

Supplementary Material: Experimental instructions

Redistributive Behavior When Circumstances Shape Choices

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*Parts 1 to 5 contain the full experimental instructions for a respondent in treatment
3. Part 6 provides an overview of all experimental variations in the study and displays
instructions for the most important variations.*

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Part I

Introduction to study

Welcome

Thank you very much for participating in this study! This study is conducted by researchers from the University of Bonn. Participation in the study typically takes **15 minutes** and is **anonymous**.

In this study, you will make several decisions that have **real consequences for other persons**. You also have the chance to **earn additional money**. Therefore, please read and respond to the survey carefully.

It is very important for the quality of our research that you **answer honestly** and **read the questions very carefully** before answering.

Informed consent form: On the next page, you will find an informed consent form. We ask you to read it carefully and confirm that you want to take part in this study.



Participant information and informed consent form

Who is responsible for the study?

Responsible for the execution of the study and therefore for the processing of your data:

Peter Andre
Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
University of Bonn
Kaiserstr. 1, 53113 Bonn
Germany

What are the purposes of the study?

The purpose of this study is to improve our understanding of human behavior in economic contexts. We are interested in natural, unbiased behavior. Hence, no details on the background of this research project is given beforehand, which is in accordance with the standard in experimental economics. All necessary information will be provided in due time.

What happens with my data?

All participating employees and scientists work in accordance with the provisions of the Data Protection Regulation, the Federal Data Protection Act and the relevant State Data Protection Acts.

Immediately after the collection, your data will be stored anonymously and, then, will be statistically analysed. No conclusions about your person can be drawn from these results. We work together with other partners, universities and laboratories for this study. These also only receive anonymized data, which do not allow any identification of your person. Even the laboratory or survey institute is no longer in a position to merge the survey data with your name after the execution of the survey.

Your data will be stored on a server within the EU, which is not operated by the University of Bonn. We have taken all necessary precautions with the operator of the server and concluded all contracts which are necessary in order to comply with data protection.

For this study, we collect "special categories of personal data", in particularly data revealing migration background (racial or ethnic origin - term according to Art. 9 GDPR) or political opinions, which we use only for research purposes and solely with your consent.

Which rights do I have?

You have the right to obtain information about the personal data stored about you (Art. 15 GDPR). Should incorrect data be processed, you have the right to rectification (Art. 16 GDPR). When the legal requirements are met, you have the right to request the deletion or restriction of the processing and submit an objection against the processing of your data (Art. 17, 18 and 21 GDPR).

You have the right to complain to the competent data protection authorities.

The consent given here can be withdrawn at any time with effect for the future. However, if your data has already been anonymized, it can no longer be associated with you. Therefore we are unable to "remove" your data from the result.

Declaration of Consent

I hereby consent to the processing of my personal data for the research project PA1901FA for the questions on human behavior in economic contexts.

I can withdraw my consent at any time. I have taken note of all information concerning the usage of my data and on my rights in the [privacy policy](#).

I confirm that I am 18 years of age or older and freely participate in the study.

I understand that **close attention to the survey is required** for my response to count.

I confirm

I do not confirm

Before you proceed to the HIT,
please complete the captcha
below.

 I'm not a robot 
reCAPTCHA
Privacy - Terms

The next question is about the following problem. In questionnaires like ours, sometimes there are participants who do not carefully read the questions and just quickly click through the survey. This compromises the results of research studies. **To show that you are reading the survey carefully, please choose both “Very strongly interested” and “Not at all interested” as your answer to the next question.**

Given the above, how interested are you in politics?

Very strongly interested

Very interested

A little bit interested

Not very interested

Not at all interested



Which gender describes you more accurately?

Male

Female

What is your age?

In which state do you currently reside?

Please enter your US Postal Code.

What was your yearly household income in 2019 in US dollars before taxes and deductions?

Note: The household income is the total amount of money earned by every member of your household.

Less than 15,000

Between 15,000 and 25,000

Between 25,000 and 50,000

Between 50,000 and 75,000

Between 75,000 and 100,000

Between 100,000 and 150,000

Between 150,000 and 200,000

More than 200,000

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

12th grade or less

Graduated high school or equivalent

Some college, no degree

Associate degree

Bachelor's degree

Post-graduate degree



Part II

Instructions

This study consists of three parts. The first part will begin on the next page.



Part 1

In what follows, we will ask you to make a series of decisions that might have **consequences for a real-life situation.**

Please read the following pages very carefully. A **quiz** will test your understanding. You can proceed with the study only if you answer all quiz questions correctly.



The context of your decision

Our institute currently hires adults from the US general public on an online job portal to work on an important task for one of our projects.

Task

These workers search for publicly available email addresses of academic economists. In each task, a worker is given the name of one economist, searches for the economist's personal or university webpage, identifies his or her email address and sends it to us.

The task requires no special qualification or ability, but demands concentration and effort. Typically, it takes about 2 minutes to complete one task.

Workers can freely choose how long they work and how many tasks they want to complete. At most, they can complete 50 tasks.



The context of your decision

Payment

Each worker receives a fixed reward of \$1.00 for completing the job as well as a variable payment. The variable payment depends on the number of completed tasks, a piece-rate, and your decisions in this survey. From now on, when we say "payment", we are only referring to this variable payment. It is calculated in two steps:

(1) A worker initially earns a fixed amount for each solved task. We refer to this amount per task as a piece-rate.

$$\text{variable payment} = \text{number of tasks} \times \text{piece-rate}$$

For example, a worker who has a piece-rate of \$0.20 and solves 10 tasks receives a variable payment of \$2 (namely \$0.20 x 10).

(2) Afterwards, someone else determines the final payments. Workers are informed about this, although they do not know how and why this happens.

This is where you come into play ...



Your decisions

In the last weeks, we hired 200 workers and matched them into 100 pairs. The decisions that you and others make in this study determine their final earnings. We randomly select one study respondent for each pair of workers.

If you are one of the selected respondents, **your decisions determine the final earnings of a pair of workers**. Let us call them *worker A* and *worker B*.

You can redistribute the payments between worker A and worker B. That is, you decide which share of the total payment amount each worker receives.

Example: Worker A receives a payment of \$10 and worker B of \$5 so that the sum of their payments is \$15. You can freely choose how to distribute the total amount of \$15 between both workers.

Completely anonymous: Please note that your decisions are completely anonymous. The workers will receive the shares that you choose with no further information. In particular, they will not learn anything about you or the nature of your decisions.



Multiple decisions - each might matter

We ask you to consider **8 different scenarios** corresponding to different possible work outcomes for worker A and worker B. 7 of those scenarios are hypothetical. 1 scenario is real and describes what actually happened when worker A and worker B worked on this task.

You will make **one distribution decision for each scenario**. If you are among the selected respondents, your decision in the real scenario is implemented and determines how much each worker earns. However, you will not be told which scenario really happened, so all of your decisions are important.

Therefore, please take each decision seriously. It might matter a lot to two real workers from the US.



The piece-rates

Recall that the piece-rates of the workers determine how much they initially earn for each task. In what follows, we explain how these piece-rates are determined.




The piece-rates

Please read the following information very carefully.

The piece-rate of each worker was determined randomly by a virtual coin flip. Worker A had a 50% chance to get a piece-rate of \$0.50 and a 50% chance to get a piece-rate of \$0.90. In contrast, worker B's rate was either \$0.10 or \$0.50. One coin flip determined the rate of worker A, and another coin flip determined the rate of worker B.

Thus, the workers had different prospects. The possible rates of worker A were higher than they were for worker B. This was due to luck because workers were randomly assigned to the roles "A" or "B".



Importantly, workers did not know during their work which piece-rate they would get. Only the chances of getting the rates were known. The coin was flipped only after a worker completed and submitted the job. Only then, a worker was informed about his or her definite piece-rate.

In the end, the coin flip determined the following definite rates:

- **Worker A** had a rate of **\$0.50**.
- **Worker B** had a rate of **\$0.50**.

Thus, they worked for an identical rate, but they were informed about their rate only after they completed the job.



Quiz

Which of the following statements are correct?

If you want to read parts of the instructions again, navigate to previous pages using the "back" button at the bottom of this page.

Each worker could freely decide how many tasks to complete.

True

False

A coin flip determined the rate of a worker. The possible rates were lower for worker B.

Worker **A** could have had a rate of **\$0.50 or \$0.90** (each with 50% chance).

Worker **B** could have had a rate of **\$0.10 or \$0.50** (each with 50% chance).

True

False

Workers did not know their definite rate when they worked. The coins were flipped only after the work was completed.

True

False

After the workers completed their work, the coin flips determined that:

Worker A worked for a rate of **\$0.50**.

Worker B worked for a rate of **\$0.50**.

True

False

Your decisions can determine the earnings of the workers.

True

False



Submit responses

Part III

Redistribution decisions

Scenario 1

	Rate prospects (known to worker)	Final rate (unknown to worker)	Completed tasks	Initial payment
Worker A	\$0.50 or \$0.90 50% chance for each	\$0.50	35 tasks 70% of total work	\$17.50 70% of total payment
Worker B	\$0.10 or \$0.50 50% chance for each	\$0.50	15 tasks 30% of total work	\$7.50 30% of total payment
			<i>Total payment:</i>	\$25.00

Please split the total payment between both workers.

To do so, please specify which share of the total payment each worker gets. The shares need to add up to 100%.

Share of **worker A**

%

Share of **worker B**

%

Total

%



Scenario 2

	Rate prospects (known to worker)	Final rate (unknown to worker)	Completed tasks	Initial payment
Worker A	\$0.50 or \$0.90 50% chance for each	\$0.50	0 tasks 0% of total work	\$0.00 0% of total payment
Worker B	\$0.10 or \$0.50 50% chance for each	\$0.50	50 tasks 100% of total work	\$25.00 100% of total payment
			<i>Total payment:</i>	\$25.00

Please split the total payment between both workers.

To do so, please specify which share of the total payment each worker gets. The shares need to add up to 100%.

Share of **worker A**

 %

Share of **worker B**

 %

Total

 %

Scenario 3

	Rate prospects (known to worker)	Final rate (unknown to worker)	Completed tasks	Initial payment
Worker A	\$0.50 or \$0.90 50% chance for each	\$0.50	50 tasks 100% of total work	\$25.00 100% of total payment
Worker B	\$0.10 or \$0.50 50% chance for each	\$0.50	0 tasks 0% of total work	\$0.00 0% of total payment
			<i>Total payment:</i>	\$25.00

Please split the total payment between both workers.

To do so, please specify which share of the total payment each worker gets. The shares need to add up to 100%.

Share of worker A	<input type="text" value="0"/> %
Share of worker B	<input type="text" value="0"/> %
Total	<input type="text" value="0"/> %



Scenario 4

	Rate prospects (known to worker)	Final rate (unknown to worker)	Completed tasks	Initial payment
Worker A	\$0.50 or \$0.90 50% chance for each	\$0.50	15 tasks 30% of total work	\$7.50 30% of total payment
Worker B	\$0.10 or \$0.50 50% chance for each	\$0.50	35 tasks 70% of total work	\$17.50 70% of total payment
			<i>Total payment:</i>	\$25.00

Please split the total payment between both workers.

To do so, please specify which share of the total payment each worker gets. The shares need to add up to 100%.

Share of **worker A**

 %

Share of **worker B**

 %

Total

 %

Scenario 5

	Rate prospects (known to worker)	Final rate (unknown to worker)	Completed tasks	Initial payment
Worker A	\$0.50 or \$0.90 <small>50% chance for each</small>	\$0.50	45 tasks 90% of total work	\$22.50 90% of total payment
Worker B	\$0.10 or \$0.50 <small>50% chance for each</small>	\$0.50	5 tasks 10% of total work	\$2.50 10% of total payment
<i>Total payment:</i>				\$25.00

Please split the total payment between both workers.

To do so, please specify which share of the total payment each worker gets. The shares need to add up to 100%.

Share of worker A	<input type="text" value="0"/> %
Share of worker B	<input type="text" value="0"/> %
Total	<input type="text" value="0"/> %



Scenario 6

	Rate prospects (known to worker)	Final rate (unknown to worker)	Completed tasks	Initial payment
Worker A	\$0.50 or \$0.90 <small>50% chance for each</small>	\$0.50	5 tasks 10% of total work	\$2.50 10% of total payment
Worker B	\$0.10 or \$0.50 <small>50% chance for each</small>	\$0.50	45 tasks 90% of total work	\$22.50 90% of total payment
			<i>Total payment:</i>	\$25.00

Please split the total payment between both workers.

To do so, please specify which share of the total payment each worker gets. The shares need to add up to 100%.

Share of worker A	<input type="text" value="0"/>	%
Share of worker B	<input type="text" value="0"/>	%
Total	<input type="text" value="0"/>	%



Scenario 7

	Rate prospects (known to worker)	Final rate (unknown to worker)	Completed tasks	Initial payment
Worker A	\$0.50 or \$0.90 50% chance for each	\$0.50	25 tasks 50% of total work	\$12.50 50% of total payment
Worker B	\$0.10 or \$0.50 50% chance for each	\$0.50	25 tasks 50% of total work	\$12.50 50% of total payment
			<i>Total payment:</i>	\$25.00

Please split the total payment between both workers.

To do so, please specify which share of the total payment each worker gets. The shares need to add up to 100%.

Share of worker A	<input type="text" value="0"/> %
Share of worker B	<input type="text" value="0"/> %
Total	<input type="text" value="0"/> %



Last scenario

	Rate prospects (known to worker)	Final rate (unknown to worker)	Completed tasks	Initial payment
Worker A	\$0.50 or \$0.90 50% chance for each	\$0.50	46 tasks 98% of work	\$23.00 98% of total payment
Worker B	\$0.10 or \$0.50 50% chance for each	\$0.50	1 tasks 2% of work	\$0.50 2% of total payment
			<i>Total payment:</i>	\$23.50

Please split the total payment between both workers.

To do so, please specify which share of the total payment each worker gets. The shares need to add up to 100%.

Share of worker A:

 %

Share of worker B:

 %

Total

 %

We asked you to consider 8 different scenarios. 7 of those scenarios are hypothetical. 1 scenario is real and describes what actually happened when worker A and worker B worked on this task.

What do you think: Which of the 8 scenarios was the real scenario?

Don't know	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
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Part IV

Beliefs about effort response

Part 2

Now, part 2 begins. Part 2 is not only about worker A and worker B but about all workers who worked on the tasks.

If your answer to the next question is correct, you can earn additional money.

A lottery randomly selects 1 out of every 10 respondents at the end of the survey. If you are selected and your response to the next question is correct, you **receive a \$5 Amazon gift card**. In this case, you will be notified after you completed the survey, and the code will be sent to you via email within a week.



Workers' effort

In the tasks, workers were randomly assigned to different piece-rate situations. Please think about the following two situations:

Low piece-rate prospects: A worker earned **\$0.10 or \$0.50** (each with 50% chance) for each task. He/she did not know his/her rate during the work. Only the chances of getting the rates were known.

High piece-rate prospects: A worker earned **\$0.50 or \$0.90** (each with 50% chance) for each task. He/she did not know his/her rate during the work. Only the chances of getting the rates were known.

As before, workers knew that their earnings might be influenced by someone else, although they did not know how and why this happens.

Workers who have low piece-rate prospects of \$0.10/\$0.50 complete 10 tasks on average.

What do you think? How many tasks do workers who have high piece-rate prospects of \$0.50/\$0.90 complete on average?

Note: We consider your guess correct if it is at most 1 task away from the true value.



Part V

Post-experimental questionnaire

Part 3

Now, part 3, the final survey part, begins.

Please respond honestly to the questions. The quality of the research project depends on the honesty of your responses.



How well do the following statements describe you? Please respond on a scale from 0 ("does not describe me at all") to 4 ("describes me very well").

	Does not describe me at all			Describes me very well	
	0	1	2	3	4
I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

	Does not describe me at all			Describes me very well	
	0	1	2	3	4
If I work hard, I will succeed.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Whether at work or in my private life: What I do is mainly determined by others.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I'm my own boss.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Fate often gets in the way of my plans.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

What is your current employment status?

Full-time employee

Part-time employee

Self-employed or small business owner

Unemployed and looking for work

Student

Not in labor force (for example: retired or full-time parent)

On *economic policy matters*, where do you see yourself on the liberal/conservative spectrum?

Very liberal

Liberal

Moderate

Conservative

Very conservative

Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party?

Republican

Democratic

How would you describe your ethnicity/race?

White	African American/Black	Hispanic/Latino	Asian/Asian American	American Indian	Other
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Your reasoning

This is the last mandatory question.

In part 1 of the survey, you split money between two workers.

Please describe briefly: What was the reasoning that shaped your decisions?




Your feedback

Feel free to leave a comment in case

- some parts of the survey were unclear or confusing
- you experienced a technical issue
- you want to give general feedback on the survey

Any comment is valuable and will improve the research project.



Thank you very much for completing the survey

Thank so much for your time and responses.



Part VI

Overview of experimental variations

The study contains the following between-subject variations:

- Treatment: 6 different treatments. The instructions are included below.
- Treatment 1: Both workers have a piece-rate of either \$0.10 or \$0.50.
- Worker A and worker B: I cross-randomize whether worker A or worker B is the advantaged worker.
- Quiz: The quiz questions are tailored to each treatment.
- Redistribution scenarios: The information provided for each redistribution scenario contains treatment-specific information. Examples are included below.
- Order of redistribution scenarios (1-7)
- Beliefs about effort response: One question was asked for treatments 1, 3, and 5. Another question was asked for treatments 2, 4, and 6. The instructions are included below.
- Part 3: In treatment 5 and 6, I add a last question that refers to the information about the piece-rate effects. Responses to this question will not be analyzed. The question is only included to alleviate experimenter demand effects (see instructions of treatment 5 and 6).


Treatment 1

The piece-rates

Please read the following information very carefully.

The piece-rate of each worker was determined randomly by a virtual coin flip. Each worker had a 50% chance to get a piece-rate of \$0.10 and a 50% chance to get a piece-rate of \$0.50. One coin flip determined the rate of worker A, and another coin flip determined the rate of worker B.

Thus, the workers had equal prospects to work for the low or the high rate.



Importantly, workers did not know during their work which piece-rate they would get. Only the chances of getting the rates were known. The coin was flipped only after a worker completed and submitted the job. Only then, a worker was informed about his or her definite piece-rate.

In the end, the coin flip determined the following definite rates:

- Worker A had a rate of \$0.10.
- Worker B had a rate of \$0.10.

Thus, they worked for an identical rate, but they were informed about their rate only after they completed the job.

Scenario 1

	Rate prospects (known to worker)	Final rate (unknown to worker)	Completed tasks	Initial payment
Worker A	\$0.10 or \$0.50 50% chance for each	\$0.10	5 tasks 10% of total work	\$0.50 10% of total payment
Worker B	\$0.10 or \$0.50 50% chance for each	\$0.10	45 tasks 90% of total work	\$4.50 90% of total payment
			<i>Total payment:</i>	\$5.00

Please split the total payment between both workers.

To do so, please specify which share of the total payment each worker gets. The shares need to add up to 100%.

Share of worker A	<input type="text" value="0"/> %
Share of worker B	<input type="text" value="0"/> %
Total	<input type="text" value="0"/> %




Treatment 2

The piece-rates

Please read the following information very carefully.

The piece-rate of each worker was determined randomly by a virtual coin flip. Each worker had a 50% chance to get a piece-rate of \$0.10 and a 50% chance to get a piece-rate of \$0.50. One coin flip determined the rate of worker A, and another coin flip determined the rate of worker B.

Thus, the workers had equal prospects to work for the low or the high rate.



Importantly, workers did not know during their work which piece-rate they would get. Only the chances of getting the rates were known. The coin was flipped only after a worker completed and submitted the job. Only then, a worker was informed about his or her definite piece-rate.

In the end, the coin flip determined the following definite rates:

- Worker A had a rate of \$0.10.
- Worker B had a rate of \$0.50.

Thus, they worked for a different rate, but they were informed about their rate only after they completed the job.



Scenario 1

	Rate prospects (known to worker)	Final rate (unknown to worker)	Completed tasks	Initial payment
Worker A	\$0.10 or \$0.50 50% chance for each	\$0.10	35 tasks 70% of total work	\$3.50 32% of total payment
Worker B	\$0.10 or \$0.50 50% chance for each	\$0.50	15 tasks 30% of total work	\$7.50 68% of total payment
<i>Total payment:</i>				\$11.00

Please split the total payment between both workers.

To do so, please specify which share of the total payment each worker gets. The shares need to add up to 100%.

Share of worker A	<input type="text" value="0"/> %
Share of worker B	<input type="text" value="0"/> %
Total	<input type="text" value="0"/> %




Treatment 3

The piece-rates

Please read the following information very carefully.

The piece-rate of each worker was determined randomly by a virtual coin flip. Worker A had a 50% chance to get a piece-rate of \$0.50 and a 50% chance to get a piece-rate of \$0.90. In contrast, worker B's rate was either \$0.10 or \$0.50. One coin flip determined the rate of worker A, and another coin flip determined the rate of worker B.

Thus, the workers had different prospects. The possible rates of worker A were higher than they were for worker B. This was due to luck because workers were randomly assigned to the roles "A" or "B".



Importantly, workers did not know during their work which piece-rate they would get. Only the chances of getting the rates were known. The coin was flipped only after a worker completed and submitted the job. Only then, a worker was informed about his or her definite piece-rate.

In the end, the coin flip determined the following definite rates:

- **Worker A** had a rate of **\$0.50**.
- **Worker B** had a rate of **\$0.50**.

Thus, they worked for an identical rate, but they were informed about their rate only after they completed the job.



Scenario 1

	Rate prospects (known to worker)	Final rate (unknown to worker)	Completed tasks	Initial payment
Worker A	\$0.50 or \$0.90 50% chance for each	\$0.50	35 tasks 70% of total work	\$17.50 70% of total payment
Worker B	\$0.10 or \$0.50 50% chance for each	\$0.50	15 tasks 30% of total work	\$7.50 30% of total payment
			<i>Total payment:</i>	\$25.00

Please split the total payment between both workers.

To do so, please specify which share of the total payment each worker gets. The shares need to add up to 100%.

Share of worker A	<input type="text" value="0"/>	%
Share of worker B	<input type="text" value="0"/>	%
Total	<input type="text" value="0"/>	%




Treatment 4

The piece-rates

Please read the following information very carefully.

The piece-rate of each worker was determined randomly by a virtual coin flip. Each worker had a 50% chance to get a piece-rate of \$0.10 and a 50% chance to get a piece-rate of \$0.50. One coin flip determined the rate of worker A, and another coin flip determined the rate of worker B.

Thus, the workers had equal prospects to work for the low or the high rate.



Importantly, workers knew which piece-rate they would get before starting their work. The coin was flipped before the workers started working and workers were informed about the result directly.

The coin flip determined the following definite rates:

- Worker A had a rate of \$0.10.
- Worker B had a rate of \$0.50.

Thus, they worked for a different rate.



Scenario 1

	Rate (known to worker)	Completed tasks	Initial payment
Worker A	\$0.10	45 tasks 90% of total work	\$4.50 64% of total payment
Worker B	\$0.50	5 tasks 10% of total work	\$2.50 36% of total payment
			<i>Total payment:</i> \$7.00

Please split the total payment between both workers.

To do so, please specify which share of the total payment each worker gets. The shares need to add up to 100%.

Share of **worker A** %

Share of **worker B** %

Total %



Treatment 5 (additional instructions, included after treatment description in treatment 3)

The piece-rates

Please read the following information very carefully. It will become relevant in part 3 of the survey. You can continue to the next page after 20 seconds.

In the past, we have seen that the **piece-rate prospects strongly influence the number of tasks a worker completes**. The higher the piece-rate prospects, the more tasks a worker typically completes. In other words, how many tasks a worker completes depends strongly on the environment to which he or she was randomly assigned.

Here are some numbers: **On average, workers complete more than 50% more tasks if their piece-rate prospects are \$0.50/\$0.90 instead of \$0.10/\$0.50**. This means that workers typically decide to complete many tasks more if their piece-rate prospects are high.

The following typical comments by workers make clear why this is the case.

If I was only making ten cents per task, I wouldn't feel it was worth my time.

*Typical comment by worker with **piece-rate prospects of \$0.10/\$0.50***

It's a good price for the work.

*Typical comment by worker with **piece-rate prospects of \$0.50/\$0.90***



The piece-rates

To sum up, how many tasks a worker completes depends strongly on the environment to which he or she was randomly assigned. On average, workers complete more than 50% more tasks if their piece-rate prospects are \$0.50/\$0.90 instead of \$0.10/\$0.50.



Treatment 6 (additional instructions, included after treatment description in treatment 4)

The piece-rates

Please read the following information very carefully. It will become relevant in part 3 of the survey. You can continue to the next page after 20 seconds.

In the past, we have seen that the **piece-rate strongly influences the number of tasks a worker completes**. The higher the piece-rate, the more tasks a worker typically completes. In other words, how many tasks a worker completes depends strongly on the environment to which he or she was randomly assigned.

Here are some numbers: **On average, workers complete more than three times as many tasks if their piece-rate is \$0.50 instead of \$0.10**. This means that workers typically decide to complete many tasks more if their piece-rate is high.

The following typical comments by workers make clear why this is the case.

For the amount of time that goes into these tasks, the compensation is simply just not sufficient.

*Typical comment by worker with a **piece-rate of \$0.10***

I think fifty cents is a good reward for each task. This motivates me.

*Typical comment by worker with a **piece-rate of \$0.50***



The piece-rates

To sum up, how many tasks a worker completes depends strongly on the environment to which he or she was randomly assigned. On average, workers complete more than three times as many tasks if their piece-rate is \$0.50 instead of \$0.10.



Belief about effort response: treatment 1, 3, and 5

Workers' effort

In the tasks, workers were randomly assigned to different piece-rate situations. Please think about the following two situations:

Low piece-rate prospects: A worker earned **\$0.10 or \$0.50** (each with 50% chance) for each task. He/she did not know his/her rate during the work. Only the chances of getting the rates were known.

High piece-rate prospects: A worker earned **\$0.50 or \$0.90** (each with 50% chance) for each task. He/she did not know his/her rate during the work. Only the chances of getting the rates were known.

As before, workers knew that their earnings might be influenced by someone else, although they did not know how and why this happens.

Workers who have low piece-rate prospects of \$0.10/\$0.50 complete 10 tasks on average.

What do you think? How many tasks do workers who have high piece-rate prospects of \$0.50/\$0.90 complete on average?

Note: We consider your guess correct if it is at most 1 task away from the true value.



Belief about effort response: treatment 2, 4, and 6

Workers' effort

In the tasks, workers were randomly assigned to different piece-rate situations. Please think about the following two situations:

Low piece-rate: A worker earned **\$0.10** for each task. He/she knew his/her rate during the work.

High piece-rate: A worker earned **\$0.50** for each task. He/she knew his/her rate during the work.

As before, workers knew that their earnings might be influenced by someone else, although they did not know how and why this happens.

Workers who earn a low piece-rate of \$0.10 complete 5 tasks on average.

What do you think? How many tasks do workers who earn a high piece-rate of \$0.50 complete on average?

Note: We consider your guess correct if it is at most 1 task away from the true value.

