Appendix A Additional tables

Table A.1: Balance, parent background

	Age		**Education**			**Self-employed**	
	Husband	Wife	Husband	Wife	Difference	Husband	Wife
Husband Bargaining	-0.521	-0.089	-0.126	0.121	-0.008	-0.009	0.053
	(1.894)	(1.350)	(0.168)	(0.144)	(0.070)	(0.081)	(0.090)
Wife Bargaining	-0.388	-2.059	0.309*	0.331**	0.008	-0.126	0.104
	(1.609)	(1.263)	(0.165)	(0.154)	(0.071)	(0.085)	(0.088)
Wife Dictator	-0.551	-0.916	0.054	0.046	0.090	-0.064	0.084
	(1.481)	(1.179)	(0.152)	(0.127)	(0.062)	(0.068)	(0.073)
Constant	43.000***	35.630***	2.813***	2.587***	0.196***	0.717***	0.467***
	(1.023)	(0.868)	(0.107)	(0.097)	(0.042)	(0.047)	(0.052)
P-value of F-test	0.995	0.351	0.054*	0.142	0.334	0.485	0.882
Couples	287	287	286	287	287	287	287
R^2	0.001	0.009	0.018	0.019	0.011	0.010	0.007

Note: The table displays coefficients from estimated regressions of each of the background variables as the dependent variable on indicator variables for the treatments. See Table 4 for definitions. Husband Dictator is the reference category. The reported p-values test the hypothesis that all the treatments have the same effect on the background indicator variables.

Table A.2: Balance, child background

	Male child	Standard	Primary	Total children	School B	School C	School D
Husband Bargaining	-0.164**	0.055	0.176	0.005	0.075	-0.034	-0.055
	(0.083)	(0.346)	(0.109)	(0.086)	(0.077)	(0.082)	(0.035)
Wife Bargaining	0.035	-0.097	0.166	-0.049	0.029	-0.081	0.046
	(0.089)	(0.366)	(0.108)	(0.087)	(0.073)	(0.079)	(0.055)
Wife Dictator	-0.037	0.139	0.166*	-0.100	-0.043	0.021	-0.005
	(0.072)	(0.288)	(0.089)	(0.071)	(0.055)	(0.069)	(0.038)
Constant	0.435***	3.424***	1.283***	0.641***	0.196***	0.326***	0.076***
	(0.052)	(0.195)	(0.057)	(0.050)	(0.042)	(0.049)	(0.028)
P-value of F-test	0.106	0.820	0.996	0.468	0.235	0.421	0.084
Couples	287	285	287	287	287	287	287
R^2	0.017	0.002	0.016	0.009	0.011	0.006	0.013

Note: The table displays coefficients from estimated regressions of each of the background variables as the dependent variable on indicator variables for the treatments. See Table 4 for definitions. "Primary" is the number of children in the household that are currently in primary school. Husband Dictator is the reference category. The reported p-values test the hypothesis that all the treatments have the same effect on the background indicator variables.

Table A.3: Balance, parent preferences

	Time preferences			**Risk preferences**		
	Husband	Wife	Difference	Husband	Wife	Difference
Husband Bargaining	0.010	0.006	0.034	-0.087*	0.126***	-0.225**
	(0.046)	(0.037)	(0.082)	(0.051)	(0.041)	(0.088)
Wife Bargaining	-0.266***	0.133**	-0.388***	-0.090*	0.031	-0.131
	(0.040)	(0.054)	(0.082)	(0.046)	(0.057)	(0.088)
Wife Dictator	-0.178***	0.123***	-0.398***	-0.071*	0.106**	-0.213***
	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.067)	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.071)
Constant	0.844***	0.636***	0.674***	0.750***	0.524***	0.641***
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.049)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.050)
P-value of F-test	0.000***	0.011**	0.000***	0.911	0.252	0.582
Couples	287	287	287	287	287	287
R^2	0.182	0.051	0.166	0.019	0.033	0.037

Note: The table displays coefficients from estimated regressions of each of the preference variables as the dependent variable on indicator variables for the treatments. See Table 4 for definitions. Husband Dictator is the reference category. The reported p-values test the hypothesis that all the treatments have the same effect on the background indicator variables.

Table A.4: Heterogeneity in time- and risk-preference difference, and gender of the child, with test of equality of treatment coefficients

	var		
	H most patient	H least risk averse	Male child
var	0.101*	-0.077	0.119**
	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.046)
Husband Bargaining	-0.004	-0.037	0.084*
	(0.079)	(0.058)	(0.047)
Wife Bargaining	-0.054	-0.081	-0.028
	(0.050)	(0.058)	(0.047)
Wife Dictator	0.077*	0.017	0.054
	(0.043)	(0.053)	(0.040)
Husband Bargaining X var	0.040	0.135*	-0.173**
	(0.094)	(0.079)	(0.082)
Wife Bargaining X var	-0.032	-0.003	-0.110
	(0.084)	(0.075)	(0.076)
Wife Dictator X var	-0.191***	-0.037	-0.115*
	(0.065)	(0.068)	(0.064)
Husband Bargaining (var)	0.036	0.098*	-0.089
	(0.045)	(0.053)	(0.066)
Wife Bargaining (var)	-0.085	-0.083	-0.138**
	(0.065)	(0.051)	(0.062)
Wife Dictator (var)	-0.115**	-0.020	-0.061
	(0.050)	(0.041)	(0.051)
HB vs. WB	0.517	0.451	0.032
WB vs WD	0.250	0.275	0.506
HB vs WD	0.003	0.078	0.060
HB (var) vs. WB (var)	0.070	0.004	0.516
WB (var) vs. WD (var)	0.005	0.035	0.675
HB (var) vs. WD (var)	0.616	0.156	0.220
Session FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Child background	Yes	Yes	Yes
Parent background	Yes	Yes	Yes
Parent difference	Yes	Yes	Yes
Couples	284	284	284
R^2	0.243	0.226	0.229

Robust standard errors in parentheses,* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: The table reports heterogeneity regressions of the share allocated to the child (with possible discrete values of $0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9, 1$) on the treatment variables "Husband Bargaining" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Husband Bargaining), "Wife Bargaining" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Wife Bargaining) in Column (2), and "Wife Dictator" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Wife Dictator). Column (1) reports a regression with the indicator variable "Husband most patient" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples where the husband allocates more to the future than the wife) "Husband Bargaining X H most patient", "Wife Bargaining X H most patient" and "Wife Dictator X H most patient" interaction terms between the treatment indicator variables and "H most patient", and a set of explanatory variables. Column (2) reports a regression with the indicator variable "Husband least risk averse" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples where the husband allocates more to the risky option than the wife) "Husband Bargaining X H least risk averse", "Wife Bargaining X H least risk averse" and "Wife Dictator X H least risk averse" interaction terms between the treatment indicator variables and "H least risk averse", and a set of explanatory variables. Column (2) reports a regression with the indicator variable "Male child" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples where the child randomly chosen to receive tutoring was male) "Husband Bargaining X Male Child", "Wife Bargaining X Male Child" and "Wife Dictator X Male Child" interaction terms between the treatment indicator variables and "Male Child", and a set of explanatory variables. "Treatment (H most patient)": sum of estimated parameters for the treatment indicator variable and "Treatment X H most patient". "Treatment (H least risk averse)": sum of estimated parameters for the treatment indicator variable and "Treatment X H least risk averse". "Treatment (Male Child)": sum of estimated parameters for the treatment indicator variable and "Treatment X Male Child". See Table 4 for definition of "Session FE", "Child background", "Parent background", and "Parent difference".

Table A.5: Heterogeneity in education level differences, number of children, wife's employment, and decision-making

	var						
	H more educated	$\geq$ 2 children	W unemployed	W involved in DM, W	W involved in DM, H	DM factor, W	DM factor, H
var	0.039	0.051	-0.027	0.122*	0.017	0.052	0.065
	(0.073)	(0.044)	(0.074)	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.047)	(0.059)
Husband Bargaining	0.018	0.034	-0.014	0.230***	-0.086	0.025	0.018
	(0.044)	(0.060)	(0.049)	(0.087)	(0.113)	(0.038)	(0.042)
Wife Bargaining	-0.090**	-0.083	-0.066	0.063	-0.051	-0.063	-0.086**
	(0.044)	(0.059)	(0.050)	(0.166)	(0.081)	(0.044)	(0.038)
Wife Dictator	0.019	0.033	-0.018	0.101	0.051	0.007	-0.002
	(0.035)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.070)	(0.082)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Husband Bargaining X var	0.012	-0.019	0.085	-0.231**	0.113	-0.055	-0.113
	(0.090)	(0.078)	(0.081)	(0.099)	(0.117)	(0.078)	(0.085)
Wife Bargaining X var	0.055	0.006	-0.050	-0.162	-0.033	-0.125	0.030
	(0.084)	(0.071)	(0.074)	(0.175)	(0.090)	(0.093)	(0.098)
Wife Dictator X var	-0.051	-0.051	0.049	-0.111	-0.057	-0.061	-0.084
	(0.084)	(0.063)	(0.068)	(0.079)	(0.093)	(0.055)	(0.073)
Session FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Child background	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Parent background	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Parent difference	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Couples	284	284	284	284	282	282	280
R^2	0.215	0.212	0.219	0.222	0.217	0.220	0.234

Note: The table reports heterogeneity regressions of the share allocated to the child (with possible discrete values of $0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9, 1$) on the treatment variables. Column (1) reports a regression with "H most educated" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples where the husband has obtained a higher level of education than the wife), interaction terms between the treatment indicator variables and "H most educated": "Husband Bargaining X H most educated", "Wife Bargaining X H most educated" and "Wife Dictator X H most educated", and a set of explanatory variables. Column (2) reports the regression for the indicator variable "Child total" (variable taking the value 1 for couples that currently care for two or more children), and Column (3) reports the a regression for the indicator variable "W unemployed" (variable taking the value 1 for couples where the wife is unemployed). Column (4) reports the regression for "W involved in DM, W" (variable taking the value 1 if wife reports that decisions about children's education are taken by her alone, or by her together with her husband) and Column (5) reports the regression for "W involved in DM, H" (variable taking the value 1 if husband reports that decisions about children's education are taken by the wife alone, or by the husband and wife together). Columns (6) and (7) report results for indexes constructed by performing factor analysis of questions about the main decision maker for children's education, wife's health, major household purchases and visiting wife's family and relatives (1 = husband alone, 2 = joint, 3 = wife alone), reported by the wife and the husband, respectively. See Table 4 for definition of "Session FE", "Child background", "Parent background", and "Parent difference".

Table A.6: Effect of increasing the wife's bargaining power on the allocation to the child, extended

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Husband Bargaining	0.012	0.016	0.021	0.026	0.022
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.039)
Wife Bargaining	-0.103***	-0.100***	-0.096***	-0.080**	-0.079**
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.040)	(0.039)
Wife Dictator	-0.019	-0.019	-0.015	0.003	0.004
	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Male child			0.020	0.037	0.036
			(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Chosen child's standard			0.001	0.006	0.005
			(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
More than 2 children			0.023	0.030	0.032
			(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)
School B			-0.002	-0.001	-0.003
			(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.043)
School C			0.034	0.039	0.039
			(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.031)
School D			0.000	-0.009	-0.011
			(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Age, H				0.003**	0.003**
				(0.002)	(0.002)
Age, W				-0.004*	-0.004*
				(0.002)	(0.002)
Self employed, H				-0.004	0.002
				(0.029)	(0.029)
Self employed, W				0.019	0.015
				(0.026)	(0.026)
Education, H				0.015	0.005
				(0.014)	(0.021)
Education, W				0.018	0.028
				(0.018)	(0.021)

Share invested in future H				0.121*	0.085
				(0.066)	(0.079)
Share invested in future W				0.047	0.109
				(0.048)	(0.072)
Share invested in risky option H				0.013	0.084
				(0.058)	(0.067)
Share invested in risky option W				0.048	-0.027
				(0.048)	(0.068)
Husband more educated					0.032
					(0.043)
Husband more patient					0.050
					(0.045)
H less risk averse					-0.067
					(0.042)
Constant	0.363***	0.387***	0.329***	0.017	0.014
	(0.026)	(0.083)	(0.097)	(0.127)	(0.127)
Session FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Couples	287	287	285	284	284
R^2	0.031	0.115	0.124	0.199	0.210

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: The table reports regressions of the share allocated to the child (with possible discrete values of $0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9, 1$) on the treatment variables "Husband Bargaining" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Husband Bargaining), "Wife Bargaining" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Wife Bargaining), "Wife Dictator" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Wife Dictator), and a set of explanatory variables. "Session FE": indicator variables for each of the 11 different sessions of the experiments. See table notes of Table 4 for definition of variables.

Table A.7: Effect of increasing the wife's bargaining power on the allocation to the wife and the husband, extended

	Allocation to wife	Allocation to husband
Husband Bargaining	-0.017	-0.007
	(0.031)	(0.035)
Wife Bargaining	0.066**	0.003
	(0.031)	(0.035)
Wife Dictator	0.092***	-0.104***
	(0.028)	(0.031)
Male child	0.003	-0.037
	(0.025)	(0.023)
Chosen child's standard	-0.004	-0.001
	(0.006)	(0.006)
More than 2 children	-0.021	-0.006
	(0.026)	(0.025)
School B	0.010	-0.001
	(0.047)	(0.041)
School C	-0.038	-0.002
	(0.024)	(0.025)
School D	-0.023	0.017
	(0.047)	(0.038)
Age, H	-0.000	-0.003**
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age, W	0.003	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Self employed, H	-0.020	0.016
	(0.024)	(0.024)
Self employed, W	-0.009	-0.006
	(0.023)	(0.022)
Education, H	0.001	-0.016
	(0.018)	(0.016)
Education, W	-0.007	-0.013
	(0.020)	(0.018)

Share invested in future H	-0.024	-0.078
	(0.064)	(0.062)
Share invested in future W	-0.018	-0.071
	(0.057)	(0.062)
Share invested in risky option H	-0.006	-0.074
	(0.063)	(0.061)
Share invested in risky option W	0.006	0.022
	(0.064)	(0.060)
Husband more educated	0.005	-0.027
	(0.038)	(0.034)
Husband more patient	0.038	-0.074*
	(0.037)	(0.039)
H less risk averse	0.034	0.037
	(0.040)	(0.039)
Constant	0.276**	0.724***
	(0.109)	(0.119)
Session FE	Yes	Yes
Couples	284	284
R^2	0.225	0.187

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: The table reports a regression of the share allocated to the wife (with possible discrete values of $0, 0.033, 0.67, 0.1, ..., 0.933, 0.967, 1$) in Column (1), and a regression of the share allocated to the husband (with possible discrete values of $0, 0.033, 0.67, 0.1, ..., 0.933, 0.967, 1$) in Column (2), on the treatment variables "Husband Bargaining" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Husband Bargaining), "Wife Bargaining" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Wife Bargaining), and "Wife Dictator" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Wife Dictator), and a set of explanatory variables. See Table 4 for definition of "Session FE", "Child background", "Parent background", and "Parent difference" as well as background variables.

Table A.8: Heterogeneity in time- and risk-preference difference, extended

	H most patient	H less risk averse	Male child	All
Husband Bargaining	-0.004	-0.037	0.084*	0.033
	(0.079)	(0.058)	(0.047)	(0.094)
Wife Bargaining	-0.054	-0.081	-0.028	0.001
	(0.050)	(0.058)	(0.047)	(0.066)
Wife Dictator	0.077*	0.017	0.054	0.122**
	(0.043)	(0.053)	(0.040)	(0.058)
Husband Bargaining X H most patient	0.040			-0.004
	(0.094)			(0.098)
Wife Bargaining X H most patient	-0.032			-0.023
	(0.084)			(0.083)
Wife Dictator X H most patient	-0.191***			-0.182***
	(0.065)			(0.065)
Male child	0.032	0.033	0.119**	0.114**
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Chosen child's standard	0.005	0.004	0.005	0.005
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
More than 2 children	0.028	0.028	0.032	0.025
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
School B	-0.011	-0.001	-0.007	-0.014
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.043)
School C	0.034	0.035	0.037	0.029
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)
School D	0.007	-0.010	-0.017	-0.003
	(0.063)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Age, H	0.003**	0.004**	0.003**	0.003**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age, W	-0.004*	-0.004*	-0.004*	-0.004*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Self employed, H	0.000	0.004	0.005	0.003
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Self employed, W	0.025	0.018	0.012	0.021

	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Education, H	0.006	0.007	0.009	0.012
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Education, W	0.024	0.029	0.024	0.022
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Share invested in future H	0.056	0.094	0.099	0.085
	(0.085)	(0.082)	(0.080)	(0.088)
Share invested in future W	0.081	0.104	0.106	0.081
	(0.076)	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.076)
Share invested in risky option H	0.106	0.070	0.085	0.091
	(0.071)	(0.068)	(0.066)	(0.071)
Share invested in risky option W	-0.047	-0.038	-0.035	-0.064
	(0.066)	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.069)
Husband more educated	0.029	0.028	0.027	0.022
	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Husband more patient	0.101*	0.042	0.041	0.090
	(0.056)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.057)
H less risk averse	-0.074*	-0.077	-0.071*	-0.094
	(0.041)	(0.059)	(0.043)	(0.058)
Husband Bargaining X H less risk averse		0.135*		0.126
		(0.079)		(0.080)
Wife Bargaining X H less risk averse		-0.003		-0.009
		(0.075)		(0.075)
Wife Dictator X H less risk averse		-0.037		-0.003
		(0.068)		(0.067)
Husband Bargaining X Male child			-0.173**	-0.173**
			(0.082)	(0.079)
Wife Bargaining X Male child			-0.110	-0.117
			(0.076)	(0.076)
Wife Dictator X Male child			-0.115*	-0.114*
			(0.064)	(0.063)
Constant	0.059	0.020	-0.008	0.031
	(0.130)	(0.131)	(0.122)	(0.127)
Session FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Couples	284	284	284	284
R^2	0.243	0.226	0.229	0.270

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: The table reports heterogeneity regressions of the share allocated to the child (with possible discrete values of $0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9, 1$) on the treatment variables. Column (1) reports a regression with "Husband most patient" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples where the husband allocates more to the future than the wife), interaction terms between the treatment indicator variables and "H most patient": "Husband Bargaining X H most patient", "Wife Bargaining X H most patient" and "Wife Dictator X H most patient", and a set of explanatory variables. Column (2) and Column (3) report similar regressions for the indicator variables "Husband least risk averse" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples where the husband allocates more to the risky option than the wife) and"Male child" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples where the child randomly chosen to receive tutoring was male), respectively. Column (4) reports results from a regression where all interaction terms are included. "Treatment (H most patient)": sum of estimated parameters for the treatment indicator variable and "Treatment X H most patient". "Treatment (H least risk averse)": sum of estimated parameters for the treatment indicator variable and "Treatment X H least risk averse". "Treatment (Male Child)": sum of estimated parameters for the treatment indicator variable and "Treatment X Male Child". See Table 4 for definition of "Session FE", "Child background", "Parent background", and "Parent difference". .

Appendix B Robustness checks

To ensure that our results are robust to different specifications and variable definitions we run a set of robustness checks.

In the bargaining treatments we could either analyse the allocation in the first proposal or in the final proposal (i.e., the proposal that was implemented). Only 8 of 97 receivers rejected the first proposal. We focus on the first proposal in the main analysis for two reasons. First, it may be problematic to use the final proposal because each time a proposal is rejected, the household endowment is reduced, and we do not know if the share allocated to the child is constant with income. Second, the receiver's decision to accept the proposal or not may be influenced by the presence of other participants in the room waiting for everyone to finish. However, we run Equation (1) with the final proposal

in the two bargaining treatments for allocation to child, husband and wife, respectively, as a first robustness check.

Because allocation to the child is not independent of allocation to self and allocation to spouse, we estimate seemingly unrelated regressions for the allocation decisions, allowing error terms to be correlated, as a second robustness check. Our main outcome variable is discrete and interval censored, and as a third robustness check, we estimate an interval censored Tobit model. We also estimate regressions where we control for whether the decision-maker won or lost in the risk preference task, amount earned in the risk preference task and total amount earned before the main task.

As robustness checks for the heterogeneity analysis, we use two alternative definitions of time and risk preferences differences between husband and wife. In the "strictly different" definition, we exclude all couples where the spouses have the same time or risk preferences and compare effects between couples where the husband is more patient/less risk averse and couples where the wife is more patient/less risk averse. In the "large difference" definition, the difference in share invested in the future/risky option between the husband an wife must be at least TSZ1,000 in order for the couple to be defined as having different preferences. We also conduct the heterogeneity analysis using the final proposal as the outcome in the two bargaining treatments.

Table B.1: Effect of increasing the wife's bargaining power on the allocation to the child, final share

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Husband Bargaining	-0.001	0.003	0.008	0.013	0.009
	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Wife Bargaining	-0.089**	-0.086**	-0.082**	-0.067*	-0.066*
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Wife Dictator	-0.019	-0.019	-0.016	-0.002	0.001
	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Male child			0.021	0.040	0.038
			(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Chosen child's standard			0.004	0.008	0.006
			(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Age, H				0.003*	0.003*
				(0.002)	(0.002)
Age, W				-0.003	-0.003
				(0.002)	(0.002)
Husband more patient					0.063
					(0.044)
H less risk averse					-0.065
					(0.041)
Session FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Child background	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Parent background	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Parent difference	No	No	No	No	Yes
HB vs. WB	0.012	0.014	0.017	0.072	0.084
WB vs WD	0.030	0.035	0.043	0.061	0.059
HB vs WD	0.583	0.512	0.475	0.670	0.820
Couples	287	287	285	284	284
R^2	0.022	0.105	0.116	0.190	0.204

Note: The table reports regressions of the **final** share allocated to the child (share allocated to child divided by the final household endowment (TSZ15000 − TSZ500 for every time a proposal is rejected), with possible discrete values of $0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9, 1$) on the treatment variables "Husband Bargaining" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Husband Bargaining), "Wife Bargaining" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Wife Bargaining), "Wife Dictator" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Wife Dictator), and a set of explanatory variables. See Table 4 for definition of "Session FE", "Child background", "Parent background" and "Parent difference".

Table B.2: Effect of increasing the wife's bargaining power on the allocation to child and the allocation to wife, seemingly unrelated regressions

	Allocation to child	Allocation to wife
Husband Bargaining	0.022	-0.017
	(0.036)	(0.031)
Wife Bargaining	-0.079**	0.066**
	(0.039)	(0.033)
Wife Dictator	0.004	0.092***
	(0.031)	(0.027)
Male child	0.036	0.003
	(0.025)	(0.022)
Chosen child's standard	0.005	-0.004
	(0.006)	(0.005)
Age, H	0.003**	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.001)
Age, W	-0.004*	0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Husband more patient	0.050	0.038
	(0.044)	(0.038)
H less risk averse	-0.067	0.034
	(0.042)	(0.036)
Session FE	Yes	Yes
Child background	Yes	Yes
Parent background	Yes	Yes
Parent difference	Yes	Yes
HB vs. WB	0.024	0.032
WB vs WD	0.641	0.001
HB vs WD	0.021	0.398
Couples	284	284
R^2	0.210	0.225
Chi^2	75.414	82.598

Note: The table reports seemingly unrelated regressions of the share allocated to the child (with possible discrete values of $0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9, 1$) and of the share allocated to the wife (with possible discrete values of $0, 0.033, 0.67, 0.1, ..., 0.933, 0.967, 1$) on the treatment variables "Husband Bargaining" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Husband Bargaining), "Wife Bargaining" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Wife Bargaining), "Wife Dictator" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Wife Dictator), and a set of explanatory variables. See Table 4 for definition of "Session FE", "Child background", "Parent background" and "Parent difference".

Table B.3: Effect of increasing the wife's bargaining power on the allocation to the child, interval censored Tobit

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Husband Bargaining	0.010	0.014	0.018	0.023	0.019
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Wife Bargaining	-0.105***	-0.102***	-0.098***	-0.084**	-0.082**
	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Wife Dictator	-0.021	-0.020	-0.017	-0.001	0.001
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Male child			0.018	0.035	0.034
			(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Chosen child's standard			0.001	0.005	0.004
			(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Age, H				0.003**	0.003**
				(0.002)	(0.002)
Age, W				-0.004*	-0.004**
				(0.002)	(0.002)
Husband more patient					0.047
					(0.042)
H less risk averse					-0.067*
					(0.039)
Session FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Child background	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Parent background	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Parent difference	No	No	No	No	Yes
HB vs. WB	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.013	0.016
WB vs WD	0.009	0.008	0.008	0.011	0.012
HB vs WD	0.381	0.322	0.313	0.497	0.593
Couples	287	287	285	284	284

Note: The table reports interval censored Tobit regressions of the share allocated to the child (lower limits for the share allocated to the child are 0, 0.05, 0.15, ..., 0.95, and upper limits are 0.049, 0.149, 0.249, ..., 1) on the treatment variables "Husband Bargaining" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Husband Bargaining), "Wife Bargaining" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Wife Bargaining), "Wife Dictator" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Wife Dictator), and a set of explanatory variables. See Table 4 for definition of "Session FE", "Child background", "Parent background", and "Parent difference".

Table B.4: Effect of increasing the wife's bargaining power on the allocation to child, controlling for outcome in the preference tasks

	Dummy for win	Amount earned in risk	Amount earned in risk & time
Husband Bargaining	0.023	0.022	0.021
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Wife Bargaining	-0.078**	-0.079**	-0.079**
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Wife Dictator	0.005	0.004	0.004
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Male child	0.037	0.036	0.036
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Chosen child's standard	0.005	0.005	0.004
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Age, H	0.003**	0.003**	0.003**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age, W	-0.004*	-0.004*	-0.004*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Husband more patient	0.049	0.049	0.049
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
H less risk averse	-0.065	-0.066	-0.068
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Win dummy	-0.013		
	(0.025)		
Amount earned in risk		-0.000	
		(0.000)	
Amount earned in risk & time			0.000
			(0.000)
Session FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Child background	Yes	Yes	Yes
Parent background	Yes	Yes	Yes
Parent difference	Yes	Yes	Yes
HB vs. WB	0.029	0.029	0.029
WB vs WD	0.020	0.022	0.022
HB vs WD	0.644	0.636	0.639
Couples	284	284	284

Note: The table reports regressions of the share allocated to the child, with possible discrete values of $0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9, 1$) on the treatment variables "Husband Bargaining" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Husband Bargaining), "Wife Bargaining" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Wife Bargaining), "Wife Dictator" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Wife Dictator), and a set of explanatory variables. "Win dummy" is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the main decision maker (Husband in Husband Dictator and Husband Bargaining, and wife in Wife Bargaining and Wife Dictator) drew the green card and tripled his or her investment in the risk preference task and zero otherwise. "Amount earned in risk" is the amount earned by the main decision maker in the risk preference task (i.e., 3000 × share invested in safe option + 9000 × share invested in risky option). "Amount earned in risk & time" is the amount earned by the main decision-maker in the time and risk preference tasks ("Amount earned in risk" + 3000 × share invested in today + 6000 × share invested in the future). See Table 4 for definition of "Session FE", "Child background", the rest of "Parent background" and "Parent difference".

Table B.5: Effect of increasing the wife's bargaining power on the allocation to the wife and the husband, with final share

	Allocation to wife	Allocation to husband
Husband Bargaining	-0.010	-0.003
	(0.030)	(0.034)
Wife Bargaining	0.043	0.009
	(0.029)	(0.033)
Wife Dictator	0.093***	-0.102***
	(0.028)	(0.030)
Male child	0.001	-0.037
	(0.024)	(0.023)
Chosen child's standard	-0.005	-0.001
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Age, H	-0.000	-0.003**
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age, W	0.003	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Husband more patient	0.030	-0.078**
	(0.036)	(0.038)
H less risk averse	0.038	0.030
	(0.039)	(0.038)
Session FE	Yes	Yes
Child background	Yes	Yes
Parent background	Yes	Yes
Parent difference	Yes	Yes
HB vs. WB	0.091	0.715
WB vs WD	0.091	0.000
HB vs WD	0.000	0.002
Couples	284	284
R^2	0.216	0.200

Note: The table reports regressions of the **final** share allocated to the wife and the husband (share allocated to the wife or the husband divided by the final household endowment (TSZ15000 − TSZ500 for every time a proposal is rejected), with possible discrete values of $0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9, 1$) in Column (1) and a regression of the **final** share allocated to the husband (with possible discrete values of $0, 0.033, 0.67, 0.1, ..., 0.933, 0.967, 1$) in Column (2) on the treatment variables "Husband Bargaining" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Husband Bargaining), "Wife Bargaining" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Wife Bargaining), "Wife Dictator" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Wife Dictator), and a set of explanatory variables. See Table 4 for definition of "Session FE", "Child background", "Parent background", and "Parent difference".

Table B.6: Heterogeneity in time- and risk-preference difference, alternative definitions

	Strictly diff.		Large diff.	
	H most patient	H least risk averse	H most patient	H least risk averse
var	0.125	-0.151	0.066	0.046
	(0.079)	(0.098)	(0.057)	(0.062)
Husband Bargaining	-0.075	-0.064	0.031	-0.019
	(0.076)	(0.090)	(0.062)	(0.051)
Wife Bargaining	-0.041	-0.058	-0.042	-0.066
	(0.063)	(0.089)	(0.045)	(0.050)
Wife Dictator	0.117*	0.069	0.052	0.042
	(0.063)	(0.088)	(0.037)	(0.044)
Husband Bargaining X var	0.119	0.156	-0.016	0.136*
	(0.090)	(0.102)	(0.081)	(0.079)
Wife Bargaining X var	-0.046	-0.004	-0.093	-0.048
	(0.096)	(0.107)	(0.090)	(0.076)
Wife Dictator X var	-0.250***	-0.072	-0.183***	-0.117*
	(0.083)	(0.103)	(0.069)	(0.066)
Session FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Child background	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Parent background	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Parent difference	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Couples	238	226	284	284
R^2	0.311	0.281	0.227	0.234

Note: The table reports heterogeneity regressions of the share allocated to the child (with possible discrete values of $0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9, 1$) on the treatment variables. **Columns (1) - (2)** report results for a sample of couples where the husband and wife have *strictly different* time and risk preferences (i.e. all couples where the husband and wife are equally patient and all couples where the husband and wife are equally risk averse are dropped). Column (1) reports a regression with "Husband most patient" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples where the husband allocates more to the future than the wife), interaction terms between the treatment indicator variables and "H most patient": "Husband Bargaining X H most patient", "Wife Bargaining X H most patient" and "Wife Dictator X H most patient", and a set of explanatory variables. Column (2) reports similar regressions for the indicator variables "Husband least risk averse" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples where the husband allocates more to the risky option than the wife). **Column (3)** reports regression where the "Husband most patient" is an indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples where the share the husband allocates the future is *at least 0.333 higher than the share the wife allocates to the future*, and the regression includes this variable, and interactions with treatment variables: "Husband Bargaining X H most patient", "Wife Bargaining X H most patient" and "Wife Dictator X H most patient", and a set of explanatory variables. **Column (4)** reports similar regressions where the "Husband least risk averse" is an indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples where the share the husband allocates to the risky option is *at least 0.333 higher that the share the wife allocates to the future*, and the regression includes this variable, the interaction terms between this variable and the treatment variables: "Husband Bargaining X H least risk averse", "Wife Bargaining X H least risk averse" and "Wife Dictator X H least risk averse" and a set of explanatory variables. See Table 4 for definition of "Session FE", "Child background", "Parent background", and "Parent difference".

Table B.7: Heterogeneity in time- and risk-preference difference, with final share

	var		
	H most patient	H least risk averse	Male child
var	0.105*	-0.081	0.117**
	(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.046)
Husband Bargaining	-0.058	-0.063	0.064
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.043)
Wife Bargaining	-0.037	-0.070	-0.012
	(0.050)	(0.058)	(0.046)
Wife Dictator	0.072*	0.011	0.048
	(0.042)	(0.052)	(0.039)
Husband Bargaining X var	0.099	0.163**	-0.149*
	(0.068)	(0.074)	(0.079)
Wife Bargaining X var	-0.053	-0.001	-0.118
	(0.085)	(0.074)	(0.076)
Wife Dictator X var	-0.198***	-0.033	-0.110*
	(0.065)	(0.067)	(0.064)
Session FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Child background	Yes	Yes	Yes
Parent background	Yes	Yes	Yes
Parent difference	Yes	Yes	Yes
Couples	284	284	284
R^2	0.250	0.226	0.221

Note: The table report regressions of the **final** share allocated to the child (share allocated to child divided by the final household endowment (TSZ15000 − TSZ500 for every time a proposal is rejected), with possible discrete values of $0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9, 1$) on the treatment variables. Column (1) reports a regression with "Husband most patient" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples where the husband allocates more to the future than the wife), interaction terms between the treatment indicator variables and "H most patient": "Husband Bargaining X H most patient", "Wife Bargaining X H most patient" and "Wife Dictator X H most patient", and a set of explanatory variables. Column (2) and Column (3) report similar regressions for the indicator variables "Husband least risk averse" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples where the husband allocates more to the risky option than the wife) and"Male child" (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples where the child randomly chosen to receive tutoring was male), respectively. "Treatment (H most patient)": sum of estimated parameters for the treatment indicator variable and "Treatment X H most patient". "Treatment (H least risk averse)": sum of estimated parameters for the treatment indicator variable and "Treatment X H least risk averse". "Treatment (Male Child)": sum of estimated parameters for the treatment indicator variable and "Treatment X Male Child". See Table 4 for definition of "Session FE", "Child background", "Parent background", and "Parent difference".

Appendix C Descriptive results

Figure C.1 illustrates the distribution of the share allocated to the child, the wife, and the husband, by treatment. The majority of couples allocate shares between 0.20 and 0.40 of the endowment to their child's education (mean share allocated is 0.34 across all treatments), but there is significant heterogeneity in the distributive behavior. Interestingly, the mode is higher in the dictator treatments (0.40) than in the bargaining treatments (0.20). There is also substantial heterogeneity in the distributions of shares allocated to the wife and the husband. The mode of the allocation to both the wife and the husband is between 0.3 and 0.4 in all treatments.

Figure C.2 reports the average share allocated to the child, the wife, and the husband in each of the four treatments. The upper panel illustrates our first main finding; an increase in the wife's bargaining power does not lead to higher allocations to the child's education. Specifically, a small or large increase in the wife's bargaining power does not result in significant changes in the allocation to the child. An intermediate increase in the wife's bargaining power, however, leads to a significant reduction in the allocation to the child from 36% to 26%. To obtain a more complete picture of the couples' decisions, we investigate the allocation to the wife and the husband in the middle and lower panels of Figure C.2. The panels illustrate several interesting patterns. First, the middle panel shows that an intermediate or large increase in the wife's bargaining power gives her a higher allocation. Second, the lower panel shows that a large increase in the wife's bargaining power reduces the husband's allocation. Third, there is no significant difference between the allocation to the wife and the allocation to the husband in Husband Dictator, but women in Wife Dictator allocate significantly more to themselves than to their husbands. Fourth, comparing the middle and lower panels we find that in Wife Bargaining and Wife Dictator, the wife proposes/allocates equally much to herself. However, looking at the upper and lower panels, we find that when the husband has the opportunity to reject the wife's proposal in Wife Bargaining, she proposes a higher allocation to him and a smaller allocation to the child than when she has full bargaining power in Wife Dictator. The overall picture from Figure C.2 is that a small increase in the wife's bar-

Figure C.1: Share allocated to the child, the wife, and the husband, by treatment



Note: The figure displays the distribution of the share allocated to the child, the wife, and the husband, respectively, by treatment. The left panels show the share allocated to the child in the dictator treatments (Husband Dictator and Wife Dictator) and the share proposed to the child in the first proposal in the bargaining treatments (Husband Bargaining and Wife Bargaining). The middle panels show the share allocated to the wife by herself in Wife Dictator and by the husband in Husband Dictator, and the share proposed to herself in Wife Bargaining and the share proposed to be allocated to her by the husband in Husband Bargaining. The right panels show the share allocated to the husband by himself in Husband Dictator and by the wife in Wife Dictator, and the share proposed to himself in Husband Bargaining and the share proposed to be allocated to him by the wife in Wife Bargaining.

Figure C.2: Share allocated to the child, the wife, and the husband, by treatment



Note: The figure reports mean share allocated to the child (upper panel), the wife (middle panel), and the husband (lower panel) and standard error for Husband Dictator, Husband Bargaining, Wife Bargaining, and Wife Dictator.

gaining power does not affect allocations to child, wife, or husband and the endowment is split approximately equally between the three. An intermediate increase in the wife's bargaining power increases the allocation to the wife and reduces the share allocated to the child. A large increase in the wife's bargaining power increases the share allocated to the wife and reduces the share allocated to the husband.

Appendix D Experimental materials

D.1 Invitation letter

Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF)

P. O. Box 31226

Dar es salaam

25th May 2015

To parents of ……

REF: INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH ON HOUSEHOLD DECISION-MAKING

I have a pleasure to invite you both (father and mother) to participate in a research project about decision-making. Participation in the research project will take about three hours. Each of you will receive a show up fee and some refreshments. Depending on the decisions you make during the study, you may receive an additional amount. The research project will take place between July 8 and August 5. Precise date and venue will be communicated to you later.

Taking part in the study is entirely your decision. You do not have to participate in this study if you do not want to. If you decide to participate in the study, you can still withdraw at any time. All information you give will be completely confidential. We will not be able to trace your answers and decisions back to you.

We would highly appreciate your participation, it is very important to our research.

Coordinator

[Name of coordinator]

If you would like to participate, please fill in your mobile phone numbers in the form provided below and return to us through your child in the next day so that we can call you back. For more details you can reach us through the following numbers:

[Numbers removed for privacy reasons]

D.2 Instructions

This section provides the instructions for elicitation of time and risk preferences as well as for the distributive decision for dictators and first proposers.

D.2.1 Time preferences

We will now hand out tokens that symbolize Tsh 3,000. Please use these to indicate your allocation. At the end of the study, you will be paid in mobile money.

You have received Tsh 3,000 and you are now asked to choose the amount you want to invest. The rest of the amount will be added to your payment that you receive today and will be paid in mobile money.

The amount you invest will be doubled and you will receive it in 3 weeks. For example, if you choose to invest nothing, you will receive Tsh 3,000 in mobile money today. If you choose to invest all of the Tsh 3,000, you will receive nothing today and Tsh 6,000 in mobile money in three weeks. If you choose to invest Tsh 1,000, you will receive Tsh 2,000 in mobile money today and Tsh 2,000 in mobile money in three weeks.

After three weeks, those of you who decide to invest some of the money will then get the mobile money. Those of you who do not invest, will not get anything after three weeks.

Please raise your hand if you have any questions

We will now come to each of you individually to verify that you have understood the task you have been given.

We now ask you to choose the amount of tokens you want to invest. The tokens you put in the cup with the picture of a calendar are the tokens you choose to invest. The invested amount will be doubled and received in mobile money in 3 weeks. The tokens you choose

not to invest will be paid out to you in mobile money today after the session is completed.

Has anyone not made their choice?

My assistants will now come around to record your answers. We then move on to the next part of the session.

D.2.2 Risk preferences

We will now hand out tokens that symbolize Tsh 3,000. Please use these to indicate your allocation. At the end of the study, you will be paid in real money, not mobile money. Your decision will be anonymous.

You have received Tsh 3,000 and you are now asked to choose the amount that you wish to invest in a risky option. The amount you choose not to invest, will be added to your payment.

In the lottery, there is an equal chance that the investment will fail or succeed. If the investment fails, you lose the amount you invested. If the investment succeeds, you receive 3 times the amount invested.

After you have chosen how much you wish to invest, you will draw a card from a bucket to determine whether you win or lose. If the card is green, you win 3 times the amount you chose to invest. If the card is red, you lose the amount you chose to invest. It is equally likely that the card is green or red.

For example, if you choose to invest nothing, you will get the Tsh 3,000 for sure. That is, the draw of card will not affect your payment. If you choose to invest all of the Tsh 3,000, then if you draw a green card, you receive Tsh 9,000 in payment, and if you draw a red card you receive nothing in payment. If you chose to invest Tsh 1,500, then if you

*draw a green card, you receive 6,000 (1,500 + 3*1,500) in payment, and if you draw a red card, you receive 1,500 in payment.*

Please raise your hand if you have any questions.

We will now come to each of you individually to verify that you have understood the task you have been given.

We now ask you to choose the amount of tokens you want to invest. The tokens you put in the cup with the picture of a question mark are the tokens you choose to invest and which will triple if you draw a green card, and be reduced to zero if you draw a red card. The tokens you choose not to invest will be paid out to you for sure after the study is completed. The payment will be made in cash, not mobile money.

Has anyone not made their choice?

My assistants will now come around to record your answers and to draw the card. We then move on to the next part of the study.

D.2.3 Distributive choice

Dictator treatments (Husband Dictator and Wife Dictator)

In this part of the study, you will be paired with your spouse. This means that the decisions you make will affect both your own and your spouse's payment.

Your household has received Tsh 15,000 and you have been chosen to decide how the money should be allocated between yourself, your child and your spouse.

We will now hand out tokens that symbolize Tsh 15,000. You will use these to show how you want to split the money between yourself, your child and your spouse. At the end of

the study, you will be paid in real money according to the decision you made.

Your spouse will be informed about the task you have been given and the decision you make. However, he or she will not make any decision in this part of the session.

For each Tsh 1,500 you give to your child, this child will receive 1 week of tutoring. The tutoring is conducted Monday through Friday from 15:00 to 17:00. It includes tuition, a speed test each day and a weekend test. Your child will be taught in groups of 25-40 children. The tutor teaches mathematics, English and Sayansi.

The RAs will now come and tell each of you which of your children has been randomly chosen to receive the tutoring.

Please raise your hand if you have any questions.

We will now come to each of you individually to verify that you have understood the task.

We now ask you to distribute the tokens between the three cups on your desk. Remember that the choice you make here will be implemented. The tokens you put in the cup with the picture of a woman will be paid out to your wife if you are a man and to yourself if you are a woman. The tokens you put in the cup with the picture of a child will be paid out as tutoring for your child. The tokens you put in the cup with the picture of a man will be paid out to yourself if you are a man and to your husband if you are a woman, after the completion of the session.

Has anyone not made their choice?

My assistants will now come and record your answers. They will take your decision to

your spouse, so that she can see what you decided to do.

We now move on to the next part of the session.

D.2.4 Bargaining treatments (Husband Bargaining and Wife Bargaining)

In this part of the study, you will be paired with your spouse. This means that the decisions you make will affect both your own and your spouse's payment.

Your household has received Tsh 15,000 and you have been chosen to propose how the money should be allocated between yourself, your child and your spouse.

We will now hand out tokens that symbolize Tsh 15,000. You will use these to show your proposal for how to split the money between yourself, your child and your spouse. At the end of the study, you will be paid in real money.

When you have made your choice, we will reveal it to your spouse. He or she can either agree or disagree with your proposal. If he or she agrees, then your choice is implemented. If your spouse disagrees, he or she will get the opportunity to make a new proposal for the allocation of money and you can agree or disagree with the new proposal. You can do this as many times you like in order to get to an agreement for an allocation, but for each time you disagree the amount is reduced by Tsh 500. For example, if your spouse disagrees with your first proposal he or she will propose an allocation of Tsh 14,500. If you then disagree with him or her, you will propose a new allocation of Tsh 14,000.

For each Tsh 1,500 you give to your child, this child will receive 1 week of tutoring. The tutoring is conducted Monday through Friday from 15:00 to 17:00. It includes tuition, a speed test each day and a weekend test. Your child will be taught in groups of 25-40

children. The tutor teaches mathematics, English and Sayansi.

The RAs will now come and tell each of you which of your children has been randomly chosen to receive the tutoring.

Please raise your hand if you have any questions.

We will now come to each of you individually to verify that you have understood the task you and your spouse have been given.

We now ask you to propose a distribution of the tokens between the three cups on your desk. The tokens you put in the cup with the picture of a woman is what you propose to give to yourself if you are a woman and to your wife if you are a man. The tokens you put in the cup with a picture of a child is what you propose to give to your child and which will be paid out as tutoring if proposal is accepted. The tokens you put in the cup with the picture of a man is what you propose to give to yourself if you are a man and to your husband if you are a woman.

Has anyone not made their choice?

My assistants will now come and record your answers. They will take your proposals to your spouses so that he or she can see what you propose to do and decide whether he or she agrees or disagrees with you. Please wait patiently while we wait for the response of your spouses.