

Analysis plan

Testable Hypotheses

1. **H0:** the automatic payment system does not affect the tax compliance of subjects.
H1: the automatic payment system increases (decreases) the tax compliance of subjects.
 - **Outcome Variable:** $Compliance_{it}$ (take value equal to 1 if the subject i pays the tax in round t , 0 otherwise); 1 observation per subject per round.
 - **Non-parametric test:** Chi-square test with 67 observations per treatment (Control and Automatic Payment) on the average individual Compliance.
 - **Regression:** Logit of $Compliance_{it}$ on Treatment dummy, with and without controls: demographics and altruism questions, risk aversion measure, round fixed effects, standard errors clustered at the subject level. Probit and LPM as robustness checks.
2. **H0:** the automatic payment system does not affect subjects' earnings.
H1: the automatic payment system increases (decreases) subjects' earnings.
 - **Outcome Variable:** $Earnings_i$ (in ECUs, continuous variable); 1 observation per subject.
 - **Non-parametric test:** Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney with 67 observations per treatment (Control and Automatic Payment) on the average individual Earnings.
 - **Regression:** OLS of $Earnings_i$ on Treatment dummy, with and without controls: demographics and altruism questions, risk aversion measure.
3. **H0:** there is no difference in the performance in the effort task between subjects in the two treatments.
H1: subjects who could adhere to the automatic payment system perform better than those who could not join it in the effort task.
 - **Outcome Variable:** $Performance_{it}$ (number of correct strings answered, discrete variable from 0 to 20); 1 observation per subject per round.
 - **Non-parametric test:** Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney with 67 observations per treatment (Control and Automatic Payment) on the average individual Performance.
 - **Regression:** OLS of $Performance_{it}$ on Treatment dummy, with and without controls: demographics and altruism questions, risk aversion measure, round fixed effects, standard errors clustered at the subject level.
 - **Analysis of relevant subgroups:** subjects in the Automatic Payment treatment who adhere to the automatic payments vs those who don't, keeping the round fixed.
4. **H0:** Risk aversion does not influence the use of the automatic system payment.

H1: more risk-averse subjects adhere to the automatic system payment more frequently than the others.

- **Outcome Variable:** N_Auto_i (number of rounds in which subject i adheres to automatic payment); 1 observation per subject.
- **Regression:** OLS of N_Auto_i on Risk Aversion, with and without controls (demographics and altruism questions).

Secondary analyses

Compliance across time: investigate if subjects who initially adhere to the automatic payment system decide to leave it at a certain round to get higher earnings by evading; on the other hand, subjects who initially evade and are immediately caught could behave differently from those who are not caught, meaning that the enforcement of the fine could push non-compliers towards the automatic payment adhesion.