Politicians:
Experimental Evidence on Candidacy

Pre-analysis plan

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Abstract

In this project, we design three experiments that provide the first experimental evidence on 1) what motivates people to seek political office, 2) how certain types of people can be encouraged to become politicians, and 3) whether voters care to put certain types of politicians in office. In the first experiment, we examine the process of candidacy by randomizing at the individual level three factors that contribute to a citizens decision to seek political office: 1) expected benefits, by making salient private or prosocial benefits from seeking office, 2) costs, by providing a lawyer to help file papers, and 3) the probability of election, by polling the village and providing this information to prospective politicians. In the second experiment, we consider specific policy responses that can be used to help certain types of people, such as the non-elite, to seek office. We test to see if messages delivered through canvassing and/or training can encourage people to participate in politics by seeking office. In the final experiment, we examine if voters care about who runs for political office. We run a get-out-the-vote experiment that provides random village-level variation in turnout at the village level. We use this experiment as an instrument for turnout to study how characteristics of the elected council change when marginal voters vote.

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This plan outlines the hypotheses to be tested and specifications to be used in the analysis of the experiment described here. Since we have completed the plan before post-treatment data are available, the plan can provide a useful reference in evaluating the final results of the study.

Section 1 presents the motivation for the study. Section 2 provides the relevant background information. Next, we discuss details of the experiment in Section 3. We discuss the data in Sections 4, and variables of interest in Section 5. We detail our analysis plan and estimation strategy in Section 6. Section 7 details the hypotheses we aim to test.

1 Introduction

1.1 Motivation

What makes a politician? How do regular citizens decide to represent their peers by seeking political office? Are voters likely to vote only for certain kinds of politicians? Are there differences in performance of politicians who run with different motivations?

In modern democracies, where stability of government matters to a lesser extent, who chooses to seek political office, and is consequently brought to office, can have great repercussions for societal welfare. For instance, local-level development - such as village schools and healthcare centers, and infrastructure like wells and roads - depend critically on the effort of locally elected politicians (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004b). The kinds of people who get elected often has a bearing on eventual outcomes of interest (Fujiwara, 2015). While, there exists theoretical literature studies when and what kinds of citizens choose to seek office and represent voters (Besley and Coate, 1997; Osborne and Slivinski, 1996), there is little empirical work that tries to ascertain the types of people who decide to contest elections, and what motivates them.

In this project, we design three experiments that try to provide the first empirical evidence on what motivates people to seek office, how can certain types of people be encouraged to become politicians, and whether voters care to put different types of politicians in office.

First, we examine the process of candidacy by focusing on three factors that contribute to a citizen's decision to seek political office. First, we note that political effort of elected representatives can be linked to both incentives that directly reward them, such as the ability to get re-elected and advance in the political system, which carries material and social benefits, as well as those that are intrinsic to the person, such as the warm glow from serving your community. Prospective candidates espouse different perceptions of these benefits from seeking office when deciding to announce their candidacy for elections. These benefits inform their decision to contest elections. Second, the process of declaring candidacy in modern democracies often involves complicated paperwork as well as campaign costs. Those with limited capacity to engage in this process may be left out of the process. Finally, in developing countries, where some elite may have entrenched interests in local formal and informal political processes, prospective politicians may have highly varying perceptions of their ability to get elected conditional on declaring candidacy. If the probability of getting

elected seems low, people can decide to not contest.

We study this by designing an experiment where we experimentally vary the salience of private and prosocial benefits from running for office to see how potential candidates respond. In addition, we offer the services of a lawyer to help people file papers. This should reduce the cost from running for office. Finally, we poll the village and provide information on electability to potential politicians. This should help the relatively pessimistic non-elite to contest.

Second, we consider specific policy responses that can induce certain types of people to seek office. We test to see if messages delivered through canvassing and training can encourage people to participate in politics by seeking office. We vary the content of the canvassing and training to focus on particular kinds of benefits that can accrue to potential politicians. We then see what kinds of people are most likely to enter politics through these commonly practiced policies.

Finally, we examine if voters care who runs for political office. Not seeking office could in fact be an equilibrium response if voters never want to vote for certain kinds of people. In contrast, if voters never see some kinds of people seeking office, they cannot vote them to office. We also focus on a sub-population of voters, those who are on the margin in terms of voting on election, to see who they vote for if indeed they turnout on election day. To do this, we conduct a get-out-the-vote experiment through text messages to induce random variation in village level turnout. We instrument turnout with the text messages to study who gets elected to the village council by the marginal voters.

Once we have results from these experiments, we will study performance differences by the attributes of the elected politicians.

1.2   Research Questions

We ask three sets of questions:

1. What motivates people to run for office?

   (a) Is there a trade off between career and prosocial motivations to run for office?

   (b) Are costs from running for office prohibitive for certain types of politicians?

   (c) Can polling on electability encourage certain types of people to run for office?

2. Can canvassing and training improve the likelihood of candidacy?

   (a) What types of potential candidates are more likely to run when they receive canvassing and training?

   (b) Can training and canvassing be used to encourage certain types of candidates to run?

3. What type of candidates do voters prefer to vote into office?

(a) Are prosocial candidates more likely to be elected than those running for career concerns?

(b) Are the non-elites likely to be elected if they run?

(c) What type of candidates are marginal voters likely to vote into office?

1.3   Literature

What motivates politicians? Our research is at the intersection of the literatures on extrinsic motivations of politicians (Ferraz and Finan, 2011, 2008; Kendall et al., 2015), the role of pro-social motivations in public service (Ashraf et al., 2014; Callen et al., 2013), and research that looks at how people self-select into politics (Brollo et al., 2013; Banerjee et al., 2013). We combine insights from work on the role of financial or electoral incentives in politics, with pro-social and career-oriented motivations from recent work in public sector recruitment and performance, and apply these to the political arena. In particular, there is a lack of understanding of the degree to which a) there exists a trade-off between pro-social and career incentives in a persons decision to run for political office, and b) whether these incentives determine the performance of politicians once they are elected. Understanding these factors is important because it provides an insight into the kinds of people who are likely run for political office. This can then provide valuable information for the design of policy interventions that hope to improve the performance of politicians.

Theory predicts policy decisions by an elected official will align with median voters preferences. However, this is not always the case in practice. Recent research on the link between policy preferences and implementation has focused on extrinsic outlook of the politicians. Pande (2003) and Besley et al. (2005) find evidence for minority centric policies based on the proportion of minorities in legislatures as a result of quotas. Similarly, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004b) show presence of female politicians lead to more projects that are preferred by female electorate and increased participation. Our research will contribute to this existing stream of literature by moving from external outlook of politician to intrinsic motivation and preferences, and linking the effort of locally elected politicians with local-level development (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000). Changes at the candidacy stage will provide a first stage for understanding how differences in motivations for candidacy can changed the performance of elected representatives.

Which qualifications or leader characteristics influence the efficiency of policy making? There exists a large body of work that analyzes how certain kinds of leaders lead to differences in policy outcomes. In the case of India, Pande (2003) studies this in the context of ethnic characteristics of leaders, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004a) examine the role of gender. In this paper, we extend this literature by examining characteristics intrinsic to politicians. Our project will help shed light on how pro-social and career-oriented motivations may attract certain kinds of leaders over others. In doing this, we hope to provide answers to what kinds of leadership characteristics influence efficiency of policy making (Olken and Pande, 2013).

What is the impact of extension of suffrage? Recent research on this usually a) relies on natural variations and b) looks at the impacts in terms of ex-post differences in public goods

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provision (Miller, 2008; Fujiwara, 2015; Martinez-Bravo, 2014). Changes at the candidacy stage will help shed light on whether voters trade off preferences for pro-social politicians versus 'competent politicians. We will first be able to trace outcomes at the candidacy stage, and then see whether voting patterns change as a result of our treatments.

2   Context

2.1   Background on Decentralization in Pakistan

The process of decentralization in Pakistan has followed a start stop pattern. The first indigenous effort at decentralization was made by the government of General Ayub in 1962 where 80,000 local representatives, called basic democrats, were elected from across the country. Their main purpose was to serve as an Electoral College for the election of the president. The system was dissolved however, as soon as Ayub Khan was ousted from the government. The next round of decentralization was undertaken through the 1979 Local Government Ordinance which introduced three tiers of government, the Union Council, Tehsil Council and District Council. Roughly the same division of local government layers was followed by the Local Government Ordinance of 2001 with slight changes in the constituencies. This system was suspended in 2008

2.2   Electing Village Councils

This project focuses on Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) is a province of about twenty seven million people in Pakistan (Bureau of Statistics, 2014). In 2013, the KP government promulgated a new local government law for the province titled "The Local Government Act of 2013" (United Nations Development Program, 2014). Under this law, village councils were elected for the first time in Pakistan on May 30th, 2015. Villages for the lowest tier of the local government under this law. The next tier is that of the Tehsil/Town Councils, while the top tier of the local government is called a District Council.

This makes the 2013 local government reform extremely important as it takes the principles of democratic representation to the very basic administrative level. It also provides opportunities for potential politicians to get hands on training on how to manage a campaign in running for office, to form relations with parties and to learn on the job about the processes that govern the provision of public services to the citizens. Under the law, each village serves as a single constituency for the election of a council.

2.3   Composition of the Council

The size of the village council is determined by the population of the village. The law follows the principle of equal representation which translates into roughly the same proportion of size to population ratio for each village council. Each council is made of general and reserved seats, all elected through direct ballot. The number of general seats varies between five and

ten, depending on the population of the village. Each village has two women, one youth (less than 30 years of age), one farmer/worker and one minority seat that is reserved. Any eligible voter can run for the election on a general seat. Whereas the reserved seats require the candidate to meet specific criteria. All village councils have four types of reserved seats, namely youth, farmer/worker, woman and minority (non-Muslim).

The elections for village councils are held on a non-party basis. While unofficially the candidates can align themselves to manifestos of a political party, they cannot get their preferred partys election symbol nor can they use the partys name. The person receiving highest number of votes is elected as the Nazim (head) of the village, and the candidate securing second most number of votes is appointed as his deputy.

2.4   Role of Village Councils

The Village Councils are the lowest tier of the local government. They are responsible for ensuring the provision of basic public services in their areas of operation. A village council, headed by the Nazim, is required to send periodic performance reports on the workings of the public offices of the departments attached to the tehsil and district governments (Government of the Khyber Pakhtukhwa, 2015). The village councils are also responsible for devising an annual development plan for their village, which is proposed to the District Government. This plan will include proposals for projects to develop sewage system, install street lights or augment the health and education facilities. The council can in principle decide to levy taxes in their village however given that most of the taxes are in the purview of District and Tehsil governments this may not happen in practice. The councils can also augment their resources by lobbying with the tehsil and district government to direct more development budgets to their villages. However the decisions of the Council, especially on development, monitoring reports and taxes can only be issued if approved by the Nazim (Government of the Khyber Pakhtukhwa, 2015). This means the Nazim will play a key role in taking all these decisions and in guiding the development agenda of the village council.

2.5   Candidacy Process

The process of filing for candidacy starts with the filling out the candidacy form by the interested citizens of the village. Defaulters of bank loans and public servants are not eligible to contest these elections. In addition, a candidate must declare his income sources and wealth. In order to file for candidacy the interested citizen has to follow a process summarized in the following steps:

1. Collect and fill the candidacy declaration form. Besides other things the form should provide details of at least two people who can endorse the candidacy of the interested person.

2. Prepare an affidavit, endorsed by Notary Public, declaring the candidate has not been a defaulter.

3. Prepare income and wealth declaration.

4. Deposit a fee of Rs. 1000 (about USD $10) through a bank draft.

5. Attach certified copies of educational certificates and national identity card.

The legal nature of the papers mean that it is difficult for ordinary citizens to fill out the forms and prepare all the papers. The services of a lawyer who are well versed in preparing legal papers and affidavits can be purchased. Lawyers may also help prospective candidates during later stage of the candidacy process when the the Returning Officers scrutinize the papers.

The papers are submitted to the designated Returning Officers of the relevant towns, notified by the government. For the elections in 2015, the above steps were completed in a window of 5 days from, April 13th to April 17th. After the submission of candidacy papers, any citizen can file an objection on the papers of the candidates. In 2015 the objections could be submitted on April 19 in the office of the relevant Returning Officers. These objections and a general scrutiny of the papers was carried out from 20th to 26th of April. Candidates filed appeals against the decisions from 26 to 28th April which were taken up by the relevant officers between 28th April and 4th of May 2015. The candidates had an option to withdraw their papers by May 5th and the final candidates were announced on May 6th. The election took place on the 30th of May.

3 Experiment

3.1 Description of Treatments

We divide our treatments into three stages: canvassing treatments, training treatments, and get-out-the-vote treatment.

3.1.1 Canvassing Treatments

1. **Message Treatment:** In this treatment we approach individuals and offer them information about the upcoming local government elections (*Neutral Message*). In some cases, we also tell them why running for the local village council can be beneficial, either for individual-centric career concerns, or for more broad-based prosocial reasons. The idea is to a) figure out the degree to which simple provision of information about the upcoming elections affects who decides to run for office, and b) if providing information on the kinds of benefits that will accrue to those who run affect who decides to run.

    (a) **Neutral Message:** *"You might be aware that for the first time the elections on May 30th, will elect a council at the village level comprising 10 to 15 members. People who are above the age of 21 can contest these elections. There isn't even an education requirement to contest. All you have to do is collect papers from*

the district office of the election commission, and submit them along with two references."

(b) **Career Message:** "*Begin with Neutral Message +*

People who are elected to the village election will be provided with a golden opportunity to move forward in politics, as well as improve their respect and influence in the area. Members of the village council will be able to build connections with tehsil and district level politicians, which will open avenues for progression in politics. Besides this, council members will be also improve their influence. They will be known as leaders in their neighborhoods, that will increase their recognition. Their children will also be able to build a network in the area, which will make their entry into politics easier."

(c) **Social Message:** "*Begin with Neutral Message +*

People who are elected to the village election will be provided a golden opportunity to do their part for the development of their area. Members of the village council will play an important role in improving the quality of government services in the village. They will work towards welfare and securing the rights of the poor. Working together with the district governments, they will improve the village's school and health facilities. An elected councillor will have a unique opportunity to address the problems of his neighborhood, which will make him the standard-bearer of social development for the village."

2. **Lawyer Treatment:** As explained, the process of filing papers is quite complicated. To help reduce transaction costs, we also offered the services of a lawyer to help people file papers for candidacy. This should reduce the transaction costs, and are especially relevant in the case of non-elite candidates who are more likely to be poorer, and as a consequence have a higher opportunity cost. The lawyer will help explain the process of filing for candidacy and will help the prospective politicians to prepare nomination papers and associated documents. The field enumerator said the following to those who were to be offered a lawyer:

"If you would like to contest the village council elections, we can help you with the process of filing papers by providing a lawyer. This lawyer, available in the local courts, will help our listed candidates in filing their papers and provide advice on related legal matters. If you would like to utilize this facility, then you can contact the lawyer at this number: — — — — — — — — — — — —. We will forward your name to him by tomorrow."

3. **Electability Information Treatment:** During canvassing, we will poll the village on people they would like to nominate for the village council. For each village we will construct a set of people who have been nominated. We will then randomly provide a subset of these nominees information on their electability. We will inform these potential candidates that others in the village have suggested their name as contestants for the upcoming election. This will provide a signal of electability to the candidates. In

comparison to elites, who may already posses this information, provision of this signal to non-elites may be particularly important.

We discuss the details of how the treatment is administered in Section 3.2. We use the following script:

"We have talked to a lot people in the village, and in the survey, many people have nominated you for the village council elections. Based on the opinions of people in this survey you should really consider contesting the elections because there are good chances of your success."

3.1.2 Training Treatments

Participants will also have the opportunity to attend a training, where information about the elections process will be relayed to them. We conduct three kinds of trainings: in the **neutral training**, we provide them only information about the candidacy process. In the **candidacy training**, we retain the neutral training content, but also add a section, where we include a group discussion on the individual-centric benefits that may accrue to the politicians who get elected to the village council. Finally, in the **social training**, we again retain the material from then neutral training, but add a group discussion on how the community can be helped by people who win the election. Below, we re-produce the main sections of the training manual.

1. Welcome and introductions

2. Overview of upcoming local elections, including information on village councils

3. Provide details of:

   - Composition of councils (information on nazim, general seats and reservations)
   - Pre-requisites for filing papers (age, nationality etc)

4. Detail process of declaring candidacy

5. **In case of Neutral Training village**

   - Questions and Discussion
   - End

6. **In case of Career Training village**

   - Detailed discussion on career benefits from running including:
     (a) Village council members will have the opportunity to increase their connections with tehsil and district level politicians. This will be beneficial in their growth in poiltics

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    (b) Those who win the election will have influence in the village, and they will be touted as the leaders of their neighborhood

    (c) The families of the village council members, as well as their children, will be known and considered influential in the area. This will also ease their entry into poiltics.

- Discussion on career benefits
- Questions
- End

7. **In case of Social Training village**

- Detailed discussion on social benefits from running including:

    (a) Village council members will play an important role in improving government services to the village. They will work towards securing development and rights of the poor.

    (b) Village Councillors will work with the district government to improve the health and education service provision in the village, including the schools and clinics.

    (c) Elected councils will have a great opportunity to resolve the problems of their neighborhood, which will make them the standard-bearers of social development in the village.

- Discussion on social benefits
- Questions
- End

3.1.3 Get-out-the-vote Treatments

Our final treatment is intended to encourage voters to go out and vote. Using the standard literature, we send up to 8 text messages to random households to 1) encourage them to vote on election day, and 2) encourage them to take other people in the village to vote on election day. We can then identify changes in turnout through our random instrument to induce random variation in who gets selected into councils. 4 texts were send on May 29th, a day before the elections, and 4 were sent on May 30th, on the morning of the elections. The text of the 8 SMSs is given below:

- SMS 1 sent on May 29th 2015 - My name is - - - and I am from - - -. Make sure to vote in the 30th May elections, and forwarding this text to others in your village.

- SMS 2 sent on May 29th 2015 - Voting in the 30th May elections is a civic duty for all of us. Make sure to vote, along with all your family and friends, on May 30th.

- SMS 3 sent on May 29th 2015 - Every single vote can be important in the 30th May Elections! Don't forget to express your democratic opinion by voting on May 30th!

- SMS 4 sent on May 29th 2015 - Remember to vote in the 30th May election! Tell all your family and friends about this democratic duty by forward this text to them!

- SMS 5 sent on 30th May 2015 - My name is —-, and I'm from —-. I wanted to remind you to vote today, and to send this text to others in your village.

- SMS 6 sent on 30th May 2015 - Remember to vote in elections today! Remind everyone you know above the age of 18 about this important democratic responsibility!

- SMS 7 sent on 30th May 2015 - Every single vote can be important in today's election. Don't forget to express your democratic opinion by voting!

- SMS 8 sent on 30th May 2015 - Voting in today's election is our civic duty. Make sure to vote, along with all your family and friends!

3.2   Evaluation Design

We design three experiments in 240 villages in 2 districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan - Haripur and Abbottabad. These districts were chosen for the experiment after careful consideration of logistics and the availability of an able partner to implement the intervention. These districts have better health and education indicators compared to the provincial average. The percentage of households with access to "improved drinking water sources" in Abbottabad is 81.7% and Haripur 75%, whereas the provincial average is 74.6% as per Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2008. In education indicators these districts fare much better than rest of the province as evident by the percentage of school age children enrolled at the primary level. In Abbottabad and Haripur 65% of the school going age children are enrolled in primary classes, whereas provincial average is just 43.1%.

In this section, we describe the evaluation design as well as field activity details for these experiments.

The first experiment is with a random sample of the village, and can involve everyone interested in learning more about politics. The purpose of this experiment to study policy instruments that can help in mobilizing people in village settings to get more engaged with politics, particularly the candidacy process.

The second experiment is with a group of people who are either more likely to be engaged with politics, or those who are perceived by the villagers as potential candidates for the village council position.

The final experiment involves all voters in the village. Retaining the sample from the first experiment, we cross-randomize a treatment that should boost turnout at the village level. The objective of this experiment is to introduce random variation in the composition of the *elected* village council.

Figure 1 illustrates the design of the experiment which we explain below.

Figure 1: Design

3.2.1 Experiment 1 - Canvassing and Training

In this experiment we canvass a large section of the village, and invite them to attend a training in the village the same afternoon, or the following day. The purpose of this experiment is to disseminate information regarding the first village council elections, as well as to induce random variation in the composition of the village council. In this sense the treatments in this experiment at the village level.

Fieldwork proceeds in two phases: canvassing and training.

We divide villages into two categories at the canvassing stage: first, are the 'career type' villages (96 in total), which we sub-divide into receiving a **neutral message** canvass (48 villages) or a **career message** canvass (48 villages). Second, are the 'social type' villages (96 villages), which we again sub-divide to receive a **neutral message** canvass (48 villages) or a **career message** canvass (48 villages).

At the training stage, we divide the 'career type' villages into receiving either a **neutral training** (24 villages each), or a **career training** (24 villages each). Similarly, divide the 'social type' villages into receiving either a **neutral training** (24 villages each), or a **social training** (24 villages each).

Figure 2 shows this cross-randomization across canvassing and training by village type.

This leaves us with 192 treatment villages in total that we can compare to the 48 control villages to study the impacts of receiving canvassing and training, as well as receiving those with messages on benefits from candidacy. By cross-randomizing the treatments, we can also identify the separate effect of receiving career or social benefit messages at the canvassing or training stages.

Activities on the ground proceed as follows. A pair of social mobilizers from our partner

	Training Stage	
	Neutral Message	Career Message
Canvass Stage — Neutral Message	24	24
Canvass Stage — Career Message	24	24

Career type villages (96)

	Training Stage	
	Neutral Message	Social Message
Canvass Stage — Neutral Message	24	24
Canvass Stage — Social Message	24	24

Social type villages (96)

Figure 2: Treatment villages (192)

organization canvass the village with the aim of talking to about 50 households. Field teams are instructed to begin at the center of the village, and talk to every 5th household in the direction of North. The team repeats this process in different directions until 50 households are interviewed. Once a household is approached, enumerators ask a short survey and solicit names of people the interviewee would like to nominate (details below). Finally, enumerators deliver a neutral, career or social message to the household and invite them to the training. Interviewees may also bring others from the village to the training.

Enumerators then proceed to carry out activities for experiment 2, before organizing the trainings with another team which specializes in conducting these trainings. The trainings themselves are organized in the village to make them accessible for everyone. A master trainer from the field staff conducts the training according to the guidelines discussed above.

3.2.2 Experiment 2 - Nominee Pool

We also focus on another population of interest which we term the 'nominee pool'. Once canvassing with a random set of 50 households in the village concludes, but before a 'neutral', 'career', or 'social' message is delivered to the interviewee, our enumerators ask each interviewee to nominate up to three people from the village who they think should contest the upcoming elections. They are also primed to name people who should run, but would not necessarily do so. This ensures that in our sample we also get some people who are on the margin about running for office.

Once each of the 50 households at the canvassing stage have named up to three people, our enumerators compile the list of unique names from these nominations, and rank everyone who is nominated in alphabetical order. This comprises the nominee pool. Individually randomized treatments are delivered to this pool of people on the same day as the canvassing but before training is conducted in the village.

For each person in the nominee pool, we offer up to three treatments as shown in matrix in Figure 1. These include: a **Neutral** or **Career/Social** Message, the offer of a **Lawyer** to help them file papers, and provision of **Information on Electability** - that is the village has nominated the person. These three treatments are cross-randomized to the nominee

pool such that each person can fall in one of 8 treatment combinations shown in the matrix.[1] This allows us to test the impact of each treatment separately, as well as together with other treatments. The important thing to note here is that because of then design, we have control groups for every kind of treatment at the individual level. This contrasts with the first experiment where everything was randomized at the village level.

3.2.3   Experiment 3 - Get-out-the-vote

Finally, 2 days before the election, after all the other field activity had ended, including all surveying, we sent out **Get-out-the-vote** texts to the 50 households who we interview in the first experiment. On the day before the elections, the household received these texts spaced throughout the day, while on the day of the election, the texts were sent out between 8 am and 11am. Polling closed on election day around 5pm. Since turnout and voting cannot be observed at the individual level in Pakistan, the outcomes from this experiment will be at the village council level.

   We randomize the texts at the village level as shown in Figure 1. We restrict the sampling frame for this treatment to villages that receive a cell phone signal, information we obtained during the canvassing stage of the experiment. In half the control villages, we also conduct a placebo canvass where our field team solicited phone numbers from about 50 households in every village without providing any information regarding the upcoming local elections.

   Since the get-out-the-vote experiments are primarily concerned with increasing turnout, we will measure the impact of our treatment primarily on this variable in the first stage. We can then instrument changes in turnout with our random allocation of the get-out-the-vote experiment to study changes in council composition (which can be used later to study how different compositions of village councils perform in office).

3.3   Timeline

Below, we provide a condensed timeline for the project.

1. March 3-14, 2015: Pilot in Haripur District, KP

2. Last week of March - April 13, 2015: Administering Treatments

3. April 13-17, 2015: Candidates file their papers

4. May 3-28, 2015: Survey of all candidates and the nominee pool

5. May 29-30, 2015: Get out the vote experiment SMS sent

6. May 30, 2015: Election Day

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[1]To ensure randomization was done correctly in the field, each village started with a different treatment group among the 8 possible combinations. The enumerators assigned treatments by going down the alphabetically arranged list of nominees.

4 Data collection

As indicated, after selection of villages, we reached individuals through a four step approach. At each of these steps we collected data from individuals that we describe below:

1. **Canvassing Survey:** Our field teams approached fifty households in each village and administered them a canvassing message regarding the May 30th Local Government elections. At this stage the respondents were asked a few questions about their demographics, their preferences regarding politics, their beliefs about the cost of running in elections and their own interest in filing candidacy. These data provide us pre-treatment variables on the candidates.

2. **Nominee Survey:** These individuals were also administered a short survey similar to the canvassed households, except that the respondents were not asked to nominate people to the village council.

3. **Training Roster:** When individuals showed up for trainings, we noted who showed up so that they could be matched to people canvassing or nominee survey.

4. **Candidate Survey:** The field teams visited the villages in sample once again after all the candidates had filed their papers, but before the Get-out-the-vote treatments were administered. The teams located and interviewed all candidates who had filed their papers as well as everyone in our nominee pool. This means that we will collect data not only for village level analysis, but also for nominee level analysis, where a counterfactual of those who did not declare candidacy is available. The survey included questions on career/prosocial preferences, experiences with paper filing, employment and income status, interaction with the state, connections and political history, decision to run, political knowledge, trust as well as several psychometric tests adopted from Callen et al. (2013) and Ashraf et al. (2014).

5. **Election Results:** We also collected data for the election results released by the local offices election commission of Pakistan. We secure village level election results from the offices of District Returning Officers in Haripur and Abbotabad. These result sheets contain information on the number of votes secured by each candidate, the total tally of votes for the village and the total registered votes in the village.

6. **Village Survey:** Our field teams collected filled out a short survey regarding the village, collecting information on the education and health facilities. They also recorded their perception of the general economic standing of the village.

5 Independent and Dependent Variables

We now present our the variables of interest. In Section 7 we presented hypothesis based on these outcomes.

1. **Main Outcomes on Selection:** We present the main outcomes for this analysis in Figure 3. We study selection into Training, Candidacy and the Elected Council.

Analysis Type	no.	Theme	Outcome	Type of Variable	Data	Variable Details
Outcomes on Selection	1	Selection into Training	Attended Training	post-treatment	Training Roster	=1 if attended training
	2	Selection into Candidacy	Filed Papers	post-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q12. =1 if filed papers, 0 otherwise
	3	Selection into Candidacy	Candidate at Time of Survey	post-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q15. =1 if still running, 0 otherwise
	4	Selection into Candidacy	Candidate at Time of Election	post-treatment	Election data	=1 if candidate according to electoral data, 0 otherwise
	5	Selection into Council	Elected into Council	post-treatment	Election data	=1 if candidate according to electoral data, 0 otherwise

Figure 3: Main Outcomes

2. **Elite:** Figure 4. We are interested in tracing our impacts across people who one would expect to participate in politics more (elite), and those who might be less likely to participate in the status-quo (non-elite). This difference is critical especially in the local government context because decentralization is often associated with elite capture Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000). We will also conduct heterogenous effects with this variable to see different impact on selection.

Defining local elite however is hard as there are several dimensions along which a person may be considered 'elite'.[2] In our analysis, we will rely on two measures of elite:

We analyze two dimensions of eliteness. Those that hold traditional power, and those who have gained their eliteness through political experience and connections to other politicians bureaucrats. The first variable called 'Traditional Elite' is a binary variable that equals one if one of the two sub-components equals one, while the second variable is an index called 'Experience and Connections Index' and comprises 4 sub-components. Below we outline each of these:

   (a) *Traditional Elite:* this captures the degree to which we expect a person to be a member of one of the influential families in the village. To generate this, we use enumerator coding as well as whether the person has a personal meeting area in the village.

   (b) *Experience and Connections Index:* this captures the previous political experience including election experience and membership of village committees, as well as the degree to which a person is connected to existing politicians and bureaucrats.

3. **Candidacy Decision Process**: These variables related to factors that contributed to a candidate's decision to file or not file papers. Each variable is relevant for a particular treatment. Figure 5 presents all of them.

4. **Opportunity Cost:** Figure 6. These moderators will be used to understand if opportunity cost from running for office prevented people from declaring candidacy. As all variables contribute to the same overall concept, we will construct an index as indicated.

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[2]For instance, Alatas et al. (2013) use a consumption based measure of local elite.

Analysis Type	no.	Theme	Outcome		Data	Variable Details
Traditional Elite	23	Traditional Elite	Traditional Elite Index	pre-treatment		=1 if either of the * items =1 variables
	24	Infuential Family	*Belongs to influencial family	pre-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q134, =1 Enumerator coding of influential family
	25	Infuential Family	*Owns a dera	pre-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q135, =1 owns a dera in village
Experience and Connections	26	Political Experience Index	Political Experience Index	pre-treatment		Index of ** items
	27	Election Experience	**Past election experience	pre-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q49, =1 if yes, 0 otherwise
	28	Political Party interactions	**Member of Political Party	pre-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q51, =1 if yes, 0 otherwise
	29	Member of local committee	**Member of Village Committee	pre-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q 57, =1 if member of a village committee
	31	Connections with politicians	**Family/friends in political office	pre-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q 55, =1 if yes, 0 otherwise
	32	Connections with bureaucracy	**Family/friends in government office	pre-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q 56, =1 if yes, 0 otherwise

Figure 4: Village Elites

Analysis Type	no.	Theme	Outcome	Type of Variable	Data	Variable Details
Candidacy Decision Process	6	Filing reason related to lawyer treatment	Cost of filing index	post-treatment		Index of starred items
	7	Filing Reasons related to lawyer treatment	*Cost of running is high	post-treatment	Candidate Survey	Index of Q13.1 and Q14.1 (reverse coded) - Collapse (1-5) likert scale to 0-1 - higher value of index reflect higher cost
	8	Filing Reasons related to lawyer treatment	*Difficulty of filling papers	post-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q17, collapse (1-5) likert scale to 0-1 (reverse coded)
	9	Filing Reasons related to electability treatment	Related to probability of winning	post-treatment	Candidate Survey	Index of Q13.2 (reverse coded) and 14.2 - collapse (1-5) likert scale to 0-1 - higher value reflects higher probability
	10	Filing Reasons related to prosocial treatment	Related to ability to help community	post-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q13.6 (reverse coded) and Q14.6 - collapse (1-5) likert scale to 0-1 - higher values reflect higher ability
	11	Filing Reasons related to career treatment	Related to opportunity cost	post-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q13.7 and Q13.8, and Q14.7 and Q14.8 (reverse coded) - collapse (1-5) likert scale to 0-1, make index - higher values reflect higher opportunity cost

Figure 5: Decision to Run

Analysis Type	no.	Theme	Outcome		Data	Variable Details
Opportunity Cost	12	Opportunity Cost	Low Opportunity Cost			Make index of starred variables, =1 if below median
	13	Worker/ labourer/ student	*Pre election occupation: low opportunity cost (reverse coded)	pre-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q35, =1 if labourer/daily wage worker, retired person, student, social worker, 0 otherwise (reverse coded)
	14	Businessman	*Pre election occupation: high opportunity cost	pre-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q35, =1 if business, 0 otherwise
	15	Income	*Pre election Income	pre-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q36, in log ruppees
	16	Education	*Years of Education	pre-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q37, number of years

Figure 6: Opportunity Cost

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5. **Priors:** We also collect priors in the canvassing stage surveys on people's priors on the treatments. We can use this information to see people holding what kinds of priors are most likely to respond to treatments. We present the variables in Figure 7.

Analysis Type	no.	Theme	Outcome		Data	Variable Details
Priors	17	Prior on Candidacy	Consider contesting elections	pre-treatment	Nominee Survey	Q25, =1 if yes, 0 otherwise
	18	Prior on Career	Prior Career	pre-treatment	Nominee Survey	Q 16, 18, 20, 22 - Make index, =1 if below median
	19	Prior on Prosociality	Prior Prosociality	pre-treatment	Nominee Survey	Q 15, 17, 19, 21 - Make index
	20	Prior on Cost	Prior on affordability of running	pre-treatment	Nominee Survey	Q24, collapse (1-5) likert scale to 0-1
	21	Prior on Electability	Prior on electability	pre-treatment	Nominee Survey	Q26, collapse (1-5) likert scale to 0-1

Figure 7: Priors

6. **Political Knowledge:** We test people's political knowledge. These variables are shown in Figure 12

Analysis Type	no.	Theme	Outcome		Data	Variable Details
Political Knowledge	67	Political Knowledge	Knowledge Index	post-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q75, Proportion of correct responses
	68	Source of Political Knowledge	From social group	pre-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q73, collapse likert scale to 0-1 and make index for options a, b,c and g
	69	Source of Political Knowledge	From media	pre-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q73, collapse likert scale to 0-1 and make index for options d,e,f

Figure 8: Political Knowledge

7. **Mission Preferences:** Figure 9. We have a host of measures for the pro-sociality and career preferences of respondents. We construct an index to measure the overall impacts on pro-sociality and career preferences.

8. **Behavioral:** Figure 10. Using Callen et al. (2013), we collect data on the Big 5 personality and Perry public sector motivation. We will also see if how risk acceptance and time preferences interact with treatment.

9. **Satisfaction with government:** We also collect information on people's experience with government services. We create an index of satisfaction as shown in Figure 11

10. **Role of Social Groups in Candidacy:** We collect information on the role of social groups in the candidacy process. We will use these data to conduct exploratory analysis on how social groups collectively may encourage candidates to seek office. We present these in Figure 12

11. **Village-level Electoral Outcomes:** We also construct some village level outcomes that should help us understand village level treatment effects. These are presented in Figure 13.

Analysis Type	no.	Theme	Outcome		Data	Variable Details
Pro Social Mission Preferences	33	Index	Prosociality Index	pre-treatment	Candidate Survey	Index of starred items
	34	Importance of Social motivation	*Relative Ranking of social motivation for filing	pre-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q74 - question gives 4 statemenes which respondents rank in order of preference. We will assign 4 to the first choice, 3 to the second and so on. We will then add the the points for the social option to construct this variable. This variable will only be included for analysis of candidate pool or village level analysis as it is only available for filers.
	35	Volunteer	*Has volunteer experience	pre-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q76. =1 if yes, 0 otherwise
	36	Perception of interests	*Perceives community interests and self-interest as overlapping	pre-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q103, equals 1 if D, 0 otherwise
	37	Dictator Game	*Donation to rural NGO in Dictator Game	pre-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q104, =1 if >0, 0 otherwise
	38	Psychometric Scale	*Desire for positive prosocial impact [1-5]	pre-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q27 to Q30, make index
	39	Psychometric Scale	*See self as pro social [1-5]	pre-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q31 to Q33, make index
	40	Psychometric Scale	*Affective commitment to beneficiaries [1-5]	pre-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q34, make index
	41	Psychometric Scale	*Pro Social Motivation (Pleasure based) [1-5]	pre-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q40 to Q43, make index
	42	Psychometric Scale	*Pro Social Motivation (Pressure based) [1-5]	pre-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q44 to Q46, make index
Career Mission Preferences	43	Index	Career Index	pre-treatment	Candidate Survey	Index of starred items
	44	Importance of career motivation	*Relative Ranking of career motivation for filing	pre-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q74 - question gives 4 statemenes which respondents rank in order of preference. We will assign 4 to the first choice, 3 to the second and so on. We will then add the the points for the career option to construct this variable. This variable will only be included for analysis of candidate pool or village level analysis as it is only available for filers.
	45	Psychometric Scale	*Career Orientation [1-5]	pre-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q18, Q19, make index
	46	Psychometric Scale	*Calling [1-5]	pre-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q21 to Q26, make index
	51	Psychometric Scale	*Status Seeking [1-5]	pre-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q96 to Q99, make index
	54	Corruption	*Think membership of council is a good way to make money	pre-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q136 (version a & b from the list experiment)

Figure 9: Mission Preferences

Analysis Type	no.	Theme	Outcome		Data	Variable Details
Behavioral	55	Public sector motivation	Psychometric Scale: Perry Public Sector Motivation [1-5].	pre-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q119 to Q128, make index but also evaluate components
	56	Personality	Psychometric Scale: Big 5 Personality index [1-5]	pre-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q109 to Q118, make index but also evaluate components
	57	Risk	Risk preference parameter	pre-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q102
	58	Time	Time preference parameter	pre-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q100

Figure 10: Behavioral

Analysis Type	no.	Theme	Outcome		Data	Variable Details
Satisfaction withn Government	59	Satisfaction with government	Satisfaction with government	pre-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q48 and sub parts. Create index of satisfaction across 5 kinds of government services people may have used (schools, health, police, irrigation, sanitation, domicile). Collapse likert scale to (0-1) and then create index

Figure 11: Satisfaction with Government

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Analysis Type	no.	Theme	Outcome		Data	Variable Details
Role of Social Groups in Candidacy	64	Reasons for filing/not filing	Related to social group encouraging candidacy	post-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q13.3-5 (reverse coded) and Q14.3-5 - collapse (1-5) likert scare to 0-1, make index, higher values mean social group encouraging more
	65	Reasons for withdrawing papers	Related to social group pressure	post-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q16.2-4, yes/no, make index
	66	Reasons for withdrawing papers	Related to low probability of winning	post-treatment	Candidate Survey	Q16.5, yes/no

Figure 12: Role of Social Groups in Candidacy

Analysis Type	no.	Theme	Outcome	Type of Variable	Data	Variable Details
Size of Training Attendee Pool	70	Training Attendance to Seats Ratio	Ration of Total number of training attendees to seats			calculate ratio
Size of Candidate Pool	71	Candidate Pool to Seats Ratio, overall	Ratio of Total number of candidates to seats	post-treatment	Electoral Data	calculate ratio
	72	General Seats	Ratio of Total number of candidates for general seats to seats	post-treatment	Electoral Data	calculate ratio
	73	Overall Reserved Seats	Ratio of Total number of candidates for reserved seats to seats	post-treatment	Electoral Data	calculate ratio
	74	Female Seats	Ration of Total number of candidates for female seats to seats	post-treatment	Electoral Data	calculate ratio
	75	Youth Seats	Ratio of Total number of candidates for youth seats to seats	post-treatment	Electoral Data	calculate ratio
	76	Peasant/Farmer Seats	Ratio of Total number of candidates for peasant/farmer seats to seats	post-treatment	Electoral Data	calculate ratio
Political Competition	77	Overall	Candidate Vote Share Herfindahl Index	post-treatment	Electoral Data	Standard Herfindahl index
	78	General Seats	Candidate Vote Share Herfindahl Index for General Seats	post-treatment	Electoral Data	Standard Herfindahl index
	79	Overall Reserved Seats	Candidate Vote Share Herfindahl Index for Reserved Seats	post-treatment	Electoral Data	Standard Herfindahl index
	80	Female Seats	Candidate Vote Share Herfindahl Index for Female Seats	post-treatment	Electoral Data	Standard Herfindahl index
	81	Youth Seats	Candidate Vote Share Herfindahl Index for Youth Seats	post-treatment	Electoral Data	Standard Herfindahl index
	82	Peasant/Farmer Seats	Candidate Vote Share Herfindahl Index for Peasant/Farmer Seats	post-treatment	Electoral Data	Standard Herfindahl index

Figure 13: Electoral Outcomes

6 Analysis Plan

We will conduct both individual level as well as village level analysis based around our randomizations as presented in Figure 14.


Figure 14: Analysis Type

- **Analysis 1. Individual-level Randomization:** The random allocation of individual level treatments are done only with the nominee pool. In this pool, we have both those who are treated and not treated, as well as those who decide to file papers to become candidates, and those who did not.

  We run regression of the following form:

$$
\begin{align}
Y_{iv} &= \beta_1 Treat_{iv} + B_v + \varepsilon_{iv} \tag{1} \\
PostTreat_{iv} &= \beta_1 Treat_{iv} + B_v + \varepsilon_{iv} \tag{2} \\
Y_{iv} &= \beta_1 Treat_{iv} + \beta_2 PreTreat_{iv} + \beta_3 Treat_{iv} \times PreTreat_{iv} + B_v + \varepsilon_{iv} \tag{3}
\end{align}
$$

  where, (1) measures the direct treatment effect. Y_{iv} and $Treat_{iv}$ refers to individual level outcomes and Treatments. B_v refers to block fixed effects, within which treatments were randomized. Errors will be clustered at the village level. (2) measures outcomes that mediate the treatment, where $PostTreat_{iv}$ is the mediator. Specification (3) will be used for heterogeneous treatment effects with respect to background characteristics, where $PreTreat_{iv}$ refers to moderators. Finally, we will also run interactions of several treatments assigned at the nominee level.

- **Analysis 2. Village-level Randomization:** This analysis will focus on village level treatments, including canvassing training, and get-out-the-vote treatments.

  For analysis 2.1-2.4, We run regressions of the same form as above, except that treatment $Treat$ is not at the village level. For 2.5, all analysis is run at the village level, so we drop the subscript i.

$$Y_{iv} = \beta_1 Treat_v + B_v + \varepsilon_{iv} \tag{4}$$

$$PostTreat_{iv} = \beta_1 Treat_v + B_v + \varepsilon_{iv} \tag{5}$$

$$Y_{iv} = \beta_1 Treat_v + \beta_2 PreTreat_{iv} + \beta_3 Treat_v \times PreTreat_{iv} + B_v + \varepsilon_{iv} \tag{6}$$

  - **2.1: General Population:** This analysis will focus on the 50 random HHs canvassed in the village. Here analysis will be done with an individual level dataset as we have people who decide to respond to treatment and those who do not.

  - **2.2: Nominee Pool:** This analysis will focus on the nominee pool and the effect of village level treatments, such as training, on this pool. We have carry out the analysis with an individual level dataset.

  - **2.3: Candidate Pool:** This analysis will focus only on those who file for candidacy. We will be able to compare the effect of treatments on an individual level dataset. For some outcomes we will also create a village level dataset.

  - **2.4: Elected Council:** This analysis will focus only on those who are elected to the council. We will be able to compare the effect of treatments on an individual level dataset. For some outcomes we will also create a village level dataset.

  - **2.5: Village-level Outcomes:** This analysis will focus on village level outcomes such as the size of the candidate pool and effects on village level political competition.

- **Analysis 3. Voting Randomization:** This analysis will focus on how random shocks to turnout (instrumented by the GOTV experiment) affect village level outcomes.

  We run regressions of the following form:

$$Y_{iv} = \beta_1 Turnout_v + \gamma_v + \varepsilon_{iv} \tag{7}$$

$$Y_{iv} = \beta_1 Treat_v + \beta_2 Turnout_v + \beta_3 Treat_v \times Turnout_v + \gamma_v + \varepsilon_{iv} \tag{8}$$

$$Turnout_v = \beta_1 SMS_v + \gamma_v + e_v \tag{9}$$

where Y_{iv} refers to outcomes of interest. In some cases we will use village level estimates so subscript i will be dropped. $Turnout_v$ refers to village level vote turnout in the 2015 elections. SMS_v is an indicator variable for whether the village received the get-out-the-vote experiment. γ_v refers to blocks within which treatment was randomized. Equation (9) presents the first-stage estimates. Equation (7) is the direct effect of

changes in turnout on the outcome of interest. We will also interact turnout with other randomly assigned treatments at the village level. These are shown in equation (8).

6.1   Other Empirical Issues

Clustering Standard Errors

All standard errors will be clustered at the village level.

Block Randomization

We randomize treatment to 240 village councils from a population of 350. We divide the 350 village councils into 12 geographical regions and block randomize our village level treatments. The get-out-the-vote treatment was assigned by block randomizing within each of the 9 village types as defined by the village treatment status. Block fixed effects will be added to regressions.

Intention-to-Treat (ITT), and Treatment-on-the-Treated (TOT)

Most of our analysis will rely on an ITT design. However, in the case of the lawyer offer treatment, we will also do a TOT analysis by obtaining data on who actually used the lawyer.

Addressing Attrition

We expect that we were not able to interview everyone who declared candidacy before the elections. To the extent that we rely on official data for outcomes (for example on candidacy), this should not be a problem. However, we this attrition will affect any analysis we do with the candidate survey. We will check to see if we have differential attrition by our treatments.

7   Hypotheses

We now describe our hypotheses by the main treatments.

Guided by Olken (2015), we first present the 'primary outcomes' of interest. Next we consider 'secondary outcomes' that we use to think about ways in which we might observe changes in our primary outcomes. These include a discussion of both mediators and moderators. Finally, we present 'other outcomes' of interest, whose analysis we treat as exploratory.

Domain A outcomes trace the impact of treatments across two stages of candidacy: filing papers for candidacy, and getting elected. A related village level outcome is the degree of political competition. Domain B outcomes relate to how our treatment effects differ for the elite and non-elite groups in society. We treat this sub-group analysis as one of primary interest because this is one of the substantively important question we designed this project to answer.

In Domain C we analyze the mission preferences of nominees and other candidates. They are a critical link in understanding the degree to which there exists a trade-off between career and prosocial preferences when certain aspects of being in political office change.

Our secondary outcomes in Domain D aim to understand the way in which we might observe treatment effects in the primary outcomes. We analyze people's decision to file for candidacy political knowledge, opportunity cost, and priors.

Finally, in Domain E, we list other outcomes that are of interest but whose analysis we treat as exploratory. These include: attending training, behavioral outcomes, satisfaction with government, trust and role of social groups in candidacy.

To allow for a sharper test of hypotheses, and also to reduce the problem of multiple inference, we construct mean outcome indices for grouped outcomes as indicated in Section 5. We use the method in Kling et al. (2007) and Anderson (2008) for this procedure.

Below we present hypotheses by the main treatment arms, but we will also examine cross cutting effects arising by design from cross randomized treatments.

7.1 The Effect of Making Career Benefits Salient (vs Neutral Msg)

- **Domain A - Primary Outcomes: Effects on Political Selection**

  - HA.1 - Files papers

    * Analysis 1: Making Career benefits salient to the nominee pool increases the incidence of paper filing (Var 2)
    * Analysis 2.1: Making Career benefits salient to the general population at village level increases the incidence of paper filing (Var 2)
    * Analysis 2.2: Making Career benefits salient to the nominee pool at village level increases the incidence of paper filing (Var 2)
    * Analysis 2.5: Making career benefits salient increases the size of the candidate pool in the village (Var 71)

  - HA.2 - Is elected

    * Analysis 1: Making Career benefits salient to the nominee pool increases the probability of getting elected (Var 5)
    * Analysis 2.1: Making Career benefits salient to the general population at village canvassing increases the probability of getting elected (Var 5)
    * Analysis 2.2: Making Career benefits salient at the village level increases the probability of getting elected in the nominee pool (Var 5)
    * Analysis 3: Those for whom career benefits were made salient are more likely to be elected from the candidate pool (Var 5)

  - HA.3 Political Competition

    * Analysis 2.5: Making career benefits salient at the village level increases political competition in the village elections (Var 77)

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* Analysis 3: When career benefits are made salient, increasing turnout at the village level increases political competition in the village elections (Var 77)

- **Domain B - Effects by Elite Participation**

  - Analysis 1: When career benefits are made salient, the elite are less likely to respond by declaring candidacy (Var 22)

  - Analysis 2.2: Making Career benefits salient to the nominee pool at village level increases candidacy less among the elite. (Var 22)

  - Analysis 2.3: Making Career benefits salient at village level increases election to the council less among the elite in candidate pool. (Var 22)

  - Analysis 2.4: Making Career benefits salient at village level decreases elites in the elected council. (Var 22)

  - Analysis 3: When career benefits are made salient, increasing turnout at the village level reduces the election of elite to the council (Var 22)

- **Domain C - Effects by Mission Preferences**

  - HC.1 - Career Preferences

    * Analysis 1: Those with career mission preferences are more likely to file for candidacy when career benefits are made salient to them. (Var 43)

    * Analysis 2.2: Making Career benefits salient to the nominee pool at village level increases candidacy more among those with higher career preferences. (Var 43)

    * Analysis 2.3: Making Career benefits increases career preferences among the candidate pool. (Var 43)

    * Analysis 2.4: Making Career benefits increases career preferences among the election council. (Var 43)

  - HC.2 - Prosocial Preferences: The way pro-social preferences moderate the treatment effect is ambiguous. If career and prosocial preferences are complements, then making career benefits salient should also increase candidacy among those with prosocial preferences. If they are substitutes, then making career benefits salient for those with prosocial mission preferences should decrease candidacy. (Var 33)

- **Domain D - Secondary Outcomes**

  - HD.1 - Filing decision informed by opportunity cost

    * Analysis 1: Making Career benefits salient to the nominee pool reduces the probability that opportunity cost is cited as an important consideration in the decision to file. (Var 11)

* Analysis 2.2: Making Career benefits salient to the nominee pool at village level reduces the probability that opportunity cost is cited as an important consideration (Var 11)
* Analysis 2.3: Making Career benefits salient at village level reduces the probability that opportunity cost is cited as an important consideration among candidates (Var 11)
* Analysis 2.4: Making Career benefits salient at village level reduces the probability that opportunity cost is cited as an important consideration in the elected council (Var 11)

– HD.2 - Political Knowledge

* Analysis 1: Making career benefits salient increases political knowledge (Var 67)
* Analysis 2.1: Making Career benefits salient to the general population at village level increases political knowledge (Var 67)
* Analysis 2.2: Making Career benefits salient to the nominee pool at village level increases political knowledge (Var 67)
* Analysis 2.3: Making Career benefits salient at village level increases political knowledge in candidate pool (Var 67)
* Analysis 2.4: Making Career benefits salient at village level increases political knowledge in the elected council (Var 67)

– HD.3 - Opportunity Cost

* Analysis 1: Those with low opportunity cost file papers more when career benefits are made salient to them (Var 12)
* Analysis 2.1: Making Career benefits salient to the general population at village level increases candidacy more among those with low opportunity cost. (Var 12)
* Analysis 2.2: Making Career benefits salient to the nominee pool at village level increases candidacy more among those with low opportunity cost. (Var 12)
* Analysis 2.3: Making Career benefits salient at village level increases election to the council more among those with low opportunity cost in candidate pool. (Var 12)
* Analysis 2.4: Making Career benefits salient at village level increases election to the council more among those with low opportunity cost. (Var 12)

– HD.4 - Prior on Career Benefits

* Analysis 1: Those with low priors on career benefits are more like to declare candidacy when Career benefits are made salient to them (Var 18)
* Analysis 2.1: Making Career benefits salient to the general population at village level increases candidacy more among those with low priors on career benefits. (Var 18)

* Analysis 2.2: Making Career benefits salient to the nominee pool at village level increases candidacy more among those with low priors on career benefits. (Var 18)

- **Domain E - Outcomes for Exploratory Analysis**

  – HE.1 - Attends training

    * Analysis 1: Making Career benefits salient to the nominee pool increases participation in Training (Var 1)
    * Analysis 2.1: Making Career benefits salient to the general population at village canvassing increases participation in Training (Var 1)
    * Analysis 2.2: Making Career benefits salient to the nominee pool at village canvassing increases participation in Training (Var 1)
    * Analysis 2.5: Making Career benefits salient at Canvassing makes more people show up for the training (Var 70)

  – HE.2 - Behavioral (Vars 55-58)

    * Perry PSM: No hypothesized direction of change (Var 55)
    * Personality: No hypothesized direction of change (Var 56)
    * Risk: More risk accepting people will respond more to treatment (Var 57)
    * Time: Less time inconsistent people are more likely to respond to treatment (Var 58)

  – HE.3 - Satisfaction with Government: more unsatisfied people are more likely to respond to treatment (Var 59)

  – HE.4 - Trust: More trusting people are more likely to respond to treatment (Vars 60-63)

  – HE.5 - Role of Social Groups in Candidacy (Vars 64-66)

7.2   The Effect of Making Social Benefits Salient (vs Neutral Msg)

- **Domain A - Primary Outcomes: Effects on Political Selection**

  – HA.1 - Files papers

    * Analysis 1: Making Social benefits salient to the nominee pool increases the incidence of paper filing (Var 2)
    * Analysis 2.1: Making Social benefits salient to the general population at village level increases the incidence of paper filing (Var 2)
    * Analysis 2.2: Making Social benefits salient to the nominee pool at village level increases the incidence of paper filing (Var 2)
    * Analysis 2.5: Making Social benefits salient increases the size of the candidate pool in the village (Var 71)

* Analysis 3: When social benefits are made salient, increasing turnout at the village level increases political competition in the village elections (Var 77)

* Analysis 3: When social benefits are made salient, increasing turnout at the village level increases political competition in the village elections on reserved seats (Var 79)

– HA.2 - Is elected

* Analysis 1: Making Social benefits salient to the nominee pool increases the probability of getting elected (Var 5)

* Analysis 2.1: Making Social benefits salient to the general population at village canvassing increases the probability of getting elected (Var 5)

* Analysis 2.2: Making Social benefits salient at the village level increases the probability of getting elected in the nominee pool (Var 5)

* Analysis 2.3: Making Social benefits salient at the village level increases the probability of getting elected candidate pool in the village (Var 5)

* Analysis 3: Those for whom Social benefits were made salient are more likely to be elected from the candidate pool (Var 5)

– HA.3 Political Competition

* Analysis 2.5: Making Social benefits salient at the village level increases political competition in the village elections (Var 77)

- **Domain B - Effects by Elite Participation**

– Analysis 1: When Social benefits are made salient, the elite are less likely to respond by declaring candidacy (Var 22)

– Analysis 2.2: Making Social benefits salient to the nominee pool at village level increases candidacy less among the elite. (Var 22)

– Analysis 2.3: Making Social benefits salient at village level increases election to the council less among the elite in candidate pool. (Var 22)

– Analysis 2.4: Making Social benefits salient at village level decreases elites in the elected council. (Var 22)

– Analysis 3: When social benefits are made salient, increasing turnout at the village level reduces the election of elite to the council (Var 22)

- **Domain C - Effects by Mission Preferences**

– HC.5 - Career Preferences: The way career preferences moderate the treatment effect is ambiguous. If career and prosocial preferences are complements, then making social benefits salient should also increase candidacy among those with career preferences. If they are substitutes, then making social benefits salient for those with career mission preferences should decrease candidacy. (Var 43)

– HC.6 - Pro-social Preferences

  * Analysis 1: Those with social mission preferences are more likely to file for candidacy when social benefits are made salient to them. (Var 33)
  * Analysis 2.2: Making social benefits salient to the nominee pool at village level increases candidacy more among those with higher social preferences. (Var 33)
  * Analysis 2.3: Making social benefits increases social preferences among the candidate pool. (Var 33)
  * Analysis 2.4: Making social benefits increases social preferences among the election council. (Var 33)

- **Domain D - Secondary Outcomes**

  – HD.1 - Filing decision informed by prosocial reasons

  * Analysis 1: Making Social benefits salient to the nominee pool increases the probability that prosocial reasons are cited as an important consideration in the decision to file. (Var 10)
  * Analysis 2.2: Making Social benefits salient to the nominee pool at village level increases the probability that prosocial reasons are cited as an important consideration (Var 10)
  * Analysis 2.3: Making Social benefits salient at village level increases the probability that prosocial reasons are cited as an important consideration among candidates (Var 10)
  * Analysis 2.4: Making Social benefits salient at village level increases the probability that prosocial reasons are cited as an important consideration in the elected council (Var 10)

  – HD.2 - Political Knowledge

  * Analysis 1: Making Social benefits salient increases political knowledge (Var 67)
  * Analysis 2.1: Making Social benefits salient to the general population at village level increases political knowledge (Var 67)
  * Analysis 2.2: Making Social benefits salient to the nominee pool at village level increases political knowledge (Var 67)
  * Analysis 2.3: Making Social benefits salient at village level increases political knowledge in candidate pool (Var 67)
  * Analysis 2.4: Making Social benefits salient at village level increases political knowledge in the elected council (Var 67)

  – HD.3 - Opportunity Cost

  * Analysis 1: Those with low opportunity cost file papers more when Social benefits are made salient to them (Var 12)

* Analysis 2.1: Making Social benefits salient to the general population at village level increases candidacy more among those with low opportunity cost. (Var 12)
* Analysis 2.2: Making Social benefits salient to the nominee pool at village level increases candidacy more among those with low opportunity cost. (Var 12)
* Analysis 2.3: Making Social benefits salient at village level increases election to the council more among those with low opportunity cost in candidate pool. (Var 12)
* Analysis 2.4: Making Social benefits salient at village level increases election to the council more among those with low opportunity cost. (Var 12)

– HD.4 - Prior on Social Benefits

* Analysis 1: Those with low priors on social benefits are more like to declare candidacy when Social benefits are made salient to them (Var 19)
* Analysis 2.1: Making social benefits salient to the general population at village level increases candidacy more among those with low priors on social benefits. (Var 19)
* Analysis 2.2: Making social benefits salient to the nominee pool at village level increases candidacy more among those with low priors on social benefits. (Var 19)

• **Domain E - Outcomes for Exploratory Analysis**

– HE.1 - Attends training

* Analysis 1: Making Social benefits salient to the nominee pool increases participation in Training (Var 1)
* Analysis 2.1: Making Social benefits salient to the general population at village canvassing increases participation in Training (Var 1)
* Analysis 2.2: Making Social benefits salient to the nominee pool at village canvassing increases participation in Training (Var 1)
* Analysis 2.5: Making Social benefits salient at Canvassing makes more people show up for the training (Var 70)

– HE.2 - Behavioral (Vars 55-58)

* Perry PSM: No hypothesized direction of change (Var 55)
* Personality: No hypothesized direction of change (Var 56)
* Risk: More risk accepting people will respond more to treatment (Var 57)
* Time: Less time inconsistent people are more likely to respond to treatment (Var 58)

– HE.3 - Satisfaction with Government: more unsatisfied people are more likely to respond to treatment (Var 59)

- HE.4 - Trust: More trusting people are more likely to respond to treatment (Vars 60-63)
- HE.5 - Role of Social Groups in Candidacy (Vars 64-66)

7.3 The Effect of a Lawyer Offer (and the Effect of Using the Lawyer (compliers))

- **Domain A - Primary Outcomes: Effects on Political Selection**

  - HA.1 - Files papers
    * Analysis 1: Giving a lawyer to the nominee pool increases the incidence of paper filing (Var 2)
  - HA.2 - Is elected
    * Analysis 1: Giving a lawyer to the nominee pool increases the probability of getting elected (Var 5)

- **Domain B - Effects by Elite Participation**

  - Analysis 1: The elite are less likely to respond by declaring candidacy when they are given a lawyer (Var 22)

- **Domain C - Effects by Mission Preferences**

  - HC.5 - Career Preferences
    * Analysis 1: No hypothesized direction of change. (Var 43)
  - HC.6 - Prosocial Preferences
    * Analysis 1: No hypothesized direction of change. (Var 33)

- **Domain D - Secondary Outcomes**

  - HD.1 - Filing decision related to difficulty of filing papers
    * Analysis 1: Giving a lawyer to the nominee pool reduces the probability that high costs of running are cited as an important consideration in the decision to file. (Var 7)
  - HD.2 - Political Knowledge
    * Analysis 1: Giving a lawyer increases political knowledge (Var 67)
  - HD.3 - Opportunity Cost
    * Analysis 1: Those with low opportunity cost file papers more when a lawyer is given to them (Var 12)
  - HD.4 - Prior on Cost of Running

* Analysis 1: Those with extreme priors on costs of running are less like to declare candidacy when a lawyer is given to them. This is because those with very high cost priors are unlikely to be affected by the treatment. Similarly, those with very low cost priors are going to contest anyway. (Var 20)

- **Domain E - Other Outcomes for Exploratory Analysis**

  - HE.1 - Attends training

    * Analysis 1: Giving a lawyer to the nominee pool increases participation in Training (Var 1)

  - HE.2 - Behavioral (Vars 55-58)

    * Perry PSM: No hypothesized direction of change (Var 55)
    * Personality: No hypothesized direction of change (Var 56)
    * Risk: More risk accepting people will respond more to treatment (Var 57)
    * Time: Less time inconsistent people are more likely to respond to treatment (Var 58)

  - HE.3 - Satisfaction with Government: more unsatisfied people are more likely to respond to treatment (Var 59)

  - HE.4 - Trust: More trusting people are more likely to respond to treatment (Vars 60-63)

  - HE.5 - Role of Social Groups in Candidacy (Vars 64-66)

7.4   The Effect of Providing Electability Information

- **Domain A - Primary Outcomes: Effects on Political Selection**

  - HA.1 - Files papers

    * Analysis 1: Providing Electability information to the nominee pool increases the incidence of paper filing (Var 2)

  - HA.2 - Is elected

    * Analysis 1: Providing Electability information to the nominee pool increases the probability of getting elected (Var 5)

- **Domain B - Effects by Elite Participation**

  - Analysis 1: The elite are less likely to respond by declaring candidacy when they are provided Electability information (Var 22)

- **Domain C - Effects by Mission Preferences**

  - HC.5 - Career Preferences

      * Analysis 1: No hypothesized direction of change. (Var 43)

    – HC.6 - Prosocial Preferences

      * Analysis 1: No hypothesized direction of change. (Var 33)

- **Domain D - Secondary Outcomes**

    – HD.1 - Filing decision related to difficulty of filing papers

      * Analysis 1: Providing Electability information to the nominee pool reduces the probability that high costs of running are cited as an important consideration in the decision to file. (Var 7)

    – HD.2 - Political Knowledge

      * Analysis 1: Providing Electability information increases political knowledge (Var 67)

    – HD.3 - Opportunity Cost

      * Analysis 1: Those with low opportunity cost file papers more when Electability information is provided to them (Var 12)

    – HD.4 - Prior on Cost of Running

      * Analysis 1: Those with extreme priors on costs of running are less like to declare candidacy when Electability information is provided to them. This is because those with very high cost priors are unlikely to be affected by the treatment. Similarly, those with very low cost priors are going to contest anyway. (Var 20)

- **Domain E - Other Outcomes:**

    – HE.1 - Attends training

      * Analysis 1: Providing Electability information to the nominee pool increases participation in Training (Var 1)

    – HE.2 - Behavioral (Vars 55-58)

      * Perry PSM: No hypothesized direction of change (Var 55)

      * Personality: No hypothesized direction of change (Var 56)

      * Risk: More risk accepting people will respond more to treatment (Var 57)

      * Time: Less time inconsistent people are more likely to respond to treatment (Var 58)

    – HE.3 - Satisfaction with Government: more unsatisfied people are more likely to respond to treatment (Var 59)

    – HE.4 - Trust: More trusting people are more likely to respond to treatment (Vars 60-63)

    – HE.5 - Role of Social Groups in Candidacy (Vars 64-66)

7.5   The Effect of Increasing Turnout

- **Domain A - Primary Outcomes: Effects on Political Selection**

    - HA.3 Political Competition
        * Analysis 3: Increasing turnout increases political competition in the elected council (var 77)

- **Domain B - Effects by Elite Participation**

    - Analysis 3: Increasing turnout reduces the eliteness of the elected council (var 22)

- **Domain C - Effects by Mission Preferences**

    - HC.1 - Prosocial Preferences
        * Analysis 3: Increasing turnout increases prosocial preferences in the elected council. (Var 23)
    - HC.2 - Career Preferences
        * Analysis 3: Increasing turnout reduces career preferences in the elected council. (Var 43)

- **Domain D - Secondary Outcomes**

    - HD.2 - Political Knowledge
        * Analysis 3: Increasing turnout increases the political knowledge of the elected council (Var 67)
    - HD.3 - Opportunity Cost
        * Analysis 3: Increasing turnout reduces the opportunity cost of the elected council (Var 12)

- **Domain E - Outcomes for Exploratory Analysis**

    - HE.2 - Behavioral (Vars 55-58)
        * Perry PSM (Var 55)
        * Personality (Var 56)
        * Risk (Var 57)
        * Time (Var 58)
    - HE.3 - Satisfaction with Government (Var 59)
    - HE.4 - Trust (Vars 60-63)
    - HE.5 - Role of Social Groups in Candidacy (Vars 64-66)

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