we are only concerned to measure bottles of gas that come from the municipal administration (and not from the health management committees).

- **% of assisted births**

Municipalities have **Partial control** over this indicator. The health facility and Sanitary District (District Sanitaire) are directly involved in the provision of this service; however municipalities can assist in organizing sensitization campaigns at the village-level, encouraging women to give birth in facilities. Municipal councilors and village councilors can also be closely involved in spreading these health messages. Municipalities have a role to play in overseeing and coordinating the services delivered by health facilities.

- **% of newborns under 1 year having been vaccinated with standard vaccination package (BCG , VPO, DTC-Hep+Hib, VAR and VAA)**

Municipalities have **Partial control** over this indicator. Even though vaccination campaigns are generally organized by the District Sanitaire, municipalities have a role to play in assisting health care staff in organizing sensitization campaigns that encourage pregnant women to give birth at health facilities. Health providers are at the first-line of the provision of services, but municipalities can also be actively involved in organizing vaccination campaigns in villages, especially when targeting hard-to-reach areas.

Access to Water

- **% of the population with access to a source of potable water within 1000m for 300 people/ water point**
*Municipalities have *Partial control* over these indicators. In their 5 year communal development plans and their annual budgets, they note the need for new wells. The communal development plan is sent to the central government, which will communicate its funding commitments to the municipality for the construction and rehabilitation of latrines and for the rehabilitation of wells. (It should be noted that this decision on central government funding commitment is made at the central level). However, municipalities can “pitch” the communal development plan to partners, donors, and NGOs to fund their needs. Also, municipalities have a role in hiring and overseeing the work of technicians in charge of maintaining and fixing water sources. Therefore, through these indicators we are also measuring i. a municipal administration’s ability to mobilize external funding for municipal water needs and ii. a municipal administration’s ability to coordinate the activities of technicians to build, repair and maintain water points.*

Civil Services:

- **Number of birth certificates delivered / number of births in the last 12 months**
Municipalities have full control over this indicator.

Binding Constraints:

We acknowledge that municipalities face binding constraints in the execution of the abovementioned indicators including insufficient budgets, human resource and capacity constraints, among others. While the PACT targets a number of these constraints through a comprehensive institutional capacity building intervention, the proposed experiment merely focuses on one identified binding constraint: the lack of accountability at the level of municipal administrations. As such, it is not expected or intended for the performance scorecard intervention to “resolve” all of these issues and constraints faced by municipal administrations. By testing separately whether the mere provision of a scorecard and the assignment of focal points for each indicator has *any* effect on municipal administration performance, we hope to answer two questions: First, it could be the case that unclear responsibilities and lack of focus within municipal administration aggravate the other problems mentioned by the reviewer. In that case, the intervention could have measurable effect. Second, measuring the separate effect of disseminating the scorecards is important in order to be able to causally attribute the impacts of the CBO-level intervention to the influence exerted by the CBO, rather than to the municipality’s awareness of the performance rating system.

Proof-of-Concept Phase: The first year of the intervention will be a proof-of-concept phase, with the opportunity of refining the municipal dashboards. We acknowledge that municipalities may not have full control over all the indicators; but one of the purposes of the IE is to harness innovative strategies used by CBOs to create bottom-up pressure and to record innovative mechanisms employed by municipalities to impact these key indicators, where municipalities may have historically been uninvolved and complacent because of a perceived lack of influence in delivering services. We have only focused on domains which have been transferred to municipalities, however within these areas; the transfer of competencies is gradual. We are testing whether the municipal dashboards, as a package of information, has an impact on improved municipal performance.

We have retained the indicators listed in the scorecards below (also in English above), but we are still confirming the relative weight (the point scale system in the right column) for each of these indicators.

V. Scorecard Prototypes (French versions)

GRILLE DE PERFORMANCE DES MUNICIPALITÉS 2013 – SERVICES PUBLICS

MUNICIPALITÉ DE [EXEMPLE]; POINT FOCAL: [nom du point focal]

EDUCATION 9 / 15 points ★★☆☆	Taux de Réussite du Certificat d'Etudes Primaire, comparé à la moyenne nationale	
	% d'écoles avec des latrines fonctionnelles et un forage fonctionnel	
	Délai pour la réception des fournitures scolaires au CEB par rapport à la rentrée scolaire	
SANTÉ 9 / 15 points ★★★	% d'accouchements assistés pendant l'année	
	% de nourrissons 0-11 mois ayant été vaccinés avec : BCG, le VPO, le DTC-Hep+Hib, le VAR et le VAA pendant l'année	
	Nombre de CSPS ayant reçu un stock de Gas de la municipalité chaque mois pendant les 6 mois passés	
EAU 1 / 10 points ★☆☆	% de la population avec accès à une source d'eau potable fonctionnelle à 1000m pour 300 personnes/forage.	
ETAT CIVIL 4 / 5 points ★★★	Nombre d'actes de naissances délivrés par 1000 naissances dans les 12 derniers mois.	

Points total en 2013: X / 45 points ★★☆☆

GRILLE DE PERFORMANCE DES MUNICIPALITÉS 2013 (PROCEDURALES)

MUNICIPALITÉ DE [EXEMPLE]

POINT FOCAL: [nom du point focal]

MAIRIE et Services Municipaux 3 / 10 points ★☆☆	Personnel de la municipalité remplissant l'organigramme type.	Maire + SD+ Agent d'état civil + Comptable 3 points Maire + SD+ Agent d'état civil+ Secrétaire + Comptable+ Service Matériel Transféré: 4 points Maire + SD+ Secrétaire +Agent d'état civil+ Comptable+ Service Matériel Transféré+ Service Technique 5 points
	Nombre de rapports complétés par la cellule de suivi et évaluation	
CONSEIL MUNICIPAL 7 / 20 points ★☆☆	Nombre de sessions du Conseil Municipal tenus par année	
	Taux de participation aux réunions du Conseil Municipal (Moyenne)	
	Nombre de cadre de concertations organisés par la mairie par année	
	Taux de participation aux réunions du cadre de concertation (Moyenne)	
GESTION FINANCIERE 9 / 10 points ★★★	Taux d'accroissement du recouvrement des taxes en fonction de l'année précédente	
	Taux d'exécution du plan de passation des marchés au cours de l'année passée	

Points total en 2013: X / 41 points ★★☆☆

APPENDIX 2: PROCESS FOR SELECTING COMMUNITY-BASED ORGANIZATIONS

The partner community-based organizations (CBOs) for the PACT will be selected based on a 3 step process.



1. NGOs send out a call for proposals for CBOs to apply, with a self-administered questionnaire

In the call for proposals, the following Inclusion criteria will be noted:

- ✓ CBO must be a membership-based organization (including for example savings groups, producer associations, cooperatives, parent-teacher associations, women's groups, etc.).
- ✓ CBO must be local to the commune (i.e. the group can be a local chapter of a larger membership-based organization, but the local chapter should not be active at a regional or national scope)
- ✓ CBOs must have significant social influence and mobilization capacity
- ✓ CBO should have regular membership meetings

The CBOs may include groups that are not formally registered, as long as they are large/important enough.

Exclusion criteria include the following:

- Political parties that serve a restricted contingency of individuals
- Small activist/advocacy groups that serve a targeted constituency of individuals

2. CBOs apply for partnership

This will also include a short and simple self-reported questionnaire for CBOs to fill out. Additionally, calls for applicants will be publicized in newspapers and on the radio in the intervention communes, with specific mention of the criteria for eligible CBOs.

The questionnaire will request information based on the following criteria;

- Dynamism of the CBO / Engagement and Implication of the CBO in communal affairs
- Broad membership base of the CBO
- Mobilization Capacity of the CBO
- Capacity for Communication and Collaboration with other CBOs and the municipality
- Intervention Zone of the CBO
- Internal Governance Processes and Transparency

3. NGOs (with the guidance of PACT and DIME), will select the top CBO by commune through a competitive, transparent process. The CBO considered the most influential, with the most social

influence and mobilization capacity in the commune will be identified for each of the treatment communes. For the selected CBO, a verification process will ensue, to ensure that self-reported information is accurate.

- During the proof of concept phase in 2014, 1 CBO will be selected per region. The 6 proof-of-concept communes have been selected randomly. So as not to contaminate the control communes, the NGO will conduct the call for proposals in the one selected commune per region.

REGION	PROVINCE	COMMUNE	RURAL/ URBAN
CASCADES	LERABA	DAKORO	RURAL
CENTRE-EST	KOULPELOGO	SANGA	RURAL
CENTRE-NORD	BAM	ROUKO	RURAL
CENTRE-SUD	ZOUNDWEOGO	GOGO	RURAL
PLATEAU CENTRAL	KOURWEOGO	NIOU	RURAL
SAHEL	SENO	DORI	URBAN

- During the scale-up of the intervention, the intervention will occur in half of the communes; or 70 communes.