Attitudes towards democracy and political rights among Chinese and their diaspora

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I - Overview

2019 was a riveting year for those hoping that economic modernization and opening would ultimately lead to political opening as well in China. Slightly more than a year into the now renewable second five years of Xi Jinping's leadership, June 4, 2019 marked the thirtieth anniversary of the PLA's crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square. The tabling of a bill to facilitate the extradition of individuals to China from Hong Kong led to the largest and most sustained set of demonstrations in the territory since its formal return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. With the CCP's successful weathering of these demonstrations and of three decades since the 1989 Tiananmen Crisis, hopes of a democratic transition in China appear to have dimmed. Yet attribution of China's lack of movement towards democracy to a cultural bias rooted in millennia of top-down rule is called into question by the emergence of democracy in Taiwan and by dramatic displays of resistance to Beijing's authority displayed by hundreds of thousands of Hong Kong residents in the demonstrations during 2019.

How can one explain the coexistence of these undeniable displays of support for democratic transition with what appears to be a hermetic authoritarian political system? What factors could lead to the intensification of the former at the expense of the latter? A research goal that is key in answering these questions is understanding the historical and experiential factors that affect Chinese nationals' seemingly entrenched preference for authoritarian vis-à-vis democratic decision-making systems. These research goals remain elusive due to increased political risk and control of the internet within the PRC, which has made the study of opinions about democracy and political rights difficult. Moreover, scholars lack an experimental tool to indirectly study individuals' preferences for authoritarian decision-making, which forces them to rely on surveys that explicitly examine issues that are politically sensitive in China.

This project intends to understand the role of historical experiences and narratives in shaping support for democratic decision-making by Chinese nationals. In doing so, it will mend the existing gap in the experimental economics literature with regards to a lack of a tool to elicit preferences for democracy in an incentivized, non-explicit, fashion. To address these issues, we will recruit people from China living in the United States and Canada to participate in a session that combines a novel incentivized experiment, a comprehensive survey, and a randomization exercise. Recruitment will take place through an online targeted advertisement, importantly using Facebook. All participants will be given a payment of $18 in exchange for completing the survey, plus the possibility of augmenting the monetary prize through the incentivized experiment. In addition to the novel incentivized task, explained in detail below, participants will report their views on democracy, freedom of expression, inequality, trust, as well as on China's current state and prospects as a democracy. We will include

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1100 participants from ages 18-75, all education levels and socioeconomic backgrounds, balanced by gender, and with a diverse range of duration of time spent outside of China[§].

II – Details of the Protocol, Decision-Task, and Interventions

At the beginning of the session, participants will be randomly exposed to one of the following treatment branches:

Treatment A (33.33% of participants will read this): Zhang Wei is a farmer in a rural area in Gushi County, Henan. In 2006, the government of Zhang Wei's township and county decided to build a new city consisting of several rows of tall modern apartment buildings including a shopping center on some of the lower floors. Due to the local government's decision, Zhang Wei and other farmers in his neighborhood were forced to move from their homes and lost the land which their ancestors had farmed for many generations. Zhang Wei was given a one-time payment of 75,000 yuan to compensate for the lost house and land. The new city was built with luxury-standard apartments that people like Zhang Wei could not afford. Since the city's completion, it has had a very low rate of occupancy, and is infamously referred to as a "ghost town." Zhang Wei told our reporter that he and a former neighbor whom he is still in contact with continue to have bitter feelings towards the officials who forced them off their land without good reason.

Treatment B (33.33% of participants will read this): Zhu Lianfeng was born in 1980 in an ordinary working family in Jingjiang, a city in Taizhou, Jiangsu, China. He originally worked as a project manager for a local power company, and his salary could only meet the basic living needs of his family. In April 2008, Zhu took 600 Yuan of his savings and a computer which he owned, and launched an effort to sell seasonings on Taobao, China's largest e-commerce platform. Today, Zhu owns several factories employing hundreds of workers, and is one of China's roughly 55,000 billionaires (people having a net worth of at least $150 million in USD terms). Stories such as Zhu's would be impossible had China not invested heavily in infrastructure to bring the country up to a world class standard of internet connectivity. Currently, he is cooperating with the local government to try to build a "Taobao Village in Taizhou".

Treatment C (16.66% of participants will read this): Huang Hua and Chen Hui are a happily married couple who live in Foshan, Guangdong with their young daughter. Huang Hua is a native Sichuanese who grew up eating spicy foods, while Chen Hui comes from a southern coastal city, and is used to sweet and light cuisine. Her palate will not adjust to very hot food, which leaves a burning sensation in her mouth. In order to reconcile their different tastes, the husband and wife have tried various things. For example, half of each dinner is spicy and half is not spicy, or during a week, the dishes are not spicy on four days and are spicy on three days. Although no perfect compromise has been reached so far, the couple are happy together and say that they would never let something as insignificant as chili come between them.

Treatment D (16.66% of participants will be assigned to this branch): No paragraph

Participants will be asked a reading comprehension question corresponding to the paragraph they were assigned to read. They will be told that they have the chance of earning an additional $2.5 if they

[§] We will attempt to achieve a balanced sample in these dimensions. Specifically, for each of these demographic characteristics we have defined 2-3 subcategories, and we will try to find participants for each of the interactions between these subcategories.

are among the one-in-ten participants randomly selected and if they answered correctly the reading comprehension question. The goal of these treatments is to understand whether representative positive (negative) experiences with, and consequences of, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s policies affect the views and deeply held attitudes toward democracy.

After providing basic demographic and individual characteristics, and after being assigned and exposed to one of the treatment branches, participants will be directed to the decision task. The experimental decision game with potential real money payoffs has been designed to detect subtle differences of views regarding democracy in an incentivized, more indirect fashion. Each respondent will be randomly assigned to a group of 5 participants. The five members of each group will win a prize of $15 each ($75 total to group as a whole) if the group reaches the correct answer to a moderately challenging problem and if the computer randomly places the group among those eligible to win the prize. Approximately one-in-four groups are expected to win the prize.

Participants are first informed of the two procedures from which they are to choose:

A) Majority rule: whatever answer to the problem is favored by the majority (three or more members) becomes the group's choice, and if that solution is the correct one, each group member earns $15 provided that the group is also among those groups randomly chosen by the computer.
B) Choice by an authority: one member of the group will be designated as the group's authority. That individual will choose what he or she believes to be the best answer to the problem, and if his or her choice is correct, each group member earns $15 provided that the group is among those groups randomly chosen by the computer.

Each participant gets to state a preference: (i) strongly prefer majority rule, (ii) prefer majority rule, (iii) no preference, (iv) prefer choice by the authority, (v) strongly prefer choice by the authority. The computer randomly picks one of the group member's decisions. If the randomly chosen participant reported either a strong preference for majority rule or a strong preference for authority rule, that method is chosen. If the chosen individual selects either preference for majority rule or preference for authority rule, then their preferred option is applied with probability 2/3 and the opposite one is applied with probability 1/3. Lastly, if the chosen participant selected 'no preference', then a method is randomly chosen by the computer with equal probabilities. Participants are informed of these details before they get to select.

In case the chosen procedure is by authority, a group's authority is chosen, which may or may not be the same participant whose procedure choice was selected by the computer. We will initially conduct only variants in which the authority is chosen randomly, but we may conduct other variants if adequate funding is obtained to increase the sample size. However, participants are never told that the authority is randomly chosen. **In fact, the information that they receive is part of an embedded randomization:** Half of the participants are only told that the authority is selected independently of their answer to the problem and independently of their answers about which choice method they prefer. The other half of participants are told this and the following statement:

"If criteria such as educational attainment or self-reported ability in mathematics are considered when selecting the authority, they are used in an intuitively reasonable way, for example, an individual with higher educational attainment or greater self-reported math ability would be selected as the authority"

This treatment, which we call **"AuthorityTreatment"** henceforth, is intended to examine whether beliefs on the authority's ability affects support for majoritarian vs. authoritarian decision-making processes.

After exposure to the interventions and following participants' reported preferences for majority vs. authority rule, each participant will get to choose an answer to the same moderately challenging question (attached in Appendix A). At that stage, participants do not know what their group's procedure will be, and they are aware that they could potentially be chosen as the group's authority (even if they choose majority rule). The computer then:

> (1) Selects the procedure from one of the member's stated preference. If the revealed preference is 'strongly prefer', then the participant's choice is enforced, whereas if the revealed choice is weak or simply 'prefer', then the participant's choice will be selected with a probability of 2/3. If the stated preference is indifference, then the computer will randomize between a majority and an authority-rule (i.e., authority/majority rule with 50/50 chance).
>
> (2) Select an authority (a random choice in the initial treatments) and use their answer as that of the group in case the decision choice is 'authority-rule', or selects the answer favored by the majority in the group if the decision choice is majority rule.

The last, post-decision task, stage of the survey involves survey questions assessing participants' reported views on democracy, inequality, freedom of speech, trust, and on the prospects of China as a democracy. Crucial demographic and individual-level characteristics that will be exploited in the subgroup analysis are:

1) Whether the participant migrated to the U.S. or to Canada
2) Whether the participant's ancestors are from mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, or Macau
3) The highest educational attainment of the participant and their socioeconomic status (in the experiment, participants are asked to classify their household with a low, medium, or high SES, based on approximate income cutoffs and examples of how households in each of these categories would look like)
4) The degree of social mobility experienced by the participant relative to her parents
5) The reasons reported by the participant as to why she stayed in the U.S. or Canada
6) Whether the participant migrated herself or if instead she is the descendant of someone who migrated to the U.S./Canada
7) The ancestral region of origin (i.e., whether ancestors lived in an urban/rural setting as well as the region/city of ancestry)
8) The decade of parent's arrival to the U.S./Canada (for the set of participants who are descendants of those who migrated)
9) The decade of arrival to the U.S./Canada (for the set of participants who migrated themselves)

III – Specifications and Proposed Analyses

This section presents the key specifications that may be examined in the paper after data is collected. The main outcomes of interest will be the survey and experimental measures of preference for democracy.

III.a - Validity of Experimental Measure

One of the main issues that we will examine is the consistency between the experimental and the survey-based measure of preference for democracy, which we will pursue through the following specification:

$$SurveyDemocracy_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 DecisionMajority_i + \theta X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Here, $SurveyDemocracy_i$ corresponds to individual *i*'s answer to the following question:

"There are a number of possible ways to govern a country, including having a strong leader who is not constrained by a legislature and elections, and having a democratic political system in which elected representatives of the people govern the country. Do you have a preference between these alternatives, and if so, which do you prefer and how strongly (choose from 1 = strongly prefer strong leader to 5 = strongly prefer democratic system, or select Don't know).

strongly prefer a strong unconstrained leader = 1 2 3 4 5 = strongly prefer a democratic political system"

Moreover, $DecisionMajority_i$ corresponds to individual *i*'s stated preference for majority vs. authority rule, as described in Section II, while X_i corresponds to individual-level characteristics, and ε_i is the error term. We anticipate a consistent strong and significant correlation between these variables (β_1<1).

It is important to note that in this and other specifications, we will examine the correlations with revealed preferences for democracy both in the intensive margin (i.e., the values for the variable as defined above) and the extensive margin (i.e., binary variable that takes the value of 1 for those participants who reveal a weak or strong preference for democracy and 0 otherwise). Analogously, the survey outcomes will be examined both in the extensive and the intensive margin.

III.b - Pure Control and Falsification Treatment Groups

We will restrict the sample to those assigned to Treatment Branches C (falsification treatment) and D (pure control), to estimate the following expression:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 TreatmentC_i + \theta X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Where Y_i corresponds to the survey and experimental measures of preference for democracy (described above) and $TreatmentC_i$ is a binary variable that assumes the value of 1 for those participants randomly assigned to Treatment C and 0 for those assigned to Treatment Branch D (no treatment). Our expectation is to find no evidence that would support rejecting the null of $\beta_1 = 0$, though it is important to note that due to small samples we could find unexpected differences between these groups.

III.c – Skilled Authority

We will then proceed with an examination into whether our intervention 'AuthorityTreatment' is shifting participants' beliefs about the procedure followed by the researchers when selecting an authority in the decision task. Specifically, after completing the decision task, participants will be asked how likely they thought it was (on a scale of 1 to 5) for the team of researchers to select an authority who was more educated or better at math. With this information, the following expressions can be estimated:

$$SkilledAuthority_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 AuthorityTreatment_i + \theta X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

$$DecisionMajority_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 SkilledAuthority_i + \theta X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Here, $SkilledAuthority_i$ is the participant's belief (on a 1 to 5 scale) about the likelihood that the researchers selected an more educated or math-skilled authority, and $DecisionMajority_i$ is defined as above. If the treatment is indeed shifting participants' beliefs about the authority in the decision task, then we should observe $\beta_1>0$. We are also interested in determining if such beliefs are correlated with participants' behavior in the decision task, which we can formally examine by assuming that if the estimate for $\alpha_1>0$ and has some statistical significance in the second expression above, this would suggest that those who prefer authority-based decisions tend to believe that authorities selected by the researchers are more skilled. We note the potentially opposing considerations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which states that majority decision has more likelihood of a correct outcome if participants are equally well informed and intelligent *ex ante*, and cases in which expected superior knowledge or intelligence of an expert outweighs the Condorcet Theorem's logic, while we will also check for roles of behavioral or psychological factors, personal background and political orientation, and treatment effects. Because the design leaves participants in a state of ambiguity about the expected level of capability of the expert, there is no selfishly best method *a priori*, which makes this decision process a potentially promising indicator of underlying orientations and predispositions

III.d – AuthorityTreatment Intervention

The analysis will then proceed with an examination on how beliefs about the authority's ability may affect the reported and experimental measures of democracy. This will be done through the following expressions, which exploit the intervention stemming from exposure or not to the sentence indicating that if factors such as mathematical ability or education are used to select the authority , it will be done in an intuitively sensible fashion (AuthorityTreatment):

$$DecisionMajority_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 AuthorityTreatment_i + \theta X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

$$SurveyDemocracy_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 AuthorityTreatment_i + \theta X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Here, $DecisionMajority_i$ and $SurveyDemocracy_i$ correspond to the experimental and survey measures of support for democracy described above, while $Math_i$ corresponds to . This will allow us to understand if the behavior of participants when facing the novel decision task hinges upon their beliefs about the potential ability of the (unconstrained) authority. Moreover, the intervention could nudge participants into believing that unconstrained leaders (authorities) tend to be well-prepared. The effect of this intervention on these outcome variables is thus ambivalent and need not be consistent with one another. The intervention could be affecting participants' behavior in the decision task via shifts in beliefs about the qualification of the authority (i.e., $\beta_1 > 0$), it could be nudging participants into thinking that unconstrained leaders tend to be well prepared (i.e., $\alpha_1 < 0$), both, or neither.

III.e – Self-reported Math ability

An important factor in explaining authority/majority choices could stem from participant's perceptions about their own ability relative to others, especially considering the (math) skills required for the task. To that end, we expect to examine the following expressions to have a sense of the scope for this variable to explain behavior in our decision task:

$$DecisionMajority_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Math_i + \theta X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

$$DecisionMajority_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 AuthorityTreatment_i + \alpha_2 Math_i + \alpha_3 \left(AuthorityTreat_i * Math_i\right) + \theta X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

If math is an important factor when explaining revealed preference for authority vs majority rule, we should observe evidence of such variable correlating with a proclivity to support authority rule ($\beta_1 > 0$). Likewise, if this dimension is only important when we shift participants' beliefs on the relevance of such factor when determining who is the authority, then we should observe the interaction term in the second expression to be pointing towards that direction ($\alpha_3 > 0$).

III.f – Main Treatments Effects

The analysis will then proceed with an examination of the main treatments' effects through the following expression:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 TreatmentA_i + \beta_2 TreatmentB_i + \theta X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Here, Y_i corresponds to the survey and experimental measures of preference for democracy (described above). We will also examine other secondary survey-outcomes capturing participant's views on

various dimensions[**]. $TreatmentA_i$ is a dummy variable that assumes the value of 1 for those participants randomly assigned to Treatment A (negative life experience of a rural individual), and $TreatmentB_i$ is a dummy that assumes the value of 1 for those assigned to Treatment B (positive life experience of a rural individual). The default category in this setting will be the control group, comprised of the pure control group (Treatment Branch D) and the falsification treatment (Treatment C). In this setting, we expect evidence of a nudging effect stemming from the representative positive/negative experience with the CCP's policies. Particularly, we expect participants exposed to Treatment A to report a greater support for democracy, either in the experimental ($\beta_1 < 0$) or the survey ($\beta_1 > 0$) measure, or both. Similarly, we expect participants exposed to Treatment B to report a lower support for democracy, either in the experimental ($\beta_1 < 0$) or the survey ($\beta_1 > 0$) measures. It is also plausible that only one of these interventions has an effect, which would suggest that saliency of positive (or negative) experiences with CCP's policies tend to be more relevant in explaining support for democracy. We also intend to examine Treatment A's effect relative to Treatment B's, which we expect would indicate lower support for democracy as captured by the survey and/or the experimental (i.e., preference among decision methods) outcomes.

III.g – Region of Destination and of Origin – Correlations and Heterogenous Treatments

Some subgroups of interest pertain to the region of origin and of destination of the participant. We are thus interested in examining the correlation and heterogenous treatments' effects based on whether the participant lives in the U.S. or Canada. Similarly, we are interested in whether the participant has proximate ancestral origins in Mainland China (i.e, herself or her parents), or if instead she comes from Taiwan, Hong Kong or Macau (if sample size allows the required statistical analysis, we will analyze these categories separately, but otherwise we may group e.g. Macau and Hong Kong or we may omit Macau altogether, since the fewest observations are anticipated for that entity, perhaps less than a dozen[††]) . We are thus interested in examining the following expressions:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 US_i + \theta X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

$$Y_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 TreatmentA_i + \alpha_2 TreatmentB_i + \alpha_3 US_i + \alpha_4 (TreatmentA_i * US_i) + \alpha_5 (TreatmentB_i * US_i) + \theta X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

$$Y_i = \lambda_0 + \lambda_1 Mainland_i + \theta X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

$$Y_i = \delta_0 + \delta_1 TreatmentA_i + \delta_2 TreatmentB_i + \delta_3 Mainland_i + \delta_4 (TreatmentA_i * Mainland_i) + \delta_5 (TreatmentB_i * Mainland_i) + \theta X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

[**] The expression in this section and subsequent ones will also be estimated with other survey measures capturing participants' support for policies to alleviate inequality, participants' views on freedom of speech, and their views on current and future outlook of China (e.g., views on corruption in China, views on past and recent protests, and views on the likelihood of western-like democracy in China in 2040).

†† Note that we include people of Macau origin as being eligible primarily because the familiar phrasing of the place names in the Mandarin used in the P.R.C. tends to group "Hong Kong and Macau," and therefore it might create some discomfort among participants if we were to omit mention of Macau. Possibly any Macau-descended participants have similar outlooks as ones from Hong Kong, but that may prove impossible to test at the scale of our survey because Macau-descended people are almost sure to be far fewer than Hong Kong ones.

Here, US_i is a dummy that assumes the value of 1 for participants who reside in the US. There is no clear expected correlation stemming from these expressions, nor there is an expected heterogenous treatment effect. Those migrating to the US could be more/less prone to support democracy, and the treatments may resonate differently among these participants. These estimations will thus allow us to shed light on how the region of destination and residence may correlate with views on democracy.

We note that there are reasons to anticipate that certain sub-groups from the different origin locales may make different choices from others. For example, members of ethnic Chinese families that left Hong Kong for Canada in the lead up to or shortly after Hong Kong's reversion to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, and individuals who left the P.R.C. in the years immediately before and after the June 4, 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, may favor political democracy differently than do others. However, we cannot assure that enough members of those sub-sets will be included in our sample to permit formal testing of these conjectures. Nevertheless, given that (1) individuals who exited the P.R.C. during roughly 1986 - 1993 are likely to be a small subset of our sample and that (2) people who left Hong Kong and Taiwan from roughly the beginning of that period onwards may constitute the bulk of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macau-originating participants (and that such individuals are generally expected to have more favorable views of democracy and political rights than are people from the P.R.C.), there exists a mild expectation on our parts that there will be an overall negative correlation between P.R.C. origin and preference for democracy in our sample.

III.h – Reason to stay in the U.S./Canada – Correlations and Heterogenous Treatments

Another category of interest stems from participants' reasons to stay in the U.S./Canada. Participants will be asked to provide three reasons as to why they came to and have stayed in the U.S./Canada, and one of the options will be "political freedom" (other options provided include job opportunities, was born/arrived very young, cleaner air, lifestyle factors, among others). We are thus interested in examining the correlation and heterogenous treatments' effects based on the type of reason provided by the participant to stay in the U.S. or Canada. The following expressions will thus be examined:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Reason_i + \theta X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

$$Y_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 TreatmentA_i + \alpha_2 TreatmentB_i + \alpha_3 Reason_i + \alpha_4 (TreatmentA_i * Reason_i) + \alpha_5 (TreatmentB_i * Reason_i) + \theta X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

With Y_i being the outcomes described earlier. We expect to examine the correlations and heterogeneous treatment effects with various functional forms for $Reason_i$, including a dummy that equals 1 for those who report 'political freedom' as one of the top 2-3 reasons and 0 otherwise, a dummy equal to 1 for those who list such reason as the most important one for staying, and also dummies equal to 1 only when participants report reasons for staying that could reasonably be categorized as 'economic' or 'non-political' (e.g., if the participant reports her spouse's job opportunities as her top reasons for staying). If anything, we expect people that report political freedom as an important reason to be more in favor of democracy, *ceteris paribus*. However, there is no expected heterogenous treatment effect, as positive/negative economic experiences of rural people could resonate more/less with this set of people. In the event that there are meaningful differences

based on this category, a subgroup analysis that will be relevant is the estimation of the baseline correlations for the group of participants who did not list a 'political reason' as a factor, which will provide evidence on whether selection based on political preferences is an important driver of other correlations that we will analyze.

III.i – Migrant or Descendant of Migrant/ Duration in the U.S./Canada – Correlations and Heterogenous Treatments

One important question that we intend to examine is whether living in the U.S./Canada predicts a greater support for democracy, and whether it affects the ways in which representative positive/negative experiences with the CCP affect democratic support. Living in a politically democratic country and hearing unfavorable news about the origin country (e.g., news about the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown), might, for example, lead to more critical views of China's one-party system of government. These types of patterns can be assessed through two strategies: focusing on the migrant vs. descendant of migrant categories and examining duration in the U.S/Canada. The specifications that will be assessed will thus be as follows:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Descendant_i + \theta X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

$$Y_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 TreatmentA_i + \alpha_2 TreatmentB_i + \alpha_3 Descendant_i + \alpha_4 (TreatmentA_i * Descendant_i) + \alpha_5 (TreatmentB_i * Descendant_i) + \theta X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Where Y_i are the outcomes described above, $Descendant_i$ is a dummy equal to 1 for those who are descendants of migrants and 0 for those who were migrants themselves. It is important to note here that the expression with the variable $Descendant_i$ can only be estimated if we have an adequate number of participants who were born in the US/Canada and who can read Chinese well enough to answer the survey. We are not certain ex-ante that this will be the case, but we would be interested in estimating these expressions if this were the case. As an alternative variant of the regression containing the variable $Descendant_i$, we will also run estimates in which Descendant is replaced by $GrewUpNA_i$, where the later is assigned the value 1 if the individual was born in North America or joined their family (came to N. America with their family) at age 5 or younger, and value 0 if the individual was born in China, Hong Kong, Macau or Taiwan and arrived in N. America at age 6 or above. If anything, we expect being born and/or growing up in North America to predict a higher support for democracy. However, we do not rule out *a priori* that support for democracy is lower among this group of people when compared to the support by those who arrive in adulthood (e.g., the former group may be more likely to take these values for granted, while at least a few of the latter might have self-selected for dislike of China's political system). Likewise, treatment effects may or may not vary according to these categories, as representative imagery of successful/negative experiences with CCP's policies may resonate equally, more, or less with descendants of migrants.

A similar set of expressions could be estimated based on the number of years of residence in the US/Canada:

$$Y_i = \delta_0 + \delta_1 Years_i + \theta X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

$$Y_i = \lambda_0 + \lambda_1 TreatmentA_i + \lambda_2 TreatmentB_i + \lambda_3 Years_i + \lambda_4 (TreatmentA_i * Years_i) + \lambda_5 (TreatmentB_i * Years_i) + \theta X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Here, $Years_i$ is the number of years that participants have resided in the US/Canada. If anything, we expect that a higher number of years in North America would be associated with stronger support for democracy. However, the number of years of residence in the US/Canada could also predict lower support for democracy (i.e., a dissatisfaction effect). Treatment effects may or may not vary along this dimension, depending on whether representative experiences resonate differently for those with more years of residence in the US/Canada. . Possible confounding effects from the aforementioned waves of emigration to the West—Hong Kong residents exiting in the 1990s to escape life under C.C.P. control, Chinese students deciding not to return to China or leaving the country around 1989 due to that year's violence against pro-democracy demonstrators—will also be checked for insofar as sample size permits.

III.j – (Sub)Region of Origin – Correlations and Heterogenous Treatments

We also intend to examine correlations and heterogenous treatment effects based on the type and location of ancestral residence within (mainland) China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macau. We do not have a hypothesis but are rather interested in exploring how patterns of behavior look like when comparing respondents whose ancestors lived in different settings/locations. The following expressions will be examined:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Location_i + \theta X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

$$Y_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 TreatmentA_i + \alpha_2 TreatmentB_i + \alpha_3 Location_i + \alpha_4 (TreatmentA_i * Location_i) + \alpha_5 (TreatmentB_i * Location_i) + \theta X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Where Y_i are the outcomes described above and $Location_i$ will be a variable that we expect to define in various ways to flesh out different patterns that could be of interest. Definitions of this variable will include a dummy for whether ancestors lived in an urban vs. rural location. Moreover, we'll try versions that have dummies for Hong Kong, Taiwan, coastal Southern China (Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangzhou), interior Chinese provinces (Guangxi, Shaanxi, Yunnan, Guizhou, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Gansu, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Tibet), northeast (Jilin, Heilongjiang, Liaoning), with "rest of mainland China" as the default (core provinces of China proper that are not southern coastal provinces). All in all, we do not want to commit to a specific definition of the $Location_i$ variable in order to have remain flexible when it comes to exploring various patterns in the data. If representation of most of the regions is adequate, then inclusion of region controls along with basic controls for gender, age, and other variables, in some regression specifications, might yield interesting findings (for example, might people from the interior regions and northeast be more supportive of the C.C.P. after controlling for differences in education, age, etc.?).

III.k – Education, Social Mobility, and Socioeconomic Status – Correlations and Heterogenous Treatments

Educational attainment, type of university/college attended to (i.e., elite vs non-elite)[‡‡], social mobility (SM) and self-reported socioeconomic status (SES) are dimensions that we intend to examine as important sources of heterogeneity. The specifications that will be assessed will thus be as follows:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Education_i + \theta X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

$$Y_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 TreatmentA_i + \alpha_2 TreatmentB_i + \alpha_3 Education_i + \alpha_4 (TreatmentA_i * Education_i) + \alpha_5 (TreatmentB_i * Education_i) + \theta X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

$$Y_i = \delta_0 + \delta_1 Elite_i + \theta X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

$$Y_i = \lambda_0 + \lambda_1 TreatmentA_i + \lambda_2 TreatmentB_i + \lambda_3 Elite_i + \lambda_4 (TreatmentA_i * Elite_i) + \lambda_5 (TreatmentB_i * Elite_i) + \theta X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

$$Y_i = \omega_0 + \omega_1 SES_i + \theta X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

$$Y_i = \sigma_0 + \lambda_1 TreatmentA_i + \sigma_2 TreatmentB_i + \sigma_3 SES_i + \sigma_4 (TreatmentA_i * SES_i) + \sigma_5 (TreatmentB_i * SES_i) + \theta X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

$$Y_i = \mu_0 + \mu_1 SM_i + \theta X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

$$Y_i = \varphi_0 + \varphi_1 TreatmentA_i + \varphi_2 TreatmentB_i + \varphi_3 SM_i + \varphi_4 (TreatmentA_i * SM_i) + \varphi_5 (TreatmentB_i * SM_i) + \theta X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Where Y_i are the outcomes described above and $Education_i$ is a variable that captures attainment, as defined in various ways, including estimated years of education, a dummy equal to 1 for those who completed secondary or more, a dummy equal to 1 for those who university-level education, etc. Moreover, if the number of observations permits it, we will also examine correlations and heterogeneous treatment effects based on whether the participant studied in an elite college or not. Finally, SES_i corresponds to a self-reported measure that captures participants' socioeconomic status (i.e., low, middle or high). We expect education, socioeconomic status, and attendance at an elite college/university to be associated with higher support for democracy. Likewise, we believe these patterns may be even stronger for the group of participants exposed to negative experiences of rural people in China with CCP's policies (Treatment A).

Information of parent's educational attainment vis-á-vis participant's will also be examined to determine if the experienced social mobility affects support for democracy or not. Hence, we will examine correlations and heterogeneous treatment effects based on the variable SM_i, which will be defined in various ways, including a dummy equal to 1 for those participants who achieved a higher educational attainment than both of their parents. If anything, we expect social mobility to be positively associated with measures of support for democracy, especially if the mobility was mainly

[‡‡] We define 'elite' university/college as "A large internationally known university/college such as Harvard, Columbia, U.C. Berkeley, U. of Chicago, or Dartmouth"

achieved while in N. America. On the other hand, we do not expect the interaction terms with Treatments A or B to operate in a specific way.

Appendix A – Decision Task Question

Suppose that a hundred people are each asked to pick any number between 0 and 100 and to write their number down. Since these numbers are picked randomly, the average will tend to be around 50. Now suppose that in addition to being told that they should pick any number that comes to mind between 0 and 100, these hundred people are told that whoever's number winds up being closest to **the average number multiplied by 0.667** will win a prize. This gives everyone an incentive to try to guess the average of the others' guesses and to multiply their guess about that average by 0.667. It may be relevant that the others' numbers might also be guesses that they themselves had multiplied by 0.667. This challenge—guess the number between 0 and 100 that is closest to 0.667 times the average number named by everyone responding to this question—was put to more than two hundred undergraduate students participating in a decision-making experiment at Brown University approximately fifteen years ago. Your group's task is to select from the two numbers below the one that is closest to the average number chosen by the university student participants.

What number do you think is closer to the average number chosen by the students?

__ 12

__ 40