Pre-Analysis Plan

Paternalistic Interventions: Determinants of Demand and Supply

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1 Introduction

Interventions by governments, experts, and parents in the lives of others are commonly motivated by a desire to help. What factors influence individuals' willingness to intervene in the decisions made by others? What factors influence individuals' attitudes toward paternalistic interventions imposed upon them? We conduct an experiment in a general population sample of the U.S. to address these questions.

2 Experimental Design

We randomly assign study participants to either the role of a "Chooser" or a "Choice Architect." Each Chooser is randomly paired with a Choice Architect. The Chooser is tasked with selecting between two bonus options. To introduce potential decision-making errors, one bonus option is presented transparently, while the other bonus option is obscured, increasing the likelihood of the Chooser selecting the lower bonus. The Choice Architect has the opportunity to intervene in the Chooser's decision to assist them in securing the higher bonus. In the subsequent sections, we offer a brief outline of the participants' choices and our treatments.

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2.1 Treatments

We randomize study participants into one of six treatments in a 2×3 factorial design. The first treatment dimension manipulates the restrictiveness of the intervention. In treatments Soft, the Choice Architect can inform the Chooser of the higher bonus and offer them the opportunity to revise their choice. Within treatments Hard, the Choice Architect can override the Chooser's initial choice and select the higher bonus on their behalf, which constitutes the more restrictive intervention.

The second treatment dimension encompasses variations in whether a Choice Architect is informed of a Chooser's preferences favoring or opposing an intervention (Preference Info and Consent Rights) or not (No Info), as well as whether a Chooser has the right to withhold consent to an intervention (Consent Rights) or not (No Info and Preference Info). Table 1 provides an overview of the treatments.

Table 1: Overview of Treatments

	Soft	Hard
No Info	Soft × No Info	Hard × No Info
Preference Info	Soft × Preference Info	Hard × Preference Info
Consent Rights	Soft × Consent Rights	Hard × Consent Rights

2.2 Choosers' Decisions

In all treatments, a Chooser first makes a decision between the two bonus options. Subsequently, they state their "demand" for an intervention.

In treatments No Info, a Chooser indicates whether they prefer an intervention, knowing that their preference will not be communicated to the matched Choice Architect. In treatments Preference Info, a Chooser indicates whether they prefer an intervention, knowing that their preference will be communicated to the matched Choice Architect. Regardless of a Chooser's preference in treatments No Info and Preference Info, the matched Choice Architect can decide whether to intervene, and this decision will be implemented. In Treatments Consent Rights, a Chooser indicates whether they consent to an intervention, knowing that their preference will be communicated to the matched Choice Architect. If they consent to an intervention, the Choice Architect's decision whether to intervene will be implemented. In contrast, if a Chooser does not consent to an intervention, their own choice will determine their bonus.

The Choosers' demand for an intervention, i.e., preferring or consenting to an intervention, is our key outcome variable for the Choosers.

2.3 Choice Architects' Decisions

In all treatments, a Choice Architect is provided with information regarding (i) the way in which the bonus options were presented to the Chooser, (ii) the fact that the Chooser made a choice between two bonus options, with the specific choice remaining undisclosed to the Choice Architect, and (iii) the values of both bonus options. Subsequently, the Choice Architect decides whether to "supply" an intervention.

In treatments Hard, a Choice Architect can either determine that the Chooser's own choice does not count and choose the higher bonus for them or decide not to intervene. In treatments Soft, a Choice Architect can either inform the Chooser which bonus is higher and provide them with the opportunity to revise their choice or decide not to intervene. In both treatments, if the Choice Architect decides not to intervene, the Chooser's initial choice will determine their bonus.

In treatments No Info, a Choice Architect decides whether to intervene without being informed about the Chooser's preference for or against an intervention. In treatments Preference Info, a Choice Architect decides whether to intervene after learning whether the matched Chooser prefers an intervention. In treatments Consent Rights, a Choice Architect matched with a Chooser who consents to an intervention decides after learning that the matched Chooser consents to an intervention. We use the direct response method for these Choice Architects. We use the strategy method for Choice Architects matched with a Chooser who does not consent to an intervention. We inform these Choice Architects that their intervention decision will be implemented only if the matched Chooser consents to an intervention.

The Choice Architects' supply of an intervention, i.e., their intervention decision, is our key outcome variable for the Choice Architects.

2.4 Additional Questions

Choosers are prompted to express their level of confidence that they have selected the higher bonus on a scale ranging from "Not confident at all" to "Extremely confident."

Likewise, we elicit Choice Architects' beliefs about Choosers' abilities. We ask them to guess how many out of 100 Choosers (who are in the same treatment and indicated the same preference as the matched Chooser) would select, absent an intervention, the higher bonus. In Treatments No Info, we also elicit Choice Architects' beliefs about Choosers' demand for an intervention. They are asked to guess how many out of 100 Choosers would prefer an intervention. The Choice Architects' belief elicitation is incentivized.

We elicit all participants' demographic variables (age, gender, state of residence, income, and education), political affiliation, and generalized trust (using the question fielded in

the World Values Survey). Furthermore, we elicit participants' support for government paternalistic interventions. In treatments Soft, we describe a soft intervention, while in treatments Hard, we describe a hard intervention.

Finally, we ask the participants an open-ended question. Choosers in treatments Preference Info and No Info are asked to explain why they indicated that they prefer or do not prefer an intervention. Choosers in treatments Consent Rights are asked to explain why they indicated that they consent or do not consent to an intervention. Choice Architects are asked to explain why they chose to intervene or not to intervene.

2.5 Data Collection

2.5.1 Procedural Details

We will first recruit participants in the role of Choosers, followed by the recruitment of participants in the role of Choice Architects. As Choosers are recruited first, we inform them of the intervention decisions made by their matched Choice Architects only after we recruit all the Choice Architects. Choosers randomized into treatments Soft (except those who do not consent to the intervention) are asked to indicate what they would do if the matched Choice Architect decides to provide information and the opportunity to revise their choice. Their decision will be implemented should the matched Choice Architect decide to intervene. Choosers who do not consent to an intervention will not receive any information about the matched Choice Architect's intervention decision (elicited using the strategy method), as they are not affected by the decision.

2.5.2 Sample

We will recruit participants from the general population of the U.S. using the data service provider Prolific. We aim to recruit 4000 Choosers and 4000 Choice Architects, with 500 pairs of participants in the Soft $\times$ No Info and Hard $\times$ No Info treatments and 750 pairs in each of the other four treatments. Participants must pass an attention check to participate in the study. Participants who pass the check will be randomly assigned to one of the six treatments.

We will consider the data of all participants who complete the study, but we will exclude the responses of participants who attempt to take the survey more than once. Since we match Choice Architects to Choosers, we set up quotas to ensure that we collect the correct number of Choice Architects. If a Choice Architect is erroneously randomized into a treatment group that has reached its quota, their data will also be excluded.

3 Analysis

3.1 Choosers' Demand for Interventions

We estimate all specifications involving the Choosers' demand for interventions using the data from treatments Consent Rights and Preference Info. We do not use the data from treatments No Info since Choosers' demand decisions in these treatments are not incentivized.

3.1.1 Role of the Restrictiveness of the Intervention and Consent Rights

To explore the role of the restrictiveness of the intervention and consent rights, we estimate the following specifications using a linear probability model.

$$Demand_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Soft_i + \epsilon_i \tag{1}$$

$$Demand_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Soft_i + \gamma X_i + \epsilon_i \tag{2}$$

$$Demand_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Consent\ Rights_i + \epsilon_i \tag{3}$$

$$Demand_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Consent\ Rights_i + \gamma X_i + \epsilon_i \tag{4}$$

$$\begin{aligned} Demand_i = {} & \beta_0 + \beta_1 Soft_i + \beta_2 Consent\ Rights_i \\ & + \beta_3 Soft_i \times Consent\ Rights_i + \epsilon_i \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

$$\begin{aligned} Demand_i = {} & \beta_0 + \beta_1 Soft_i + \beta_2 Consent\ Rights_i \\ & + \beta_3 Soft_i \times Consent\ Rights_i + \gamma X_i + \epsilon_i \end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

$Demand_i$ is an indicator variable taking a value of 1 if Chooser i indicates that they prefer an intervention (treatments Preference Info) or if they consent to an intervention (treatments Consent Rights) and 0 otherwise. $Soft_i$ is an indicator variable taking a value of 1 if a Chooser is in treatments Soft and 0 if a Chooser is in treatments Hard. $Consent\ Rights_i$ is an indicator variable taking a value of 1 if a Chooser is in treatments Consent Rights and 0 if a Chooser is in treatments Preference Info. Vector X_i includes the following indicator variables: $High\ Belief\ Ability_i$ (equals 1 if a Chooser's confidence of choosing the higher bonus is above the median and 0 otherwise), $High\ Trust_i$ (equals 1 if a Chooser indicates that "Most people can be trusted" and 0 if the Chooser indicates "Need to be very careful"), $High\ Education_i$ (equals 1 if above median education and 0 otherwise), $High\ Income_i$ (equals 1 if above median income and 0 otherwise), $High\ Age_i$ (equals 1 if above median age and 0 otherwise), $Male_i$ (equals 1 if male and 0 otherwise), and $Republican_i$ (equals 1 if Republican and 0 otherwise). The regressions in this section and subsequent sections use HC3 standard errors. We have the following hypotheses.

Hypothesis D1. *The Choosers' demand for interventions is higher in treatments Soft than in treatments Hard: $\beta_1 > 0$ in Equations (1) and (2).*

Hypothesis D2. *The Choosers' demand for interventions is higher in treatments Consent Rights than in treatments Preference Info: $\beta_1 > 0$ in Equations (3) and (4).*

We include the background variables X_i in Equations (2), (4), and (6) to control for possible treatment imbalances. In case of treatment imbalances, we test the above hypotheses based on the results from Equations (2) and (4). We discuss the role of the background variables in more detail in Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3. We study the interaction effects specified in Equations (5) and (6) as exploratory analyses and do not state hypotheses.

3.1.2 Role of Background Variables

To explore the role of background variables, we estimate the following specifications using a linear probability model.

$$Demand_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_i^k + \epsilon_i \tag{7}$$

$Demand_i$ is defined above. x_i^k indicates a single background characteristic of Chooser i, where $x_i^k \in X_i$, and the vector X_i is defined above. We estimate Equation (7) for each of the seven $x_i^k \in X_i$. We have the following hypotheses.

Hypothesis D3.

The demand for interventions is lower among Choosers with high beliefs in their ability than among Choosers with low beliefs in their ability: The coefficient estimate of High Belief Ability$_i$ is negative in Equation (7).

Hypothesis D4.

The demand for interventions is higher among Choosers with high levels of trust than among Choosers with low levels of trust: The coefficient estimate of High Trust$_i$ is positive in Equation (7).

We explore the role of the other background characteristics as exploratory analysis and do not state hypotheses.

3.1.3 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

To explore the heterogeneous treatment effects, we estimate the following specifications using a linear probability model.

$$Demand_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Soft_i + \beta_2 x_i^k + \beta_3 Soft_i \times x_i^k \tag{8}$$

$$Demand_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Consent\ Rights_i + \beta_2 x_i^k + \beta_3 Consent\ Rights_i \times x_i^k \tag{9}$$

The variables $Demand_i$, $Soft_i$, $Consent\ Rights_i$, and $x_i^k \in X_i$ are defined above. We estimate Equations (8) and (9) for each $x_i^k \in X_i$. We study the heterogeneous treatment effects as an exploratory analysis and do not state hypotheses.

3.2 Choosers' Support for Government Interventions

To study how the Choosers' demand decisions in the experiment relate to their support for government interventions, we estimate the following specification using a linear regression model.

$$Policy\ View_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Demand_i + \gamma X_i + \epsilon_i \tag{10}$$

The variable $Policy\ View_i$ represents Chooser i's level of support for hard government interventions in treatments Hard or for soft government interventions in treatments Soft. Higher values of $Policy\ View_i$ indicate stronger support for the respective intervention. $Demand_i$ and X_i are defined above. We estimate Equation (10) separately in Treatments Soft and Hard, pooling over treatments Preference Info and Consent Rights. We would interpret $\beta_1 > 0$ in Equation (10) as evidence supporting the external validity of our experimental results.

3.3 Choice Architects' Supply of Interventions

3.3.1 Role of the Restrictiveness of the Intervention

To explore the role of the restrictiveness of the intervention, we estimate the following specifications using a linear probability model.

$$Supply_j = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Soft_j + \epsilon_j \tag{11}$$

$$Supply_j = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Soft_j + \gamma X_j + \epsilon_j \tag{12}$$

$Supply_j$ is an indicator variable taking a value of 1 if Choice Architect j implements an intervention and 0 otherwise. $Soft_j$ is defined above. X_j includes the following indicator variables: $High\ Trust_j$, $High\ Education_j$, $High\ Income_j$, $High\ Age_j$, $Male_j$, and $Republican_j$, all defined above. X_j also includes $High\ Belief\ Ability_j$, which is an indicator variable taking a value of 1 if a Choice Architect's beliefs about the share of Choosers choosing the higher bonus is greater than the median and 0 otherwise. We construct $High\ Belief\ Ability_j$ separately in the following four cases: (i) treatments No Info, (ii) treatments Preference Info and matched Chooser prefers an intervention, (iii) treatments Preference Info and matched Chooser does not prefer an intervention, and (iv) treatments Consent Rights.

To explore the role of the restrictiveness of the intervention, we analyze the data of Choice Architects in treatments No Info. This treatment allows us to study the role of the restrictiveness of the intervention in a scenario where information regarding Choosers' preferences for or against an intervention is unavailable to the Choice Architects. We have the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis S1. *Choice Architects' supply of interventions is higher in treatments Soft than in treatments Hard:* $\beta_1 > 0$ *in Equations (11) and (12).*

We include the background variables X_j in Equation (12) to control for possible treatment imbalances. In case of treatment imbalances, we test the above hypothesis based on the results from Equation (12). We discuss the role of the background variables in more detail in Sections 3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.5, and 3.3.7.

We will also estimate versions of Equations (11) and (12) in which we include the variable *High Belief Demand*$_j$ in the regressions. The variable *High Belief Demand*$_j$ is an indicator variable taking a value of 1 if a Choice Architect's beliefs about the share of Choosers demanding an intervention is greater than the median and 0 otherwise. We include the Choice Architects' beliefs about the Choosers' demand in the regressions to study whether a possible higher willingness to implement the Soft intervention is driven by the Choice Architects' beliefs that a larger fraction of Choosers demand an intervention in treatment Soft than in treatment Hard.

As robustness checks, we estimate separate versions of Equations (11) and (12) with the data of the Choice Architects in (i) treatments Preference Info matched to Choosers demanding an intervention, (ii) treatments Preference Info matched to Choosers not demanding an intervention, and (iii) treatments Consent Rights. These specifications allow us to control for the Choosers' demand by random assignment of Choice Architects to the different treatments and cases.

3.3.2 Role of Background Variables

To explore the role of background variables, we estimate the following specifications using a linear probability model.

$$Supply_j = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_j^k + \epsilon_j \tag{13}$$

Supply$_j$ is defined above. x_j^k indicates a single background characteristic of Choice Architect j, where $x_j^k \in X_j$, and vector X_j is defined above. We estimate Equation (13) for each of the seven $x_j^k \in X_j$. These specifications are estimated using the subset of Choice Architects in treatments No Info. We have the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis S2. *The supply of interventions is lower among Choice Architects with high beliefs in Choosers' ability than among Choice Architects with low beliefs in Choosers' ability: The coefficient estimate of High Belief Ability$_j$ is negative in Equation (13).*

We explore the role of the other background characteristics as exploratory analysis and do not state hypotheses.

As robustness checks, we estimate separate versions of Equations (13) with the data of the Choice Architects in (i) treatments Preference Info matched to Choosers demanding an intervention, (ii) treatments Preference Info matched to Choosers not demanding an intervention, and (iii) treatments Consent Rights.

3.3.3 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects of Soft

To explore the heterogeneous treatment effects of the restrictiveness of the intervention, we estimate the following specifications using a linear probability model.

$$Supply_j = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Soft_j + \beta_2 x_j^k + \beta_3 Soft_j \times x_j^k + \epsilon_j \tag{14}$$

$Supply_j$, $Soft_j$, and $x_j^k \in X_j$ are defined above. We estimate Equation (14) for each $x_j^k \in X$. These specifications are estimated using the subset of Choice Architects in treatments No Info. We study the heterogeneous treatment effects as an exploratory analysis and do not state hypotheses.

As robustness checks, we estimate separate versions of Equations (14) with the data of the Choice Architects in (i) treatments Preference Info matched to Choosers demanding an intervention, (ii) treatments Preference Info matched to Choosers not demanding an intervention, and (iii) treatments Consent Rights.

3.3.4 Role of Choosers' Demand

To investigate the impact of Choosers' demand for interventions, we restrict the sample to the subset of Choice Architects in treatments Preference Info. We estimate the following specifications using a linear probability model.

$$Supply_j = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Demand_j + \epsilon_j \tag{15}$$

$$Supply_j = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Demand_j + \gamma X_j + \epsilon_j \tag{16}$$

$$Supply_j = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Soft_j + \beta_2 Demand_j + \beta_3 Soft_j \times Demand_j + \epsilon_j \tag{17}$$

$$Supply_j = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Soft_j + \beta_2 Demand_j + \beta_3 Soft_j \times Demand_j + \gamma X_j + \epsilon_j \tag{18}$$

$Supply_j$, $Soft_j$ and X_j are defined above. $Demand_j$ is an indicator variable that assumes a value of 1 if the matched Chooser expresses a preference for intervention and 0 otherwise.

We have the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis S3. *Choice Architects' supply of interventions is higher when the matched Choosers demand an intervention than when the matched Choosers do not demand an intervention:* $\beta_1 > 0$ *in Equations (15) and (16).*

We include the background variables X_j in Equations (16) and (18) to control for possible imbalances in the random assignment of Choice Architects to Choosers, distinguishing between those preferring an intervention and those preferring no intervention. In case of imbalances, we test the above hypothesis based on the results from Equation (16). We study the interaction effects specified in Equations (17) and (18) as exploratory analysis and do not state hypotheses.

3.3.5 Heterogeneous Effects of Demand Information

To study heterogeneous effects of $Demand_j$, we estimate Equation (14) in Section 3.3.3, replacing $Soft_j$ with $Demand_j$, using the sample described in Section 3.3.4. We study the heterogeneous effects as an exploratory analysis and do not state hypotheses.

3.3.6 Role of Consent Rights

We explore the role of consent rights in the sample of Choice Architects in treatments Consent Rights and Preference Info.

In treatments with Consent Rights, the direct response method is employed when Choice Architects are matched with Choosers who consent to an intervention. The strategy method is utilized when Choice Architects are matched with Choosers who do not consent to an intervention. We will pool the data across these two methods.

In treatments Preference Info, we restrict the sample to the subset of Choice Architects paired with Choosers who express a preference for an intervention so that all Choice Architects are matched with Choosers who either consent to or prefer an intervention.

We estimate the following specifications using a linear probability model.

$$Supply_j = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Consent\ Rights_j + \epsilon_j \tag{19}$$

$$Supply_j = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Consent\ Rights_j + \gamma X_j + \epsilon_j \tag{20}$$

$$\begin{aligned} Supply_j = {} & \beta_0 + \beta_1 Soft_j + \beta_2 Consent\ Rights_j \\ & + \beta_3 Soft_j \times Consent\ Rights_j + \epsilon_j \end{aligned} \tag{21}$$

$$\begin{aligned} Supply_j = {} & \beta_0 + \beta_1 Soft_j + \beta_2 Consent\ Rights_j \\ & + \beta_3 Soft_j \times Consent\ Rights_j + \gamma X_j + \epsilon_j \end{aligned} \tag{22}$$

Consent Rights$_j$ is an indicator variable taking a value of 1 if a Choice Architect is in treatments Consent Rights and 0 if a Choice Architect is in treatments Preference Info. *Soft*$_j$ and X_j are defined above. We have the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis S4. *Choice Architects' supply of interventions is higher in treatments Consent Rights than in treatments Preference Info:* $\beta_1 > 0$ *in Equations (19) and (20).*

We include the background variables X_j in Equations (20) and (22) to control for possible treatment imbalances. In case of treatment imbalances, we test the above hypothesis based on the results from Equation (20). We study the interaction effects specified in Equations (21) and (22) as exploratory analyses and do not state hypotheses.

3.3.7 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects of Consent Rights

To study heterogeneous treatment effects of *Consent Rights*$_j$, we estimate Equation (14) in Section 3.3.3, replacing *Soft*$_j$ with *Consent Rights*$_j$, using the sample described in Section 3.3.6. We study the heterogeneous treatment effects as an exploratory analysis and do not state hypotheses.

3.4 Choice Architects' Support for Government Interventions

To study how the Choice Architects' intervention decisions in the experiment relate to their support for government interventions, we estimate the following specification using a linear regression model.

$$Policy\ View_j = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Supply_j + \gamma X_j + \epsilon_j \tag{23}$$

The variable *Policy View*$_j$ represents Choice Architect j's level of support for government interventions; it is defined identically to that of Choosers. *Supply*$_j$ and X_j are defined above. We estimate Equation (23) separately in treatments Soft and treatments Hard, pooling over treatments No Info, Preference Info, and Consent Rights.

We would interpret $\beta_1 > 0$ in Equation (23) as evidence supporting the external validity of our experimental results.

4 Minimum Detectable Effect Sizes

We calculate Minimum Detectable Effect Sizes (MDE) under the assumptions of a baseline mean of 0.5 and a standard deviation of 0.5, requiring a significance level of $\alpha = 0.05$ and a statistical power of 80 percent.

4.1 Choosers' Demand Decisions

The Choosers in the No Info treatments are not considered in the analysis as the preference elicitation is not incentivized in these treatments. Our sample thus comprises 3000 Choosers.

We investigate **Hypothesis D1** (Hard vs. Soft), aggregating across the Preference Info and Consent Rights treatments. This yields a sample size of 1500 Choosers in the Hard treatments and 1500 in the Soft treatments, leading to an MDE of 5.1 percentage points. This computation also applies to **Hypothesis D2** (Preference Info vs. Consent Rights), where we aggregate over the Hard and Soft treatments.

Concerning **Hypothesis D3**, we split the sample of 3000 Choosers into two subsets: one comprising Choosers with $\textit{High Belief Ability}_i = 1$ and another with $\textit{High Belief Ability}_i = 0$. Similarly, concerning **Hypothesis D4**, we partition Choosers into two groups based on their $\textit{High Trust}_i$ values. This yields an MDE of 5.1 percentage points, assuming an equal distribution of the sample across the two split groups.

4.2 Choice Architects' Supply Decisions

We investigate **Hypothesis S1** (Hard vs. Soft) in the subset of the 1000 Choice Architects in the No Info treatments. This yields a sample size of 500 Choice Architects in the Hard treatments and 500 in the Soft treatments, leading to an MDE of 8.9 percentage points.

To explore **Hypothesis S2**, we split the sample of 1000 Choice Architects into two subsets: one comprising of Choice Architects with $\textit{High Belief Ability}_j = 1$ and another with $\textit{High Belief Ability}_j = 0$. This yields an MDE of 8.9 percentage points, assuming equally sized groups.

We investigate **Hypothesis S3** in the subset comprising of 1500 Choice Architects assigned to the Preference Info treatments. Assuming that 40% of the Choice Architects in the Hard treatments demand an intervention and 80% of the Choice Architects in the Soft treatments demand an intervention, we have 900 Choice Architects in the $\textit{Demand}_j = 1$ group and 600 Choice Architects in the $\textit{Demand}_j = 0$ group. This results in an MDE of 7.4 percentage points.

Finally, we explore **Hypothesis S4** in the subset of the 3000 Choices Architects in treatments Preference Info and Consent Rights. In treatments Consent Rights, we have a sample of 1500 Choice Architects. In treatments Preference Info, under the same assumptions regarding the demand of Choosers as previously stated, there are 900 Choice Architects within the $\textit{Demand}_j = 1$ group. This yields an MDE of 5.9 percentage points.