

Pre-analysis plan

Consequences of cooperation: Linking cooperative behavior and outcomes in a large-scale experiment

Marvin Deversi* Martin Kocher† Robert Schmidt ‡

Christiane Schwieren§

November 24, 2017

Abstract

This project provides evidence on how cooperative inclination is related to professional behavior and success in a large multinational software corporation. The pre-analysis plan at hand anticipates respective analyses of the data to be elicited through artefactual field experiments and company data to be linked on the individual and group level. Also, potential sources of naturally occurring experiments as well as potential field interventions are described. The three main hypotheses we are going to address in this pre-analysis plan are the effect of cooperative inclination measured via variants of the public goods game on main outcome variables of professional behavior within a company (1), the predictive power of cooperative norms elicited through coordination mechanisms (2), and the external validity of these experimental measures of cooperation (3).

*University of Munich (LMU); email: marvin.deversi@econ.lmu.de.

†Institute of Higher Studies Vienna, University of Vienna and University of Gothenburg; email: kocher@ihs.ac.at.

‡University of Heidelberg; email: robert.schmidt@awi.uni-heidelberg.de.

§University of Heidelberg; email: christiane.schwieren@awi.uni-heidelberg.de.

1 Introduction

The importance of the concept of cooperation in social dilemmas in economics, and the social sciences in general, is unquestioned. The vast majority of our empirical knowledge on cooperation relies on laboratory experiments in parsimonious setups. However, how cooperation in an experiment translates to real-life cooperation decisions within an organization and how real-life cooperation interacts with given institutions and contexts are under-researched topics. Building on this observation, the twofold purpose of this project can be described as follows:

First, we plan to study cooperation and cooperative norms within an organization (a large company) and relate it to relevant outcomes in the professional context at hand. More specifically, we will analyze the extent to which cooperation makes individuals and teams in a competitive environment more or less successful with respect to their individual or team/organizational goals. In this context, we will analyze how cooperative inclination of individuals and teams or perceptions of cooperative norms interact with given incentive schemes, different complementarities of cooperative and selfish effort in the production function, and team compositions.

Second, as experimental measures on behavioral types with respect to cooperation so far have mostly been used in the laboratory, our study also fulfills a methodological purpose by assessing the external validity of laboratory measures of cooperation in an artefactual field experiment setting. We plan to use the elicited levels of individual and team-level cooperation as correlates and predictors of real-world cooperative behavior within the company.

Our project will address these research objectives in a unique setting. In collaboration with a large software corporation in Germany, we are able to run fully incentivized online experiments with up to 1,000 employees (approximately 100 teams) of the company. We link the data from the experiments that measure cooperative behavior in variants of the public goods game and individual norm perception using coordination mechanisms (including a large set of controls) with objective outcome variables from the company. We

herewith systematically address the context and consequences of cooperative behavior in a professional environment controlling for contextual factors of cooperation.

This pre-analysis plan also serves as an instrument to anticipate the exploitation of potentially naturally occurring experimental variations or the planning of field experimental interventions that rely on analyses of the artefactual field experiment and company record data.

The reminder of this pre-analysis plan is structured as follows: First we specify our research strategy by describing the sampling, the data to be used, and the data collection procedures. Then, we sketch our planned empirical analyses. Here, among other aspects, we define our primary and secondary outcome variables, state our hypotheses, and specify how we are going to test these hypotheses. We conclude with a brief description of how we proceed from here.

2 Research strategy

2.1 Sampling

Our sample will consist of teams within the company that have at least 8 members of which more than 70% are based in Germany. For a first two-weeks long roll-out phase, starting in November 2017, a total of around 1,300 potential respondents (i.e., about 100 teams) will be randomly chosen (given the stratification criteria mentioned above), and we aim for a participation rate of about 50%. Another 1,000 potential respondents will be randomly chosen for the second two-weeks long roll-out phase taking place in 2018.¹ Our objective is to reach a final sample size of 1,000 participants. After a team has been randomly selected, the potential individual team members will be send an e-mail with an official invitation for which both the HR Department and the Works Council have agreed to accompany a strong support statement.² Then, a few days later, potential participants

¹Here, we only describe the analyses for the first wave's data.

²All material including invitation and reminder e-mails can be found in the appendix.

receive a personalized participation link and have two weeks time to take part in the experiment. We also plan to send one reminder after the first week of the respective roll-out phase and a second reminder two days before the experiment ends to make sure that attrition is as small as possible. Having all company information about non-respondents that we have for respondents will allow us to control for potential sample selection effects.

2.2 Data to be collected

Our analyses is based on data from four different sources. We collect data on cooperative behavior and respective norms from a fully incentivized online experiment (an artefactual field experiment in the terminology of [Harrison and List \(2004\)](#)) taking place with 1,000 employees of the company (2.1.1). In a subsequent survey module, we elicit a variety of control variables like socio-economic characteristics or measures for team coherence and identification (2.1.2). The gathered data is then merged with objective outcome variables (and other context variables) from the company (2.1.3). We aim at exploiting potential natural experiments within the company’s incentive structure, team production functions, team compositions or performance communications (2.1.4).³

An overview of all elicited variables and the full online experiment/survey can be found in the appendix.

2.2.1 Artefactual field experiments

The first part is an experiment according to the abc-framework of cooperation. It uses the design of [Fischbacher et al. \(2001\)](#), including the elicitation of beliefs. This is a standard experimental design that has been used extensively in experiments with different subject pools. It elicits an unconditional contribution, a full contribution schedule, and subjects’ beliefs about others’ average unconditional contributions in a voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) setting.

³2.1.4. requires further discussions with the company that rely on the outcomes of the analyses of the first two modules.

Participants are randomly grouped in groups of three. Every participant is aware of the fact that all other participants are randomly selected employees of the company. Each group member receives an initial endowment of 10 Tokens (which equals 10 Euro) to be allocated to a private account or to be contributed to a public account. The invested amount, an integer that satisfies $0 \leq c_i \leq 10$, is referred to as the unconditional contribution. The sum of all contributions to the public good is multiplied by $n\gamma$, which is 1.5 in our case, and divided equally among all n group members. This leads to the following payoff function for subject i

$$\pi_i = 10 - c_i + \gamma \sum_{j=1}^n c_j$$

which is linear in the public good contribution and where c_i denotes the contribution of group member i . The marginal per capita return (MPCR) from investing in the public good is $\frac{1}{n} < \gamma < 1$. From an individual perspective, free-riding (i.e., $c_i = 0$) is a dominant strategy. Since the sum of marginal returns is larger than 1, however, contributing the entire endowment is the optimal choice from a collective perspective (i.e., maximizing efficiency). The decision is made only once and anonymously; thus there are no incentives to build a reputation.

After indicating an unconditional contribution and without any feedback, participants are asked to fill in a contribution table, indicating their contribution for each possible average contribution of the other group members, rounded up to integers. The conditional contributions from the contribution table (“the contribution vector”) allow us to classify types: *free riders*, *conditional contributors*, *hump-shaped* or *triangle contributors*, and *others* (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Kocher et al., 2008, 2015). To make both sets of decisions, the unconditional and the conditional contribution, incentive-compatible we use the mechanisms described in Fischbacher et al. (2001). That is, for one randomly selected subject the conditional contributions are payoff-relevant, whereas for the two remaining subjects the unconditional contribution is. We also elicit expected contributions of others in an

incentivized way. Following [Gächter and Renner \(2010\)](#), participants are asked to guess the average unconditional contribution of the other group members and receive 5 Euro if they hit the correct average, and 0 Euro otherwise.

After the public goods game has ended, we will elicit norms and norm perception with regard to helping, information sharing and teamwork. This provides us with a better understanding of the “cooperative culture” in the company. Each participant will receive five vignettes with each of the vignettes describing a specific social dilemma. A social dilemma consists of a cooperation subject (a person that decides to cooperate or not) and a cooperation object (a person to cooperate with). Subsequently an action statement is made that expresses whether the cooperation subject decided to cooperate or not.

For 50% of the participants the question is whether the respective action statement is deemed “very appropriate”, “rather appropriate”, “rather inappropriate”, or “very inappropriate”. For the other 50% of the participants the question is whether the behavior is observed “very frequently”, “rather frequently”, “rather rarely”, or “very rarely”. It is important that we are not interested in the answers per se, but in the perception of the social norm. A social norm is a shared perception (for an overview, see [Bicchieri and Muldoon \(2011\)](#)). When asking how socially appropriate the described behavior is, we elicit the injunctive norm. In contrast, how frequently a specific behavior is observable gives rise to the descriptive norm (for a discussion on differences between injunctive and descriptive norms see [Burks and Krupka \(2012\)](#)). To elicit the norm, we pay 3 Euro per vignette to those participants that select the answer category that has been chosen by the relative majority of the respondents. Hence, a profit-maximizing decision maker should choose the answer category that he or she deems the modal answer category. [Krupka and Weber \(2013\)](#) have shown that the procedure is indeed suitable to elicit social norms.

In a very similar vein to the coordination mechanism above, we elicit the shared perception of team success, the shared assessment of the team’s impact on the company’s value, and the perceptions about the necessity of cooperative efforts. The first aspect is addressed by asking how successful the team is on a scale from “not successful”, “rather

successful”, “rather unsuccessful”, to “very unsuccessful”. The impact question is addressed by asking whether the team’s contribution to the company’s value is “very high”, “rather high”, “rather low”, or “very low”. The necessity of cooperation is measured on a scale from “very unimportant”, “rather unimportant”, “rather important”, to “very important”. Again, we incentivize participants by paying 3 Euro for each question for which they hit the modal answer category.

Finally, we also elicit time preferences in an incentivized fashion as described by [Falk et al. \(2016\)](#).

2.2.2 Survey

After the incentivized parts, we elicit additional variables that are relevant for the analysis of the determinants of cooperation in an unincentivized way. We capture personality traits (a short form of the Big Five; see [Gosling et al., 2003](#)), and information about individual cooperative behavior in spare time using items from the self-reported altruism questionnaire ([Rushton et al., 1981](#)). Furthermore, we elicit basic socio-economic variables (like nationality, education, and marital status). Finally, variables with respect to perceived team cohesion, team coherence, team and company identification ([Mael and Ashforth, 1992](#)), and team stability will be elicited as well as variables regarding the cooperative attitude within the team, competitive attitude (e.g., the competitiveness index; see [Smither and Houston \(1992\)](#); [Newby and Klein \(2014\)](#)) and an indicator of self-evaluated performance/cooperation.

2.2.3 Company information

In addition to the data we collect from the experimental and survey modules, we obtain information about team structures (e.g. gender composition), hierarchy levels, personal responsibilities, incentive schemes, bonuses and awards received, performance and potential ratings, and other aspects from the company.

2.2.4 Potential sources of natural variations or field experimental interventions

In the progress of our projects and conditional on the first wave’s findings we will make use of data from “natural experiments” within the firm, i.e., currently planned changes in incentive schemes and promotion rules or discuss and plan experimental interventions within the company.

There are several developments at the company over the coming two years that will allow us to take them into account in our final study design. First, the company is starting to implement new incentive models that are rolled out in waves. Second, there is a gradual change in the business model - the traditional model uses servers that are on the premise of the client and that are serviced by company employees, whereas the new model uses internet cloud solutions that concurrently apply to many clients. According to our discussions with managers of the company, the latter model requires more cooperation among employees than the former; in other words, it entails a production function with much more pronounced complementarities (for instance, between software development and service). We want to exploit these natural experiments. We will use data collected in the other other parts of the study and compare the response of individual team members before the change (or re-organizations in combination with the change) and comparable individuals in teams after the change (making sure that the assignment to the before-after conditions is as close as possible to random). It is important to add that the implementation of these analysis and its details depend on on-going developments at the company for which an exact time line does not exist, but we have the agreement with managers of the company to be able to fine- tune the roll-out of our online experiment along a time line that allows taking these natural experiments into account. For instance, a change in the compensation scheme (from competitive to more cooperative) would probably not affect cooperation levels in the experiment (assuming them to be quite stable), but it could affect cooperation in the company and, thus, the predictive power of experimental cooperation for real-world

cooperation.

We are also currently discussing field interventions that rely on the findings from our artefactual field experiment and company record data. For example, this includes the by our data informed reorganization of teams.

2.3 Data collection procedures

We are conducting the described experimental and survey modules online. Potential participants receive a personalized participation link. Every respondent knows that he/she must complete the experiment within the two-weeks long roll-out. The online experiment does not require participants to simultaneously take decisions. Groups will be assembled randomly ex post, and participants will know that. Since nobody receives feedback during the experiment, such a procedure is game theoretically equivalent to actually simultaneously entered decisions. Participants can use their personal ID code to login after the roll-out phase has ended to get feedback on the results. We will ask participants to perform the online experiment individually. The random allocation to groups makes sure that coalition formation among group members when filling in the online experiment will be impossible.

We will also take utmost care to ensure data protection. Individual data from the company to be linked to our elicited data will be de-identified. The data collection and storage is facilitated through Qualtrics. There exists a data protection agreement between the company and Qualtrics; and a research agreement (including data protection) between the company and the research team. Data protection units at the company, at LMU and University of Heidelberg supervise the study. The company will not receive individual-level data, and all participants will be informed about the full pseudonymization of their responses. Data protection procedures will also be monitored by the responsible unit for data protection at the company. However, the latter will only be involved in determining the exact procedures, not in handling the linked data. We make sure that the

pseudonymized final data set will only be stored on the computers of the researchers involved in this project within university fire walls. An application for ethics approval of the Universities of Munich has been filed in September 2017. We are currently awaiting the response.

3 Empirical analysis

We analyze two main guiding hypotheses, but our data allows us to assess many other hypotheses (for the statistical analysis we will make sure to control for multiple hypothesis testing; see ?). In the following, we formulate the null hypotheses. Obviously, one can write down economic models that support both the null hypotheses and the alternative hypotheses, depending on assumptions regarding the complementarity of efforts within a team or the specific formulation of social preferences in team members.

The conceptual framework that best describes the underlying tradeoffs and the context of cooperative behavior in a company setting is a multitasking model in the fashion of ?. The contextual factors and the respective sensitivity of cooperative effort are, for example, described by ? (complementarity of efforts), ?(development of cooperative cultures within companies), or ? (assumption on form of social preferences).

We see our project as, on the one hand, providing exploratory evidence, but more importantly, on the other hand, (i) providing evidence on the alleged but not substantiated association between cooperative inclination, cooperation culture and individual as well as team success within a company and (ii) providing rigorous evidence for the external validity for a business context of two of the most frequently applied laboratory measures of cooperative behavior and norms.

All data descriptions and the anticipation of the analyses rely on the exact format and company record data availability. As this pre-analysis plan is written, we only have rough descriptions of the variables. In particular, we have no information on the variances in responses. We are going to update this analysis plan once we receive more detailed

information on the company data.

3.1 Primary outcome variables

For our first purpose of understanding the relationship between cooperative inclination and success/performance, the main variable of interest is *performance* that is a manager appraisal on the performance of each employee on a scale from 1 (very good) to 6 (insufficient). We use the average performance evaluation of all members of the same real-life team in our sample as an indicator for team performance.⁴ The most direct mapping of performance differences can be expected to be individual and average team wage increases.

To analyze the external validity of the public goods game and the cooperation games, we employ measures of within-company cooperation which is most likely to be the variable *reward* that is 1 if an employee received a recognition award for being very cooperative at the workplace, and 0 otherwise. The receipt of such an reward can be proposed by other employees in the company (peer-level reward) and it measures whether employees behaved like they are ought to do. On the team level we consider a measure of team cohesion (Mal and Ashford, 1994) as main indicator for a cooperative team.

3.2 Secondary outcome variables

As an alternative measure of performance especially for younger employees (that are also likely to be on lower hierarchy levels because of their seniority) we use a potential rating (variable *potential*) that is a committee appraisal whether a employee is a “growth”, “accelerated” or “fast”-track candidate. To have a less subjective evaluation of a single or a smaller group of managers we also cross-check our findings with the dependent variable *promotion* and *career* that indicates how often an employee has been promoted and the

⁴For some of the employees there is a new performance rating from 2016 on in which not marks but verbal evaluations are reported. In the first step of the analysis we will exclude this subjects but will later on try to generate a variable that brings the qualitative data on a scaleable measure.

career level of the employee, respectively.⁵ Promotion decisions are taken by a committee of several managers (which are usually larger than the committees that decide about performance or potential ratings). Also, whether an employee received an award for achieving individual targets is a secondary measure for success in the company. On the team level, we are going to measure team success also by the receipt of an target achievement bonus (which however is a team target; depending on the incentive scheme). A success measure that is more broadly relevant across different incentive schemes is the shared perception about team success elicited via our earlier described coordination mechanism.

Finally, outcome variables of secondary importance will be the self-evaluation of employees' performance that are being measured on the same scale as *performance* and the self-report about individual satisfaction (and an average measure for teams).

To check the external validity of our experimental measures we use a team stability index (see variable *team-stability*) as a secondary measure for cooperation and norms on the team level. On the individual level, we use the difference of the self-evaluation and the manager appraisal to describe the difference between norm and real behavior. We cross-check the predictive power of our public good measure using standard instruments that we elicited in our survey module. In particular, these are the variables *trust*, *pos-reciprocity*, *donation*, and *friends*. We use the public good game contributions (both conditional and unconditional) for the external validity check of the norm elicitation. On the team level we use the average contribution for each real-life company team that is represented with more than one team member in our sample or a variable that describes the team compositions with respect to the cooperative types in our sample.

3.3 Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1:

Cooperative attitude has no relationship to individual success/performance within the

⁵Again, a speciality could lie in the seniority of the employees. So, we might also consider the variable *successor* that indicates whether a especially younger employee is designated to be a future leader of a team.

company.

Being cooperative can be beneficial if others are also cooperative, but it can be a disadvantage if others are not cooperative. In the latter case, cooperative players are exploited. In an extreme case, in which outcomes depend on individual and on group effort, in which group effort levels are neither substitutes nor complements and in which there is a contest among group members for promotion, the free riding equilibrium in a social dilemma is sustained (and it will be even reinforced from a behavioral perspective, i.e., group members that would have cooperated in the absence of the contest, will not cooperate anymore). Naturally, this result could change if the contest takes place between two groups (one member of each group is promoted) or if there are complementarities in efforts. We formulate Hypothesis 1 cautiously, but one can conceive a relationship that probably has different signs on different hierarchy levels or in different departments of the company, following different production functions (remember that we can assess the actual levels of complementarities in different participating departments and teams).

Hypothesis 1-a:

Cooperative attitude has a positive relationship to team success/performance within the company. The relationship becomes more strongly positive with more complementarities being present.

Most tasks within a team require cooperation and coordination. It is natural to expect to see teams function better if their members are cooperative. However, we can also look at the specific influence of the distribution of types within a team (we will select comparatively small teams for our experiment from the teams at the company). Is one strong free-rider enough to spoil the performance of a small team or can a team handle a certain number of free riders and still sustain cooperation?

Hypothesis 1-b:

The incentive mechanism has no impact on the relationship between cooperative attitude and individual success/performance.

Hypothesis 1-b is formulated cautiously. One can imagine that strong individual performance incentives are related to less cooperative behavior in many environments, whereas fixed wages (with weak promotion incentives) are associated with more cooperative behavior. The variation in actual tenure of employees in specific incentive mechanisms can give us some guidance on the extent of self-selection and the extent of the direct effects of the incentives.

Hypothesis 1-c:

A higher average cooperative attitude has a positive impact on individual and team satisfaction.

If cooperation is perceived as the social norm and if we assume that humans have a preference for following the norm or for sustaining a positive image, higher average levels of cooperation, controlling for everything else, should lead to more satisfaction on the individual level and on the team level. However, the level of satisfaction might interact with individual attitudes toward cooperation or with personality traits.

In environments with strong complementarities promotion incentives may foster cooperation, whereas if complementarities are weak, they should not be very important for the observed level of cooperation. Importantly, the nature of the promotion will matter a lot - if the promotion is most likely outside the team (into another team or department), cooperation incentives are reinforced, whereas if team members compete directly for promotion, cooperation will likely break down.

Hypothesis 2:

Measures of cooperative attitudes and cooperative behavior have no predictive power for real-world cooperation within the company.

Hypothesis 2 addresses the issue of external validity of measures from the online experiment. Real-world cooperation will be proxied by the assessment of one's cooperative behavior by one's team members and by one's self-assessment. This is an assessment that

can be performed on the individual level, when one uses employee evaluations of superiors and subordinates by the respective other group. However, we can also exploit the variation across teams. Teams that perceive themselves as more cooperative (by evaluations) should have members that, on average, tend to be more cooperative in the online experiment. Whenever possible, we will try to control for the level of competition across teams. Competition across teams might foster cooperation within teams. Remember that our online experiment elicits cooperation in an anonymized fashion, without sanctioning mechanisms being available. In day-to-day team business within the company, teams interact repeatedly and informal peer sanctioning is possible. Hence, there is no one-to-one relationship between the “online laboratory” and the “wild”. However, even in repeated interaction with sanctioning, cooperative individuals are required to sustain cooperation. As a consequence, the direction of any effect against the null hypothesis formulated above should still be relevant. Notice that we assume cooperative attitude as measured by our public goods experiment to be a relatively stable individual trait; thus, we formulate a causal statement. However, a word of caution is necessary: without this assumption, we can establish only a potential correlation.

Hypothesis 2-a:

A higher average cooperative attitude is positively related to team cohesion and team stability.

It is rather obvious that more cooperative teams should be more stable and more cohesive. However, again, rigorous empirical evidence from the workplace is scarce. Furthermore, team cohesion has been shown to have ambiguous effects on performance. More cohesive teams are more likely to fall prey to “groupthink” in decision making (?), which might lead to inferior results.

Hypothesis 2-b:

The perception of social (cooperative) norms influences cooperative behavior in the experiment and outside the laboratory.

We observe the perception of cooperative norms by employees at the company, and we also observe actual cooperation in the online experiment and outside the laboratory. It is straightforward to assume that these measures are correlated. We also expect that injunctive and descriptive norms will be correlated and that injunctive norms will be more extreme than descriptive norms. Both perceptions of the social (cooperation) norms should have predictive power for cooperative behavior in the experiment and outside the laboratory. Injunctive norms should be a better predictor for conditional cooperation in the VCM and descriptive norms should be a better predictor for unconditional cooperation. Depending on the team, units with more complementarities, less individual incentives, and more team incentives will report higher social standards, both injunctively and descriptively.

Hypothesis 2-c:

Differences in the perception of social (cooperative) norms within a team help explain team success/performance.

Team success should depend on the level of cooperation (cooperative attitude) within the team (see Hypothesis 1-a), but cooperative attitude might be influenced by the perception of the social norm. It could be that, even though all team members are in principle conditionally cooperative, they perceive the norm differently and, thus, the team is less successful. We can control the type of decision makers and assess the effect of perception on behavior. Perception of social norms may also be related to structural variables, to one's position in the company, to one's immediate environment (such as variables capturing team cohesion and team stability), and to one's cooperative behavior.

3.4 Construction of main regressors

Our main regressors are public good game contributions (unconditional and conditional) and the respective classification of types that also rely on the beliefs about other group members contribution. We use the typology as described in [Kocher et al. \(2015\)](#). Also, the cooperative norms (injunctive/descriptive norms, differences between norms, average of

the five) will be very relevant contextual factors. We will specify our variables as described in [Krupka and Weber \(2013\)](#) or [Burks and Krupka \(2012\)](#). Due to the between-subject elicitation of injunctive and descriptive using one of these norms will lower our sample size. Shared perception about impact, success and complementarity will also be used. The variable *team-stability* will be an average index from three questions on team stability in the survey module. All other control variables are described in more detail in the variable list attached to this pre-analysis plan.

3.5 Econometric models

While our hypotheses document our theoretical predictions and relevant contextual factors (that give rise to control or interaction variables), we also anticipate our econometric model specifications. Instead of writing the exact model down, however, we specify classes of dependent and independent variables that will later be proxied by the variables mentioned and defined in 3.1., 3.2., and 3.4., respectively. Please remind that we do not know the exact appearance of all company record data. We also want to mention that some of the relations we anticipate might differ for different areas or hierarchies in the company. We will encounter these structural differences more exploratively as these are most likely company-specific.

The attached table “Econometric models” summarizes our regression specifications. We will make sure to account for the panel structure of the data by using random effects specification and will also cluster on the team-level if necessary. We will also address potential censoring or truncation of the data when necessary.

4 What’s next?

We are expecting the company data to arrive after the 25th of November 2017. Once the data has arrived, we update this pre-analysis plan according to our better understanding about the availability of the data and variable structures. Subsequently, we analyze the first

wave of the data and will discuss the results with the company. Resulting field interventions or the exploitation of natural experiments or the start of the second wave of the experiments will then be pre-registered again.

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Consequences of cooperation: Data

Variables collected from the experiments

Category	Variable	Scale	Description	Details
Public goods game	<i>contribute</i>	ratio	Unconditional contribution	
	<i>x_contribute</i>	ratio	Contribution conditional on x contributed by other team members	
	<i>belief_contribute</i>	ratio	Belief about average contribution of the other team members	$x \in \{1,2, \dots, 10\}$
Coordination games	<i>y_inorm</i>	ordinal	Guessed modal answer category for question on social appropriateness of behavior in the vignettes	50% der TeilnehmerInnen: $x \in \{1,2, \dots, 5\}$
	<i>y_dnorm</i>	ordinal	Guessed modal answer category for question on frequency of observability of behavior in the five vignettes	50% der TeilnehmerInnen: $x \in \{1,2, \dots, 5\}$
	<i>team_success</i>	ordinal	Guessed modal answer category for question on perceived team success	
	<i>team_impact</i>	ordinal	Guessed modal answer category for question on perceived impact of team on company value	
Time preferences	<i>time</i>	binary	Switching point in Falk et al. (2016) incentivized elicitation procedure	

Variables collected from online survey

Category	Variable	Scale	Description	Details
	<i>team_cooperation</i>	ordinal	Need for cooperation among team members	
	<i>team_cohesion</i>	cardinal	Perception of team cohesion (Mal and Ashford)	
	<i>n_competiveness</i>	ordinal	Perception of negative competitive pressure among team members	
	<i>p_competiveness</i>	ordinal	Perception of positive competitive pressure among team members	
	<i>team_stability</i>	cardinal	Perception of staff stability within the team	Individual average score
	<i>stress</i>	cardinal	Perceived chronic stress	Individual average score
	<i>big_five</i>	cardinal	big five personality measure (Rammstedt et al 2012; Gosling et al 2003)	Individual average score (for each personality trait)
	<i>neg_reciprocity</i>	ordinal	Social preference measure indicating the participants tendency for negative reciprocity (Falk et al 2016)	
	<i>pos_reciprocity</i>	ordinal	Social preference measure indicating the participants tendency for positive reciprocity (Falk et al 2016)	
	<i>trust</i>	ordinal	Social preference measure indicating the participants trust (Anderson et al 2004)	
	<i>competitive_attitude</i>	cardinal	The participants individual competitive attitude (Newby and Klein 2014)	Individual average score
	<i>donation</i>	binary	Participants donation of his/her earned money from the study	
	<i>children</i>	binary	Indicating whether the participant has children or not	
	<i>friends</i>	cardinal	The participants amount of friends (Anderson et al 2004)	

Variables collected from the company

Individual-level data on a yearly basis from 2013 to 2016.

Category	Variable	Scale	Description	Details
Structural aspects	<i>team_membership</i>	nominal	Unique team identifier (from ORG structure)	
	<i>team_size</i>	ratio	Number of team members	
Socio-economics	<i>age</i>	ratio	Age of employee	
	<i>gender</i>	nominal	Gender of employee	
Work-related characteristics	<i>seniority</i>	ratio	Seniority of employee (in years)	
	<i>board</i>	nominal	Board area	Human Resources Products & Innovation Digital Business Services Global Customer Operations Business Networks & Applications
	<i>function</i>	nominal	Functional area which consists of clusters of several job families based on generic job content	Communications Development Education and Knowledge Services Finance General Management and Admin Human Resources Information Technology Marketing Sales and Presales Services Non Headcount relevant
	<i>career</i>	ordinal	Career level of employee (describes contribution based upon business results, accountability, complexity, experience and communication)	T1 (Associate) T2 (Specialist) T3 (Senior) T4PF (Expert) T4PM (Manager) T5PF (Chief Expert) T5PM (Senior Management)
	<i>job</i>	nominal	Job families, i.e., groups of jobs in a more specific occupational area within a functional area	More than 104

Personnel responsibility	<i>leader</i>	ordinal	Within company hierarchy	Aspiring Leaders First Level Leaders Mid Level Leaders Executive Global Executive / Senior Executive
HR development	<i>talk</i>	binary	Indicator for participating in the “talk program”, i.e., not receiving performance rankings	<i>talk</i> =1 for all from 2017 on
	<i>potential</i>	ordinal	Potential rating by manager appraisal	If <i>talk</i> = 0: growth accelerated fast if <i>talk</i> = 1: key contributor no key contributor
	<i>performance</i>	ordinal	Performance rating by manager appraisal	If <i>talk</i> = 0: insufficient progressing successful outstanding extraordinary if <i>talk</i> = 1: none
	<i>self_performance</i>	ordinal	Self-assessment of performance rating to be appraised by the manager	If <i>talk</i> = 0: insufficient progressing successful outstanding extraordinary if <i>talk</i> = 1: none
	<i>successor</i>	binary	Indicator for employee is designated successor of a position on the next hierarchy level	
	<i>talent</i>	binary	Indicator for employee participating in a talent program	

Incentives	<i>bonus</i>	nominal	Bonus scheme the subject is incentivized with	If <i>bonus</i> =0: variable pay component is contingent on company target attainment If <i>bonus</i> =1: variable pay component is contingent on individual target attainment
	<i>bonus_decision</i>	binary	Indicator for employee chose his/her bonus system by him/herself	Only employees in that are not revenue enabling can choose between schemes; others don't
	<i>wage</i>	ratio	Yearly wage before taxes	
	<i>spot</i>	ratio	Amount of money received by a spot award	Individual monetary incentive awarded by manager
	<i>move</i>	ratio	Amount of money received by a move award	Individual investment option incentive awarded by manager
Cooperation within the company	<i>cooperate</i>	ratio	Number of peer-to-peer awards received for being cooperative	Social recognition awarded by another employee
	<i>cooperate_2</i>		Other variable for cooperation within the company	?
	<i>complement</i>		Complementarities of cooperation in the production function (expert interview)	Not conducted yet
Satisfaction	<i>satisfaction</i>		Average satisfaction in team (People survey)	no information yet

Econometric models

Hypothesis	Unit	Dependent variable class	Main independent variable	Further controls	Models	(Potential) Interactions with main independent variable
1	individual	Success/performance - <i>performance</i> - <i>potential</i> - <i>promotion</i> - <i>career</i> - <i>successor</i> - <i>bonus</i>	<i>contribute/type</i>	<i>norms</i> <i>board area</i> <i>seniority</i> <i>contribute_others</i> <i>incentives</i> <i>team_cooperation</i>	OLS as baseline Mixed, ordered and multinomial logit	<i>hierarchy</i> <i>board areas</i> <i>seniority</i> <i>team_cooperation</i>
1-a	team	Success/performance - <i>avg. performance</i> - <i>team_bonus</i> - <i>team_success</i>	<i>avg. contribute/type_composition</i>	<i>norms</i> <i>board area</i> <i>seniority</i> <i>incentives</i> <i>team_cooperation</i>	OLS as baseline Probit and mixed logit	Esp. <i>team_cooperaton</i>
1-b	individual	Success/performance - <i>performance</i> - <i>potential</i> - <i>promotion</i> - <i>career</i> - <i>successor</i> - <i>bonus</i>	<i>contribute/type</i>	<i>norms</i> <i>board area</i> <i>seniority</i> <i>contribute_others</i> <i>incentives</i> <i>team_cooperation</i>	OLS as baseline Mixed, ordered and multinomial logit	Esp. <i>incentives</i>
1-c	individual	<i>satisfaction</i>	<i>contribute/type</i>	<i>norms</i> <i>big_five</i> <i>board area</i> <i>seniority</i>	OLS as baseline Mixed logit	<i>norms</i>

				<i>contribute_others</i> <i>incentives</i> <i>team_cooperation</i>		
1-c	team	<i>satisfaction</i>	<i>avg. contribute/</i> <i>type_composition</i>	<i>norms</i> <i>board area</i> <i>seniority</i> <i>incentives</i> <i>team_cooperation</i>	OLS as baseline Mixed logit	<i>norms</i>
2	individual	Real-life cooperation within company - <i>cooperate</i> - <i>cooperate_2</i> - <i>cooperation_assessment</i>	<i>contribute/type</i>	<i>norms</i> <i>board area</i> <i>seniority</i> <i>incentives</i> <i>team_cooperation</i>	OLS as baseline Probit	<i>incentives</i> <i>hierarchy</i> <i>board areas</i> <i>seniority</i> <i>team_cooperation</i>
2 (check)	individual	<i>contribute/type</i>	<i>pos_reciprocity</i> <i>trust</i> <i>donation</i> <i>friends</i>	<i>big_five</i> <i>competitive_attitude</i>	OLS	<i>gender</i>
2	team	Real-life cooperation within company - <i>cooperation_assessment</i>	<i>avg. contribute/</i> <i>type_composition</i>	<i>norms</i> <i>board area</i> <i>seniority</i> <i>incentives</i> <i>team_cooperation</i>	OLS as baseline	<i>incentives</i> <i>hierarchy</i> <i>board areas</i> <i>seniority</i> <i>team_cooperation</i>
2-a	team	Real-life cooperation within company - <i>team_cohesion</i> - <i>team_stability</i>	<i>avg. contribute/</i> <i>type_composition</i>	<i>norms</i> <i>board area</i> <i>seniority</i> <i>incentives</i> <i>team_cooperation</i>	OLS	<i>incentives</i> <i>hierarchy</i> <i>board areas</i> <i>seniority</i> <i>team_cooperation</i>

2-b	individual	Cooperative behavior - contribute/type - cooperate - cooperate_2 - cooperation_assessment	<i>Norms (injunctive and descriptive separately)</i>	<i>board area</i> <i>seniority</i> <i>incentives</i> <i>team_cooperation</i>	OLS Multinomial logit	<i>incentives</i> <i>team_cooperation</i>
2-b	team	Cooperative behavior - avg. contribute/ - type_composition - cooperation_assessment	<i>Norms (injunctive and descriptive separately)</i>	<i>board area</i> <i>seniority</i> <i>incentives</i> <i>team_cooperation</i>	OLS Multinomial logit	<i>incentives</i> <i>team_cooperation</i>
2-c	team	Success/performance - avg. performance - team_bonus - team_success	<i>norms_differences</i>	<i>avg. contribute/</i> <i>type_composition</i> <i>team_cohesion</i> <i>team_stability</i> <i>board area</i> <i>seniority</i> <i>incentives</i> <i>team_cooperation</i>	OLS as baseline Probit and mixed logit	

Invitation E-Mail:

To: 100 randomly selected teams from bla and bla in Germany

Dear colleague,

As announced at the works meeting in September 2017, we are investigating collaboration at bla in Germany in the context of a research project. The project is a joint initiative of our HR department, the Works Councils of bla and bla, and the chairs of behavioral economics at the Ludwig-Maximilian University of Munich and the University of Heidelberg. It is being conducted exclusively at and with bla, and is being funded by the German Research Foundation.

One hundred teams from bla in Germany have been selected at random to participate in the study – and yours is one of them!

Join in! Your personal access link is here:

**Personalized link to
participate**

The link will be open until November 25, 2017. Participation is voluntary, will take about 30 minutes and can take place during your working hours. Any information and data you enter or that relates to you will be anonymized.

Why we hope for your participation:

- Based on scientific standards, we want to investigate which factors influence successful collaboration at bla.
- To achieve quality results, we need a high participation rate among the teams invited to take part.

Why it's worth your time:

- The study is made up of interactive elements and compelling scenarios.
- You will receive a payment of between €5 and €126.50 for participating.

Further details are given in the online experiment. Once the universities have completed their evaluation, we will publish the results internally at bla.

Any questions? Simply email us at survey@econ.lmu.de.

Thank you and best regards,

Bla

bla

Prof. Dr. Christiane Schwieren
University of Heidelberg

bla

Prof. Dr. Martin Kocher
Ludwig-Maximilian University of
Munich

Reminder E-Mail:

Dear Colleagues,

We are investigating collaboration at bla in Germany in the context of a research project. You can still participate until this **Saturday, November 25th**.

Please invest 30 minutes and join in, as a high response rate is very important for the quality of the results. For more information, please see our previous e-mail below.

Thank You!

[copy of invitation e-mail]

Kooperationskultur bei BLA

Survey Flow

EmbeddedData payoffValue will be set from Panel or URL.
Block: Willkommensbildschirm (1 Question) Standard: Zustimmungserklärung (1 Question)
EmbeddedData stopper1Value will be set from Panel or URL.
Standard: Öffentliches Gut Experiment (12 Questions)
EmbeddedData stopper2Value will be set from Panel or URL.
Standard: Öffentliches Gut Experiment (Erwartungen) (2 Questions)
EmbeddedData stopper3Value will be set from Panel or URL.
BlockRandomizer: 1 - Evenly Present Elements
Standard: Vignetten (IST) (6 Questions) Standard: Vignetten (SOLL) (6 Questions)
EmbeddedData stopper4Value will be set from Panel or URL.
Standard: Teamerfolg (4 Questions)
EmbeddedData stopper8Value will be set from Panel or URL.
Standard: Zeitpräferenzen (2 Questions)
EmbeddedData stopper5Value will be set from Panel or URL.
Standard: Fragebogenteil (21 Questions)
EmbeddedData stopper6Value will be set from Panel or URL.
Standard: Abschlussbildschirm mit Auszahlungscode (2 Questions)
EmbeddedData stopper7Value will be set from Panel or URL.
Branch: New Branch If

If Wie möchten Sie Ihre Auszahlung erhalten? als Überweisung auf mein Konto Is Selected

Standard: Konto (1 Question)

Branch: New Branch

If

If Wie möchten Sie Ihre Auszahlung erhalten? als Spende an das SOS Kinderdorf Is Selected

Or Wie möchten Sie Ihre Auszahlung erhalten? als Spende an World Wide Fund For Nature (WWF) Is Selected

Or Wie möchten Sie Ihre Auszahlung erhalten? als Spende an Ärzte ohne Grenzen Is Selected

Or Wie möchten Sie Ihre Auszahlung erhalten? als Spende an Amnesty International Is Selected

Or Wie möchten Sie Ihre Auszahlung erhalten? als Spende an die Deutsche AIDS-Hilfe Is Selected

Standard: Spende (1 Question)

Page Break

Start of Block: Willkommensbildschirm

welcome

Herzlich Willkommen und vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme!

Diese Studie dient der Untersuchung von Entscheidungsverhalten und wird gut **30 Minuten** in Anspruch nehmen. Sie haben bis zum **24.11.2017** Zeit an der Studie teilzunehmen. Insgesamt besteht die Studie aus **vier Teilen**. Alle vier Teile sind unabhängig voneinander. Zu Beginn jeden Teils erhalten Sie detaillierte Instruktionen. Bitte lesen Sie diese aufmerksam durch.

Im Rahmen von Teil I bis Teil III haben Ihre Entscheidungen monetäre Konsequenzen. Das heißt, abhängig von Ihren Entscheidungen und den Entscheidungen anderer TeilnehmerInnen dieser Studie (alles MitarbeiterInnen von BLA) erhalten Sie eine Auszahlung in Höhe von 5€ bis zu 126,50€. Sie können dann ein Konto angeben, auf das die Auszahlung kostenlos überwiesen wird. Sie können Ihre Teilnahme an der Studie unterbrechen und nach der Pause über Ihren Teilnahme-Link wieder fortsetzen. Bitte stellen Sie sicher, dass Sie eine Fortsetzung an demselben Endgerät und mit demselben Browser starten, um einen reibungslosen Anschluss zu gewährleisten. Ihre Daten werden streng vertraulich behandelt (Details zum Datenschutz finden Sie auf dem nächsten Bildschirm), und Ihre Teilnahme ist selbstverständlich freiwillig.

Bei Rückfragen und Anmerkungen kontaktieren Sie bitte: 06221 54 2930 (von 9:00-17:00 Uhr) oder bla.survey@econ.lmu.de

Mit freundlichen Grüßen, Prof. Dr. Christiane Schwieren
Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg Prof. Dr. Martin Kocher
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

welcome **Welcome and thank you very much for your participation!**

This study will be used to investigate decision-making behavior and will take about 30 minutes. You have until **November 20th, 2017** to participate in the study.

The study consists of **four parts**. All four parts are independent of each other. At the beginning of each part you will receive detailed instructions. Please read them carefully.

Within the framework of Part I to Part III, your decisions have monetary consequences. This means that depending on your decisions and the decisions of other participants in this study (all BLA employees), you will receive a payout of €5 to €126.50. You can then specify an account to which the payout will be transferred free of charge.

You can interrupt your participation in the study and continue after the break via your participation link. Please make sure you start a continuation on the same device and browser to ensure a smooth connection.

Your data will be treated strictly confidential (details of the data privacy protection can be found

on the next screen) and your participation is of course voluntary.

If you have any questions or comments, please contact:

06221 54 2930 (from 9:00 a.m. to 5 p.m.) or bla.survey@econ.lmu.de

Sincerely,

Prof. Dr. Christiane Schwieren
University of Heidelberg, Germany

Prof. Dr. Martin Kocher
University of Munich, Germany

End of Block: Willkommensbildschirm

Start of Block: Zustimmungserklärung

data_protect **Zustimmungserklärung**

Zweck dieser Studie ist die Erforschung Ihres Entscheidungsverhaltens, Ihrer Zufriedenheit bei BLA und Ihres Arbeitsumfelds generell. Ihre Entscheidungen und angegebene Informationen werden streng geschützt und für wissenschaftliche Zwecke in anonymisierter Form (z.B. im Rahmen von Publikationen, Vorträgen, wissenschaftlichen Papieren) von den Universitäten (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Universität Heidelberg) verwendet. Rückschlüsse auf die Entscheidungen und Antworten von einzelnen Individuen sind nicht möglich. Die Daten dürfen der BLA BLA und der BLA BLA auch nur in anonymer Form zur Verfügung gestellt werden und dienen dann der Ableitungen von Managementempfehlungen. Dies bedeutet insbesondere, dass niemand bei BLA BLA oder BLA BLA Ihre Identität mit den gesammelten Daten in Verbindung bringen kann – Sie bleiben anonym. Ihre Angaben in dieser Studie werden u.a. mit Unternehmensdaten zusammengeführt, die es erlauben Ihre Arbeitsbedingungen zu analysieren (hierbei handelt es sich zum Beispiel um Ihre Angaben zu Arbeitsplatzbedingungen und Unternehmensdaten wie die Größe Ihres Teams). Die Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (LMU) verarbeitet, sammelt, speichert und schützt Ihre Daten. Der Anonymisierungscode und die E-Mail-Adressen zur Einladung zur Studienteilnahme werden gelöscht, sobald es der Forschungszweck zulässt, spätestens aber nach Abschluss der Studie.

Ihre Verdienste aus der Teilnahme an dieser Studie werden auf das von Ihnen angegebene Konto (im Euroraum) überwiesen. Ihre Verdienstmöglichkeiten werden in den entsprechenden Teilen dieser Studie detailliert erläutert. Dafür werden Sie am Ende der Studie gebeten, Ihre Kontodaten zur Verfügung zu stellen. Sie willigen ein, dass die Universität Heidelberg (UH) Ihre Kontodaten verwendet, um Ihnen Ihren Verdienst aus der Studienteilnahme zu überweisen. Die Überweisung erfolgt innerhalb einiger Wochen. Ihre Kontodaten werden nach der Überweisung für einige weitere Wochen aufbewahrt, um mögliche Fehler nachvollziehen zu können und dann gelöscht, soweit keine rechtlichen Gründe eine Speicherung erfordern. Die Angabe Ihrer Daten

und die Teilnahme an der Studie ist freiwillig. Die Unternehmens- und Studiendaten werden durch die LMU und Ihre Kontodaten durch die UH verarbeitet. Eine Zusammenführung dieser Daten ist ausgeschlossen.

Es werden nur Daten volljähriger TeilnehmerInnen gesammelt und verarbeitet. Ihre Teilnahme an dieser Studie ist freiwillig und Sie können diese Zustimmungserklärung jederzeit mit einem entsprechenden Hinweis an bla.survey@econ.lmu.de widerrufen. Den Text dieser Zustimmungserklärung können Sie jederzeit über bla.survey@econ.lmu.de anfordern. Außerdem haben Sie das Recht auf Auskunft über und Korrekturen von gespeicherten personenbezogenen Daten, sowie das Recht auf Löschung dieser Daten. Bei Widerruf müssen die von Ihnen erzielten Verdienste zurückgeführt werden und Ihre Daten werden gelöscht. Eine Nichtteilnahme an dieser Studie führt zu keinen Nachteilen für Sie, insbesondere wird die BLA BLA oder BLA BLA nicht über Ihre Nicht-Teilnahme informiert.

- ☐ Ich habe die Informationen zur Kenntnis genommen und bin einverstanden. (1)
- ☐ Ich bin nicht einverstanden (dann können Sie leider nicht an der Studie teilnehmen). (2)

data_protect Declaration of consent The purpose of this study is to investigate your decision-making behavior, your satisfaction at BLA and with your working environment in general. Your decisions and specified information will be strictly protected and used for scientific purposes in an anonymized form (e. g. in the context of publications, lectures, scientific papers) by the universities (LMU Munich and Heidelberg University). It is not possible to draw conclusions about the decisions and answers of individual persons. The data may be made available to BLA BLA and BLA BLA also only in anonymous form and is then used to derive management recommendations. This means in particular that nobody from the BLA BLA or BLA BLA is able to associate your identity with the collected data. Your data in this study will be merged with company data, which will allow your working conditions to be analyzed (for instance, those are your information on workplace conditions and company data such as the size of your team). The Ludwig Maximilian University Munich (LMU) processes, collects, stores and protects your data. The anonymization code and the e-mail addresses used for the invitations will be deleted as soon as the purpose of the research permits it, but at the latest after completion of the study.

Your earnings from participating in this study will be transferred to the account you have indicated (within the euro area). Your earnings potential is explained in detail in the corresponding parts of this study. To do this, you will be asked to provide your account information at the end of the study. You agree that the University of Heidelberg (UH) will use your account data to transfer your earnings from participating in the study to you. The transfer will be made within a few weeks. Your bank account data will be stored for a few more weeks after the transfer in order to be able to trace possible errors and then deleted, as far as no legal reasons require storage. The provision of your data as well as your participation in the study is voluntary. The company and study data is processed by the LMU and your account data by the UH. A combination of these data is precluded.

Only data of participants of age will be collected and processed. Your participation in this study is voluntary and you may revoke this declaration of consent at any time by notifying bla.survey@econ.lmu.de accordingly. You can request this text on declaration of consent anytime via bla.survey@econ.lmu.de. Furthermore, you have also the right to get any information of stored personal data, corrections of it or to delete it. If you withdraw your consent, the money you have earned has to be returned and your data will be deleted. Not participating in this study will not be detrimental to you, in particular BLA BLA or BLA BLA will not be informed of your non-participation.

- ☐ I acknowledge and agree with the information provided. (1)
- ☐ I do not agree (then you unfortunately cannot participate in the study). (2)

Skip To: End of Survey If Zustimmungserklärung Zweck dieser Studie ist die Erforschung Ihres Entscheidungsverhaltens, Ihr... = Ich bin nicht einverstanden (dann können Sie leider nicht an der Studie teilnehmen).

End of Block: Zustimmungserklärung

Start of Block: Öffentliches Gut Experiment

inst1 **Instruktionen zu Teil I** Sie sind Mitglied einer 3er-Gruppe, bestehend aus anonymen TeilnehmerInnen an dieser Studie. Alle TeilnehmerInnen sind zufällig ausgewählte MitarbeiterInnen von BLA. Die Zusammenstellung in die 3er-Gruppen erfolgt zufällig. Die Auszahlungen für Sie und die anderen Gruppenmitglieder aus diesem Teil hängen von Ihren Entscheidungen und den Entscheidungen der anderen Mitglieder Ihrer Gruppe

ab. **Entscheidungssituation**

Jedes Mitglied der Gruppe muss über die Verwendung von jeweils 10 Token entscheiden. Sie und die anderen Gruppenmitglieder können die 10 Token auf ein Privatkonto legen, oder Sie können sie ganz oder teilweise in ein Gemeinschaftskonto einzahlen. Jeden Token, den Sie nicht in das Gemeinschaftskonto einzahlen, legen Sie automatisch auf das Privatkonto.

Einkommen aus dem Privatkonto

Für jeden Token, den Sie auf das Privatkonto legen, verdienen Sie genau einen Euro. Wenn Sie zum Beispiel 4 Token auf das Privatkonto legen, verdienen Sie genau 4€ aus dem Privatkonto. Niemand außer Ihnen bezieht ein Einkommen aus Ihrem Privatkonto.

Einkommen aus dem Gemeinschaftskonto

Für jeden Token, der zum Gemeinschaftskonto beigetragen wird, erhalten Sie 0,5€. Auch die anderen beiden Gruppenmitglieder erhalten jeweils 0,5€ für jeden Token, den Sie beitragen. Umgekehrt gilt, dass auch Sie durch die Beiträge der anderen zwei Gruppenmitglieder zum Gemeinschaftskonto verdienen. Das Einkommen jedes Mitglieds aus dem Gemeinschaftskonto ist folgendermaßen bestimmt:

Wenn also beispielsweise die Summe der Beiträge aller drei Gruppenmitglieder zum Gemeinschaftskonto 30 Token ergibt, dann erhalten Sie und die anderen zwei Gruppenmitglieder jeweils $30 \times 0,5 = 15\text{€}$ aus dem Gemeinschaftskonto. Wenn die drei Gruppenmitglieder insgesamt 10 Token in das Gemeinschaftskonto einzahlen, erhalten Sie und die zwei anderen Gruppenmitglieder jeweils $10 \times 0,5 = 5\text{€}$ aus dem Gemeinschaftskonto.

Gesamteinkommen

Ihr Gesamteinkommen ergibt sich aus der Summierung Ihres Einkommens aus dem Privatkonto und Ihres Einkommens aus dem Gemeinschaftskonto. Also:

Ihre Eingabe

Wie eingangs beschrieben, stehen Ihnen 10 Token zur Verfügung, die Sie auf Ihr Privatkonto und in das Gemeinschaftskonto einzahlen können. Jedes Gruppenmitglied muss zwei Typen von Beitragsentscheidungen treffen, die wir im Folgenden den Beitrag und die Beitragstabelle nennen werden. Eine detaillierte Beschreibung Ihrer Eingaben finden Sie auf den Eingabebildschirmen.

inst1 Instructions for Part I

You are a member of a group of three, consisting of anonymous participants in this study. All participants are randomly selected employees of BLA. The combination into groups of 3 occurs randomly. The payouts for you and the other group members in this section depend on your decisions and the decisions of the other members of your group.

Decision-making situation

Each member of the group must decide on the use of 10 tokens each. You and the other group members can put the 10 tokens into a private account, or you can deposit them in whole or in part into a joint account. Any tokens that you do not deposit into the joint account are automatically added to your private account.

Income from the private account

You earn exactly one euro for each token you put in your private account. For example, if you put 4 tokens into your private account, you will earn exactly €4 from your private account. No one but you receives income from your private account.

Income from the joint account

For each token that is added to the joint account, you will receive €0.5. The other two group members also each receive €0.5 for each token you contribute. Conversely, you also earn money from the contributions of the other two group members to the joint account. The income of each member from the joint account is determined as follows:

For example, if the sum of all three group members' contributions to the joint account results in 30 tokens, then you and the other two group members each receive $30 \times 0.5 = €15$ from the joint account. If the three group members pay a total of 10 tokens into the joint account, you and the other two group members receive $10 \times 0.5 = €5$ each from the joint account.

Total income

Your total income is the sum of your income from your private account and your income from the joint account. So:

Your decision

As described above, you can use 10 tokens to fund your private account and the joint account. Each group member has to make two types of contribution decisions, which we will refer to below as the contribution and the contribution table. You can find a detailed description of your entries on the entry screens.

inst2

Verständnisfragen

Bitte beantworten Sie die folgenden Fragen, um sicherzustellen, dass Sie die Instruktionen zu Teil I des Experiments verstanden haben. Sollten Sie sich unsicher sein, können Sie über "Zurück" wieder zu den Instruktionen gelangen.

inst2 **Comprehension questions** Please answer the following questions to ensure that you have understood the instructions for Part I of the experiment. If you are unsure, you can return to the instructions by clicking on "Back".



ct1 Nehmen Sie an, dass **keines** der Gruppenmitglieder (auch Sie selbst nicht) einen Beitrag in das Gruppenkonto einzahlt.

	Wie hoch ist... (1)
 ... Ihr Gesamteinkommen? (1)	
 ... das jeweilige Gesamteinkommen der anderen beiden Gruppenmitglieder? (2)	

ct1 Assume that **none** of the group members (even you yourself) pay a contribution into the group account.

	How high is... (1)
☒ ... your total income? (1)	
☒ ... the respective total income of the other two group members? (2)	



ct2 Nehmen Sie an, dass **alle** drei Gruppenmitglieder (auch Sie selbst) jeweils einen **Beitrag in Höhe von 10 Token** in das Gruppenkonto einzahlen.

	Wie hoch ist... (1)
☒ ... Ihr Gesamteinkommen? (1)	
☒ ... das jeweilige Gesamteinkommen der anderen beiden Gruppenmitglieder? (2)	

ct2 Assume that **all** three group members (also you yourself) each pay a **contribution of 10 tokens** into the group account.

	How high is... (1)
 ... your total income? (1)	
 ... the respective total income of the other two group members? (2)	



ct3 Nehmen Sie an, dass **Sie 0 Token** in das Gemeinschaftskonto einzahlen und die **beiden anderen Mitglieder Ihrer Gruppe jeweils 10 Token**.

	Wie hoch ist... (1)
 ... Ihr Gesamteinkommen? (1)	
 ... das jeweilige Gesamteinkommen der anderen beiden Gruppenmitglieder? (2)	

ct3 Assume that you deposit **0 tokens** into the joint account and that the **other two members of your group deposit 10 tokens each**.

	How high is... (1)
 ... your total income? (1)	
 ... the respective total income of the other two group members? (2)	



ct4 Nehmen Sie an, dass **Sie 10 Token** in das Gemeinschaftskonto einzahlen und die **beiden anderen Mitglieder Ihrer Gruppe jeweils 0 Token**.

	Wie hoch ist... (1)
 ... Ihr Gesamteinkommen? (1)	
 ... das jeweilige Gesamteinkommen der anderen beiden Gruppenmitglieder? (2)	

ct4 Assume that you pay **10 tokens** into the joint account and **the other two members of your group each pay 0 tokens**.

How high is... (1)

 ... your total income? (1)

 ... the respective total income of the other
two group members? (2)

Page Break

inst3 Beim Beitrag zum Gemeinschaftskonto legen Sie fest, wie viele von den 10 Token Sie in das Gemeinschaftskonto einzahlen wollen. Die Einzahlung auf Ihr Privatkonto ist automatisch die Differenz zwischen 10 Token und Ihrem Beitrag zum Gemeinschaftskonto.

inst3 When choosing the contribution to the joint account, you determine how many of the 10 tokens you want to deposit into the joint account. The deposit to your private account is automatically the difference between 10 tokens and your contribution to the joint account.

contribute Bitte geben Sie den Betrag an, den Sie in das **Gemeinschaftskonto** einzahlen möchten (jeder ganzzahlige Wert zwischen und inklusive 0 und 10 ist möglich):

Gemeinschaftskonto (1)	
------------------------	--

contribute Please enter the amount you would like to pay into the **joint account** (any whole-number value between and including 0 and 10 is possible):

Joint account (1)	
-------------------	--

Page Break

inst4 Nun werden Sie gebeten, eine Beitragstabelle auszufüllen. In der Beitragstabelle sollen Sie für jeden möglichen (gerundeten) durchschnittlichen Beitrag der zwei anderen Gruppenmitglieder zum Gemeinschaftskonto angeben, wie viele Token Sie in das Gemeinschaftskonto einzahlen wollen. Sie müssen also in Abhängigkeit davon, wie viel die anderen im Durchschnitt beitragen, Ihre eigene Beitragsentscheidung festlegen. Bitte geben Sie für jeden durchschnittlichen Beitrag der beiden anderen Gruppenmitglieder den Betrag an, den Sie in das Gemeinschaftskonto einzahlen möchten (jeder ganzzahlige Wert zwischen und inklusive 0 und 10 ist möglich; selbstverständlich können Sie auch mehrmals den gleichen Betrag angeben):

inst4 Now you will be asked to fill in a contribution table. In the contribution table, you should specify how many tokens you want to pay into the joint account for each possible (rounded) average contribution of the other two group members to the joint account. So, depending on how much the others contribute on average, you must define your own contribution decision.

For each average contribution of the other two group members, please indicate the amount you would like to pay into the joint account (any whole-number value between and including 0 and 10 is possible; of course, you can also enter the same amount several times):

x_contribute Was ist Ihr Beitrag in das Gemeinschaftskonto, wenn...

... die anderen beiden Gruppenmitglieder im Durchschnitt 0 Token einzahlen. (1)	
... die anderen beiden Gruppenmitglieder im Durchschnitt 1 Token einzahlen. (2)	
... die anderen beiden Gruppenmitglieder im Durchschnitt 2 Token einzahlen. (3)	
... die anderen beiden Gruppenmitglieder im Durchschnitt 3 Token einzahlen. (4)	
... die anderen beiden Gruppenmitglieder im Durchschnitt 4 Token einzahlen. (5)	
... die anderen beiden Gruppenmitglieder im Durchschnitt 5 Token einzahlen. (6)	
... die anderen beiden Gruppenmitglieder im Durchschnitt 6 Token einzahlen. (7)	
... die anderen beiden Gruppenmitglieder im Durchschnitt 7 Token einzahlen. (8)	
... die anderen beiden Gruppenmitglieder im Durchschnitt 8 Token einzahlen. (9)	
... die anderen beiden Gruppenmitglieder im Durchschnitt 9 Token einzahlen. (10)	
... die anderen beiden Gruppenmitglieder im Durchschnitt 10 Token einzahlen. (11)	

x_contribute What is your contribution to the joint account if...

... the other two group members deposit an average of 0 tokens . (1)	
... the other two group members deposit an average of 1 tokens . (2)	
... the other two group members deposit an average of 2 tokens . (3)	
... the other two group members deposit an average of 3 tokens . (4)	
... the other two group members deposit an average of 4 tokens . (5)	
... the other two group members deposit an average of 5 tokens . (6)	
... the other two group members deposit an average of 6 tokens . (7)	
... the other two group members deposit an average of 7 tokens . (8)	
... the other two group members deposit an average of 8 tokens . (9)	
... the other two group members deposit an average of 9 tokens . (10)	
... the other two group members deposit an average of 10 tokens . (11)	

help Hilfe-Option:

Die Zahlen in der linken Spalte sind die möglichen (gerundeten) durchschnittlichen Beiträge der zwei anderen Gruppenmitglieder zum Gemeinschaftskonto. Sie müssen jetzt bei jedem Schieberegler angeben, wie viele Token Sie - unter der Voraussetzung, dass die anderen im Durchschnitt den angegebenen Beitrag einbringen - auf das Gemeinschaftskonto einzahlen wollen. Sie müssen in jedem Feld eine Eintragung machen. Sie sollen also beispielsweise angeben, wie viel Sie zum Gemeinschaftskonto beitragen, wenn die anderen Gruppenmitglieder im Durchschnitt 0 Token in das Gemeinschaftskonto einzahlen; wie viele Token Sie beitragen, wenn die anderen im Durchschnitt 1 Token oder 2 Token oder 3 Token, usw. beitragen. Sie können in jedem Feld jeden ganzzahligen Beitrag von 0 Token bis 10 Token eintragen und natürlich auch mehrmals den gleichen Betrag.

help Help option:

The numbers in the left column are the possible (rounded) average contributions of the other two group members to the joint account. You now have to specify how many tokens you want to deposit into the joint account for each slider, provided that the others contribute the specified

amount on average. You have to make an entry in each field. For example, you are to specify how much you contribute to the joint account if the other group members deposit an average of 0 tokens into the joint account; how many tokens you contribute if the others contribute an average of 1 token or 2 tokens or 3 tokens, and so on. You can enter any whole-number contribution from 0 tokens to 10 tokens in each field and, of course, the same amount several times.

Page Break

inst5 Auszahlungsrelevanz Ihrer Entscheidungen Nachdem alle StudienteilnehmerInnen ihre Entscheidungen getroffen haben, wird per Zufall in jeder 3er-Gruppe ein Mitglied ausgewählt. Für das vom Zufall ausgewählte Mitglied ist ausschließlich die von ihm/ihr ausgefüllte Beitragstabelle entscheidungs- und auszahlungsrelevant. Für die anderen zwei Gruppenmitglieder, die nicht ausgewählt wurden, ist ausschließlich der Beitrag entscheidungs- und auszahlungsrelevant. Der Durchschnitt der beiden Beiträge (aufgerundet auf die nächste ganze Zahl) bestimmt dann den relevanten bedingten Beitrag aus der Beitragstabelle des dritten Mitglieds. Sie wissen natürlich noch nicht, welche Ihrer Beitragsentscheidungen vom Zufall ausgewählt wird. Sie müssen daher beide Typen von Beitragsentscheidungen sorgfältig bedenken, da beide für Sie relevant werden können.

Die folgende Grafik soll die Entscheidungssituation visualisieren. Für die zufällig ausgewählte Person rechts ist der bedingte Beitrag aus der Beitragstabelle relevant. Für die zwei anderen Gruppenmitglieder ist der Beitrag auszahlungsrelevant.

inst5 Payout relevance of your decisions

After all study participants have made their decisions, one member is randomly selected in each group of 3. For the randomly selected member, only the contribution table filled in by him/her is relevant for decision making and payout. For the other two group members who have not been selected, only the contribution is relevant for decision-making and payout. The average of the two contributions (rounded to the next whole number) then determines the relevant conditional contribution from the third member's contribution table. Of course, you do not yet know which of your contribution decisions will be randomly selected. You must therefore carefully consider both types of contribution decisions, as both can become relevant to you.

The following graphic is intended to visualize the decision-making situation. For the randomly selected person on the right, the conditional contribution from the contribution table is relevant. For the other two group members, the contribution is relevant for payout.

End of Block: Öffentliches Gut Experiment

Start of Block: Öffentliches Gut Experiment (Erwartungen)

inst6 Zusätzlich zu Ihrem Verdienst aus dem Privat- und Gemeinschaftskonto erhalten Sie eine weitere Auszahlung für die Schätzung des durchschnittlichen Beitrags der beiden anderen Mitglieder Ihrer Gruppe in das Gemeinschaftskonto.

Ihre Auszahlung hängt davon ab, wie genau Sie den tatsächlichen durchschnittlichen Beitrag Ihrer beiden Gruppenmitglieder schätzen. Liegen Sie exakt richtig, erhalten Sie zusätzlich 5€. Liegen Sie mit Ihrer Schätzung um 0,5 oder mehr Token vom tatsächlichen durchschnittlichen Beitrag entfernt, erhalten Sie 0€. Bitte geben Sie eine Zahl von 0 bis 10 ein (jede Zahl in 0,5er-Schritten ist erlaubt).

inst6 In addition to your earnings from your private and joint account, you will receive a further payout for estimating the average contribution of the other two members of your group to your joint account.

Your payout will depend on how accurately you estimate the actual average contribution of your two group members. If you are exactly right, you will receive an additional €5. If your estimate differs by 0.5 or more tokens from the actual average contribution, you will receive €0. Please enter a number from 0 to 10 (each number is allowed in steps of 0.5).

belief_contribute Was glauben Sie, ist der durchschnittliche Beitrag an Token Ihrer beiden Gruppenmitglieder in das Gemeinschaftskonto?

Durchschnittlicher Beitrag der beiden anderen Mitglieder Ihrer Gruppe (1)	
---	--

belief_contribute What do you think is the average amount of tokens your two group members contribute to the joint account?

Average contribution of the other two members of your group (1)	
---	--

End of Block: Öffentliches Gut Experiment (Erwartungen)

Start of Block: Vignetten (IST)

inst7

Instruktionen zu Teil II Im Folgenden beschreiben wir Ihnen verschiedene Entscheidungssituationen bei BLA und das Entscheidungsverhalten eines fiktiven BLA-Mitarbeiters in diesen Situationen. Es geht darum, wie häufig sich ein echter BLA-Mitarbeiter so wie der beschriebene fiktive BLA-Mitarbeiter verhalten würde. Wir sind dabei **nicht** an Ihrer persönlichen Einschätzung interessiert. Wir wollen wissen, welche der vier Kategorien, Ihrer Einschätzung zufolge, von den jeweils meisten TeilnehmerInnen an dieser Studie (mehrere hundert MitarbeiterInnen aus verschiedenen Bereichen bei BLA) ausgewählt wird. Sagt die relative Mehrheit der TeilnehmerInnen an dieser Studie, dass das Verhalten des Mitarbeiters

sehr häufig, eher häufig, eher selten oder sehr selten auftritt (vier Kategorien)? **Gelingt es Ihnen, die Kategorie auszuwählen, die am häufigsten von den anderen TeilnehmerInnen an dieser Studie ausgewählt wurde, erhalten Sie 3€.** Dies gilt für jede der folgenden Entscheidungssituationen. Sie können also für jede der folgenden Entscheidungssituationen 3€ verdienen.

inst7

Instructions for Part II

The following section describes various BLA decision-making situations and the decision-making behavior of a fictitious BLA employee in these situations. It is about how often a real BLA employee would behave like the fictitious BLA employee described above. We are **not** interested in your personal assessment. We would like to know which of the four categories, according to your assessment, is selected by the most participants in this study (several hundred employees from different BLA departments). Does the relative majority of respondents to this study say that the employee's behavior occurs very frequently, rather frequently, rather rarely or very rarely (four categories)? **If you succeed in selecting the category most often selected by the other participants in this study, you will receive €3.** This applies to each of the following decision-making situations. So you can earn €3 for each of the following decision-making situations.

Page Break

1_dnorm **Situation 1**

Mitarbeiter B kontaktiert Mitarbeiter A aus einem anderen Bereich und bittet um seine Hilfe. Mitarbeiter A könnte ihm weiterhelfen, was etwa zwei Stunden seiner Zeit in Anspruch nehmen würde. Ohne die Hilfe von Mitarbeiter A müsste sich Mitarbeiter B zunächst selbst einarbeiten und bräuchte daher etwa acht Stunden, um das Problem alleine zu lösen. Das Thema steht allerdings in keinem direkten Zusammenhang zu den Aufgaben von Mitarbeiter A und dieser ist zeitlich bereits ziemlich ausgelastet. *Mitarbeiter A entscheidet sich, nicht zu helfen.*

Als wie häufig bewerten die meisten anderen Teilnehmer dieser Studie Ihrer Einschätzung nach das beschriebene Verhalten von **Mitarbeiter A**?

Als...

- ☐ sehr selten (1)
- ☐ eher selten (2)
- ☐ eher häufig (3)
- ☐ sehr häufig (4)

1_dnorm **Situation 1**

Employee B contacts employee A from another department and asks for his help. Employee A could help him, which would take about two hours of his time. Without the help of employee A, employee B would have to familiarize himself with the problem first and would therefore need about eight hours to solve the problem on his own. However, this topic is not directly related to the tasks of employee A and he is already working at close to full capacity.

Employee A decides not to help.

According to your estimate, as how frequently occurring do most other participants in this study evaluate the described behavior of **employee A**?

As...

- ☐ very rare (1)
 - ☐ rather rare (2)
 - ☐ rather frequent (3)
 - ☐ very frequent (4)
-

2_dnorm **Situation 2** Mitarbeiter B kontaktiert Mitarbeiter A und bittet um einen Ratschlag zur Entwicklung eines neuen Produkts. Mitarbeiter A könnte ihm weiterhelfen, da er Experte im entsprechenden Fachgebiet ist. Allerdings arbeitet er selbst aktuell an einem ähnlichen Produkt, welches zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt mit dem Produkt von Mitarbeiter B konkurrieren wird. *Mitarbeiter A entscheidet sich, Mitarbeiter B den Ratschlag nicht zu geben.*

Als wie häufig bewerten die meisten anderen Teilnehmer dieser Studie Ihrer Einschätzung nach das beschriebene Verhalten von Mitarbeiter A?

Als...

- ☐ sehr selten (1)
- ☐ eher selten (2)
- ☐ eher häufig (3)
- ☐ sehr häufig (4)

2_dnorm **Situation 2**

Employee B contacts employee A and asks for advice on the development of a new product. Employee A could help him, as he is an expert in the field. However, he is currently working on a similar product himself, which will compete with employee B's product at a later date.

Employee A decides not to give advice to employee B.

According to your estimate, as how frequently occurring do most other participants in this study evaluate the described behavior of **employee A**?

As...

- ☐ very rare (1)
 - ☐ rather rare (2)
 - ☐ rather frequent (3)
 - ☐ very frequent (4)
-

3_dnorm Situation 3 Mitarbeiter A gilt als der Experte für einen wichtigen Unternehmensbereich eines großen Kunden. Mitarbeiter B arbeitet ebenfalls für diesen Kunden und hat eine spezifische Frage zu dem Teilgebiet, in dem Mitarbeiter A Experte ist. Zusätzlich zur Beantwortung dieser Frage, könnte Mitarbeiter A wertvolle Informationen zum gesamten Bereich geben, welche er in den letzten Jahren angesammelt hat. Diese Expertise wäre für Mitarbeiter B und seine Arbeit hilfreich. Es würde jedoch die Bedeutung des Mitarbeiters A als Experte schmälern, wenn er sein Fachwissen weitergeben würde. *Mitarbeiter A entscheidet sich, nur die konkrete Frage des Mitarbeiters B zu beantworten und keine darüberhinausgehenden Informationen über den Kunden preiszugeben.*

Als wie häufig bewerten die meisten anderen Teilnehmer dieser Studie Ihrer Einschätzung nach das beschriebene Verhalten von Mitarbeiter A?

Als...

- ☐ sehr selten (1)
- ☐ eher selten (2)
- ☐ eher häufig (3)
- ☐ sehr häufig (4)

3_norm Situation 3

Employee A is considered to be the expert for an important business unit of a large customer. Employee B also works for this customer and has a specific question about the sub-area in which employee A is an expert. In addition to answering this question, employee A could provide valuable information about the entire unit he has accumulated in recent years. This expertise would be helpful for employee B and his work. However, it would diminish the importance of employee A as an expert if he were to pass on his expertise.

Employee A decides to answer only employee B's specific question and not to disclose any additional information about the customer.

According to your estimate, as how frequently occurring do most other participants in this study evaluate the described behavior of **employee A**?

As...

- ☐ very rare (1)
 - ☐ rather rare (2)
 - ☐ rather frequent (3)
 - ☐ very frequent (4)
-

4_dnorm **Situation 4** Ein Senior Vice President berichtet im internen Projektsteuerkreis begeistert von einem neuen Produkt. Mitarbeiter A weiß allerdings, dass das Quality Management erhebliche Probleme bei der Fehlerbehebung in der Produktverwendung hat. Entsprechend gibt es erhebliche Zweifel an dem möglichen Erfolg dieses Produkts. Mitarbeiter A könnte im Projektsteuerkreis von dieser Problematik berichten. Er befürchtet jedoch, dass dies sein Verhältnis zu dem Senior Vice President negativ beeinflussen würde. *Mitarbeiter A entscheidet sich, nicht von diesen Informationen zu berichten.*

Als wie häufig bewerten die meisten anderen Teilnehmer dieser Studie Ihrer Einschätzung nach das beschriebene Verhalten von Mitarbeiter A?

Als...

- ☐ sehr selten (1)
- ☐ eher selten (2)
- ☐ eher häufig (3)
- ☐ sehr häufig (4)

4_dnorm **Situation 4**

A Senior Vice President reports enthusiastically about a new product in the internal project steering committee. Employee A knows, however, that Quality Management has significant problems in troubleshooting with the product in use. Accordingly, there are considerable doubts about the possible success of this product. Employee A could report of these problems in the project steering committee. However, he fears that this would adversely affect his relationship with the Senior Vice President.

Employee A decides not to report this information.

According to your estimate, as how frequently occurring do most other participants in this study evaluate the described behavior of **employee A**?

As...

- ☐ very rare (1)
 - ☐ rather rare (2)
 - ☐ rather frequent (3)
 - ☐ very frequent (4)
-

5_norm Situation 5 Mitarbeiter A und Mitarbeiter B besprechen die strategische Ausrichtung für ein Projekt mit dem zuständigen Manager. Mitarbeiter B und der Manager sind sich in einem wesentlichen Punkt uneinig und diskutieren ausgiebig. Mitarbeiter A sieht es wie Mitarbeiter B und hat auch überzeugende Argumente für die Position von Mitarbeiter B. Mitarbeiter A befürchtet allerdings, dass der Manager dies negativ auffassen würde. Darüber hinaus geht Mitarbeiter A davon aus, dass sich der Manager nicht von seiner Meinung abbringen lässt. Mitarbeiter A überlegt sich nun, ob er Mitarbeiter B in der Diskussion unterstützen soll oder nicht. *Mitarbeiter A entscheidet sich dazu, Mitarbeiter B bei der Diskussion nicht zu unterstützen.*

Als wie häufig bewerten die meisten anderen Teilnehmer dieser Studie Ihrer Einschätzung nach das beschriebene Verhalten von Mitarbeiter A?

Als...

- ☐ sehr selten (1)
- ☐ eher selten (2)
- ☐ eher häufig (3)
- ☐ sehr häufig (4)

5_norm Situation 5

Employees A and B discuss the strategic direction for a project with the responsible manager. Employee B and the manager disagree on one important point and discuss it extensively. Employee A shares B's opinion and also has convincing arguments for employee B's position. Employee A fears, however, that the manager would take this in a negative light. In addition, employee A assumes that the manager will not be dissuaded from his opinion. Employee A is now considering whether or not to support employee B in the discussion.

Employee A decides not to support employee B in the discussion.

According to your estimate, as how frequently occurring do most other participants in this study evaluate the described behavior of **employee A**?

As...

- ☐ very rare (1)
- ☐ rather rare (2)
- ☐ rather frequent (3)
- ☐ very frequent (4)

End of Block: Vignetten (IST)

Start of Block: Vignetten (SOLL)

inst8

Instruktionen zu Teil II Im Folgenden beschreiben wir Ihnen verschiedene Entscheidungssituationen bei BLA und das Entscheidungsverhalten eines fiktiven BLA-Mitarbeiters in diesen Situationen. Es geht darum, als wie angemessen das beschriebene Entscheidungsverhalten beurteilt wird. Wir sind dabei nicht an Ihrer persönlichen Einschätzung interessiert. Wir wollen wissen, welche der vier Kategorien, Ihrer Einschätzung zufolge, von den jeweils meisten TeilnehmerInnen an dieser Studie (mehrere hundert MitarbeiterInnen aus verschiedenen Bereichen bei BLA) ausgewählt wird. Sagt die relative Mehrheit der TeilnehmerInnen an dieser Studie, dass das Verhalten des Mitarbeiters als *sehr angemessen*, *eher angemessen*, *eher unangemessen* oder *sehr unangemessen* beurteilt wird (vier Kategorien)? **Gelingt es Ihnen, für eine Entscheidungssituation die Kategorie auszuwählen, die am häufigsten von den anderen TeilnehmerInnen an dieser Studie ausgewählt wurde, erhalten Sie 3€.** Dies gilt für jede der folgenden Entscheidungssituationen. Sie können also für jede der folgenden Entscheidungssituationen 3€ verdienen.

inst8

Instructions for Part II

The following section describes various BLA decision-making situations and the decision-making behavior of a fictitious BLA employee in these situations. The question is as how appropriate the decision-making behavior described is assessed as. We are not interested in your personal assessment. We would like to know which of the four categories, according to your assessment, is selected by the most participants in this study (several hundred employees from different BLA departments). Does the relative majority of respondents to this study say that the employee's behavior is *very appropriate*, *rather appropriate*, *rather inappropriate* or *very inappropriate* (four categories)? **If you succeed in selecting the category most often selected by the other participants in this study, you will receive €3.** This applies to each of the following decision-making situations. So you can earn €3 for each of the following situations.

Page Break

1_inorm **Situation 1**

Mitarbeiter B kontaktiert Mitarbeiter A aus einem anderen Bereich und bittet um seine Hilfe. Mitarbeiter A könnte ihm weiterhelfen, was etwa zwei Stunden seiner Zeit in Anspruch nehmen würde. Ohne die Hilfe von Mitarbeiter A müsste sich Mitarbeiter B zunächst selbst einarbeiten und bräuchte daher etwa acht Stunden, um das Problem alleine zu lösen. Das Thema steht allerdings in keinem direkten Zusammenhang zu den Aufgaben von Mitarbeiter A und dieser ist zeitlich bereits ziemlich ausgelastet. *Mitarbeiter A entscheidet sich, nicht zu helfen.*

Wie bewerten die meisten anderen Teilnehmer dieser Studie Ihrer Einschätzung nach das beschriebene Verhalten von **Mitarbeiter A**?

Als...

- ☐ sehr unangemessen (1)
- ☐ eher unangemessen (2)
- ☐ eher angemessen (3)
- ☐ sehr angemessen (4)

1_inorm

Situation 1

Employee B contacts employee A from another department and asks for his help. Employee A could help him, which would take about two hours of his time. Without the help of employee A, employee B would have to familiarize himself with the problem first and would therefore need about eight hours to solve the problem on his own. However, this topic is not directly related to the tasks of employee A and he is already working at close to full capacity. .

Employee A decides not to help.

How do you estimate that most other participants in this study evaluate the described behavior of **employee A**?

As...

- ☐ very inappropriate (1)
 - ☐ rather inappropriate (2)
 - ☐ rather appropriate (3)
 - ☐ very appropriate (4)
-

2_inorm **Situation 2** Mitarbeiter B kontaktiert Mitarbeiter A und bittet um einen Ratschlag zur Entwicklung eines neuen Produkts. Mitarbeiter A könnte ihm weiterhelfen, da er Experte im entsprechenden Fachgebiet ist. Allerdings arbeitet er selbst aktuell an einem ähnlichen Produkt, welches zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt mit dem Produkt von Mitarbeiter B konkurrieren wird. *Mitarbeiter A entscheidet sich, Mitarbeiter B den Ratschlag nicht zu geben.*

Wie bewerten die meisten anderen Teilnehmer dieser Studie Ihrer Einschätzung nach das beschriebene Verhalten von **Mitarbeiter A**?

Als...

- ☐ sehr unangemessen (1)
- ☐ eher unangemessen (2)
- ☐ eher angemessen (3)
- ☐ sehr angemessen (4)

2_inorm **Situation 2**

Employee B contacts employee A and asks for advice on the development of a new product. Employee A could help him, as he is an expert in the field. However, he is currently working on a similar product himself, which will compete with employee B's product at a later date.

Employee A decides not to give advice to employee B.

How do you estimate that most other participants in this study evaluate the described behavior of **employee A**?

As...

- ☐ very inappropriate (1)
- ☐ rather inappropriate (2)
- ☐ rather appropriate (3)
- ☐ very appropriate (4)

3_inorm **Situation 3** Mitarbeiter A gilt als der Experte für einen wichtigen Unternehmensbereich eines großen Kunden. Mitarbeiter B arbeitet ebenfalls für diesen Kunden und hat eine spezifische Frage zu dem Teilgebiet, in dem Mitarbeiter A Experte ist. Zusätzlich zur Beantwortung dieser Frage, könnte Mitarbeiter A wertvolle Informationen zum gesamten Bereich geben, welche er in den letzten Jahren angesammelt hat. Diese Expertise wäre für Mitarbeiter B und seine Arbeit hilfreich. Es würde jedoch die Bedeutung des Mitarbeiters A als Experte schmälern, wenn er sein Fachwissen weitergeben würde. *Mitarbeiter A entscheidet sich, nur die konkrete Frage des Mitarbeiters B zu beantworten und keine darüberhinausgehenden Informationen über den Kunden preiszugeben.*

Wie bewerten die meisten anderen Teilnehmer dieser Studie Ihrer Einschätzung nach das beschriebene Verhalten von **Mitarbeiter A**?

Als...

- ☐ sehr unangemessen (1)
- ☐ eher unangemessen (2)
- ☐ eher angemessen (3)
- ☐ sehr angemessen (4)

3_inorm **Situation 3**

Employee A is considered to be the expert for an important business unit of a large customer. Employee B also works for this customer and has a specific question about the sub-area in which employee A is an expert. In addition to answering this question, employee A could provide valuable information about the entire unit he has accumulated in recent years. This expertise would be helpful for employee B and his work. However, it would diminish the importance of employee A as an expert if he were to pass on his expertise.

Employee A decides to answer only employee B's specific question and not to disclose any additional information about the customer.

How do you estimate that most other participants in this study evaluate the described behavior of **employee A**?

As...

- ☐ very inappropriate (1)
 - ☐ rather inappropriate (2)
 - ☐ rather appropriate (3)
 - ☐ very appropriate (4)
-

4_inorm **Situation 4** Ein Senior Vice President berichtet im internen Projektsteuerkreis begeistert von einem neuen Produkt. Mitarbeiter A weiß allerdings, dass das Quality Management erhebliche Probleme bei der Fehlerbehebung in der Produktverwendung hat. Entsprechend gibt es erhebliche Zweifel an dem möglichen Erfolg dieses Produkts. Mitarbeiter A könnte im Projektsteuerkreis von dieser Problematik berichten. Er befürchtet jedoch, dass dies sein Verhältnis zu dem Senior Vice President negativ beeinflussen würde. *Mitarbeiter A entscheidet sich, nicht von diesen Informationen zu berichten.*

Wie bewerten die meisten anderen Teilnehmer dieser Studie Ihrer Einschätzung nach das beschriebene Verhalten von **Mitarbeiter A**?

Als...

- ☐ sehr unangemessen (1)
- ☐ eher unangemessen (2)
- ☐ eher angemessen (3)
- ☐ sehr angemessen (4)

4_inorm **Situation 4**

A Senior Vice President reports enthusiastically about a new product in the internal project steering committee. Employee A knows, however, that Quality Management has significant problems in troubleshooting with the product in use. Accordingly, there are considerable doubts about the possible success of this product. Employee A could report on this problem in the project steering committee. However, he fears that this would adversely affect his relationship with the Senior Vice President.

Employee A decides not to report this information.

How do you estimate that most other participants in this study evaluate the described behavior of **employee A**?

As...

- ☐ very inappropriate (1)
 - ☐ rather inappropriate (2)
 - ☐ rather appropriate (3)
 - ☐ very appropriate (4)
-

5_inorm **Situation 5** Mitarbeiter A und Mitarbeiter B besprechen die strategische Ausrichtung für ein Projekt mit dem zuständigen Manager. Mitarbeiter B und der Manager sind sich in einem wesentlichen Punkt uneinig und diskutieren ausgiebig. Mitarbeiter A sieht es wie Mitarbeiter B und hat auch überzeugende Argumente für die Position von Mitarbeiter B. Mitarbeiter A befürchtet allerdings, dass der Manager dies negativ auffassen würde. Darüber hinaus geht Mitarbeiter A davon aus, dass sich der Manager nicht von seiner Meinung abbringen lässt. Mitarbeiter A überlegt sich nun, ob er Mitarbeiter B in der Diskussion unterstützen soll oder nicht. *Mitarbeiter A entscheidet sich dazu, Mitarbeiter B bei der Diskussion nicht zu unterstützen.*

Wie bewerten die meisten anderen Teilnehmer dieser Studie Ihrer Einschätzung nach das beschriebene Verhalten von **Mitarbeiter A**?

Als...

- ☐ sehr unangemessen (1)
- ☐ eher unangemessen (2)
- ☐ eher angemessen (3)
- ☐ sehr angemessen (4)

5_inorm **Situation 5**

Employees A and B discuss the strategic direction for a project with the responsible manager. Employee B and the manager disagree on one important point and discuss it extensively. Employee A shares B's opinion and also has convincing arguments for employee B's position. Employee A fears, however, that the manager would take this in a negative light. In addition, employee A assumes that the manager will not be dissuaded from his opinion. Employee A is now considering whether or not to support employee B in the discussion.

Employee A decides not to support employee B in the discussion.

How do you estimate that most other participants in this study evaluate the described behavior of **employee A**?

As...

- ☐ very inappropriate (1)
- ☐ rather inappropriate (2)
- ☐ rather appropriate (3)
- ☐ very appropriate (4)

End of Block: Vignetten (SOLL)

Start of Block: Teamerfolg

inst9 Im Folgenden sehen Sie drei Fragen, die sich auf Ihr aktuelles Team beziehen. Denken Sie hierbei bitte an Ihr Team entsprechend der BLA BLA-Struktur. Wir sind wieder **nicht** an Ihrer persönlichen Einschätzung interessiert. Wir wollen wissen, welche der vier Antwortkategorien, Ihrer Einschätzung zufolge, von den jeweils meisten TeilnehmerInnen dieser Studie ausgewählt wird. Gelingt es Ihnen, die Kategorie auszuwählen, die am häufigsten von den anderen Teilnehmern ausgewählt wurde, erhalten Sie jeweils 3€.

inst9 Below are three questions that relate to your current team. Please think of your team according to the BLA BLA structure. Again, we are **not** interested in your personal assessment. We would like to know which of the four response categories, according to your assessment, is selected by most of the participants in this study. If you succeed in selecting the category most frequently selected by the other participants, you will receive €3 for each.

team_success Für wie erfolgreich hält die Mehrheit Ihrer Teammitglieder Ihr Team?

- ☐ sehr erfolglos (1)
- ☐ eher erfolglos (2)
- ☐ eher erfolgreich (3)
- ☐ sehr erfolgreich (4)

team_success How successful does the majority of your team members consider your team to be?

- ☐ very unsuccessful (1)
 - ☐ rather unsuccessful (2)
 - ☐ rather successful (3)
 - ☐ very successful (4)
-

team_impact Für wie wichtig schätzt die Mehrheit Ihrer Teammitglieder den Beitrag Ihres Teams für BLA ein?

- ☐ sehr gering (1)
- ☐ eher gering (2)
- ☐ eher hoch (3)
- ☐ sehr hoch (4)

team_impact As how important does the majority of your team members rate your team's contribution to BLA?

- ☐ very low (1)
 - ☐ rather low (2)
 - ☐ rather high (3)
 - ☐ very high (4)
-

team_production Für wie wichtig halten Sie eine enge Zusammenarbeit in Ihrem Team, um die beruflichen Aufgaben des Teams erfolgreich erfüllen zu können?

- ☐ sehr unwichtig (1)
- ☐ eher unwichtig (2)
- ☐ eher wichtig (3)
- ☐ sehr wichtig (4)

team_production How important is it that you work closely with your team in order to be able to successfully fulfil the team's professional tasks?

- ☐ very unimportant (1)
- ☐ rather unimportant (2)
- ☐ rather important (3)
- ☐ very important (4)

End of Block: Teamerfolg

Start of Block: Zeitpräferenzen

inst14

Instruktionen zu Teil III

In diesem Teil kann jede/r 10. TeilnehmerIn weiteres Geld verdienen. Nach Abschluss der

Studie wird zufällig bestimmt, ob dieser Teil für Sie eine weitere Auszahlung erbringt.

Wir bitten Sie 25 Entscheidungen zu treffen. In jeder der Entscheidungen haben Sie die Auswahl zwischen einer frühen Auszahlung ("heute") und einer späten Auszahlung ("in 12 Monaten") eines angegebenen Geldbetrages. Die beiden Optionen können folgendermaßen beschrieben werden: **Sie erhalten einen Geldbetrag in Höhe von 180 Token, der Ihnen direkt nach Abschluss der Studie ausgezahlt wird (Spalte "heute")** oder **Sie erhalten einen höheren Geldbetrag, der Ihnen 12 Monaten nach Abschluss der Studie ausgezahlt wird (Spalte "in 12 Monaten")** Zusätzlich zu den Auszahlungen aus den anderen Teilen, erhalten Sie also aus diesem Teil einen Geldbetrag, der Ihnen sofort im Anschluss an die Studie (Auswahl der Option "heute") oder erst nach Ablauf von 12 Monaten überwiesen wird (Auswahl von Option "in 12 Monaten").

In diesem Teil entsprechen **100 Token genau 25€**. **Vier Token sind also einen € wert.**

Sie treffen Ihre Entscheidungen in der folgenden Tabelle. Sie beginnen bitte mit Zeile 1 und gehen dann von Zeile zu Zeile weiter. In jeder Zeile entscheiden Sie sich bitte zwischen den 180 Token und dem höheren Betrag, wobei Sie bitte den Zeitpunkt der Auszahlung beachten. Der Betrag links bleibt immer gleich, nur der Betrag rechts steigt von Zeile zu Zeile. Welche Zeile für Ihren Gewinn maßgeblich ist, sollten Sie zur Auszahlung ausgewählt werden, wird später per Zufall bestimmt.

Wie Sie sehen, können Sie in diesem Teil potentiell eine beträchtliche Summe Geld verdienen. Überlegen sie deshalb jede Ihrer Entscheidungen sorgfältig.

-

inst14

Instructions for Part III

In this part, every 10th participant can earn additional money. After the study is completed, it will be randomly determined whether this part will provide you with a further payout.

We ask you to make 25 decisions. In each of the decisions you have the choice between an early ("today") and a late ("in 12 months") payout of a specified amount of money. The two options can be described as follows:

You will receive a sum of money of 180 tokens, which will be paid to you immediately after the completion of the study (column "today")

or

You will receive a higher amount of money, which will be paid to you 12 months after the end of the study (column "in 12 months")

So, in addition to the payments from the other parts, you will also receive a sum of money from this part, which will be transferred to you immediately after the study (selection of the option "today") or after 12 months (selection of option "in 12 months").

In this part, 100 tokens equal exactly €25. So four tokens are worth one €.

You make your decisions in the following table. Please start with line 1 and go from line to line. In each line, please choose between the 180 tokens and the higher amount, taking into account the time of the payout. The amount on the left always remains the same, only the amount on the right increases from line to line. If you are selected for a payout, the line that determines your payout will be selected at random later on.

As you can see, you can potentially earn a considerable amount of money in this part. Therefore, consider each of your decisions carefully.

-

time_pref Bitte treffen Sie folgende Entscheidungen.

	heute (1)	in 12 Monaten (2)
1) Möchten Sie lieber 180 Token heute oder 185 Token in 12 Monaten erhalten? (1)	☐	☐
2) Möchten Sie lieber 180 Token heute oder 189 Token in 12 Monaten erhalten? (2)	☐	☐
3) Möchten Sie lieber 180 Token heute oder 194 Token in 12 Monaten erhalten? (3)	☐	☐
4) Möchten Sie lieber 180 Token heute oder 198 Token in 12 Monaten erhalten? (4)	☐	☐
5) Möchten Sie lieber 180 Token heute oder 203 Token in 12 Monaten erhalten? (5)	☐	☐
6) Möchten Sie lieber 180 Token heute oder 208 Token in 12 Monaten erhalten? (6)	☐	☐
7) Möchten Sie lieber 180 Token heute oder 213 Token in 12 Monaten erhalten? (7)	☐	☐
8) Möchten Sie lieber 180 Token heute oder 218 Token in 12 Monaten erhalten? (8)	☐	☐
9) Möchten Sie lieber 180 Token heute oder 223 Token in 12 Monaten erhalten? (9)	☐	☐
10) Möchten Sie lieber 180 Token heute oder 228 Token in 12 Monaten erhalten? (10)	☐	☐
11) Möchten Sie lieber 180 Token heute oder 233 Token in 12 Monaten erhalten? (11)	☐	☐
12) Möchten Sie lieber 180 Token heute oder 238 Token in 12 Monaten erhalten? (12)	☐	☐
13) Möchten Sie lieber 180 Token heute oder 243 Token in 12 Monaten erhalten? (13)	☐	☐

14) Möchten Sie lieber 180 Token heute oder 249 Token in 12 Monaten erhalten? (14)

☐☐

15) Möchten Sie lieber 180 Token heute oder 254 Token in 12 Monaten erhalten? (15)

☐☐

16) Möchten Sie lieber 180 Token heute oder 259 Token in 12 Monaten erhalten? (16)

☐☐

17) Möchten Sie lieber 180 Token heute oder 265 Token in 12 Monaten erhalten? (17)

☐☐

18) Möchten Sie lieber 180 Token heute oder 270 Token in 12 Monaten erhalten? (18)

☐☐

19) Möchten Sie lieber 180 Token heute oder 276 Token in 12 Monaten erhalten? (19)

☐☐

20) Möchten Sie lieber 180 Token heute oder 281 Token in 12 Monaten erhalten? (20)

☐☐

21) Möchten Sie lieber 180 Token heute oder 287 Token in 12 Monaten erhalten? (21)

☐☐

22) Möchten Sie lieber 180 Token heute oder 293 Token in 12 Monaten erhalten? (22)

☐☐

23) Möchten Sie lieber 180 Token heute oder 298 Token in 12 Monaten erhalten? (23)

☐☐

24) Möchten Sie lieber 180 Token heute oder 304 Token in 12 Monaten erhalten? (24)

☐☐

25) Möchten Sie lieber 180 Token heute oder 310 Token in 12 Monaten erhalten? (25)

☐☐

time_pref Please make the following decisions.

	today (1)	in 12 months (2)
1) Would you rather receive 180 tokens today or 185 tokens in 12 months? (1)	☐	☐
2) Would you rather receive 180 tokens today or 189 tokens in 12 months? (2)	☐	☐
3) Would you rather receive 180 tokens today or 194 tokens in 12 months? (3)	☐	☐
4) Would you rather receive 180 tokens today or 198 tokens in 12 months? (4)	☐	☐
5) Would you rather receive 180 tokens today or 203 tokens in 12 months? (5)	☐	☐
6) Would you rather receive 180 tokens today or 208 tokens in 12 months? (6)	☐	☐
7) Would you rather receive 180 tokens today or 213 tokens in 12 months? (7)	☐	☐
8) Would you rather receive 180 tokens today or 218 tokens in 12 months? (8)	☐	☐
9) Would you rather receive 180 tokens today or 223 tokens in 12 months? (9)	☐	☐
10) Would you rather receive 180 tokens today or 228 tokens in 12 months? (10)	☐	☐
11) Would you rather receive 180 tokens today or 233 tokens in 12 months? (11)	☐	☐
12) Would you rather receive 180 tokens today or 238 tokens in 12 months? (12)	☐	☐
13) Would you rather receive 180 tokens today or 243 tokens in 12 months? (13)	☐	☐

- | | | |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| 14) Would you rather receive
180 tokens today or 249
tokens in 12 months? (14) | ☐ | ☐ |
| 15) Would you rather receive
180 tokens today or 254
tokens in 12 months? (15) | ☐ | ☐ |
| 16) Would you rather receive
180 tokens today or 259
tokens in 12 months? (16) | ☐ | ☐ |
| 17) Would you rather receive
180 tokens today or 265
tokens in 12 months? (17) | ☐ | ☐ |
| 18) Would you rather receive
180 tokens today or 270
tokens in 12 months? (18) | ☐ | ☐ |
| 19) Would you rather receive
180 tokens today or 276
tokens in 12 months? (19) | ☐ | ☐ |
| 20) Would you rather receive
180 tokens today or 281
tokens in 12 months? (20) | ☐ | ☐ |
| 21) Would you rather receive
180 tokens today or 287
tokens in 12 months? (21) | ☐ | ☐ |
| 22) Would you rather receive
180 tokens today or 293
tokens in 12 months? (22) | ☐ | ☐ |
| 23) Would you rather receive
180 tokens today or 298
tokens in 12 months? (23) | ☐ | ☐ |
| 24) Would you rather receive
180 tokens today or 304
tokens in 12 months? (24) | ☐ | ☐ |
| 25) Would you rather receive
180 tokens today or 310
tokens in 12 months? (25) | ☐ | ☐ |

End of Block: Zeitpräferenzen

Start of Block: Fragebogenteil

inst10

Instruktionen zu Teil IV

Im Folgenden finden Sie einige Aussagen zu Ihrer Arbeit bei BLA. Wenn von Ihrem Team die Rede ist, denken Sie bitte an Ihr aktuelles Team entsprechend der BLA BLA-Struktur.

Inwiefern treffen die folgenden Aussagen zu bzw. inwieweit stimmen Sie diesen zu?

inst10

Instructions for Part IV

Following are statements that relate to your work at BLA. When your team is referred to please think of your current team according to the BLA BLA structure.

To what extent do the following statements apply or to what extent do you agree with them?

cohesion	trifft gar nicht zu (1)	trifft wenig zu (2)	trifft mittelmäßig zu (3)	trifft überwiegend zu (4)	trifft völlig zu (5)
Der Aufgabenbereich meines Teams erfordert ein hohes Maß an Kooperation unter den Teammitgliedern. (1)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Die Zusammenarbeit zwischen mir und meinen Teammitgliedern ist überwiegend gekennzeichnet durch ein ausgeprägtes Konkurrenzdenken, welches zu Spannungen im Team führt. (2)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Die Zusammenarbeit zwischen mir und meinen Teammitgliedern ist überwiegend geprägt durch einen positiven, motivations- und leistungsfördernden Wettbewerb. (3)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Meinen Teammitgliedern liegt viel daran, dass wir unsere Ziele erreichen. (4)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Meinen Teammitgliedern liegt viel daran, dass wir unsere Aufgaben	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

zufriedenstellend
erledigen. (5)

Die Teammitglieder
fühlen sich ihren
Aufgaben
verpflichtet. (6)

Die Teammitglieder
müssen
kooperieren, um
die Teamziele zu
erreichen. (7)

Unser Team
verbringt auch
außerhalb der
Arbeit Zeit
miteinander. (8)

Der Zusammenhalt
in unserem Team
ist groß. (9)

Ich bin stolz,
Mitglied meines
Teams zu sein.
(10)

☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐

cohesion	Disagree strongly (1)	Disagree a little (2)	Neither agree nor disagree (3)	Agree a little (4)	Agree strongly (5)
The tasks of my team require a high degree of cooperation among the team members. (1)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The cooperation between me and my team members is mainly characterized by a distinct competitive attitude, which leads to tensions in the team. (2)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The cooperation between me and my team members is mainly characterized by positive, motivational and performance-enhancing competition. (3)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
My team members care a lot about achieving our goals. (4)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

My team members care a lot about fulfilling our tasks satisfactorily. (5)

☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
-----------------------	-----------------------	-----------------------	-----------------------	-----------------------

The team members feel an obligation to their tasks. (6)

☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
-----------------------	-----------------------	-----------------------	-----------------------	-----------------------

The team members have to cooperate to achieve the team goals. (7)

☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
-----------------------	-----------------------	-----------------------	-----------------------	-----------------------

Our team also spends time with each other outside of work. (8)

☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
-----------------------	-----------------------	-----------------------	-----------------------	-----------------------

The team cohesion in our team is great. (9)

☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
-----------------------	-----------------------	-----------------------	-----------------------	-----------------------

I am proud of being a member of my team. (10)

☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
-----------------------	-----------------------	-----------------------	-----------------------	-----------------------

Page Break

inst11

Im Folgenden finden Sie einige Fragen, die Sie danach beurteilen sollen, wie häufig Sie die darin angesprochene Erfahrung gemacht bzw. Situation erlebt haben. Ihre Aufgabe ist es, anzugeben, ob Sie die darin angesprochenen Erfahrungen bzw. Situationen (nie, selten, manchmal, häufig, sehr häufig) gemacht bzw. erlebt haben. Denken Sie bei der Beantwortung bitte an die, vom heutigen Tag aus gesehen, vergangenen drei Monate und versuchen Sie sich daran zu erinnern, wie oft Sie in diesem Zeitraum die jeweilige Erfahrung gemacht haben.

inst11 On the following pages you will find descriptions of situations and experiences. Please answer how often each event has happened to you in the past 3 months, using a rating of *never, rarely, sometimes, often* or *very often*.

stress	nie (1)	selten (2)	manchmal (3)	häufig (4)	sehr häufig (5)
Zeiten, in denen mir die Sorgen über den Kopf wachsen. (1)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Zeiten, in denen ich mir viele Sorgen mache und nicht damit aufhören kann. (2)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Erfahrung, dass alles zu viel ist, was ich zu tun habe. (3)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Zeiten, in denen ich sorgenvolle Gedanken nicht unterdrücken kann. (4)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Befürchtung, meine Aufgaben nicht erfüllen zu können. (5)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Zeiten, in denen mir die Arbeit über den Kopf wächst. (6)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Befürchtung, dass irgendetwas Unangenehmes passiert. (7)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Zeiten, in denen ich nicht die Leistung bringe, die von mir erwartet	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

wird. (8)

Zeiten, in
denen mir die
Verantwortung
für andere zur
Last wird. (9)

☐☐☐☐☐

Ich bemühe
mich
vergeblich, mit
guten
Leistungen
Anerkennung
zu erhalten.
(10)

☐☐☐☐☐

Obwohl ich
mein Bestes
gebe, wird
meine Arbeit
nicht gewürdigt.
(11)

☐☐☐☐☐

Zeiten, in
denen ich zu
viele
Verpflichtungen
zu erfüllen
habe. (12)

☐☐☐☐☐

stress	Never (1)	Rarely (2)	Sometimes (3)	Often (4)	Very often (5)
Times when my worries overwhelm me. (1)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Times when I worry a lot and cannot stop. (2)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
I experience having too much to do. (3)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Times when I cannot suppress worrisome thoughts. (4)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
I worry that I will not be able to fulfill my tasks. (5)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Times that my work overwhelms me. (6)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
I worry that something unpleasant will happen. (7)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Times when I am not able to perform as well as expected. (8)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Times when my responsibility for others becomes a burden to me.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

(9)

I try in vain to
gain
recognition
for my good
work. (10)

☐☐☐☐☐

Although I do
my best, my
work is not
appreciated.
(11)

☐☐☐☐☐

Times when I
have too
many duties
to fulfill. (12)

☐☐☐☐☐

Page Break

denke_team Denken Sie bitte wieder an Ihr aktuelles Team entsprechend der BLA BLA-Struktur.

denke_team Please again think of your current team according to the BLA BLA structure.

stability1 Wie lange sind Sie Mitglied Ihres aktuellen Teams?

- ☐ weniger als 6 Monate (1)
- ☐ 6 Monate bis 1 Jahr (2)
- ☐ 1 Jahr bis 3 Jahre (3)
- ☐ länger als 3 Jahre (4)

stability1 For how long have you been a member of your current team?

- ☐ less than 6 months (1)
 - ☐ 6 months to 1 year (2)
 - ☐ 1 year to 3 years (3)
 - ☐ longer than 3 years (4)
-

stability2 Wann gab es in Ihrem Team zuletzt eine Umstrukturierung?

- ☐ vor weniger als 6 Monaten (1)
- ☐ vor mehr als 6 Monaten, aber maximal 1 Jahr (2)
- ☐ vor mehr als 1 Jahr, aber maximal 3 Jahre (3)
- ☐ vor mehr als 3 Jahren (4)

stability2 When was the last time your team underwent restructuring?

- ☐ less than 6 months ago (1)
 - ☐ more than 6 months, but at most 1 year ago (2)
 - ☐ more than 1 year, but at most 3 years ago (3)
 - ☐ more than 3 years ago (4)
-

stability3 Wie lange ist Ihre direkte Führungskraft bereits in dieser Rolle?

- ☐ weniger als 6 Monate (1)
- ☐ 6 Monate bis 1 Jahr (2)
- ☐ länger als 1 Jahr bis 3 Jahre (3)
- ☐ länger als 3 Jahre (4)

stability3 How long has your immediate manager been in this role?

- ☐ less than 6 months (1)
 - ☐ 6 months to 1 year (2)
 - ☐ 1 year to 3 years (3)
 - ☐ longer than 3 years (4)
-

stability4 Als wie stabil empfinden Sie Ihr Team?

- ☐ sehr instabil (1)
- ☐ überwiegend instabil (2)
- ☐ mittelmäßig stabil (3)
- ☐ überwiegend stabil (4)
- ☐ sehr stabil (5)

stability4 How stable do you feel your team to be?

- ☐ very instable (1)
 - ☐ mostly instable (2)
 - ☐ moderately stable (3)
 - ☐ mostly stable (4)
 - ☐ very stable (5)
-

stability5 Inwieweit hat das Team und seine Zusammensetzung bei der Auswahl Ihres aktuellen Jobs eine wichtige Rolle gespielt?

- ☐ sehr unwichtig (1)
- ☐ unwichtig (2)
- ☐ weder wichtig noch unwichtig (3)
- ☐ wichtig (4)
- ☐ sehr wichtig (5)

stability5 To what extent has the team and its composition played an important role in selecting your current job?

- ☐ very unimportant (1)
 - ☐ unimportant (2)
 - ☐ neither important nor unimportant (3)
 - ☐ important (4)
 - ☐ very important (5)
-

cloud_team Arbeitet Ihr Team eher an/mit BLA Cloud Solutions oder Customer-Based Solutions?

- ☐ Cloud Solutions (1)
- ☐ Customer-Based Solutions (2)
- ☐ Keine von beiden (3)

cloud_team Does your team work more on/with BLA Cloud Solutions or Customer-Based Solutions?

- ☐ Cloud Solution (1)
 - ☐ Customer-Based Solutions (2)
 - ☐ neither (3)
-

cloud_ind Arbeiten Sie persönlich eher an/mit BLA Cloud Solutions oder Customer-Based Solutions?

- ☐ Cloud Solutions (1)
- ☐ Customer-Based Solutions (2)
- ☐ Keine von beiden (3)

cloud_ind Do you personally rather work on/with BLA Cloud Solutions or Customer-Based Solutions?

- ☐ Cloud Solution (1)
- ☐ Customer-Based Solutions (2)
- ☐ neither (3)

Page Break

inst12 Inwieweit treffen die folgenden Aussagen auf Sie persönlich zu?

inst12 To what extent do the following statements apply to you personally?

big5

	trifft überhaupt nicht zu (1)	trifft eher nicht zu (2)	weder noch (3)	trifft eher zu (4)	trifft voll und ganz zu (5)
Ich bin eher zurückhaltend, reserviert. (1)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ich schenke anderen leicht Vertrauen, glaube an das Gute im Menschen. (2)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ich bin bequem, neige zur Faulheit. (3)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ich bin entspannt, lasse mich durch Stress nicht aus der Ruhe bringen. (4)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ich habe nur wenig künstlerisches Interesse. (5)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ich gehe aus mir heraus, bin gesellig. (6)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ich neige dazu, andere zu kritisieren. (7)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ich erledige Aufgaben gründlich. (8)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ich werde leicht nervös und unsicher. (9)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ich habe eine aktive Vorstellungskraft, bin fantasievoll. (10)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

big5

	Disagree strongly (1)	Disagree a little (2)	Neither agree nor disagree (3)	Agree a little (4)	Agree strongly (5)
I see myself as someone who is reserved. (1)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
I see myself as someone who is generally trusting. (2)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
I see myself as someone who tends to be lazy. (3)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
I see myself as someone who is relaxed, handles stress well. (4)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
I see myself as someone who has few artistic interests. (5)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
I see myself as someone who is outgoing, sociable. (6)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
I see myself as someone who tends to find fault with others. (7)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
I see myself as someone who does a thorough job. (8)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

I see myself
as someone
who gets
nervous
easily. (9)



I see myself
as someone
who has an
active
imagination.
(10)



compet_reci	trifft überhaupt nicht zu (1)	trifft eher nicht zu (2)	weder noch (3)	trifft eher zu (4)	trifft voll und ganz zu (5)
Wenn mir jemand einen Gefallen tut, bin ich bereit, diesen zu erwidern. (1)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Wenn ich ungerecht behandelt werde, übe ich bei erstbester Gelegenheit Vergeltung, auch wenn ich dadurch Nachteile erfahre. (2)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ich genieße es, mit anderen zu konkurrieren. (3)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ich erbringe bessere Leistungen, wenn ich mich mit anderen messe. (4)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Anhand von Wettbewerb kann ich meinen eigenen Erfolg messen. (5)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Durch Wettbewerb kann ich meine Kompetenz	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

verbessern.
(6)

Ich versuche
bei allem, die
beste Person
im Raum zu
sein. (7)

Ich möchte
bei allen
Aktivitäten
besser als die
anderen sein.
(8)



compet_reci	Disagree strongly (1)	Disagree a little (2)	Neither disagree nor agree (3)	Agree a little (4)	Agree strongly (5)
When someone does me a favor, I am willing to return it. (1)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
If am treated very unjustly, I will take revenge at the first occasion, even if there is a cost to do so. (2)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
I enjoy competing against others. (3)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
I perform better when I compete against others. (4)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Competition allows me measure my own success. (5)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
I can improve my competence by competing. (6)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
I try to be the best person in the room at almost anything. (7)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

I like to be
better than
others at
almost
everything.
(8)

☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

trust

	trifft überhaupt nicht zu (1)	trifft eher nicht zu (2)	weder noch (3)	trifft eher zu (4)	trifft voll und ganz zu (5)
Im Allgemeinen kann man den Menschen vertrauen. (1)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Heutzutage kann man sich auf niemanden mehr verlassen. (2)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

trust

	Disagree strongly (1)	Disagree a little (2)	Neither disagree nor agree (3)	Agree a little (4)	Agree strongly (5)
Most People can be trusted. (1)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
You can't trust strangers anymore. (2)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Page Break

inst13 Zum Schluss möchten wir gerne noch einige persönliche Fragen an Sie richten. Ihre Antworten auf diese Fragen sind sehr wichtig für die Validität unserer Studie.

inst13 Finally, we would like to ask you some personal questions. Your answers to these questions are very important for the validity of our study.

nation Was ist Ihre Nationalität?

nation What is your nationality?

children Haben Sie Kinder?

☐ Ja (1)

☐ Nein (2)

children Do you have children?

☐ Yes (1)

☐ No (2)

education Bitte kreuzen Sie das Feld an, welches auf Ihren höchsten Bildungsabschluss zutrifft

- ☐ Hochschulreife (1)
- ☐ Bachelor (2)
- ☐ Master/Diplom (3)
- ☐ Doktor/Ph.D. (4)
- ☐ Andere (5)

education Please check the box that corresponds to your highest level of education.

- ☐ higher education entrance qualification (1)
 - ☐ Bachelor (2)
 - ☐ Master/Diplom (3)
 - ☐ Doktor/Ph.D. (4)
 - ☐ other (5)
-

friends Wie viele Menschen zählen Sie privat zu Ihren Freunden?

friends In private life, how many people do you consider to be your friends?

End of Block: Fragebogenteil

Start of Block: Abschlussbildschirm mit Auszahlungscode

thanks

Danke für Ihre Teilnahme! Nachdem alle TeilnehmerInnen diese Studie abgeschlossen haben, wird Ihre Auszahlung berechnet. Informationen zur Höhe Ihrer Auszahlung können Sie

mit Ihrem persönlichen Code nach dem 27.11.2017 auf unserer Homepage (<https://sites.google.com/site/surveyblalmu/>) einsehen. Ihr Code lautet: `#{m://LastName}`.

Im Folgenden können Sie eine Auswahl darüber treffen, wie Sie Ihre Auszahlung erhalten möchten. Sie können Ihre Auszahlung entweder an Ihr privates Konto überweisen lassen oder an eine der angegebenen gemeinnützigen Organisationen spenden lassen. In beiden Fällen können Sie die Überweisungs- bzw. Spendenhöhe mit Hilfe des obigen Links und Ihres persönlichen Codes einsehen. Sie können leider keine individuelle Spendenquittung erhalten, weil wir die Spende vornehmen. Wir werden die Gesamtspendenbelege zur Bestätigung auf unserer Homepage hochladen. Für die Eingabe Ihrer Kontodaten werden Sie auf den geschützten Server der Universität Heidelberg, die die Überweisung vornehmen wird, weitergeleitet. Bei Rückfragen melden Sie sich bitte an 06221 54 2930 (von 9:00-17:00 Uhr) oder bla.survey@econ.lmu.de.

thanks

Thank you for participating!

After all participants have completed this study, your payout will be calculated. Information on the amount of your payout can be found with your personal code after November 22nd, 2017 at 12 noon on our Homepage (<https://sites.google.com/site/surveyblalmu/>)

Your code is: `#{m://LastName}`

Below you can make a selection of how you would like to receive your payout. You can either have your payment transferred to your private account or donate it to one of the charities listed. In both cases, you can view the amount of the transfer or donation by using the above link and your personal code. Unfortunately, you cannot receive an individual donation receipt because we make the donation. We will upload the transfer receipts for confirmation to www.infozumverdienst.de.

To enter your account data, you will be redirected to the secure server of the University of Heidelberg, which will carry out the transfer. If you have any questions, please contact us by phone +49 (0)6221 54 2930 (9 a.m. to 5 p.m.) or email bla.survey@econ-lmu.de.



payment Wie möchten Sie Ihre Auszahlung erhalten?

- ☐ als Überweisung auf mein Konto (1)
- ☐ als Spende an das SOS Kinderdorf (2)
- ☐ als Spende an World Wide Fund For Nature (WWF) (3)
- ☐ als Spende an Ärzte ohne Grenzen (4)
- ☐ als Spende an Amnesty International (5)
- ☐ als Spende an die Deutsche AIDS-Hilfe (6)

payment How would you like to receive your payout?

- ☐ As a bank transfer to your account. (1)
- ☐ as a donation to SOS Children's Villages (2)
- ☐ as a donation to the World Wide Fund For Nature (WWF) (3)
- ☐ as a donation to Doctors without borders/Médecins sans Frontières (4)
- ☐ as a donation to Amnesty International (5)
- ☐ as a donation to the Deutsche AIDS-Hilfe/German AIDS Service Organization (6)

End of Block: Abschlussbildschirm mit Auszahlungscode

Start of Block: Konto

heidelberg Sie möchten Ihre Auszahlung, die Sie in dieser Studie erzielt haben, auf Ihr privates Konto erhalten. Zur Eingabe Ihrer Kontodaten klicken Sie bitte auf den folgenden Link. Sie werden dann auf den geschützten Server der Universität Heidelberg weitergeleitet. Um das Geld zu erhalten, geben Sie bitte Ihren persönlichen Code an.

Zur Erinnerung, Ihr Code lautet:

[\\${m://LastName}](#).

Zur Dateneingabe:

https://awiheidelberg.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_81hjk3Wh5rPtFYF

heidelberg You would like to receive the payout you have obtained in this study to your private account. To enter your account data, please click on the following link. You will then be forwarded to the protected server of the University of Heidelberg.

As a reminder, your code is:

[\\${m://LastName}](#).

Click here for entering your information:

https://awiheidelberg.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_81hjk3Wh5rPtFYF

End of Block: Konto

Start of Block: Spende

donation Herzlichen Dank. Sie verwenden Ihre Auszahlung aus der Studie [\\${payment/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}](#). Wir leiten Ihre Spende gerne weiter.

donation Thank you very much. You are using your payout from the study [\\${payment/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}](#). We are happy to pass on your donation.

End of Block: Spende
