

PRE-ANALYSIS PLAN:
VOTER COORDINATION AND ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY: AN
INFORMATIONAL EXPERIMENT IN MEXICO

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A responsive and accountable political system has the potential to support economic development, public safety, and social stability by incentivizing good performance in office, legitimizing and strengthening local governments, and fostering community buy-in. However, many voters face a low-accountability political equilibrium where they expect poor performance from their politicians—both incumbents and challengers—and politicians do not expect voters to sanction such poor performance. This study aims to understand how such low-accountability equilibria can be broken down through the provision of information to voters that is also designed to induce explicit or tacit coordinated electoral action. Building on recent studies highlighting mixed effects of information provision on electoral accountability, we implement a randomized controlled trial that disseminates independent audit report information pertaining to municipal malfeasance in office in Mexico. To understand whether voter coordination can help break low-accountability equilibria, our delivery of this information also varies the scope for coordinated action by further randomizing a) the fraction of the municipal population that receives the information, and b) whether that fraction receiving the information is common knowledge. These treatments are delivered en masse using municipal-level Facebook ad campaigns and individually using WhatsApp messages, respectively Mexico’s most popular social media website and messenger platform. We will assess the effects of these treatments—and their within-municipality spillovers—on voter beliefs, coordination, and voting behavior. The findings will inform the extent to which voter coordination can complement information dissemination campaigns to break down low-accountability equilibria. Furthermore, we will also assess the extent to which our mass Facebook campaigns can achieve this objective at low cost, and thus constitute a scalable option for enhancing political accountability.

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1 Motivation

Ideally, an efficient democratic system would oversee the election of high-quality politicians serving the voters that elected them and incentivize politicians to perform well in order to be re-elected in the future (Fearon 1999). To the extent that the system is able to represent voters’ interests, policy is likely to support economic development and poverty reduction, political stability, and good governance. However, as in many developing contexts, Mexican politicians often engage in malfeasance, are unwilling to effectively provide public goods, and rely on providing clientelistic benefits at election time to obtain office. These behaviors are symptomatic of the failure of electoral and post-electoral mechanisms of participation to keep governments accountable—a situation we refer to as a low-accountability political equilibrium.

This project seeks to understand how, in the context of mayoral government, voters can be induced to elect politicians likely to protect their interests and to hold such politicians accountable at the ballot box. Recent academic research attributes the failures of the democratic system to elect clean and effective politicians to an uninformed electorate (Khemani et al. 2016; Pande 2011). According to this prevailing logic, policy interventions are required to rectify voters’ information deficits. However, as we argue below, providing individuals with information on its own is unlikely to break low-accountability equilibria where revelations of poor performance are not surprising, challenger parties are perceived to be little better, and voters continue to accept clientelistic interactions with malfeasant incumbents if they do not believe that other voters will also sanction malfeasance.

We instead hypothesize that information is only likely to support effective democratic governance when accompanied by coordinated citizen participation. Specifically, we argue that a credible “public signal” is necessary to induce voters to solve the coordination problem that voters do not believe others are likely to react to incumbent performance revelation by shifting toward a mutually beneficial high-accountability equilibrium. In other words, incumbent performance information is most likely to galvanize voters to sanction malfeasant incumbents, or send signals of dissatisfaction with the performance of politicians more generally, when many voters receive the information, know that many other voters also received it, and actively discuss how to respond to it. Consequently, we anticipate that credible information will be most effective when it saturates an electorate, represents common knowledge, and generates informational spillovers.

We propose a novel test for this theoretical argument using a large-scale randomized controlled trial (RCT) that combines the provision of information with mechanisms for inducing voter coordination to break low-accountability political equilibria. We focus on the context of informing

Mexican voters about municipal misallocation of federal transfers mandated for social infrastructure projects benefiting the poor before the 2018 elections—the first elections for which most municipal mayors will be able to seek re-election to a consecutive term. Our field experiment is primarily designed to estimate short-run effects on electoral accountability, but may also have the capacity to influence medium-term effects on post-election participation in government affairs, and longer-term electoral and development outcomes—these medium- and longer-term effects are not discussed in this pre-analysis plan. Moreover, our surveys and treatments are designed to identify (tacit and explicit) coordinated voter behavior, as distinct from other mechanisms that could drive accountability dynamics.

2 Theory

This section first outlines our framework for considering the low-accountability problem. We then briefly review the empirical evidence pertaining to the conventional wisdom that simply informing voters can solve the problem. Building on these findings, we propose a coordination-based theory, arguing that information is only likely to successfully break low-accountability equilibria when it is delivered in a mass public manner from a credible source that can coordinate voters around sanctioning poorly-performing incumbents at the ballot box.

2.1 Theoretical framework and statement of the problem

Effective governance rests on two key pillars: state capacity and political accountability. In other words, a government must possess both *the tools and the will* to implement policies that reflect voters’ preferences for economic development, security, low levels of corruption, and political stability. Unfortunately, one or both of these pillars often fails. The following framework highlights the importance of principal-agent relationships in understanding the persistence of low-accountability political equilibria.

Governance is defined by principal-agent relationships, where voters (the principal) elect politicians (agents) to implement policies on their behalf. Agency failure in this relationship arises when the actions of politicians deviate from what voters would want. Such failure generally arises from two problems of asymmetric information: adverse selection and moral hazard (see [Ashworth 2012](#); [Fearon 1999](#)). Adverse selection reflects voters’ lack of information about whether the policy preferences of the politician are aligned with their own. Moral hazard instead reflects voters inability to monitor the actions of a politician once in office, which may lead politicians to shirk or deviate

from voters desired policies because they know that voters cannot fully observe their actions in office.

Theories of electoral accountability optimistically argue that, provided that voters receive some—potentially very imprecise—information about the performance of candidates, elections can substantially mitigate such agency failures. First, if previous performance in office at least partially reflects fixed characteristics of politicians, information addresses the adverse selection problem updating voter beliefs about a politicians competence or alignment with their interests. Signals of performance in office are likely to be informative because more competent incumbents seek to distinguish themselves in office from less competent politicians by attaining a level of performance that incompetent politicians could not achieve (Fearon 1999; Rogoff 1990). Second, information about previous performance can help voters to identify and replace politicians that shirk in office. This threat of replacement, in turn, encourages politicians to work harder to avoid replacement (provided that the minimum standard set by voters to remain in office is attainable) (Barro 1973; Ferejohn 1986). Third, and more dynamically, the election of high-quality politicians may set in motion a transition toward a more permanent high-accountability political equilibrium by discouraging incompetent or malfeasant politicians from standing for office. In sum, this argument predicts that unfavorable performance information—relative to voters’ prior beliefs—induces voters to punish the responsible incumbent.

On the other hand, elections may do little on their own to ameliorate agency failures, and could instead reinforce the low-accountability equilibria observed across the developing world. First, voters may still lack sufficient information to evaluate incumbent politicians and parties relatively accurately. In addition to lowering the probability that voters will select a good politician when available, good politicians may be less likely to stand for office because they know that voters will struggle to initially identify them or retain them. Second, the provision of information is only likely to change electoral behavior to the extent that it deviates from what voters already believed (Arias et al. 2017a; Banerjee et al. 2011; Dunning et al. forthcoming; Humphreys and Weinstein 2012). Moreover, even when confronted with damning evidence of poor incumbent performance, voters may not believe that there exists a viable alternative option. In such scenarios, voters can get stuck in low expectations equilibria. Third, voters may face a commitment problem: even after observing that a politician deviated from their desired policy, they still choose the politician they believe is better according to underlying characteristics (Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2014; Banks and Sundaram 1993; Fearon 1999). In other words, voters struggle to punish politicians that are not performing as well as they can because they favor them on other dimensions.

In addition to the agency problems just described, voters face an additional challenge in that

any one person's vote contributes little to an election outcome—even at the municipal level. This means that coordinated voting behavior is necessary in order to punish a bad incumbent or reward a good one. Coordination is generally difficult to galvanize, even when voters wish to do so, when they are uncertain about the actions of others. Given this, it is especially challenging to induce coordination in clientelistic settings where bad politicians can condition patronage on turning out or supporting a candidate. In such settings, an individual voter has incentives to free-ride on the behavior of others—e.g. by voting clientelistically while letting others forgo clientelistic benefits and vote to boot out the bad politician (Arias et al. 2017b). Furthermore, voters could rationally respond to public signals of incumbent performance in ways that undermine accountability, for instance by abstaining from voting or by voting clientelistically (e.g. Cruz, Keefer and Labonne 2017). In other words, information on incumbent performance could spur (or reinforce) coordination on a low-accountability equilibrium.

2.2 Literature review: does information increase political accountability?

The evidence that information can improve accountability both electoral and non-electoral is mixed. Some studies show promising effects of information that is worse than expected inducing voters to sanction the incumbent and increase their monitoring, whereas others find null or opposing effects that nonetheless teach us about the contexts in which information works best and where it may backfire.

On the positive side, several studies find that providing information to voters improves accountability. Ferraz and Finan (2008) show that the release of audit reports that document multiple incidents of corruption among Brazilian municipalities with comparable levels of corruption reduces the re-election rate of incumbent mayors. Moreover, a follow-up study by Avis, Ferraz and Finan (forthcoming) demonstrates that the experience of audits reduces corruption among future incumbents. Ferraz and Finan (2008) also provide evidence that this effect on re-election rates was more pronounced in municipalities that had a local radio station, suggesting that an informed electorate and the media can play an important role in weeding out corrupt politicians. Besley and Burgess (2002) and Snyder and Strömberg (2010) similarly show in India and the United States that politicians better serve their constituents when the media has stronger incentives to cover their actions in office. Building on these studies, Larreguy, Marshall and Snyder (2017) exploit plausibly exogenous variation in access to local media in Mexico to demonstrate that, at least when the media has incentives to report on municipal audit reports, pre-election media revelations causes voters to sanction malfeasant incumbent parties. In India, Mexico, and Uganda, respectively, Banerjee et al. (2011), Arias et al. (2017b), and Humphreys and Weinstein (2012) all find that although informa-

tion provided via performance scorecards has little effect on average, relatively poor performance is more likely to be punished at the ballot box and relatively good performance is more likely to be rewarded.

The effects of information on electoral accountability, however, are not uniformly positive. The most systematic evidence pertaining to electoral accountability comes from the recent Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP) Metaketa initiative that harmonized the experimental provision of similar incumbent performance information across Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, India, Mexico, and Uganda.¹ The results provide relatively mixed evidence that voters respond to a variety of types of incumbent performance information: while the results from Mexico and Uganda offer some support for the finding that information increases electoral accountability, the evidence from other studies is less sanguine (Dunning et al. forthcoming). Other experimental studies similarly find a limited effect of providing incumbent performance information on electoral accountability in Mexico and Brazil (Chong et al. 2015; de Figueiredo, Hidalgo and Kasahara 2013).

As it starts to understand such mixed effects, the empirical literature has highlighted several possible problems and sources of heterogeneity in responses. First, information may have limited effects if the information provided conforms with voters prior beliefs about candidates (e.g. Arias et al. 2017b; Banerjee et al. 2011). In fact, voters may even reward poorly-performing incumbent parties, if their prior beliefs are sufficiently pessimistic, as in many low-accountability contexts (e.g. Chong et al. 2015). Focusing explicitly on the prior beliefs of voters, Arias et al. (2017b) find that when Mexican voters who initially believed that their incumbents were highly malfeasant received audit reports exhibiting low malfeasance, they often come to believe that the incumbent is less malfeasant than initially expected, which in turn increases support for fairly malfeasant incumbent parties, despite voters still believing that challenger candidates continue to be relatively less malfeasant. This suggests that a further catalyst may be required to induce voters to switch away from incumbents revealed to be malfeasant.

Second, recent observational evidence suggests that dense social networks can induce voter action. With respect to electoral accountability, Arias et al. (2017a) find evidence implying that information provided in denser networks helps voters coordinate around challenger parties that they believe to be less malfeasant. To social networks information dissemination and voter coordination functions, they leverage survey data and a peculiar feature of their context where information generally causes voters to positively update about the incumbent without making the incumbent objectively preferable. While such evidence is primarily correlational due to the lack of random

¹For an overview of the Metaketa initiative, see <http://egap.org/metaketa/metaketa-information-and-accountability>.

variation on social network density, there is stronger evidence in the case of political participation. Recent studies find that social media technologies play a key role in coordinating voter protests in Russia and across Africa (Enikolopov, Makarin and Petrova 2016; Manacorda and Tesei 2016), while others show that online messages mobilizing collective action are especially likely to be censored by autocratic governments (King, Pan and Roberts 2014). Nevertheless, these studies struggle to separate the extent to which information effects reflect the diffusion of information or voter coordination, which imply very different policy recommendations.

Third, the effects of information dissemination campaigns may be counteracted by strategic responses by politicians (e.g. Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2014). On one hand, Cruz, Keefer and Labonne (2017) find that an information campaign in the Philippines was almost exactly counteracted by an increase in vote buying. Similarly, Arias et al. (2017b) encounter considerable pushback from incumbent and challenger parties in Mexico. On the other hand, Banerjee et al. (2011) find that their newspaper campaign reduced vote buying in India, while Casey (2015) finds that information causes politicians to start serving groups across ethnic lines in Sierra Leone. A key outstanding question is to understand when political information can be provided with minimal pushback.

Fourth, the existence and magnitude of information's effect appears to vary with the mode of information delivery. Studies utilizing variation in media coverage consistently report substantial levels of electoral accountability (Banerjee et al. 2011; Chang, Golden and Hill 2010; Ferraz and Finan 2008; Larreguy, Marshall and Snyder 2017; Snyder and Strömberg 2010). In contrast, smaller-scale leaflet dissemination and SMS campaigns that are probably more likely to actually reach voters register significantly smaller effects (Chong et al. 2015; Cruz, Keefer and Labonne 2017; Dunning et al. forthcoming; de Figueiredo, Hidalgo and Kasahara 2013). This evidence might reflect the relatively better ability of media to generate common knowledge about the dissemination of information, and consequently to coordinate voters around it.

Together, the extant literature highlights that providing voters with incumbent performance information has the potential to enable voters to make better choices at the polls and induce politicians to perform better once in office. However, such optimism is frequently not realized: consistent with the theoretical reasons to believe that performance information may not be sufficient for political accountability, information dissemination campaigns often fail to break voters out of low-accountability equilibria. The key challenge is understanding how voters can be induced to demand more from their governments in the face of information, rather than accepting bad equilibria where all politicians are expected to be corrupt or incompetent.

2.3 Theoretical advance: when can information induce coordinated accountability?

As noted above, incumbent performance information often fails to break down entrenched low-accountability equilibria in developing countries. Such equilibria are generally characterized by low expectations about the performance of all political parties that are consistent with their actual performance, clientelistic practices of the worst-performing incumbents, and limited monitoring by citizens.

To escape such low-accountability traps, we argue that voters must solve a fundamental coordination problem preventing them from holding politicians to account.² In general, coordination problems reflect the existence of multiple (better and worse) equilibria where individuals converge on inferior (often risk-averse) equilibria because they do not believe that others will shift toward the Pareto-improving outcome. In our context of re-electing malfeasant politicians, this manifests itself as individual voters each settling for low-quality politicians that may offer clientelistic benefits and failing to monitor their actions in office because they do not believe that other voters are likely to hold governments to account (Arias et al. 2017a). There is then a risk that this becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, as voters come to believe that other voters will continue to vote for low-quality politicians. However, voters would be better off in the high-accountability equilibrium where they instead all agree to set high standards for public good provision, responsiveness to voter interests and to external shocks, and resisting corruption, and set in motion a dynamic whereby voters commit to demanding increased standards, monitoring performance in office, and ultimately sanctioning politicians for failing to deliver.

Perhaps the most appealing approach for coordinating voters is to establish “institutions” that enforce behavior (see Ostrom 1999) supplemented by modes of communication that provide information about how coordination should work in practice. For example, social media appears to be effectively performing the latter role by coordinating the logistics of protest (Enikolopov, Makarin and Petrova 2016; Manacorda and Tesei 2016). However, establishing behavior-enforcing institutions—especially in potentially adversarial political contexts where logistics are not the primary constraint—is often not feasible.

We believe that a more viable means for solving coordination problems in weakly institutionalized politically systems is a public signal, of the type that incumbent performance information—under the rights conditions—can provide. A public signal is a piece of information that reaches

²Note that we abstract from the commitment problems associated with turnout. While a large theoretical literature seeks to explain why voters do not free-ride on turnout in large numbers, we start from the empirical reality that many voters will turn out but are yet to decide for whom to vote for.

most individuals in the same form and is sufficiently credible that voters update their beliefs about the world from the signal. Public signals could coordinate voters via at least three mechanisms relevant in our context of voters becoming informed about incumbent performance in office. First, in addition to affecting a voter's own beliefs, public signals are important because they affect higher-order beliefs—each voter knows that other voters' beliefs are likely to change simultaneously. As with stock markets responding to announcements by the Federal Reserve, a public signal makes voters aware that others received the same information and may respond to it in a similar manner (e.g. [Morris and Shin 2002](#)). Voter behavior could thus change purely by establishing common knowledge that others also received the same information. Second, information that reaches a large number of voters is more likely to be discussed among voters, which could either reinforce the idea that others may change their behavior or induce voters to explicitly coordinate by engaging in agreements to punish a malfeasant incumbent ([Chwe 2000](#)). Third, a negative public signal is difficult for incumbent parties to counteract. For example, clientelistic incumbents may have the resources to make targeted payments to buy off small numbers of people that learn about their low quality (e.g. [Cruz, Keefer and Labonne 2017](#)), but they likely lack the resources to make greater payments to a substantial proportion of the electorate.

However, public signals are only likely to be effective in coordinating voters under certain conditions.³ First, given that a few voters changing their behavior is not sufficient to change political outcomes in large electorates, an effective public signal must reach a substantial proportion of the electorate to instigate coordinated action. Moreover, this is likely to significantly reduce the scope for politicians to engage in a targeted crack down in response. As argued by [Kuran \(1991\)](#), the Soviet Union only collapsed once a critical mass of voters realized that others felt similarly alienated. We thus expect incumbent performance information only to significantly coordinate voting behavior if it reaches a substantial fraction of the population.

Second, even if the information reaches a substantial fraction of the population, coordination is still likely to require common knowledge. If voters believe that few others received the information, then they have little reason to believe that others will also change their behavior. This could explain why malfeasance revelations in the mass media have induced greater electoral sanctioning in developing contexts (e.g. [Banerjee et al. 2011](#); [Ferraz and Finan 2008](#); [Larreguy, Marshall and Snyder 2017](#)). We thus hypothesize that making clear to voters that the many others also received the information is likely to significantly increase the probability of galvanizing a coordinated voter response.

³Of course, this does not preclude that some voters may also decide to change their vote choices based on the information, regardless of the coordination motive. As a consequence, there might still be a smaller change in voter behavior, even in the absence of those conditions.

Third, a public signal is only likely to be effective if it is credible for most voters. This is particularly relevant in politics, given that pre-existing biases can be instrumental in shaping which voters engage with information, and motivated reasoning induces voters to reject information contradicting their world view (e.g. [Taber and Lodge 2006](#); [Zaller 1992](#)). Given that some recent leaflet campaigns indicate that, even when explicitly told that information comes from a non-partisan source, voters believe that information interventions are politically motivated, ensuring the credibility of an information campaign is of central importance.

If voters can be induced to coordinate, which candidates are likely to coordinate on? We propose three possible responses that we will seek to differentiate empirically. First, voters may coordinate on the candidate that they believe will better represent their interests. Under this scenario, even information that somewhat negatively updates voters' beliefs about a good incumbent could increase support for that incumbent provided that voters' posterior beliefs still suggest that the incumbent is a better option than the challenger ([Arias et al. 2017a](#)). Such a "better option" could be defined either with respect to irregularities or multiple (or other) dimensions. Second, voters may coordinate around the objective severity of poor performance, regardless of how it relates to the comparison between candidates. Unlike the previous model, in this scenario voters would sanction the incumbent for poor performance, even when they believe that the challenger is just as bad—in order to send a signal establishing the dynamic incentive that poor performance will no longer be tolerated. In practice, this may mean that performance below expectations is punished, or that even bad performance exceeding pessimistic priors is punished. Third, and related, voters may simply engage in vengeance against poor performers, rather than seek to alter incentives. Differentiating between these explanations relies upon carefully measuring both voters' prior and posterior beliefs.

Generally, we believe that such coordination is likely to generate better equilibrium outcomes. This in large part reflects our supposition that the starting point is a low-accountability equilibrium with low levels of voter welfare arising from political decision-making. Nevertheless, it is theoretically possible that voters could also coordinate on worse outcomes as well. One study of Mexican elections in the 1990s, for example, found that opposition supporters who expected elections to be fraudulent were less likely to turn out to vote, and concluded that "in denouncing the practice of electoral fraud, [opposition leaders] must take care not to discourage their own voters from participating in the election" ([McCann and Domínguez 1998](#)). While the information we provide is not about electoral fraud, the general idea is the same: it could lead those who receive it to expect co-partisans not to turn out, effectively coordinating voters in a manner inimical to accountability. Similarly, our theory might also have predictive power in instances where the information that is deemed as partisan, and thus as not credible. In particular, the signal might operate as a coordina-

tion device around the candidate or party that voters believe is being subject to a smear campaign, or against the candidate or party that is believed to be providing non-credible information.

In sum, we hypothesize that information is only likely to break down the low-accountability equilibria that define politics in many developing contexts when voters are able to coordinate around such information. Specifically, we seek to test the following claim: electoral accountability is greater where credible information is provided in a saturated manner, establishes common knowledge, generates explicit coordinated action, and creates informational spillovers.

2.4 Empirical implications

As explained in the background section, our study’s key objective is to shed light on voter coordination. Specifically, we wish to answer the following general questions:

- What is the causal effect of providing information about incumbent performance on voter electoral coordination?
- What types of candidates to voters coordinate around?
- What are the mechanisms that mediate any such effects?

There exist a variety of theoretical approaches to understanding how voters respond to the provision of information. Different theoretical approaches often differ in their empirical implications. Our analysis is designed to test some of the main ideas that have been put forth as mechanisms underlying electoral behavior and voter coordination.

First, we seek to discern between different **categories of mediating factors** that respond to the question: what do people do with the information about incumbent performance? Our survey data allow us to examine mediation by the following factors (which may not be mutually exclusive):

- Direct learning: information leads voters to update their prior beliefs about the quality of the incumbent.
- Indirect learning: information leads to conversations or other forms of information-sharing (e.g. via Facebook) which lead to learning about the performance of the incumbent.
- Explicit agreement: information generates explicit coordination via conversations or messages that reach (informal) agreements on how to behave.
- Tacit agreement: information enables tacit coordination through a change in expectations about the actions of others.

- Feelings: information elicits feelings, such as anger, which in turn motivate behavior, even in the absence of learning or agreement.

Second, we wish to study the effect of the **patterns of knowledge**. Specifically, our treatments and our survey questions make it possible to study the potentially-different causal roles of:

- Receiving information (either directly via treatment or indirectly from others).
- Knowing or believing that others received the information.
- Knowing or believing that others will update their beliefs about this information.
- Knowing or believing that others know that yet others received the information.

To make the above distinctions, we make use of the following **empirical resources**:

1. Random assignment of information saturation across municipalities.
2. Random assignment of information within different parts of treated municipalities.
3. Random assignment of information across individuals.
4. Random assignment of “degree” of common knowledge across both individuals and municipalities.
5. Survey questions on: information exposure and recall, priors and posteriors about incumbent quality, frequency of political conversations with others, conversations about the information, individual reaction to the information, expectations about exposure of others to the information, expectations about others’ reaction to the information, explicit conversations about how to behave electorally, individual electoral behavior.
6. Administrative data on turnout and vote choice at various levels of aggregation (precinct and municipality).

3 Research Design

This section outlines our research design for testing the theoretical expectations described above. We first provide an overview of our empirical context, before turning to our treatments, experimental design, and measurement strategies.

3.1 Context: mayoral malfeasance and accountability in Mexico

Municipal governments are led by mayors typically elected to three-year terms, which will become renewable for the first time in most states in 2018. Mayors are responsible for delivering basic public services and managing local infrastructure. In addition to addressing major developmental challenges, many municipalities face significant security and state capacity challenges that threaten the state's ability to deliver public services and deal with crime. Such challenges both reflect and are compounded by the worryingly widespread lack of accountability in office. Although the new opportunity for re-election may help mitigate this (e.g. [Ferraz and Finan 2011](#)), since mayors often sought higher (state and federal) office and thus already faced incentives to remain relatively disciplined, this reform is unlikely to fully address the lack of effective accountability mechanisms.

A key source of funding for mayors is the Municipal Fund for Social Infrastructure (FISM). This represents 24% of the average municipality's budget. According to the 1997 Fiscal Coordination Law, FISM funds are direct federal transfers mandated exclusively for infrastructure projects that benefit the population living in poverty, as defined by those living in localities deemed to be marginalized by the National Population Council (CONAPO). In 2010, CONAPO defined 79% of localities as eligible due to scoring high or very high on the marginalization scale. Eligible projects include investments in the water supply, drainage, electrification, health infrastructure, education infrastructure, housing, and roads.

Each year, around 150 municipalities are selected for audit by Mexico's independent Federal Auditors Office (ASF), to evaluate their use of FISM transfers. The ASF selects municipalities primarily on the basis of their relative contribution of FISM transfers to the municipal budget, historical performance, factors that raise the likelihood of mismanagement, and whether the municipality has recently been audited (including concurrent federal audits of other programs) (see [Auditoria Superior de la Federación 2014](#)). Audits are announced after spending has occurred, and reports address the spending, accounting, and management of FISM funds from the previous fiscal year.

Although the ASF's reports categorize the use of FISM funds in various ways, we focus in this study on spending irregularities in the use of exercised FISM resources. Such malfeasance typically represent funds that are either spent on projects not benefiting the poor (i.e. projects primarily benefiting ineligible localities) or spent on unauthorized projects that do not fall within the definition of social infrastructure projects (e.g. personal expenses and election campaigns). Since 2015, 14% of funds have broken spending regulations in either of these two ways in the average municipality ([Larreguy, Marshall and Snyder 2017](#)). Given that other programs and funding sources are not subject to such audits, mayoral malfeasance in other areas could be significantly higher.

We expect malfeasance across areas to be correlated, and thus information about malfeasance in the use of FISM funds to be at least somewhat correlated with, and thus indicative of, the overall malfeasance of the mayor.

However, the potential for voters to punish high levels of mayoral malfeasance and reward clean incumbents is limited by low levels of voter information about both the resources available to mayors and their responsibility to provide basic public services in the first place (Chong et al. 2015). Although the reports are publicized in some media outlets (Larreguy, Marshall and Snyder 2017), coverage is not widespread. Arias et al. (2017b) show that distributing this information via non-partisan leaflets causes voters to update their beliefs about incumbent party malfeasance. Despite high levels of malfeasance, they find that this frequently causes voters with low expectations to reward incumbent parties. In contrast, Chong et al. (2015) instead find that revealing severe malfeasance in FISM spending breeds voter disengagement, particularly among the supporters of challengers. This project extends these studies by seeking to understand how voter coordination can facilitate greater accountability when similar information is provided using a low-cost and scalable technology.

3.2 Experimental treatments

Our intervention—which was conceived in conjunction with our *Borde Político*, our partnering NGO—is designed to examine how voter coordination around information can break the low-accountability equilibria frequently observed in Mexico and across the developing world. Beyond simply informing voters of their incumbent’s performance, our treatments combine information with factors that could shift such an equilibrium by enhancing coordination.

Baseline treatment. Like previous studies, the common component of our treatment conditions is the provision of ASF audit reports detailing the percentage of the municipal incumbent’s spending that break FISM regulations, i.e. the irregularities mentioned above.⁴ We intend to inform voters about the FISM program (that it is a federal transfer to their municipality, intended for social infrastructure projects benefiting the poor, how much money their municipality received), and how their incumbent has performed in terms of the percentage of spending subject to irregularities. The core information is conveyed by the example infographics in Figures 1 and 2 respectively showing cases with 0% and greater than 0% irregularities.

⁴The information provided is similar to various extant studies (e.g. Arias et al. 2017a; Banerjee et al. 2011; Chong et al. 2015; Larreguy, Marshall and Snyder 2017), especially those in the EGAP Metaketa initiative. This will facilitate comparison with previous findings, and thus both enhance our understanding of the mechanisms supporting improved electoral accountability and increase external validity.




Figure 1: Example of an infographic from a municipality (Xilitla, San Luis Potosí) where irregularities were 0%





Figure 2: Example of an infographic from a municipality (Los Cabos, Baja California Sur) where irregularities were greater than 0%

This information will primarily be delivered as a video both *en masse* via *Facebook ads* to sizeable shares of Facebook users in treated municipalities and also *individually* via *WhatsApp messages* to the cell phones of the individually-treated voters within our baseline survey sample. Figure 3 shows the slides included in the video; the seventh slide will only appear for those in the common knowledge subtreatment (see below). In addition, we also created Facebook pages for each municipality (for baseline and common knowledge treatments), where an infographic akin to those in Figures 1 or 2 is posted alongside the video (from which Facebook ads are “boosted”), a link to the ASF webpage hosting the official report itself, and a cover photo highlighting the money received and fraction of irregularities. The link to the ASF and the infographic are also posted as comments on the Facebook ads, while the infographic is sent as a follow-up WhatsApp message. An example of the ad and infographic messages sent as part of the individual-level treatment via WhatsApp are shown in Figure 4. To open the WhatsApp video, respondents are required to click to download the video.

The low-cost potential of digital interventions—in comparison with previous studies providing scorecards via leaflets (Arias et al. 2017b; Chong et al. 2015; Humphreys and Weinstein 2012) or newspapers (Banerjee et al. 2011; Gerber, Karlan and Bergan 2009; Green, Kirby and Zelizer 2006)—presents the possibility that modern technology can dramatically improve electoral accountability. Recent studies have demonstrated that SMS messages can effectively encourage voter turnout (Aker, Collier and Vicente forthcoming; Vicente, Humphreys and Sabet 2015), and can help communicate incumbent performance information to voters (Buntaine et al. 2016; George, Gupta and Neggers 2017). However, we are not aware of previous studies using these technologies to disseminate incumbent performance information.

Treatment variants. We extend existing research by experimentally varying two factors that could empower the voter coordination around information provision required to break voters out of low-accountability political equilibria:

First, we intend to vary the *saturation of municipal information dissemination via Facebook ads*. As noted above, information is most likely to produce the shared expectations and explicit discussion that support coordination when communicated as a mass public signal. Specifically, to identify the effects of varying the extent to which the signal is public, we purchased a Facebook ad campaign seeking to reach 20% of Facebook users of voting age in a municipality with the Facebook ad described above in low-saturation municipalities (low-reach), while we seek to reach 80% with the ad in high-saturation municipalities (high-reach). The 20% and 80% saturations were selected based on the power calculations proposed by Baird et al. (2014) for minimizing the equally-weighted sum of the standard errors for treatment and spillover effects where municipali-




(a) Slide 1




(b) Slide 2



(c) Slide 3



(d) Slide 4




(e) Slide 5



(f) Slide 6




(g) Slide 7




(h) Slide 8


Figure 3: Example of the slides included in the ad video (from San Luis Potosí, San Luis Potosí)



(a) WhatsApp message containing ad (top)



(b) WhatsApp message containing ad (bottom)



(c) Reminder WhatsApp message containing infographic (top)



(d) Reminder WhatsApp message containing infographic (bottom)

Figure 4: Example of the slides included in the ad video (from San Luis Potosí, San Luis Potosí)

ties are equally split between control, low-saturation, and high-saturation (see below for additional details). The ad campaigns run for a week, concluding on Wednesday 27th June—the last day of official campaigning. Although we cannot guarantee that all Facebook users will see the ad, due to the complexity of Facebook’s ad generation algorithm, we intend to at least ensure that the ad could have reached each Facebook user. Varying the extent of saturation in this way helps us to establish how many voters need to be informed (at the municipal level) for coordination to occur and (using a randomized saturation design) the extent of within-municipality informational spillovers (see below). In all treated (and some control) municipalities, we will also send individual WhatsApp messages to our surveyed voters, but these will be negligible as a fraction of the municipal population. Accordingly, we can disregard them for municipal treatment-saturation considerations.

Second, to better distinguish coordination from the information diffusion that high-saturation could also induce, we additionally generate within- and across-municipality variation in voters’ common knowledge by randomly providing *information about the saturation of municipal information dissemination* both in the *en masse* Facebook ads and the individual WhatsApp messages. Accordingly, in the segments of municipalities and individually-treated survey respondents that receive common knowledge treatments, voters receiving audit report information will also be informed about the share of voters (80% or 20%) that we attempt to provide information to via Facebook. An example of this is slide 7 of Figure 3. To avoid deception, this information is only ever made available to respondents in treated municipalities and always reflects the true share of people that our campaigns seek to reach. The common knowledge information is delivered at the end of the ad to avoid altering the probability of treated respondents being differentially exposed to other parts of the message. As argued above, informing voters of the number of other voters in their municipality that received incumbent malfeasance information could support voter coordination around better candidates either tacitly via higher-order beliefs or explicitly through discussion or verbal agreement. Our surveys are designed to differentiate these mechanisms.

3.3 Sample

Between 2017 and 2018, the ASF released audit reports for 561 municipalities (approximately 10% of all Mexican municipalities each year) corresponding to the FISM spending of mayors typically in their first year in office.⁵ Of these, 128 municipalities are from the 17 states—Baja California Sur, Campeche, Chiapas, Colima, Estado de México, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Jalisco, Michoacán, Morelos, Nuevo León, Puebla, Querétaro, San Luis Potosí, Sonora, Tabasco, and Yucatán—holding municipal elections in 2018 in which the mayor currently in office is the same

⁵We exclude the two Delegacionales in the Federal District of Mexico City.

mayor as the one that presided over the audited FISM spending.⁶ These 128 municipalities included in our sample are shaded in green in Figure 5 below. As the figure shows, they are scattered across the country, and collectively contain a little over 30 million people (around a quarter of Mexicans).

Within municipalities, our sample frame comprises of (i) at the municipality level, all voters with a Facebook account, and (ii) at the voter level, survey respondents using the smart phone app WhatsApp. In 2016, 41% of the Mexican population were Facebook users but this figure represents an underestimate for our purpose since Facebook users are concentrated in the adult population that is eligible to vote.⁷ Of social media users, 97% have a Facebook account.⁸ Moreover, more than half of the adult population owns a smart phone, and can thus use WhatsApp.⁹ Due to it being free once internet access has been established (in contrast with SMS messages), WhatsApp has become the messaging service of choice in many major developing countries, including Brazil, India, and Mexico. Of smart phone users in Mexico, more than 70% use WhatsApp. The demographic is likely to be disproportionately young people, who have led the recent protests in Mexico about government failure, and are most likely to be receptive to the information that we intend to disseminate.

Although Facebook and WhatsApp usage are widespread, a key challenge is ensuring that the relevant information treatment actually reaches specific voters. Fortunately, Facebook allows us to target ads within a 1km radius, although the exact accuracy of this somewhat uncertain. When it comes to WhatsApp accounts, which are identified by their cell phone number, our survey implementing partner GeoPoll has generated a sample based on randomly calling and messaging randomly-generated cell numbers (based on areas codes local to our municipalities), TelMex land-line numbers, and the completion of an online Qualtrics surveyed recruited via a Facebook ad campaign. We aim to recruit 31 respondents per municipality for a baseline survey, and 20 of these for endline survey (with replacement if this is not possible); the final numbers will differ from this due to the differing ease of recruitment across municipalities. To incentivize participation, respondents that complete the baseline survey will be entered into a lottery to win one of 10 prizes

⁶This entails dropping municipalities from states like Coahuila, where mayors were elected in 2017 and thus are different from the mayor's responsible for audited spending.

⁷See Statista <https://www.statista.com/statistics/553759/facebook-penetration-in-mexico> and <https://www.statista.com/statistics/553759/facebook-penetration-in-mexico>.

⁸See <https://www.emarketer.com/Article/Facebook-Dominates-Social-Media-Market-Mexico/1013828>.

⁹See the March 2016 Interactive Advertising Bureau Mexico (IAB Mexico); Millward Brown report Estudio de Consumo de Medios y Dispositivos Entre Internautas Mexicanos; the eMarketer report Mobile Mexico 2016: Updated Forecasts and Key Growth Trends; and Statista DMO, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/598030/number-of-smartphone-users-mexico>.




Figure 5: The 128 municipalities included in our sample

with value equivalent to a new smart phone; an additional independent lottery will be used for the endline as well.

An important advantage of our *en masse* Facebook treatment is our ability to target a substantial share of voters in treated municipalities. This is especially important when attempting to induce voter coordination because we are more likely to reach activists and organizers, and more likely to generate the mass common knowledge and expectations required for coordinated collective action. We expect to treat a broadly nationally representative sample of municipalities and voters—a rare opportunity for high levels of external validity within a country. Given the relatively low costs of the Facebook ads, our findings may be easily scalable.

Regarding the surveys, the baseline survey was conducted by telephone and online over 2-3 weeks in early June 2018. This survey lasts approximately 20 minutes, although this varies by the mode through which the survey is completed. Similarly, the endline survey will be conducted via telephone and online in the weeks immediately after the election, starting on Monday 2nd July. The endline survey will also last approximately 20 minutes. Furthermore, survey respondents must satisfy several conditions to be eligible for the two-wave panel survey: be a registered voter; reside in one of the study municipalities; possess a cellphone; use WhatsApp; and be willing to receive a WhatsApp message with information about the upcoming municipal elections. Failure to satisfy any of these conditions will exclude the participant from the study. The need to be a registered voter is a fairly weak restriction because most citizens are registered in Mexico, and the need reside in one of the study municipalities follows from the fact that we cannot conduct the study with individuals from municipalities for whom we are missing audit reports indicating the misallocation of federal transfers mandated for social infrastructure projects benefiting the poor by the incumbent municipal governments. While the cellphone restriction might be somewhat more restrictive, it is technologically impossible to remove that restriction since both the survey and information treatment delivery will be conducted over the phone.

3.4 Experimental design and treatment assignment


To understand the importance of voter coordination for electoral accountability, we evaluate the effects of our randomized informational treatments described above on electoral, survey, and downstream administrative outcomes. We propose a three-level randomization strategy—at the municipality, (within-municipality) segment, and individual levels—to estimate the extent to which information dissemination, information saturation and common knowledge affect voter beliefs, electoral behavior, and post-election outcomes.

Our study is divided into 3 main phases. The first phase involves a baseline individual-level sur-

vey of approximately 3,968 voters conducted by telephone and online before the general election on July 1st 2018. The second phase entails the distribution of treatment information about municipal incumbent political performance via WhatsApp and the noted placement of Facebook ads in order to truthfully aim to reach 20/80% of the Facebook users in the municipality. The third phase involves a post-election individual-level endline survey designed to understand how voters respond to the information provided, and thus illuminate the mechanisms underpinning their responses.

The three levels of randomization are implemented as follows, with the design summarized in Figure 6. First, we start by block-randomizing the provision of Facebook ads providing information about the incumbent’s performance according to the ASF audit reports at the municipal level, as well as a link to a Facebook page containing more detailed information about the ASF report (namely, information about the audits and links to the ASF website to demonstrate the information’s credibility). Examples of this information are shown in Figures 1-3. We created 42 blocks containing 3 similar municipalities (based on 28 pre-treatment covariates) governed (in all but one block) by the same incumbent party, and randomly assign one municipality from each block to: (i) a pure control condition where no Facebook ads are placed; (ii) a low-reach treatment where only 20% of Facebook users within a municipality can potentially access the Facebook ads; and (iii) a higher-reach treatment where 80% of Facebook users within a municipality can potentially access Facebook ads. The one block containing 2 municipalities also used complete randomization, but only randomized between control and the high-saturation treatment. The municipal-level block randomization ensures that each municipality has an equal probability of being treated, while the blocking strategy ensures that treatments cannot differentially affect incumbents from particular parties.

The 20% and 80% shares are reached by dividing municipalities into (multiples of, in larger municipalities) 5 similarly-sized segments. Segments were created before treatment assignment and defined by contiguous electoral precincts—generally, Mexico’s smallest electoral geographic unit—that form compact polygons with similar populations of individuals aged 18 or above according to the 2010 Census. Larger municipalities received more segments where it was possible to specifically target those segments using Facebook’s targeting system. Our 793 segments were first created using the freely-downloadable redistricting program Auto-Redistrict (auto-redistrict.org) that allows user to redistrict blocks of precincts into “districts” subject to various constraints, and then manually adjusted at the margins to smooth edges in order to facilitate ease of targeting with Facebook ads (given the targeting constraint of needing to pick points with 1km radii). The latter adjustment effectively relaxes the population equality constraint somewhat. In all but one very small municipality (containing only three precincts), there were sufficient precincts to form multi-



Notes: Approximate number of municipalities shown in parentheses; approximate number of segments shown in {green curly brackets} based on actual randomization; approximate number of individuals shown in [blue brackets], based on simplifying assumptions of 10 segments per municipality, and 5000 subjects in the WhatsApp study group evenly distributed across municipalities.

Figure 6: Summary of the experimental design

ples of five segments.

Second, within low and high-saturation treatment municipalities, we next use complete randomization to assign segments to be targeted with Facebook ads. Moreover, we further randomize whether the segment receives common knowledge ads, where voters are informed how many other voters within their municipality are being targeted with the ad. That is, while Facebook ads will be available to either a 20% or 80% random share of the municipal Facebook users in the respondents' municipalities, the Facebook ads might indicate or not the share of municipal Facebook users that they are available to. Within the large majority of low-saturation municipalities with only 5 segments, only one segment is treated; this is determined by complete randomization within this municipal-level treatment type. In the few low-saturation municipalities with more than 5 segments (but always a multiple of 5), receiving an equal number of non-common knowledge and common knowledge treated segments is prioritized. Within high-saturation municipalities, 40% of segments do receive the common knowledge information and 40% do not receive this information.

Third, treatments are independently assigned to individual baseline survey participants to broadly mirror the municipal/segment-level treatments. We maintain similarity in order to help draw inferences from the surveys about segment-level electoral behavior. Treatments containing the Facebook video ad and then subsequently the infographic available on the Facebook page will be sent via WhatsApp after the baseline survey and before the election. Following the municipal assignments, respondents in low- and high-saturation treated municipalities will have access to the ads, while respondents in many control municipalities will not. Specifically, all respondents in 20 of the control municipalities will receive no WhatsApp treatments, while 20% of respondents in low- and high-saturation treated municipalities and the remaining 23 control municipalities will serve as controls. Within the 23 control municipalities that receive only WhatsApp treatments, 80% of these respondents will receive the treatment without common knowledge (given that there is no Facebook campaign in these municipalities). Within low- and high-saturation treated municipalities, 40% of respondents will receive the treatment without common knowledge, and 40% will receive the treatment with common knowledge. These treatments are also assigned in blocks of 5 similar respondents within municipalities.

3.5 Measurement of outcomes

Our outcomes will be measured after the election. First, we will use polling station level electoral returns to assess potential effects on actual vote choices across precincts in different municipalities and segments. Specifically, we intend to examine turnout, incumbent vote share as a share of registered voters, incumbent vote share as a percentage of total votes, and the same vote shares for

particular non-incumbent parties. This data will be collected from Mexico’s state electoral institutes, which publish precinct-level electoral returns in the months after the election. The finalized polling station-level election data is likely to be made publicly available at least several weeks after election day.

Second, our endline survey will elicit self-reported turnout and vote choice. To capture mechanisms driving any potential effect, we also examine stated reasons for such voting behavior, individual beliefs about the performance and quality of the incumbent candidate/party, political knowledge, political campaigning, engagement with the treatment (both individually and with others), and beliefs about others engagement with and response to the information. Please see the survey instruments in the Appendix for all baseline and endline outcomes. The endline data will be collected in the weeks immediately after the election.

In addition to these primary outcomes, we will also attempt to survey Facebook users that interact with the treatments (by messaging them on Facebook), in order to better understand how the treatment operated.

Although there is no reason to anticipate attrition in electoral outcomes, we expect to encounter some attrition in our panel survey. However, our estimates of (complier) treatment effects will remain unbiased if such attrition is uncorrelated with our WhatsApp treatment (a claim that can be tested and should be minimized by our survey completion incentive). To address the imprecision induced by attrition, we will replenish our endline sample after all attempts to re-contact respondents fail.

4 Hypotheses and estimation strategies

As explained in the background section, our study’s main objective is to shed light on the importance of coordination for electoral accountability. We thus use the design described above to test the following hypotheses relating to the effects of the information campaign on voter behavior:

1. Information about incumbent performance influences citizen electoral behavior (turnout, vote choice) and aggregate election outcomes (turnout, incumbent vote %, reelection).
2. Information about incumbent performance has a greater influence on electoral behavior when a larger fraction of the municipality is treated.
3. Information about incumbent performance has a greater influence on electoral behavior when there is common knowledge about the treatment.

4. Saturation and common knowledge serve as complements in amplifying the effects of information about incumbent performance on electoral behavior.
5. Information about incumbent performance also influences electoral behavior among voters in untreated segments of treated municipalities via informational spillover.

Our design also seeks to illuminate the *mechanisms* underlying any effects of the information campaign on electoral behavior and outcomes. The information needed in order to do this will principally come from the previously mentioned two-wave panel questionnaire, although we also intend to use our survey of those interacting with the ad campaign on Facebook and examine heterogeneity in aggregate effects. The primary mechanisms that we intend to investigate capture the following questions:

1. How do treated voters interact with, share, and appraise the credibility of the treatment?
2. Are treated voters more informed about incumbent performance?
3. Are treated voters more likely to update their prior beliefs about incumbent performance?
4. Does knowledge that information on incumbent performance is available to others influence whether a citizen (a) acquires or internalizes such information and (b) updates prior beliefs about incumbent performance? If yes, does the share of other citizens to whom the information is available matter?
5. Are changes in voter electoral behavior resulting from treatment consistent with the direction of belief updating?
6. Are changes in voter electoral behavior resulting from treatment consistent with voters' claimed motives for coordinated action and the implied parties that they will support?
7. Are changes in citizen electoral behavior greater when it is commonly known that information is available to others? If yes, does the share of other citizens to whom the information is available matter?
8. Does the treatment influence the information, updating of priors, and electoral behavior of untreated citizens? If yes, does the fraction of treated citizens in proximity to untreated ones matter?
9. To what extent do changes in citizen electoral behavior follow from coordination among citizens v. information diffusion?

4.1 Estimation

We employ a variety of empirical strategies to test short-term and long-term implications of the coordinated-based theory of electoral behavior, using both individual and municipal level outcomes. We use regression analyses that transparently leverage our experimental variation to identify causal effects on outcome variables at various levels of aggregation: municipality, segment (consisting of a collection of contiguous precincts), precinct, and individual citizen. Standard errors are clustered by municipality throughout to reflect the design randomizing treatments at the municipal level, and all observations will be weighted by the inverse probability of receiving the received treatment to address differential probabilities of treatment assignment arising from municipal block sizes and differences in the randomization of treatments within municipalities. We will also adopt a second weighting strategy that further weights electoral outcomes by the number of registered voters within the relevant unit.

4.1.1 Municipal-level outcomes

Our most basic specification estimates the average treatment effect (ATE) of assignment of municipalities to information treatments:

$$Y_m = \beta_1 L_m + \beta_2 H_m + \mu_b + X'_m \gamma + \varepsilon_m, \quad (1)$$

where m indexes municipalities, Y_m is a municipality-level outcome (turnout, incumbent vote share (as a share of registered voters and as a share of those that turn out), vote share for particular challenger parties, or an indicator for incumbent or other party election), the variable L_m is an indicator for assignment to the 20%-ad-saturation condition (arm B in Figure 6), H_m an indicator for the 80%-ad-saturation condition (arm C), and μ_b are fixed effects for the blocks within which treatment is assigned (and do not bias estimates of the ATE because treatments are uncorrelated with blocks by construction). The reference category is the set of municipalities in the control condition (arm A). All observations are weighted by the inverse probability of treatment assignment, which is $\frac{1}{1/3}$ for the blocks containing 3 municipalities, and $\frac{1}{1/2}$ for the single block containing two municipalities. Baseline specification will not include additional controls, but we intend to increase efficiency by adding controls X_m —most notably including a lagged dependent variable that enables us to soak up significant baseline variation (McKenzie 2012).

The assumption that arm A constitutes an adequate control condition rests on the fact that the treatments in branches $D0$ and $D1$ are unlikely to have much of an effect on municipal-level outcomes, since the number of individuals treated with WhatsApp messages in that branch is tiny

relative to the municipality population size. If there are significant differences in municipality-level outcome variables across branches $D-$ and $D0-D1$, we will add a further control for assignment to the 23 municipalities containing $D0$ and $D1$ treatments.

The above setup allows us to test whether the information treatments have any effects on outcomes ($\beta_1 \neq 0$ and $\beta_2 \neq 0$), and whether the degree of information saturation makes a difference ($\beta_1 \neq \beta_2$). However, it is not obvious *a priori* whether information (and the degree of saturation) will increase or decrease support for the incumbent in a given municipality. This will depend on the interplay of information and priors (about incumbent performance, about the quality of challengers, and about the likely behavior of other voters). We explore these issues in the individual-level analysis further below as well as offer more precise predictions with respect to effect heterogeneity.

We also intend to examine the saturation slope effect by also imposing a linearity assumption that may allow us to increase power by estimating the following regression:

$$Y_m = \beta Sat_m + \mu_b + X'_m \gamma + \varepsilon_m, \quad (2)$$

where the linear dosage variable, Sat_m , takes the values 0 (for treatment arm A), 0.2 (for treatment arm B), and 0.8 (for treatment arm C). Again, we cannot *a priori* sign the coefficient β .

To identify the effect of any level of saturation, we also estimate the following pooled regression:

$$Y_m = \beta LH_m + \mu_b + X'_m \gamma + \varepsilon_m, \quad (3)$$

where β identifies the effect of a municipality receiving either treatment. This is equally-weighted between saturation by design. Inverse probability weights will be adjusted accordingly.

4.1.2 Precinct-level outcomes

We estimate treatment effects of information on outcomes at the precinct level using the following regression specification, based on the segment-level assignments and the approach to estimating spillover effects advocated by [Baird et al. \(2014\)](#):

$$Y_{psm} = \beta_1 AN_{sm} + \beta_2 AC_{sm} + \beta_3 S_{sm} + \mu_b + X'_{psm} \gamma + \varepsilon_{psm}, \quad (4)$$

where Y_{psm} is now an electoral outcome for precinct p in segment s of municipality m , AN_{sm} is an indicator for a segment receiving the basic Facebook ad campaign, AC_{sm} is an indicator for a segment receiving the common knowledge Facebook ad campaign, and S_{sm} is an indicator for a

untreated segment located within a treated municipality. S_{sm} does not separate between basic and common knowledge campaigns, because spillovers could come from either type of treatment in many municipalities. However, we might consider to assess whether common knowledge campaigns are more likely to generate spillovers by defining whether spillovers are most likely from a common knowledge or not common knowledge campaign, or a metric that captures the extent to which spillovers are likely to come from a common knowledge campaign. As in the municipal level analysis, the reference category is arm A0, considered the control branch (the previous relevant discussion applies here too). Importantly, because the number of precincts differs by segment, observations are weighted by the precinct's share of the segment's 2010 adult population aged 18 or above, beyond the weighting that reflects the design (here, the inverse of the product of municipality blocks and the number of segments in the municipality).

The coefficients β_1 , β_2 , and β_3 estimate the ATE of the segment-level treatment conditions relative to the control. We further intend to test whether common knowledge strengthens or weakens average treatment effects (i.e. $|\beta_2 - \beta_1| > 0$); however, since the regression-based comparison gives greater weight to treated observations in high-saturation municipalities (80% of treated cases) and spillover observations in low-saturation municipalities (80% of spillover cases), we will also implement a reweighted regression to ensure a like-for-like comparison. Rejecting $\beta_3 = 0$ would provide evidence that there are spillover effects of information provision on citizen behavior in untreated segments within treated municipalities, although the exact nature of such spillover (e.g. Facebook ads themselves spilling across targets or information diffusion among citizens) is likely to require additional information from the surveys.

We also intend to pool across ad types to estimate the effect of any type of Facebook ad by estimating the following regression:

$$Y_{psm} = \beta_1 A_{sm} + \beta_2 S_{sm} + \mu_b + X'_{psm} \gamma + \varepsilon_{psm}, \quad (5)$$

where A_{sm} is an indicator for receiving any type of segment-level treatment (i.e. treatment arms B1-B4, C1, and C2). Rejecting $\beta_1 = 0$ would indicate the presence of an effect of the ads on precinct-level electoral outcomes.

To examine the effects of saturation, we further intend to interact the segment-level treatments

with the municipality saturation level using regressions of the form:

$$Y_{psm} = \beta_1 AN_{sm} + \beta_2 AC_{sm} + \beta_3 L_m + \beta_4 H_m + \beta_5 (AN_{sm} \times H_m) + \beta_6 (AC_{sm} \times H_m) + \beta_7 S_{sm} + \beta_8 (S_{sm} \times H_m) + \mu_b + X'_{psm} \gamma + \varepsilon_{psm}, \quad (6)$$

$$Y_{psm} = \beta_1 A_{sm} + \beta_3 L_m + \beta_2 H_m + \beta_4 (A_{sm} \times H_m) + \beta_5 S_{sm} + \beta_6 (S_{sm} \times H_m) + \mu_b + X'_{psm} \gamma + \varepsilon_{psm}. \quad (7)$$

The coefficients on the interaction between the segment-level treatments and municipal-level saturations enable us to identify differential treatments effect attributable to saturation levels. Because there are no segment-level treatments within control municipalities, the interaction coefficients identify the differential effects of high versus low saturation.¹⁰ β_5 , β_6 , and β_8 in equation (6), for example, thus identify how increasing the share of other people with access to the information influences voter responses to information. If such saturation effects play an important role, then we should expect that β_5 , β_6 , and β_8 will follow the sign of β_1 , β_2 , and β_7 respectively. Analogous expectations apply to β_4 and β_6 pooled specification in equation (7).

4.1.3 Voter-level outcomes

Our individual-level analysis examines the effects of both the mass segment-level Facebook campaigns *and* the individual-level WhatsApp treatments on survey respondents. The primary individual-level outcome variables of interest include self-reported turnout and vote choice, as well as higher-order beliefs and reports of explicit electoral coordination with other citizens.

First, to identify the role of directly having access to (any type of) information via WhatsApp or Facebook and of the information that others within the same municipality have access to, we will examine the effects of an individual receiving information themselves and municipal saturation using the following specification:

$$Y_{ism} = \beta_1 W_{im} + \beta_2 L_m + \beta_3 H_m + \mu_b + X'_{ism} \gamma + \varepsilon_{ism}, \quad (8)$$

where Y_{ism} is an outcome for individual i in segment s of municipality m , and W_{im} is an indicator for an individual receiving either type of WhatsApp treatment (treatment arms $D1$, $E1$, $E2$, $F1$, and $F2$). The reference category is the set of control respondents in either entirely control muni-

¹⁰Since we have only two interior saturation levels, this also means that we cannot impose linearity on the relationship (because the coefficient on β_5 is equivalent to the same coefficient on an interaction with Sat_m divided by $0.8-0.2=0.6$).

palties (treatment arm $D-$) or control respondents in municipalities where some people received either the WhatsApp (treatment arms $D0$, $E0$, and $F0$). Inverse probability weights will account for both the individual and municipal assignments.

While the baseline specification will not include controls (such that X_{ism} is empty), additional specifications will include individual, segment, and municipality characteristics as controls in X_{ism} to increase estimation efficiency. Most importantly, X_{ism} will include a lagged dependent variable; McKenzie (2012) shows that this is more efficient than defining the outcome as a first difference. In addition, X_{ism} will include municipality or individual randomization block fixed effects in some specifications, which may increase precision within municipalities with WhatsApp treatments, but comes at the cost of effectively dropping the respondents from control municipalities without WhatsApp treatments and respondents in individual-level blocks where most respondents are not surveyed at endline.

The coefficients β_1 and (β_2, β_3) thus respectively estimate the ATE of the WhatsApp treatment and the saturation of a treated municipality. While for many voters in treated municipalities this may constitute a spillover effect, for others it represents the effects of the Facebook campaign. Finding that $(\beta_2, \beta_3) \neq 0$ would suggest that information spills across individuals, particularly if $\beta_2 \neq 0$ because of the low saturation in such municipalities. Further finding that $\beta_1 = \beta_2$ or $\beta_1 = \beta_3$ would suggest that this municipal-level combination of Facebook ads and spillovers is just as strong as the treatment itself, implying substantial social effects (reflecting either information diffusion or voter coordination).

However, to better separate spillovers from intention to reach an individual with the Facebook campaign, we attempt to elicit the precinct at which the respondent votes as part of the endline survey (we ask at the end of the survey, in case this discourages participation in the survey). To the extent that we are able to obtain this data, this enables us to examine the effects of *segment*-level treatments using similar specification of the following form:

$$Y_{ism} = \beta_1 W_{im} + \beta_2 A_{sm} + \beta_3 S_{sm} + \mu_b + X'_{ism} \gamma + \varepsilon_{ism}. \quad (9)$$

The control group contains respondents in entirely control municipalities ($D-$), WhatsApp control respondents in control municipalities where some people received the WhatsApp treatment ($D0$), and now WhatsApp control respondents in municipalities that received Facebook versions of the treatments (arms $E0$ in $B0_noCK$ and $B0_CK$ segments and $F0$ in $C0$ segments, as well as control respondents in treated segments abstracting from the segment-level ATE). This allows us to separate the ATEs of WhatsApp treatments, Facebook treatments, and within-municipality Facebook treatment spillovers.

To more specifically test for the importance of information saturation, we will identify the moderating effect of the level of Facebook-ad saturation on the ATE and spillover effects of our WhatsApp information treatments. In contrast with the segment-level treatments where treatments are not received in control municipalities, this “saturation slope” will be estimated both non-parametrically and by imposing linearity using regressions of the following form:

$$Y_{ism} = \beta_1 W_{im} + \beta_2 L_m + \beta_3 H_m + \beta_4 (W_{im} \times L_m) + \beta_5 (W_{im} \times H_m) + \mu_b + X'_{ism} \gamma + \varepsilon_{ism}, \quad (10)$$

$$Y_{ism} = \beta_1 W_{im} + \beta_2 A_{sm} + \beta_3 S_{sm} + \beta_4 L_m + \beta_5 H_m + \beta_6 (W_{im} \times L_m) + \beta_7 (W_{im} \times H_m) + \beta_8 (A_{sm} \times H_m) + \beta_9 (S_{sm} \times H_m) + \mu_b + X'_{ism} \gamma + \varepsilon_{ism}, \quad (11)$$

$$Y_{ism} = \beta_1 W_{im} + \beta_2 L_m + \beta_3 H_m + \beta_4 (W_{im} \times Sat_m) + \mu_b + X'_{ism} \gamma + \varepsilon_{ism}, \quad (12)$$

$$Y_{ism} = \beta_1 W_{im} + \beta_2 A_{sm} + \beta_3 S_{sm} + \beta_4 L_m + \beta_5 H_m + \beta_6 (W_{im} \times Sat_m) + \beta_7 (A_{sm} \times H_m) + \beta_8 (S_{sm} \times H_m) + \mu_b + X'_{ism} \gamma + \varepsilon_{ism}. \quad (13)$$

The coefficients β_4 and β_5 in equation (10), for example, non-parametrically identify how increasing the share of other people with access to the information influences voter responses to information.¹¹ If saturation effects play an important role in supporting tacit or explicit coordination, then we should expect that β_4 and β_5 follow the sign of β_1 and β_2 respectively. Analogous expectations apply to equation (11) and the parametric specifications. If the WhatsApp treatment is read by all treated respondents, it would be hard to account for any differential effects of this form through an information diffusion mechanism.

To identify the effects of *common knowledge*—i.e. of informing citizens that other citizens also received the information—on individual-level outcomes, we estimate the following specifications:

$$Y_{ism} = \beta_1 WN_{im} + \beta_2 WC_{im} + \beta_3 L_m + \beta_4 H_m + \beta_5 N_m + \mu_b + X'_{ism} \gamma + \varepsilon_{ism}, \quad (14)$$

$$Y_{ism} = \beta_1 WN_{im} + \beta_2 WC_{im} + \beta_3 AN_{sm} + \beta_4 AC_{sm} + \beta_5 S_{sm} + \beta_6 N_m + \mu_b + X'_{ism} \gamma + \varepsilon_{ism}, \quad (15)$$

where WN_{im} and WC_{im} are respectively indicators for individuals receiving the WhatsApp treatment without and with common knowledge treatment (i.e. treatment arms $D1$, $E1$, and $F1$ versus $E2$ and $F2$), and N_m is an indicator for assignment to a control municipality with WhatsApp treatments (i.e. arms $D0$ and $D1$). The latter control accounts for the fact that in such municipalities there is no common knowledge version of the WhatsApp treatment. Finding $|\beta_2| \geq |\beta_1|$ in the first equation would indicate that the effect of information on audit reports is a function of the degree to

¹¹We can also estimate similar specifications accounting for the interaction of the WhatsApp treatment and the corresponding segment-level-treatment. However, we expect to be a lot less powered.

which such information is known to be public. If, as predicted, β_2 has the same sign as β_1 , then information and common knowledge are complements: the effect of information (in absolute value) is amplified by the knowledge that the information is public. Similarly, in the second equation, $0 < |\beta_3| < |\beta_4|$ (where β_5 and β_6 have the same sign) would indicate an analogous result for the Facebook segment-level treatment.

Finally, we combine all three sources of random variation to examine how the effects of information dissemination vary with saturation *and* common knowledge. Following the analysis above, this implies estimating the following non-parametric and linearized regressions:¹²

$$Y_{ism} = \beta_1 WN_{im} + \beta_2 WC_{im} + \beta_3 L_m + \beta_4 H_m + \beta_5 (WN_{im} \times L_m) + \beta_6 (WN_{im} \times H_m) + \beta_7 (WC_{im} \times L_m) + \beta_8 (WC_{im} \times H_m) + \mu_b + X'_{ism} \gamma + \varepsilon_{ism}, \quad (16)$$

$$Y_{ism} = \beta_1 WN_{im} + \beta_2 WC_{im} + \beta_3 AN_{sm} + \beta_4 AC_{sm} + \beta_5 L_m + \beta_6 H_m + \beta_7 (WN_{im} \times L_m) + \beta_8 (WN_{im} \times H_m) + \beta_9 (WC_{im} \times L_m) + \beta_{10} (WC_{im} \times H_m) + \beta_{11} (AN_{sm} \times H_m) + \beta_{13} (AC_{sm} \times H_m) + \mu_b + X'_{ism} \gamma + \varepsilon_{ism}, \quad (17)$$

$$Y_{ism} = \beta_1 WN_{im} + \beta_2 WC_{im} + \beta_3 L_m + \beta_4 H_m + \beta_5 (WN_{im} \times Sat_m) + \beta_6 (WC_{im} \times Sat_m) + \mu_b + X'_{ism} \gamma + \varepsilon_{ism}, \quad (18)$$

$$Y_{ism} = \beta_1 WN_{im} + \beta_2 WC_{im} + \beta_3 AN_{sm} + \beta_4 AC_{sm} + \beta_5 L_m + \beta_6 H_m + \beta_7 (WN_{im} \times Sat_m) + \beta_8 (WC_{im} \times Sat_m) + \beta_9 (AN_{sm} \times H_m) + \beta_{10} (AC_{sm} \times H_m) + \mu_b + X'_{ism} \gamma + \varepsilon_{ism}. \quad (19)$$

Although this analysis may be under-powered, we nevertheless test for complementarities between saturation and common knowledge by comparing the coefficients on the interaction terms. For example, $|\beta_6| - |\beta_5| \leq |\beta_8| - |\beta_7|$ in equation (16) would imply that high saturation amplifies the effect of common knowledge versus non-common knowledge information, relative to low saturation. Analogous tests will be implemented to compare high to zero saturation and to compare low to zero saturation.

4.2 Heterogeneous effects

We investigate treatment effect heterogeneity with respect to variables that are theoretically believed to moderate treatment effects and variables expected to capture the penetration of the treatments. In both cases, we extend equations (1)-(17) to estimate heterogeneous treatment by interacting treatments with pre-treatment covariates Z_{ism} (which could be a vector) and conditional

¹²Similarly, we can estimate similar specifications accounting for the interaction of the WhatsApp treatment and the corresponding segment-level-treatment. However, we expect to have much less power.

average treatment effects (CATEs) in strata z by subsetting the sample to $Z_{ism} = z$.

Specifically, we investigate whether the causal effect of audit information varies with the following pre-determined variables in line with the hypothesized directions or amplifications:

- Municipal-level covariates:
 1. The effect of Facebook and WhatsApp treatments on incumbent support are decreasing in the level of irregularities reported by the ASF.
 2. The magnitude of any effect of Facebook and WhatsApp treatments on turnout and incumbent support is greater for mayors seeking re-election.
 3. The magnitude of any effect of Facebook and WhatsApp treatments on turnout and incumbent support is greater in municipalities where previous elections were most competitive (measured by an indicator for whether the PRI has ever lost power in the municipality, the number of times the municipality has experienced partisan turnover in previous elections, the average margin of victory in the previous two municipal elections, the average Lakso-Taagepera (1979) effective number of parties in the previous two elections, and the average of Molinar's (1991) NP measure of the effective number of parties in the previous two elections).
- Segment/precinct-level covariates:
 1. The magnitude of the effect of Facebook and WhatsApp treatments on incumbent support is greater in precincts containing a larger of the segment population that Facebook claims to reach.
 2. The magnitude of the effect of Facebook and WhatsApp treatments on turnout and incumbent support is greater in precincts where a larger share of the population is classified as marginalized (conditional on other potentially confounding interactions such as education), and thus stand to lose more from misallocation of FISM funds.
- Individual-level covariates elicited in the baseline survey (unless specified otherwise):
 1. The effect of Facebook and WhatsApp treatments on incumbent support are increasing in a voter's (retrospective and prospective) prior belief about the incumbent's level of malfeasance.
 2. The effect of Facebook and WhatsApp treatments on incumbent support are increasing in a voter's prior belief about other voters' prior beliefs about the incumbent's level of malfeasance.

3. The effect of Facebook and WhatsApp treatments on incumbent support are decreasing in the difference between a voter's prospective prior belief about the incumbent's level of malfeasance and their prior belief about the main challenger's level of malfeasance.
4. The magnitude of the effect of Facebook and WhatsApp treatments on turnout and incumbent support are decreasing in the precision of a voter's (retrospective and prospective) prior belief about the incumbent's level of malfeasance.
5. The magnitude of the effect of Facebook and WhatsApp treatments on turnout and incumbent support are decreasing in the strength of a voter's partisanship.
6. The magnitude of the effect of Facebook and WhatsApp treatments on turnout and incumbent support are decreasing in the certainty of a voter's baseline vote intention.
7. The magnitude of the effect of Facebook and WhatsApp treatments on incumbent support are decreasing in the intensity of a voter's news consumption.
8. The magnitude of the effect of Facebook and WhatsApp treatments on incumbent support are increasing in the frequency of a voter's Facebook and WhatsApp usage.
9. The magnitude of the effect of Facebook and WhatsApp treatments on turnout and incumbent support is greater among voters that list honesty and irregularities as important factors in determining their vote choice.
10. The magnitude of the effect of Facebook and WhatsApp treatments on turnout and incumbent support is greater among voters that report finding the information more credible (measured in the endline survey).
11. The magnitude of the effect of Facebook and WhatsApp treatments on incumbent support is greater among poorer voters (who stand to lose more from misallocation of FISM funds).
12. The magnitude of the effect of Facebook and WhatsApp treatments on turnout and incumbent support with respect to voter education (conditional on the precision of their prior beliefs) is ambiguous, given that educated voters are more likely to understand the information while being less likely to benefit from FISM spending.

We further expect the covariates amplifying effect magnitudes to also do so with respect to the direction of the information provided; these triple interactions are not stated to save space. Individual-level covariates will be aggregated by municipal or precinct for electoral outcomes.

4.3 Evaluating mechanisms

While the randomization of municipalities, segments, and individuals to treatment arms makes it possible to identify the causal effects of such treatments, identifying the causal mechanisms at work is inherently more challenging (Bullock, Green and Ha 2010). Our research design, however, allows us to examine a variety of observable implications of alternative causal mechanisms. Although no test can be definitive, we will implement the following strategies to shed light on the mechanism underlying treatment effects.

Our first strategy is based on the observation that if the causal effect of T on Y runs via W , then T will likely have an average treatment effect on W . Thus, we estimate the causal effects of our information treatment variables on mechanism-related variables (such as information reception, relation between priors and information provided, updating of priors, and coordination with other citizens). Beyond the separation in estimation between information, common knowledge, saturation, and spillover effects above, we particularly seek to discern between mechanisms based on tacit and explicit coordination and those based on information diffusion or learning.

Both categories of mechanisms presuppose that the information provided is actually received by the treated individuals. Hence, we estimate the equations described above with a survey-based measure of information recall as the dependent variable. Finding no effect of the information treatment on information recall (both receiving the treatment and recalling its malfeasance and common knowledge content) would provide evidence against both of the mechanisms under consideration. However, a null effect here is suggestive, rather than definitive, as it remains possible that information or others' actions were internalized in the decision-making process without respondents recalling receiving a treatment. Accordingly, we also test some more specific theoretical implications.

We can also examine more distinctive implications of different potential mechanisms. Tacit coordination implies a coherence of the mutual expectations of citizens. We therefore next test whether the information treatment causes changes in an individual's expectations about how others are likely to behave (turning out to vote and voting for the incumbent vs. opposition), as well as the extent to which the report that this altered their own vote choice. Explicit coordination similarly implies that interactions with others led to explicit agreement to vote for a particular party; we assess this by asking whether such discussions influenced respondents' vote, with how many people these discussions occurred, and which party they resolved to vote for. Evidence of a causal effect would be consistent with coordination. Similarly, information diffusion or learning implies that priors about incumbent quality are influenced by the information treatment. We thus examine an individual's assessment of incumbent performance as a dependent variable. The absence of a

causal effect of a direct treatment would suggest that learning is not driving any effects, while the absence of spillover effects would similarly suggest that learning by diffusion is not driving any effects. However, the presence of both causal effects could be consistent with both learning and coordination, or just one.

Our second strategy is based on the idea that different mechanisms imply different patterns of treatment effect heterogeneity. A learning mechanism predicts that the informational content of a signal will more-strongly influence the electoral behavior of those individuals whose priors about incumbent performance are more distant from the audit information. However, finding that treatment effects are homogeneous across priors (for given audit information) is likely to be inconsistent with a learning story but consistent with coordination. We test this by examining heterogeneous treatment effects with respect to the prior beliefs elicited in the baseline survey and the difference between the share of irregularities reported and a respondent's prior belief on the same metric. If learning is driving the results, we would expect to observe that the effects of the WhatsApp and Facebook treatments are more positive among voters who already expected higher levels of irregularities. This kind of belief heterogeneity is also consistent with some forms of coordination, but is likely to be a necessary condition for the learning mechanism.

Pinning down the mechanisms underpinning coordination is more challenging because voters could coordinate in a variety of ways. Given that we do not have strong priors about what will be coordinated on, we use the endline survey to draw inferences about this. In particular, we intend to examine the extent to which treatment induces respondents to tacitly or explicitly coordinate to .

In addition to the coordination, learning, and diffusion mechanisms, we also include some questions at endline that are designed to examine other potential explanations. Most importantly, we ask about party responses to the information (what they did and how it related to the information provided) and questions that can assess the extent to which campaign strategies were altered as a consequence of treatment. Given that the treatment was provided shortly before the election, it is unlikely that there are major change, but it the mass nature of the Facebook intervention at least makes this plausible. Other endline questions are able to assess the extent to which individuals altered their news consumption to become more politically informed more generally as a function of treatment, altered the weight that they attach to different factors when casting their ballot, altered their perception of municipal mayor capacity, or did not find the information credible.

4.4 Power calculations

Our research was designed taking various power calculations into account for the average treatment effects. For the municipal level treatments, we followed the power calculations proposed by Baird

et al. (2014). Specifically, we conservatively based these calculations on 5 segments in each of our 128 municipalities (in practice, some municipalities have more), a 0.1 intra-cluster correlation (higher than we expect to observe based on previous similar studies in this context), and 0% variance explained by the municipal block randomization. We then used the compass search method to calculate power for a design where we fixed the fraction of municipalities in each saturation condition to be one third. The optimal design calculator suggested that the optimal saturation levels should be 0%, 22%, and 86%, which informed our choice to use 20% and 80% saturations—given that we needed to round to divisibles of 5 to be able to accurately report the attempted reach as part of the common knowledge treatment. For one-sided (two-sided) tests with power of 0.8, the minimum detectable effects (MDEs) of the pooled direct effect, pooled spillover effect, saturation slope for the direct effect, and saturation slope for the indirect effect are respectively 0.27 (0.31), 0.28 (0.32), 0.67 (0.76), 0.60 and (0.67) standard deviations. For the reasons noted above, we expect that such MDEs may be significantly more conservative than the final design. To put the MDEs in context, the standard deviation for incumbent party vote share is 0.14 across municipalities and 0.15 across precincts, and the standard deviation in turnout is 0.11 across municipalities and 0.13 across precincts. We thus find these MDEs both plausible and substantively meaningful.

For the individual treatments, we approximate the power calculations through a simplification that ignores the municipal treatments and the implied clustering of individual level treatments. This is most relevant for the control group, where all respondents from 20 municipalities always receive the control WhatsApp treatment condition. Conversely, we again ignore the randomization blocks, which could substantially increase the variance explained. Based on 20 endline respondents per municipality and power of 0.8, the two-tailed MDEs for the effects of the WhatsApp and common knowledge WhatsApp treatments relative to the control group are respectively 0.12 and 0.13, while we are able to detect a 0.12 standard deviation difference between these treatment conditions.

5 Partners

5.1 Program partner

This experiment is being conducted in partnership with the Mexican NGO Borde Político (bordepolitico.com). Borde Político is a leading civil society organization seeking to increase voter knowledge about the actions of their politicians in office, which has significant experience in the provision of politically-relevant information, and in pushing for legislation that enhances transparency and electoral accountability. For this project, the information treatments are delivered on

behalf of Borde Político.

5.2 Implementing partners

The baseline and surveys are implemented with GeoPoll (<https://research.geopoll.com/>), an international survey company. To deliver the WhatsApp ads, we purchased a number of accounts with the bulk WhatsApp messaging service WhatsAppMarketing (whatsappmarketing.es).

6 Ethical Considerations

This study received IRB approval from Columbia University (protocol number AAAR8909), Harvard University (protocol number IRB18-0743), and the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM). We do not anticipate significant potential risks affecting participants or other members of society for a number of reasons.

First, our baseline and endline surveys use standard survey questions and procedures that are neither invasive nor politically sensitive, and thus pose minimal risk. Furthermore, registered voters will be offered the opportunity not to participate in the survey, as well as refuse to answer any question that they might feel uncomfortable answering. The surveys are both short and subject to the consent of participants, and are unlikely to represent a significant cost in terms of the time taken to complete the survey. Data confidentiality will be addressed by storing individual identifiers on password-protected computer devices and deleting these identifiers from all datasets except those retained on the password-protected computers of the PIs.

Second, although we—and more importantly our partnering NGO Borde Político—expect that survey respondents will update their perceptions about different political parties and potentially the behavior of other individuals, our non-partisan intervention based around factually-correct and publicly-available information is specifically designed not to influence voting decisions beyond providing information that enables individuals to cast an informed ballot. The study does not exert any pressure on individuals to change their decisions if they do not wish to do so, especially given that the secret ballot is generally well understood. Voters can of course discard the information provided if they do not believe it to be of value.

Third, the Facebook ads, and the associated Facebook pages, are unlikely to influence electoral outcomes. This is because, in practice, we do not expect our ads to actually be engaged with by the maximum reach of the campaigns and only have a limited persuasive effect. In the relatively unlikely event that an election outcome was affected (e.g. if the prior winning margin was extremely small), our intervention is only likely to improve voter welfare by enabling voters to cast a

better-informed ballot and to align their choices with other members of their community. As noted above, our attempts to ensure that many voters could see Facebook ads is designed to ensure that second-order beliefs can be generated without deception. Moreover, we do not encourage voters to change their votes because of the intervention, which they are unlikely to do en masse, given that there is no followup survey for virtually all voters in treated municipalities. Moreover, the combination of the independent selection of municipalities for audit and the by-party blocking design (see above) also ensure that the intervention is not unlikely to be unduly biased toward any particular party.

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ENGLISH VERSION OF THE BASELINE

Enumerator's name: _____
Enumerator's ID: _____
Date: _____
Start time: _____
End time: _____

CONSENT

Read verbal consent script

ELIGIBILITY QUESTIONS

Which state do you live in?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Answer: _____
Don't know 88
Refused to answer 99

Note: If state not in sample, or DNK/NA, thank for participation and conclude interview.

Which municipality and state do you live in?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Answer: _____
Don't know 88
Refused to answer 99

Note: If municipality not in sample, or DNK/NA, thank for participation and conclude interview.

Are you registered to vote in this municipality, and have a cell phone and use WhatsApp?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Yes 1
No 2
Don't know 88
Refused to answer 99

Note: If No or DNK/NA, thank for participation and conclude interview.

You are eligible to participate in the study we are conducting. Do you want to participate?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Yes 1
No 2
Don't know 88
Refused to answer 99

Note: If they are not willing, or DNK/NA, thank for participation and conclude interview.

POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE

In the last two weeks, how often have you discussed politics with family and acquaintances in person, or over the phone?

Never, Every once in a while, Once a week, Several times a week, or Daily?

[Enumerator: choose only one option in each case.]

Never 0
Every once in a while 1
Once a week 2
Several times a week 3
Daily 4
Don't know 88
Refused to answer 99

In the last two weeks, how often have you discussed politics with family and acquaintances through social networks like Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp?

Never, Every once in a while, Once a week, Several times a week, or Daily?

[Enumerator: choose only one option in each case.]

Never	0
Every once in a while	1
Once a week	2
Several times a week	3
Daily	4
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

In the last two weeks, how often have you followed information and news about the election campaigns on Television, Radio, or Newspapers?

Never, Every once in a while, Once a week, Several times a week, or Daily?

[Enumerator: choose only one option in each case.]

Never	0
Every once in a while	1
Once a week	2
Several times a week	3
Daily	4
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

In the last two weeks, how often have you followed information and news about the election campaigns on Internet, or Social networks like Facebook and Twitter?

Never, Every once in a while, Once a week, Several times a week, or Daily?

[Enumerator: choose only one option in each case.]

Never	0
Every once in a while	1
Once a week	2
Several times a week	3
Daily	4
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Could you please tell me whether the current Municipal Mayor can be reelected in the coming July elections?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Could you please tell me the party of the current Municipal Mayor?

[Enumerator: do not read options and choose only one option.]

PAN	1
PRI	2
PRD	3
Partido Verde (PVEM)	4
Partido del Trabajo (PT)	5
Partido Nueva Alianza (PANAL)	6
Movimiento Ciudadano	7
MORENA	8
Partido Encuentro Social	9
Independent	10
Other	11
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

We are now interested in your perception about the ability of the current municipal mayor, or his\her party, to implements projects in your municipality.

On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is "extremely unlikely" and 10 is "extremely likely," how likely is the current municipal mayor, or his\her party, to effectively implement projects in your municipality if they are reelected?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Answer:	_____	(from 0 "extremely unlikely" to 10 "extremely likely")
Don't know	88	
Refused to answer	99	

Federal audits often reveal irregularities in the use of municipal resources by mayors

If an audit revealed irregularities in the spending of the mayor in your municipality, what types of spending irregularities do you would think occurred?

[Enumerator: read options and choose all mentioned by the respondent.]

Failure to spent designated funds?	1
Failure to understand de regulations for the use of designated funds?	2
Using funds for personal use or to benefit family or acquaintances?	3
Using funds for election campaigns?	5
Using funds for different types of projects than intended?	5
Diversion of funds from intended beneficiaries?	6
Other	7
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99
Note:	Randomize order of 1 to 7

USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA

How frequently do you use WhatsApp?

Never, Once a month, Once a week, Few days days a week,

At least once a day all days, or Many times a day?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Never	0
Once a month	1
Once a week	2
Few days days a week	3
At least once a day all days	4
Many times a day	5
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

How frequently do you use Facebook?

Never, Once a month, Once a week, Few days days a week,

At least once a day all days, or Many times a day?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Never	0
Once a month	1
Once a week	2
Few days days a week	3
At least once a day all days	4
Many times a day	5
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

PAST VOTE AND IDEOLOGY

In politics, do you consider yourself to be on the left, the right, or in the center?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

If respondent says LEFT or RIGHT: inquire whether very LEFT/RIGHT or somewhat LEFT/RIGHT?

IF respondent says CENTER: inquire on the center-left, center-right, or center-center?]

Very left	1
Somewhat left	2
Center-left	3
Center-center	4
Center-right	5
Somewhat right	6
Very right	7
None	77
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Even if you do not feel very attached to a particular political party,
which political party do you feel closest to?

[Enumerator: do not read options and choose only one option.]

PAN	1
PRI	2
PRD	3
Partido Verde (PVEM)	4
Partido del Trabajo (PT)	5
Partido Nueva Alianza (PANAL)	6
Movimiento Ciudadano	7
MORENA	8
Partido Encuentro Social	9
Independent	10
Other	11
None	12
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Note: Use party choice to define [CORRESPONDING PARTY]
If None, Don't know, of Refused to answer skip next question.

On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you do not feel very attached to [CORRESPONDING PARTY] and
10 means you feel very attached to [CORRESPONDING PARTY],
what degree of attachment do you feel for [CORRESPONDING PARTY]?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Answer:	_____	(from 0 "extremely unlikely" to 10 "extremely likely")
Don't know	88	
Refused to answer	99	

In 201[say corresponding year], the mayoral elections were held, and as in any other election, there are always people who do not have time to vote and others who are not interested.

Did you or did you not vote during the 201[say corresponding year] mayoral elections?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Could you tell me which party you voted for in the 201[say corresponding year] mayoral elections?

Remember that this survey is confidential and only for academic purposes.

[Enumerator: do not read options and choose only one option.]

PAN	1
PRI	2
PRD	3
Partido Verde (PVEM)	4
Partido del Trabajo (PT)	5
Partido Nueva Alianza (PANAL)	6
Movimiento Ciudadano	7
MORENA	8
Partido Encuentro Social	9
Independent	10
Other	11
Nullified - Scratched	12
Wrote something	13
Left blank	14
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

VOTE INTENTION AND REASON

When choosing which candidate for Municipal Mayor candidate to vote for,

On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is "not that important" and 5 is "very important,"

how important to you think each of the following characteristics are?

[Enumerator: read options and choose only one option in each case.]

	Answer	Don't know	Refused to answer
Political party?	_____	88	99
Honesty?	_____	88	99
Education and political experience?	_____	88	99
His or her campaign policy promises?	_____	88	99
The resources he/she would bring to the community if elected?	_____	88	99
The gifts, favors, or access to services for the people in your colony/communit	_____	88	99
Irregularities in the use of the resources by the Mayor's administration such as unauthorized spending derived from corruptio	_____	88	99
and the diversion of resources from intended beneficiaries?	_____	88	99

Note: Randomize order.

On July 1st there will be mayoral elections in your municipality.

If they were today, could you tell me which party would you vote for?

Remember that this survey is confidential and only for academic purposes.

[Enumerator: do not read options and choose only one option.]

Do not intend to vote	0
PAN	1
PRI	2
PRD	3
Partido Verde (PVEM)	4
Partido del Trabajo (PT)	5
Partido Nueva Alianza (PANAL)	6
Movimiento Ciudadano	7
MORENA	8
Partido Encuentro Social	9
Independent	10
Other	11
Nullify - Scratch	12
Write something	13
Leave blank	14
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Note: If the respondent says Don't know, Refused to answer, skip the next question.

On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "completely uncertain" and 10 means "completely certain," how sure are you about this vote choice?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Answer:	_____	(from 0 "extremely unlikely" to 10 "extremely likely")
Don't know	88	
Refused to answer	99	

What percentage, between 0% and 100%, of voters in your municipality do you think will turn out to vote in the upcoming mayoral elections?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Answer:	_____	(from 0% to 100%)
Don't know	88	
Refused to answer	99	

Out of the voters turning out in the upcoming mayoral elections, what percentage, between 0% and 100%, do you think will vote for the party of your current mayor?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Answer:	_____	(from 0% to 100%)
Don't know	88	
Refused to answer	99	

PRIOR BELIEFS

We will now ask you some questions about irregularities in the use of municipal resources by your current municipal mayor.

Examples of irregularities include unauthorized spending derived from corruption, and the diversion of resources from intended beneficiaries.

On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is "none of the resources" and 10 is "the totality of the resources," what amount of municipal resources do you believe were subject to irregularities?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Answer:	_____	(from 0 "extremely unlikely" to 10 "extremely likely")
Don't know	88	
Refused to answer	99	

If you had to be more precise, what percentage, between 0% and 100%, of municipal resources do you believe were subject to irregularities?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Answer: _____ (from 0% to 100%)

Don't know 88

Refused to answer 99

Note: If no answer from the two previous questions is different from Don't know or Refused to answer, skip then next question.

On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "completely uncertain" and 10 means "completely certain," how sure are you about these assessments?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Answer: _____ (from 0 "completely uncertain" to 10 "completely certain")

Don't know 88

Refused to answer 99

Other citizens in your municipality might have a different opinion about the municipal resources that were subject to irregularities. What percentage, between 0% and 100%, of municipal resources do you believe that a typical citizen in your municipality thinks were subject to irregularities?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Answer: _____ (from 0% to 100%)

Don't know 88

Refused to answer 99

PROSPECTIVE BELIEFS FOR INCUMBENT

We are now interested in the amount of municipal resources that you believe that would be subject to irregularities if the mayor or his/her party is reelected.

On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is "none of the resources" and 10 is "the totality of the resources," what amount of municipal resources do you believe would be subject to irregularities?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Answer: _____ (from 0 "none of the resources" to 10 "the totality of the resources")

Don't know 88

Refused to answer 99

If you had to be more precise, what percentage, between 0% and 100%, of municipal resources do you believe would be subject to irregularities?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Answer: _____ (from 0% to 100%)

Don't know 88

Refused to answer 99

Note: If no answer from the two previous questions is different from Don't know or Refused to answer, skip then next question.

On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "completely uncertain" and 10 means "completely certain," how sure are you about these assessments?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Answer: _____ (from 0 "completely uncertain" to 10 "completely certain")

Don't know 88

Refused to answer 99

PROSPECTIVE BELIEFS FOR MAIN POLITICAL ALTERNATIVE

We are now interested in the amount of municipal resources that you believe that would be subject to irregularities if the main political alternative to the party of your current mayor is elected.

On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is "none of the resources" and 10 is "the totality of the resources," what amount of municipal resources do you believe would be subject to irregularities?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Answer: _____ (from 0 "none of the resources" to 10 "the totality of the resources")
Don't know 88
Refused to answer 99

If you had to be more precise, what percentage, between 0% and 100%, of municipal resources do you believe would be subject to irregularities?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Answer: _____ (from 0% to 100%)
Don't know 88
Refused to answer 99

Note: If no answer from the two previous questions is different from Don't know or Refused to answer, skip then next question.

On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "completely uncertain" and 10 means "completely certain," how sure are you about these assessments?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Answer: _____ (from 0 "completely uncertain" to 10 "completely certain")
Don't know 88
Refused to answer 99

DEMOGRAPHICS

What is your age?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Answer: _____
Don't know 88
Refused to answer 99

What is your gender?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Male 1
Female 2
Other 3
Don't know 88
Refused to answer 99

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

[Enumerator: do not read options, choose only one option.]

If still a student, chose the current level of education]

No formal education 0
Incomplete primary school 1
Complete primary school 2
Incomplete secondary/technical school 3
Complete secondary/technical school 4
Incomplete preparatory equivalent 5
Complete preparatory equivalent 6
Incomplete university 7
Complete university or more 8
Don't know 88
Refused to answer 99

WHATSAPP NUMBER

As I mentioned earlier, we might need you to send you some information via WhatsApp about the upcoming mayoral elections as part of the study.

Is this the same phone number you use for WhatsApp?

Your data will be confidential and used only for academic purposes.

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Yes

1

No

Don't know

88

Refused to answer

99

Note: Thank for participation and conclude interview.

SPANISH VERSION OF THE BASELINE

Nombre del encuestador: _____

ID del encuestador: _____

Fecha: _____

Tiempo de inicio: _____

Tiempo de fin: _____

CONSENTIMIENTO

Leer guion de consentimiento verbal

CUESTIONES PARA DETERMINAR ELEGIBILIDAD

¿En qué Entidad vive?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Respuesta: _____

No sabe 88

No responde 99

Nota: Si entidad no se encuentra en la muestra, o no sabe/no responde, agradecer por la participación y concluir entrevista.

¿En qué Municipio y Entidad vive?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Respuesta: _____

No sabe 88

No responde 99

Nota: Si el municipio no se encuentra en la muestra, o no sabe/no responde, agradecer por la participación y concluir entrevista.

¿Tiene usted credencial para votar vigente en ese municipio y un teléfono celular, y utiliza Whatsapp?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Sí 1

No 2

No sabe 88

No responde 99

Si No o no sabe/no responde, agradecer por la participación y concluir entrevista.

Usted satisface todas las condiciones para participar en el estudio que estamos realizando. ¿Desea participar?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Sí 1

No 2

No sabe 88

No responde 99

Nota: Si no esta dispuesto, o no sabe/no responde, agradecer por la participación y concluir entrevista.

CONOCIMIENTO SOBRE POLÍTICA Y CONSUMO DE INFORMACIÓN

En las últimas dos semanas, ¿qué tan frecuentemente habló usted sobre política con su familia o conocidos ya sea en persona, o por teléfono?

Nunca, De vez en cuando, Una vez a la semana, Varias veces a la semana, o Diario?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción en cada caso.]

Nunca 0

De vez en cuando 1

Una vez a la semana 2

Varias veces a la semana 3

Diario 4

No sabe 88

No responde 99

En las últimas dos semanas, ¿qué tan frecuentemente habló usted sobre política con su familia o conocidos a través de redes sociales como Facebook, Twitter y WhatsApp?

Nunca, De vez en cuando, Una vez a la semana, Varias veces a la semana, o Diario?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción en cada caso.]

Nunca	0
De vez en cuando	1
Una vez a la semana	2
Varias veces a la semana	3
Diario	4
No sabe	88
No responde	99

En las últimas dos semanas, ¿qué tan frecuentemente leyó o escuchó usted noticias de las campañas electorales por Televisión, Radio, o Periódicos?

Nunca, De vez en cuando, Una vez a la semana, Varias veces a la semana, o Diario?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción en cada caso.]

Nunca	0
De vez en cuando	1
Una vez a la semana	2
Varias veces a la semana	3
Diario	4
No sabe	88
No responde	99

En las últimas dos semanas, ¿qué tan frecuentemente leyó o escuchó usted noticias de las campañas electorales por Internet, o Redes sociales como Facebook y Twitter?

Nunca, De vez en cuando, Una vez a la semana, Varias veces a la semana, o Diario?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción en cada caso.]

Nunca	0
De vez en cuando	1
Una vez a la semana	2
Varias veces a la semana	3
Diario	4
No sabe	88
No responde	99

¿Me podría decir si el Presidente municipal que gobierna hoy en su municipio puede ser reelecto/a en las próximas elecciones de Julio?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Sí	1
No	2
No sabe	88
No responde	99

¿Me podría decir el partido del Presidente municipal que gobierna hoy en su municipio?

[Encuestador: no lea opciones y elija solamente una opción.]

PAN	1
PRI	2
PRD	3
Partido Verde (PVEM)	4
Partido del Trabajo (PT)	5
Partido Nueva Alianza (PANAL)	6
Movimiento Ciudadano	7
MORENA	8
Partido Encuentro Social	9
Independiente	10
Otro	11
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Ahora estamos interesados en su percepción sobre la capacidad del Presidente Municipal actual, o su partido, para implementar proyectos en su municipio.
 En una escala de 0 a 10, siendo 0 "extremadamente improbable" y 10 "extremadamente probable,"
 ¿qué tan probable cree usted que es que su Presidente Municipal, o su partido, actual implemente proyectos en su municipio eficientemente si son reelegidos?
 [Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Respuesta: _____ (de 0 "ninguno de los recursos" a 10 "la totalidad de los recursos")
 No sabe 88
 No responde 99

Las auditorías del Gobierno Federal usualmente revelan irregularidades en el uso de recursos municipales por parte de los Presidentes Municipales. Si una auditoría revelase irregularidades en el uso de recursos por parte del Presidente Municipal en su municipio,
 ¿qué tipo de irregularidades usted creería que ocurrieron?

[Encuestador: lea opciones y elija todas las opciones mencionadas por el encuestado.]

¿Incapacidad de gastar los fondos asignados?	1
¿Incapacidad entender las normativas para usar los fondos asignados?	2
¿Uso de fondos para uso personal o beneficiar familias o conocidos?	3
¿Uso de fondos para campañas electorales?	5
¿Uso de fondos para proyectos diferentes de los asignados?	5
¿Desvío de recursos de las poblaciones beneficiarias?	6
Otro	7
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Nota: Aleatorizar el orden de 1 a 7.

USO DE REDES SOCIALES

¿Qué tan frecuentemente usa usted WhatsApp?

¿Nunca, Una vez por mes, Una vez por semana, Varios días a la semana,
 Por lo menos una vez por día, o Muchas veces por día?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Nunca	0
Una vez por mes	1
Una vez por semana	2
Varios días a la semana	3
Por lo menos una vez por día	4
Muchas veces por día	5
No sabe	88
No responde	99

¿Qué tan frecuentemente usa usted Facebook?

¿Nunca, Una vez por mes, Una vez por semana, Varios días a la semana,
 Por lo menos una vez por día, o Muchas veces por día?

[Encuestador: lea opciones y elija solamente una opción.]

Nunca	0
Una vez por mes	1
Una vez por semana	2
Varios días a la semana	3
Por lo menos una vez por día	4
Muchas veces por día	5
No sabe	88
No responde	99

VOTACIÓN PASADA E IDEOLOGÍA

En política, ¿cómo se considera usted, de Izquierda, de Derecha o de Centro?

Si el encuestado dice IZQUIERDA o DERECHA: preguntar ¿muy o algo de IZQUIERDA / DERECHA?

Si el encuestado dice CENTRO: preguntar ¿de centro-izquierda, centro-derecha, o centrocentro?]

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Muy de izquierda	1
Algo de izquierda	2
Centro-izquierda	3
Centro-centro	4
Centro-derecha	5
Algo derecha	6
Muy de derecha	7
Ninguno	77
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Ya sea que usted se sienta o no se siente especialmente cercano a un partido político, ¿con qué partido diría que simpatiza más?

[Encuestador: no lea opciones y elija solamente una opción.]

PAN	1
PRI	2
PRD	3
Partido Verde (PVEM)	4
Partido del Trabajo (PT)	5
Partido Nueva Alianza (PANAL)	6
Movimiento Ciudadano	7
MORENA	8
Partido Encuentro Social	9
Independiente	10
Otro	11
Ninguno	12
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Nota: Use la elección de partido para definir [PARTIDO CORRESPONDIENTE]

If No sabe, No responde, saltar la próxima pregunta.

En una escala de 0 a 10, donde 0 significa que siente muy poca simpatía por el [PARTIDO CORRESPONDIENTE] y 10 significa que siente mucha simpatía por el [PARTIDO CORRESPONDIENTE], ¿qué grado de apego siente por el [PARTIDO CORRESPONDIENTE]?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Respuesta:	_____ (de 0 "siente muy poca simpatía" a 10 "siente mucha simpatía")
No sabe	88
No responde	99

En el 201[diga el año correspondiente] hubo elecciones para Presidente municipal y, como en cualquier elección, siempre hay personas que no tienen tiempo de ir a votar y otras a las que no les interesa.

¿Usted votó en las elecciones para Presidente municipal en el 201[diga el año correspondiente]?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Sí	1
No	2
No sabe	88
No responde	99

¿Podría indicarme el partido por el cual votó en las elecciones para Presidente municipal en el 201[diga el año correspondiente]?

Recuerde que esta encuesta es confidencial y para usos académicos.

[Encuestador: no lea opciones y elija solamente una opción.]

PAN	1
PRI	2
PRD	3
Partido Verde (PVEM)	4
Partido del Trabajo (PT)	5
Partido Nueva Alianza (PANAL)	6
Movimiento Ciudadano	7
MORENA	8
Partido Encuentro Social	9
Independiente	10
Otro	11
Anuló/Tachó	12
Escribió algo	13
Dejó en blanco	14
No sabe	88
No responde	99

INTENCIÓN Y RAZÓN DE VOTO

A la hora de decidir por qué candidato votar para Presidente municipal, siendo 1 "nada importante" y 5 "muy importante,"

¿qué nivel de importancia le asignaría a las siguientes características?

[Encuestador: lea opciones y elija solamente una opción en cada caso.]

	Respuesta	No sabe	No responde
El partido político?	_____	88	99
Honestidad?	_____	88	99
Formación y experiencia en política?	_____	88	99
Las políticas prometidas durante la campaña?	_____	88	99
Los recursos que traería a su colonia/comunidad si es electo/a?	_____	88	99
Los regalos, favores o accesos a servicios que traería a las personas en su colonia/comunidad durante	_____	88	99
Las irregularidades en el uso de los recursos por parte de la administración del Presidente municipal como gastos no autorizados derivados de corrupción y desvío de recursos de las poblaciones beneficiarias.	_____	88	99

Nota: Aleatorizar el orden.

El 1 de Julio habrá elecciones para Presidente municipal en su municipio.

Si las elecciones fueran hoy, ¿podría indicarme el partido por el cual votaría?

Recuerde que esta encuesta es confidencial y para usos académicos.

[Encuestador: no lea opciones y elija solamente una opción.]

No piensa votar	0
PAN	1
PRI	2
PRD	3
Partido Verde (PVEM)	4
Partido del Trabajo (PT)	5
Partido Nueva Alianza (PANAL)	6
Movimiento Ciudadano	7
MORENA	8
Partido Encuentro Social	9
Independiente	10
Otro	11
Anularía/Tacharía	12
Escribiría algo	13
Dejaría en blanco	14
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Nota: If the respondent says No sabe, No responde saltar la próxima pregunta

En una escala de 0 a 10, donde 0 es “completamente inseguro/a” y 10 “extremadamente seguro/a,”

¿qué tan seguro está usted sobre esta intención voto?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Respuesta:

_____ (de 0 “completamente inseguro/a” a 10 “extremadamente seguro/a”)

No sabe 88

No responde 99

¿Cuál es el porcentaje, entre 0% y 100%, de votantes de su municipio que usted cree votarán en las próximas elecciones municipales?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Respuesta:

No sabe 88

No responde 99

De los votantes de su municipio que votarán en las próximas elecciones municipales, ¿qué porcentaje, entre 0% y 100%, cree usted que votará por el partido del Presidente municipal actual?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Respuesta:

No sabe 88

No responde 99

PERCEPCIONES PREVIAS

Ahora le vamos a hacer unas preguntas sobre irregularidades en el uso de los recursos municipales por parte de su Presidente municipal actual.

Algunos ejemplos de irregularidades son gastos no autorizados derivados de corrupción y desvío de recursos de las poblaciones beneficiarias.

En una escala de 0 a 10, siendo 0 “ninguno de los recursos” y 10 “la totalidad de los recursos,” ¿cuál es la cantidad de recursos del municipio que usted cree estuvieron sujetos a irregularidades ?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Respuesta:

_____ (de 0 “ninguno de los recursos” a 10 “la totalidad de los recursos”)

No sabe 88

No responde 99

Siendo más preciso, ¿cuál es el porcentaje, entre 0% y 100%, de recursos del municipio que usted cree estuvieron sujetos a irregularidades?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Respuesta:

_____ (de 0% a 100%)

No sabe 88

No responde 99

Nota: Si no hay respuesta diferente a No sabe o No responde en la dos preguntas anteriores, saltar la próxima pregunta.

En una escala de 0 a 10 donde 0 es “completamente inseguro/a” y 10 “extremadamente seguro/a,” ¿qué tan seguro está usted sobre estas percepciones?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Respuesta:

_____ (de 0 “completamente inseguro/a” a 10 “extremadamente seguro/a”)

No sabe 88

No responde 99

Otros ciudadanos en su municipio pueden tener una opinión distinta sobre los recursos del municipio que estuvieron sujetos a irregularidades. ¿Cuál es el porcentaje, entre 0% y 100%, de recursos del municipio que usted cree que un ciudadano típico de su municipio cree estuvieron sujetos a irregularidades?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Respuesta:

_____ (de 0% a 100%)

No sabe 88

No responde 99

PERCEPCIONES FUTURAS SOBRE EL GOBERNANTE

Ahora estamos interesados en la cantidad de los recursos municipales que usted cree que estarían sujetos a irregularidades si su Presidente municipal o su partido político es reelecto.

En una escala de 0 a 10, siendo 0 "ninguno de los recursos" y 10 "la totalidad de los recursos," ¿cuál es la cantidad de recursos del municipio que usted cree estarían sujetos a irregularidades ?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Respuesta: _____ (de 0 "ninguno de los recursos" a 10 "la totalidad de los recursos")
No sabe 88
No responde 99

Siendo más preciso, ¿cuál es el porcentaje, entre 0% y 100%, de recursos del municipio que usted cree estarían sujetos a irregularidades?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Respuesta: _____ (de 0% a 100%)
No sabe 88
No responde 99

Nota: Si no hay respuesta diferente a No sabe o No responde en la dos preguntas anteriores, saltar la próxima pregunta.

En una escala de 0 a 10 donde 0 es "completamente inseguro/a" y 10 "extremadamente seguro/a," ¿qué tan seguro está usted sobre estas percepciones?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Respuesta: _____ (de 0 "completamente inseguro/a" a 10 "extremadamente seguro/a")
No sabe 88
No responde 99

PERCEPCIONES FUTURAS PARA LA PRINCIPAL ALTERNATIVA POLÍTICA

Ahora estamos interesados en la cantidad de los recursos municipales que usted cree que estarían sujetos a irregularidades si el partido con mayores posibilidades de ganarle al partido de su Presidente municipal actual es elegido.

En una escala de 0 a 10, siendo 0 "ninguno de los recursos" y 10 "la totalidad de los recursos," ¿cuál es la cantidad de recursos del municipio que usted cree estarían sujetos a irregularidades ?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Respuesta: _____ (de 0 "ninguno de los recursos" a 10 "la totalidad de los recursos")
No sabe 88
No responde 99

Siendo más preciso, ¿cuál es el porcentaje, entre 0% y 100%, de recursos del municipio que usted cree estarían sujetos a irregularidades?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Respuesta: _____ (de 0% a 100%)
No sabe 88
No responde 99

Nota: Si no hay respuesta diferente a No sabe o No responde en la dos preguntas anteriores, saltar la próxima pregunta.

En una escala de 0 a 10 donde 0 es "completamente inseguro/a" y 10 "extremadamente seguro/a," ¿qué tan seguro está usted sobre estas percepciones?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Respuesta: _____ (de 0 "completamente inseguro/a" a 10 "extremadame
No sabe 88
No responde 99

DEMOGRÁFICOS

¿Cuál es su edad?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Respuesta:

No sabe	88
No responde	99

¿Cuál es su género (sexo)?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Masculino	1
Femenino	2
Otro	3
No sabe	88
No responde	99

¿Hasta qué grado de educación estudió?

[Encuestador: no lea opciones, elija solamente una opción.]

Si es todavía estudiante, elija que el grado que tiene actualmente]

No tiene estudios	0
Primaria incompleta	1
Primaria completa	2
Secundaria/Técnica incompleta	3
Secundaria/Técnica completa	4
Preparatoria Equivalente incompleta	5
Preparatoria Equivalente completa	6
Universidad incompleta	7
Universidad completa o más	8
No sabe	88
No responde	99

NÚMERO DE WHATSAPP

Come le mencioné, puede que tengamos que enviarle

información a través de WhatsApp sobre las próximas elecciones municipales como parte del estudio.

¿Es este el mismo número que usa para Whatsapp?

Sus datos serán confidenciales y usados únicamente para fines académicos.

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Sí	1
No	
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Nota: Agradecer por la participación y concluir entrevista.

ENDLINE SURVEY - ENGLISH VERSION

Enumerator's name: _____
Enumerator's ID: _____
Date: _____
Start time: _____
End time: _____

CONSENT

Read verbal consent script

Do you want to participate?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Yes 1
No 2

Note: If they are not willing, thank for participation and conclude interview.

ELIGIBILITY QUESTIONS

Which state do you live in?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Answer: _____
Don't know 88
Refused to answer 99

Note: If municipality and state not in sample, or DNK/NA, thank for participation and conclude interview.

Which municipality do you live in?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Answer: _____
Don't know 88
Refused to answer 99

Note: If municipality and state not in sample, or DNK/NA, thank for participation and conclude interview.

POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE

In the two weeks before the recent elections on July 1st, how often have you discussed politics with family and acquaintances in person, or over the phone?

Never, Every once in a while, Once a week, Several times a week, or Daily?

[Enumerator: choose only one option in each case.]

Never 0
Every once in a while 1
Once a week 2
Several times a week 3
Daily 4
Don't know 88
Refused to answer 99

In the two weeks before the recent elections, how often have you discussed politics with family and acquaintances through social networks like Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp?

Never, Every once in a while, Once a week, Several times a week, or Daily?

[Enumerator: choose only one option in each case.]

Never 0
Every once in a while 1
Once a week 2
Several times a week 3
Daily 4
Don't know 88
Refused to answer 99

In the two weeks before the recent elections, how often have you followed information and news about the election campaigns on Television, Radio, or Newspapers?

Never, Every once in a while, Once a week, Several times a week, or Daily?

[Enumerator: choose only one option in each case.]

Never	0
Every once in a while	1
Once a week	2
Several times a week	3
Daily	4
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

In the two weeks before the recent elections, how often have you followed information and news about the election campaigns on the Internet, or through Social networks like Facebook and Twitter?

Never, Every once in a while, Once a week, Several times a week, or Daily?

[Enumerator: choose only one option in each case.]

Never	0
Every once in a while	1
Once a week	2
Several times a week	3
Daily	4
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Could you please tell me the party of the mayor that governed your municipality before the recent elections?

[Enumerator: do not read options and choose only one option in each case.]

PAN	1
PRI	2
PRD	3
Partido Verde (PVEM)	4
Partido del Trabajo (PT)	5
Partido Nueva Alianza (PANAL)	6
Movimiento Ciudadano	7
MORENA	8
Partido Encuentro Social	9
Other	10
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Could you please tell me whether the mayor that governed your municipality before the recent elections was eligible to run for reelection in those elections on July 1st?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Could you please tell me whether the mayor that governed your municipality before the recent elections run for reelection in those elections on July 1st?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

We are now interested in your perception about the ability of the mayor that governed your municipality before the recent elections to implements projects in your municipality.

On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is "extremely unlikely" and 10 is "extremely likely," how likely is the current municipal mayor to effectively implement projects in your municipality?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Answer: _____ (from 0 "extremely unlikely" to 10 "extremely likely")

Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

PAST VOTE AND IDEOLOGY

Even if you do not feel very attached to a particular political party,
which political party do you feel closest to?

[Enumerator: do not read options and choose only one option.]

PAN	1
PRI	2
PRD	3
Partido Verde (PVEM)	4
Partido del Trabajo (PT)	5
Partido Nueva Alianza (PANAL)	6
Movimiento Ciudadano	7
MORENA	8
Partido Encuentro Social	9
Other	10
None	11
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Note: Use party choice to define [CORRESPONDING PARTY]
If None, Don't know, of Refused to answer skip next question.

On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you do not feel very attached to [CORRESPONDING PARTY]
and 10 means you feel very attached to [CORRESPONDING PARTY],
what degree of attachment do you feel for [CORRESPONDING PARTY]?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Answer:	_____	(from 0 "does not feel very attached" a 10 "feels very attached")
Don't know	88	
Refused to answer	99	

On July 1st, the mayoral elections were held, and as in any other election,
there are always people who do not have time to vote and others who are not interested.

Did you or did you not vote during the recent mayoral elections on July 1st?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Note: If No, Don't know, or Refused to answer, skip next question.

Could you tell me which party you voted for in the recent mayoral elections on July 1st?

Remember that this survey is confidential and only for academic purposes.

[Enumerator: do not read options and choose only one option.]

PAN	1
PRI	2
PRD	3
Partido Verde (PVEM)	4
Partido del Trabajo (PT)	5
Partido Nueva Alianza (PANAL)	6
Movimiento Ciudadano	7
MORENA	8
Partido Encuentro Social	9
Nullified - Scratched	10
Wrote something	11
Left blank	12
Other	13
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

What percentage, between 0% and 100%, of voters in your municipality do you think turned out to vote in the recent mayoral elections?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Answer: _____ (from 0% to 100%)

Don't know 88

Refused to answer 99

Out of the voters that turned out in the recent mayoral elections, what percentage, between 0% and 100%, do you think voted for the party of the mayor in office before the election?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Answer: _____ (from 0% to 100%)

Don't know 88

Refused to answer 99

To what extent did your expectations about how others would vote affected your vote in the recent? election for Municipal President on July 1st Not at all, a little, some, or a lot?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Not at all 1

A little 2

Some 3

A lot 4

Don't know 88

Refused to answer 99

To what extent did you agree during discussions with other people before the recent mayoral elections on July 1st to vote for the same candidate or political party?

Not at all, a little, some, or a lot?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Not at all 1

A little 2

Some 3

A lot 4

Don't know 88

Refused to answer 99

Note If Not at all, Don't know, Refused to answer, jump the next two questions

With how many other people did you agree to vote for the same candidate or political party in the recent mayoral elections on July 1st? Nobody, Few, Several, The majority in your community, Everybody in your community, or The majority in your municipality?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Nobody 0

Few 1

Several 2

The majority in your community 3

Everybody in your community 4

The majority in your municipality 5

Don't know 88

Refused to answer 99

Note If "Nobdy," jump the next question

What is the party of the candidate that you agreed to vote for in the recent mayoral elections on July 1st?

[Enumerator: do not read options and choose only one option in each case.]

PAN 1

PRI 2

PRD 3

Partido Verde (PVEM) 4

Partido del Trabajo (PT) 5

Partido Nueva Alianza (PANAL) 6

Movimiento Ciudadano 7

MORENA 8

Partido Encuentro Social 9

Other 10

None 11

Don't know 88

Refused to answer 99

POSTERIOR BELIEFS

We will now ask you some questions about irregularities in the use of municipal resources by the municipal mayor in office before the election.

Examples of irregularities include unauthorized spending derived from corruption, and the diversion of resources from intended beneficiaries.

On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is "none of the resources" and 10 is "the totality of the resources," what amount of municipal resources do you believe were subject to irregularities?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Answer: _____ (de 0 "none of the resources" a 10 "the totality of the resources")

Don't know 88

Refused to answer 99

If you had to be more precise, what percentage, between 0% and 100%, of municipal resources do you believe were subject to irregularities?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Answer: _____ (from 0% to 100%)

Don't know 88

Refused to answer 99

Note: If no answer from the previous two is different from Don't know or Refused to answer, skip then next question..

On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "completely uncertain" and 10 means "completely certain," how sure are you about these assessments?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Answer: _____ (from 0 "completely uncertain" a 10 "completely certain")

Don't know 88

Refused to answer 99

Other citizens in your municipality might have a different opinion about the municipal resources that were subject to irregularities. What percentage, between 0% and 100%, of municipal resources do you believe that a typical citizen in your municipality thinks were subject to irregularities?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Answer: _____ (from 0% to 100%)

Don't know 88

Refused to answer 99

VALIDATION OF DISSEMINATED INFORMATION

Before the recent elections, do you remember receiving a WhatsApp message about how the municipal budget was spent by your municipal government?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Yes 1

No 2

Don't know 88

Refused to answer 99

Note: If No, Don't know, or Refused to answer jump to the question starting with "Before the recent elections, do you remember seeing a Facebook ad or page""

What type of information do you remember from the WhatsApp message?

[Enumerator: read options and choose all mentioned by the respondent.]

The candidates for Mayor in the recent mur 1

The resources received by the municipal gov 2

The municipal resources spent that are subj 3

Level of expenditure by the municipal gover 4

Don't know 88

Refused to answer 99

Note: Ask the following question even if Don't know, Refused to answer
Randomize order of answers 1 to 4.

The WhatsApp message contained information regarding the use of municipal resources by the municipal government that are subject to irregularities.

Do you remember the percentage of those irregularities? 0%, between 1 and 20%, between 21 and 40%, between 41 and 60%, between 61 and 80%, between 81 and 100%?

[Enumerator: choose only one option]

0%	1
1-20%	2
21-40%	3
41-60%	4
61-80%	5
81-100%	6
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Before the recent elections, do you remember seeing a Facebook ad or page with information on the use of resources by the municipal government?

[Enumerator: read options but only choose only one option.]

No	1
Yes, only a Facebook ad	2
Yes, only a Facebook page	3
Yes, both a Facebook ad and a page	4
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Note: If No, Don't know, or Refused to answer jump, to the questions.

EFFECT OF DISSEMINATED INFORMATION

If "Yes, only a Facebook ad," jump the next question.

How did you get to the Facebook page?

[Enumerator: read options and choose all mentioned by the respondent.]

Following a link in a WhatsApp message	1
Clicking on an ad on Facebook	2
Someone recommended or mentioned by via WhatsApp	3
Someone recommended or mentioned via Facebook	4
Family or acquaintances recommended or mentioned personally	5
Recommended or mentioned by a political party representative	6
Mentioned on the media (e.g. in a newspaper, on the radio, on TV)	7
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Note: Randomize the order of answers 1 to 7.

What type of information was on the Facebook ad or page?

[Enumerator: read options and choose all mentioned by the respondent.]

The candidates for Mayor in the recent municipal election	1
The resources received by the municipal government to invest in infrastructure that benefits socially disadvantaged	2
The municipal resources spent that are subject to irregularities	3
Level of expenditure by the municipal government in fighting crime in your municipality	4
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Note: Ask the following question even if Don't know, Refused to answer

Randomize the order of answers 1 to 4.

The Facebook ad and page had information on the use of municipal resources by the municipal government that are subject to irregularities.

Do you remember the percentage of those irregularities? 0%, between 1 and 20%, between 21 and 40%, between 41 and 60%, between 61 and 80%, between 81 and 100%?

[Enumerator: choose only one option]

0%	1
1-20%	2
21-40%	3
41-60%	4
61-80%	5
81-100%	6
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Did you make any comments about the information on the Facebook ad or page ?

[Enumerator: choose only one option]

No	0
Yes	1
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Do you remember if you read comments by others about the Facebook ad or page?

[Enumerator: read options and choose all mentioned by the respondent.]

No, there were no comments	0
No, I did not read any comments	1
Yes, they confirmed the information	2
Yes, they tried to discredit the information	3
Other	4
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

How many other voters in your municipality do you think saw the information on the Facebook ad or page? 0%, between 1 and 20%, between 21 and 40%, between 41 and 60%, between 61 and 80%, between 81 and 100%?

[Enumerator: choose only one option]

0%	1
1-20%	2
21-40%	3
41-60%	4
61-80%	5
81-100%	6
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

EFFECT OF DISSEMINATED INFORMATION

Note: This whole section "EFFECT OF DISSEMINATED INFORMATION" should only be asked of those that said they saw the WhatsApp message, the Facebook ad, or the Facebook page in the questions on lines 291 and 326.

Did the information on the WhatsApp message and/or the Facebook ad or page lead you to change your vote?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

No	0
Yes	1
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Note: If No, Don't know, or Refused to answer jump the next question.

Why do you think that the information lead you to change your vote?

[Enumerator: read options and choose all mentioned by the respondent.]

It changed my opinion of the candidate or party	1
It made me angry	2
I expected others to change their vote as result of the information	3
It led me to put more attention on the elections	4
It led me to discuss with others in my municipality about which candidate or political party was best.	5
It led me to agree with others in my municipality for which candidate or political party to vote	6
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Note: Randomize the order of answers 1 to 6
Jump the next question.

How many other people did you discuss the information on the WhatsApp message and/or the Facebook ad or page with? Nobody, Few, Several, The majority in your community, Everybody in your community, or The majority in your municipality?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Nobody	0
Few	1
Several	2
The majority in your community	3
Everybody in your community	4
The majority in your municipality	5
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Note: If Nobody, Don't know, or Refused to answer, jump to question that starts with "To what extent do you think that you changed your vote since you expected"

To what extent do you think that these discussions led you to change your vote during the recent mayoral elections on July 1st? Not at all, a little, some, or a lot?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Not at all	1
A little	2
Some	3
A lot	4
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

To what extent do you think that these discussions led you to agree with other people to vote for the same candidate or political party during the recent mayoral elections on July 1st? Not at all, a little, some, or a lot?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Not at all	1
A little	2
Some	3
A lot	4
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Note If Not at all, Don't know, Refused to answer, jump the next question

What were the main reasons that your discussions led you to vote for the candidate or political party you agreed to vote with other people?

[Enumerator: read options and choose all mentioned by the respondent.]

To punish the candidate or political party whose expenses were subject to irregularities	1
For candidates and political parties to see that irregularities will not be tolerated	2
Because my discussions with others led me to see that such candidate or political party would be less likely to engage in irregularities	3
Because my discussions with others led me to see that such candidate or political party was better along many dimensions	4
Other	5
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Note: Randomize the order of answers 1 to 4

To what extent do you think that you changed your vote since you expected others to change their vote as result of the information on the WhatsApp message and/or the Facebook ad or page, even if you did not discuss the information with them directly?

Not at all, a little, some, or a lot?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Not at all	1
A little	2
Some	3
A lot	4
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Note: Jump next question if "Not at all, Don't know, or Refused to answer."

What are the main reasons that your expectations of how others would change their vote led you to vote for the candidate or political party that you voted for during the recent mayoral elections on July 1st?

[Enumerator: read options and choose all mentioned by the respondent.]

To punish the candidate or political party whose expenses were subject to irregularities	1
For candidates and political parties to see that irregularities will not be tolerated	2
Because you expected others to vote for the candidate or political party that would be less likely to engage in irregularities	3
Because you expected others to vote for the candidate or political party that was better along many dimensions	4
Other	5
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Bearing in mind that other citizens in your municipality might have a different experience, How many people in your municipality you think agreed to vote for the same candidate during the recent mayoral elections on July 1st as a result of the information and discussion around it?

Very few, Less than half, Approximately half, More than half, or Almost everybody?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Very few	0
Less than half	1
Approximately half	2
More than half	3
Almost everybody	4
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

How many people in your municipality do you think change their vote during the recent mayoral elections on July 1st because they expected others to change their vote as result of the information?

Very few, Less than half, Approximately half, More than half, or Almost everybody

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Very few	0
Less than half	1
Approximately half	2
More than half	3
Almost everybody	4
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Who do you think sent the WhatsApp message and posted the Facebook ad or page? A Non-partisan NGO, the Federal government, the State government, the Municipal Government, or a Political party?

[Enumerator: read options and choose only one option.]

Non-partisan NGO	1
Federal government	2
State government	3
Municipal Government	4
Political party	5
Other	6
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Note: Randomize the order of answers from 1 to 5.

Do only next question if answer is "Political Party"

Which political party do you think sent the WhatsApp message and posted the Facebook ad or page?

[Enumerator: do not read options and choose only one option.]

PAN	1
PRI	2
PRD	3
Partido Verde (PVEM)	4
Partido del Trabajo (PT)	5
Partido Nueva Alianza (PANAL)	6
Movimiento Ciudadano	7
MORENA	8
Partido Encuentro Social	9
Other	10
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

How objective did you find the information on the WhatsApp message and/or the Facebook ad or page?

Not at all objective, Not very objective, Somewhat objective, Very objective?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Not at all objective	0
Not very objective	1
Somewhat objective	2
Very objective	3
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Relative to other information that you have encountered before the elections on July 1st in social media,

Was the information in the WhatsApp message and/or the Facebook ad or page more or less objective?

Much less objective, less objective, similarly objective, more objective, or much more objective?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Much less objective	1
Less objective	2
Similarly objective	3
More objective	4
Much more objective	5
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Relative to other information that you have encountered before the elections on July 1st on television, on radio, and newspapers, Was the information in the WhatsApp message and/or the Facebook ad or page more or less objective? Much less objective, less objective, similarly objective, more objective, or much more objective?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Much less objective	1
Less objective	2
Similarly objective	3
More objective	4
Much more objective	5
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Which of the following options describe your views about the information on the WhatsApp message and/or the Facebook ad or page?

[Enumerator: read options and choose all mentioned by the respondent.]

The information was very useful	1
The information only related to irregularities in one of many municipal government programs	2
I care more about which projects were implemented than whether there were irregularities	3
The information did not seem credible to me	4
Other people discredited the information	5
I do not care about irregularities in municipal spending	6
I felt it was political advertising	7
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Note: Randomize the order of answers from 1 to 7.

PARTY RESPONSES

I will now ask you about your experience during the recent mayoral election campaign.

First think about the party of your current Municipal mayor.

Did this party mention information about if municipal resources the campaign ...

[Enumerator: read options and choose only one option in each instance.]

	Yes	No	Don't know
Through fliers, billboards, campaign acts and candidates' visits?	0	1	88
In the media (e.g. a newspaper, the radio, on TV)?	0	1	88
On the internet and social media (e.g. Facebook and Twitter)?	0	1	88

Note: Skip the next question unless there is a Yes answer to any of the questions

When the party of the Municipal mayor mentioned the information, did it ...

[Enumerator: read options and choose all mentioned by the respondent.]

Dismiss the information?	1
Draw attention to or highlight the information?	2
Provide excuses for the information?	3
Argue that all parties are the same?	4
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Note: Randomize the order of answers 1 to 4

Now think about the party that represented the main political alternative to the party of the current

Municipal mayor in the recent elections. Did this party mention information about

irregularities in the use of municipal resources the campaign ...

[Enumerator: read options and choose only one option in each instance.]

	Yes	No	Don't know
Through fliers, billboards, campaign acts and candidates' visits?	0	1	88
In the media (e.g. a newspaper, the radio, on TV)?	0	1	88
On the internet and social media (e.g. Facebook and Twitter)?	0	1	88

When this party mentioned the information, did it ...

[Enumerator: read options and choose all mentioned by the respondent.]

Dismiss the information?	1
Draw attention to or highlight the information?	2
Provide excuses for the information?	3
Argue that all parties are the same?	4
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Note: Randomize the order of answers from 1 to 4.

CAMPAIGNING AND VOTE BUYING

We are interested in the frequency with which you interacted with different elements of the campaign during the recent mayoral election campaign.

First think about the party of your current Municipal mayor on the following scale:

Not at all frequently, Not very frequently, Somewhat frequently, or Very frequently

During the campaign, how frequently did the Municipal mayor party

[Enumerator: read options and choose only one option in each instance.]

	Not at all f	Not very fr	Somewhat	Very frequ	Don't know
Make proposals through fliers, billboards, campaign acts and candidates' visits?	0	1	2	3	88
Buy votes with gifts, favors, or access to services in your colony/community?	0	1	2	3	88
Place campaign ads on the media (e.g. a newspaper, the radio, on TV)?	0	1	2	3	88
Place campaign ads on the internet and social media (e.g. Facebook and Twitter)?	0	1	2	3	88

Now think about the party that represented the main political alternative to the party of the current

Municipal mayor in the recent elections on the following scale:

Not at all frequently, Not very frequently, Somewhat frequently, or Very frequently

During the campaign, how frequently did this party

[Enumerator: read options and choose only one option in each instance.]

	Not at all f	Not very fr	Somewhat	Very frequ	Don't know
Make proposals through fliers, billboards, campaign acts and candidates' visits?	0	1	2	3	88
Buy votes with gifts, favors, or access to services in your colony/community?	0	1	2	3	88
Place campaign ads on the media (e.g. a newspaper, the radio, on TV)?	0	1	2	3	88
Place campaign ads on the internet and social media (e.g. Facebook and Twitter)?	0	1	2	3	88

POLLING BOOTH

To conclude, can you please tell me the electoral precinct your voter identification card says you can vote? (This number is in the bottom lower part of your voter identification card).

Your data will be confidential and used only for academic purposes.

Response _____ (from 0 to 9999)

Don't know 88

Refused to answer 99

ENDLINE SURVEY - SPANISH VERSION

Nombre de _____
ID del enci _____
Fecha: _____
Tiempo de _____
Tiempo de _____

CONSENTIMIENTO

Leer guion de consentimiento verbal

¿Desea participar?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Sí 1
No 2

Si no esta dispuesto, o no sabe/no responde, agradecer por la participación y concluir entrevista.

CUESTIONES PARA DETERMINAR ELEGIBILIDAD

¿En qué Entidad vive?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Respuesta: _____

No sabe 88
No responde 99

Nota: Si el municipio y entidad no se encuentra en la muestra, o no sabe/no responde, agradecer por la participación y concluir entrevista.

¿En qué Municipio vive?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Respuesta: _____

No sabe 88
No responde 99

Nota: Si el municipio y entidad no se encuentra en la muestra, o no sabe/no responde, agradecer por la participación y concluir entrevista.

CONOCIMIENTO SOBRE POLÍTICA Y CONSUMO DE INFORMACIÓN

En las dos semanas antes de las elecciones que acaban de pasar el 1º de julio, ¿qué tan frecuentemente habló usted sobre política con su familia o conocidos ya sea en persona, o por teléfono? Nunca, De vez en cuando, Una vez a la semana, Varias veces a la semana, o Diario?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción en cada caso.]

Nunca 0
De vez en cuando 1
Una vez a la semana 2
Varias veces a la semana 3
Diario 4
No sabe 88
No responde 99

En las dos semanas antes de las elecciones que acaban de pasar, ¿qué tan frecuentemente habló usted sobre política con su familia o conocidos a través de redes sociales como Facebook, Twitter y WhatsApp? Nunca, De vez en cuando, Una vez a la semana, Varias veces a la semana, o Diario?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción en cada caso.]

Nunca 0
De vez en cuando 1
Una vez a la semana 2
Varias veces a la semana 3
Diario 4
No sabe 88
No responde 99

En las dos semanas antes de las elecciones que acaban de pasar, ¿qué tan frecuentemente leyó o escuchó usted noticias de las campañas electorales por Televisión, Radio, o Periódicos?

Nunca, De vez en cuando, Una vez a la semana, Varias veces a la semana, o Diario?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción en cada caso.]

Nunca	0
De vez en cuando	1
Una vez a la semana	2
Varias veces a la semana	3
Diario	4
No sabe	88
No responde	99

En las dos semanas antes de las elecciones que acaban de pasar, ¿qué tan frecuentemente leyó o escuchó usted noticias de las campañas electorales por Internet, o Redes sociales como Facebook y Twitter? Nunca, De vez en cuando, Una vez a la semana, Varias veces a la semana, o Diario?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción en cada caso.]

Nunca	0
De vez en cuando	1
Una vez a la semana	2
Varias veces a la semana	3
Diario	4
No sabe	88
No responde	99

¿Me podría decir el partido del Presidente Municipal que gobernaba en su municipio antes de las elecciones que acaban de pasar?

[Encuestador: no lea opciones y elija solamente una opción en cada caso.]

PAN	1
PRI	2
PRD	3
Partido Verde (PVEM)	4
Partido del Trabajo (PT)	5
Partido Nueva Alianza (PANAL)	6
Movimiento Ciudadano	7
MORENA	8
Partido Encuentro Social	9
Otro	10
No sabe	88
No responde	99

¿Me podría decir si el Presidente Municipal que gobernaba en su municipio antes de las elecciones que acaban de pasar podía ser reelecto/a en esas elecciones del 1º de julio?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Sí	1
No	2
No sabe	88
No responde	99

¿Me podría decir si el Presidente Municipal que gobernaba en su municipio antes de las elecciones que acaban de pasar fue candidato en esas elecciones del 1º de julio?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Sí	1
No	2
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Ahora estamos interesados en su percepción sobre la capacidad del Presidente Municipal que gobernaba en su municipio antes de las elecciones para implementar proyectos en su municipio. En una escala de 0 a 10, siendo 0 "extremadamente improbable" y 10 "extremadamente probable," ¿qué tan probable cree usted que es que el Presidente Municipal implemente proyectos en su municipio eficientemente?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Respuesta: _____ (de 0 "ninguno de los recursos" a 10 "la totalidad de los recursos")

No sabe 88

No responde 99

VOTACIÓN PASADA E IDEOLOGÍA

Incluso si no siente simpatía por un partido político en particular, ¿usted con qué partido político simpatiza más?

[Encuestador: no lea opciones y elija solamente una opción.]

PAN 1

PRI 2

PRD 3

Partido Verde (PVEM) 4

Partido del Trabajo (PT) 5

Partido Nueva Alianza (PANAL) 6

Movimiento Ciudadano 7

MORENA 8

Partido Encuentro Social 9

Otro 10

Ninguno 11

No sabe 88

No responde 99

Nota: Use la elección de partido para definir [PARTIDO CORRESPONDIENTE]

If No sabe, No responde, saltar la próxima pregunta.

En una escala de 0 a 10, donde 0 significa que siente muy poca simpatía por el [PARTIDO CORRESPONDIENTE] y 10 significa que siente mucha simpatía por el [PARTIDO CORRESPONDIENTE], ¿qué grado de apego siente por el [PARTIDO CORRESPONDIENTE]?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Respuesta: _____ (de 0 "siente muy poca simpatía" a 10 "siente mucha simpatía")

No sabe 88

No responde 99

El 1 de Julio hubo elecciones para Presidente Municipal y, como en cualquier elección, siempre hay personas que no tienen tiempo de ir a votar y otras a las que no les interesa.

¿Usted votó en las pasadas elecciones del 1º de julio para Presidente Municipal?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Si 1

No 2

No sabe 88

No responde 99

Nota: Si No, No sabe, No responde, saltar la próxima pregunta.

¿Podría indicarme por qué partido votó en las pasadas elecciones del 1º de julio para Presidente Municipal? Recuerde que es esta encuesta es confidencial y para usos académicos.

[Encuestador: no lea opciones y elija solamente una opción.]

PAN	1
PRI	2
PRD	3
Partido Verde (PVEM)	4
Partido del Trabajo (PT)	5
Partido Nueva Alianza (PANAL)	6
Movimiento Ciudadano	7
MORENA	8
Partido Encuentro Social	9
Anuló/Tachó	10
Escribió algo	11
Dejo en blanco	12
Otro	13
No sabe	88
No responde	99

¿Cuál es el porcentaje, entre 0% y 100%, de votantes de su municipio que usted cree que votó en las elecciones para Presidente Municipal que acaban de pasar?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Respuesta:	_____ (de 0% a 100%)
No sabe	88
No responde	99

De los votantes de su municipio que votaron en las elecciones municipales que acaban de pasar, ¿qué porcentaje, entre 0% y 100%, cree usted que votó por el partido del Presidente municipal que gobernaba en su municipio antes de la elecciones?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Respuesta:	_____ (de 0% a 100%)
No sabe	88
No responde	99

¿Qué tanto influyó en su voto en las pasadas elecciones del 1º de julio para Presidente Municipal la manera en que usted esperaba que votaran las demás personas de su municipio?

¿Nada, poco, algo, o mucho?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Nada	1
Poco	2
Algo	3
Mucho	4
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Antes de las elecciones que acaban de pasar el 1º de julio para Presidente Municipal, ¿qué tanto se puso usted de acuerdo durante pláticas con otras personas para votar por el mismo candidato o partido político? ¿Nada, poco, algo, o mucho?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Nada	1
Poco	2
Algo	3
Mucho	4
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Nota: Si Nada, No sabe o No responde, saltar las próximas dos preguntas.

Antes de las elecciones que acaban de pasar el 1º de julio para Presidente Municipal, ¿Con cuántas personas se puso de acuerdo para votar por el mismo candidato o partido político? Nadie, Pocos, Muchos, La mayoría en su colonia/localidad, Todos en su colonia/localidad, o La mayoría de su

municipio?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Nadie	0
Pocos	1
Muchos	2
La mayoría en su colonia/localidad	3
Todos en su colonia/localidad	4
La mayoría de su municipio	5
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Nota: Si "Nadie", salte la próxima pregunta.

Antes de las elecciones que acaban de pasar el 1º de julio para Presidente Municipal, ¿Cuál es el partido del candidato por el que se pusieron de acuerdo en votar?

[Encuestador: no lea opciones y elija solamente una opción en cada caso.]

PAN	1
PRI	2
PRD	3
Partido Verde (PVEM)	4
Partido del Trabajo (PT)	5
Partido Nueva Alianza (PANAL)	6
Movimiento Ciudadano	7
MORENA	8
Partido Encuentro Social	9
Otro	10
Ninguno	11
No sabe	88
No responde	99

PERCEPCIONES POSTERIORES

Ahora le vamos a hacer unas preguntas sobre irregularidades en el uso de los recursos municipales por parte de su Presidente municipal que gobernaba antes de la elecciones.

Algunos ejemplos de irregularidades son gastos no autorizados derivados de corrupción y desvío de recursos de las poblaciones beneficiarias.

En una escala de 0 a 10, siendo 0 "ninguno de los recursos" y 10 "la totalidad de los recursos," ¿cuál es la cantidad de recursos del municipio que usted cree estuvieron sujetos a irregularidades ?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Respuesta:	_____ (de 0 "ninguno de los recursos" a 10 "la totalidad de los recursos")
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Siendo más preciso, ¿cuál es el porcentaje, entre 0% y 100%, de recursos del municipio que usted cree estuvieron sujetos a irregularidades?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Respuesta:	_____ (de 0% a 100%)
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Nota: Si no hay respuesta diferente a No sabe o No responde en la pregunta anterior, saltar la próxima pregunta.

En una escala de 0 a 10 donde 0 es “completamente inseguro/a” y 10 “extremadamente seguro/a,”
¿qué tan seguro está usted sobre estas percepciones?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Respuesta: _____ (de 0 “completamente inseguro/a” a 10 “extremadamente seguro/a”)

No sabe 88

No responde 99

Otros ciudadanos en su municipio pueden tener una opinión distinta sobre los recursos del municipio que estuvieron sujetos a irregularidades. ¿Cuál es el porcentaje, entre 0% y 100%, de recursos del municipio que usted cree que un ciudadano típico de su municipio cree estuvieron sujetos a irregularidades?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Respuesta: _____ (de 0% a 100%)

No sabe 88

No responde 99

VALIDACIÓN DE INFORMACIÓN DISEMINADA

Antes de las elecciones que acaban de pasar el 1º de julio, usted recuerda haber recibido un mensaje vía WhatsApp sobre el uso del presupuesto municipal ejercido por su gobierno municipal?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Sí 1

No 2

No sabe 88

No responde 99

Nota: Si No, No sabe, No responde, saltar a la pregunta que empieza con
"Antes de las elecciones que acaban de pasar, ¿usted recuerda haber visto ..."

¿Qué tipo de información recuerda usted haber visto en el mensaje de WhatsApp?

[Encuestador: lea opciones y elija todas las opciones mencionadas por el encuestado.]

El nombre de los candidatos a Alcalde en las elecciones que acaban de pasar municipales 1

El monto de los recursos recibidos por el gobierno municipal para invertir en infraestructura que beneficia a población en rezago soci 2

El monto usado de los recursos del municipio que están sujetos a irregularidades. 3

Nivel de gasto del gobierno municipal en combatir el crimen en su municipio. 4

No sabe 88

No responde 99

Note: Hacer la próxima pregunta incluso si el encuestado responde No sabe, No responde
Aleatorizar el orden de respuestas 1 a 4.

El mensaje de WhatsApp tenía información sobre el uso de recursos del municipio por parte del gobierno municipal que están sujetos a irregularidades, ¿recuerda usted el porcentaje de irregularidades?

0%, entre 1 y 20%, entre 21 y 40%, entre 41 y 60%, entre 61 y 80%, entre 81 y 100%?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción]

0% 1

1-20% 2

21-40% 3

41-60% 4

61-80% 5

81-100% 6

No sabe 88

No responde 99

Antes de las elecciones que acaban de pasar, ¿usted recuerda haber visto una publicidad o página de Facebook con información sobre el uso de recursos por parte del gobierno municipal?

[Encuestador: lea opciones y elija solamente una opción.]

No	1
Sí, sólo una publicidad de Facebo	2
Sí, sólo una página de Facebook	3
Sí, una publicidad y una página d	4
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Nota: Si "No, No sabe, No responde," saltar a las pregunta de

EFFECTO DE LA INFORMACIÓN DISEMINADA

Si "Sí, sólo una publicidad de Facebook" saltar la proxima pregunta.

¿Cómo llegó usted a la página de Facebook?

[Encuestador: lea opciones y elija todas las opciones mencionadas por el encuestado.]

Siguiendo una liga dentro de un mensaje de WhatsApp	1
A través de publicidad en Facebook	2
Alguien lo recomendó o mencionó en WhatsApp	3
Alguien lo recomendó o mencionó en Facebook	4
Un familiar o conocido lo recomendó o mencionó en persona	5
Un representatne de un partido político lo recomendó o mencionó en persona	6
Lo escuché en los medios (por ejemplo, en el periódico, la radio, o la televisión)	7
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Note: Aleatorizar el orden de las respuestas 1 a 7.

¿Qué tipo de información recuerda usted haber leído en la publicidad o página de Facebook?

[Encuestador: lea opciones y elija todas las opciones mencionadas por el encuestado.]

El nombre de los candidatos a Presidente Municipal en las elecciones que acaban de pasar municipales	1
El monto de los recursos recibidos por el gobierno municipal para invertir en infraestructura que beneficia a población en rezago soci	2
El monto usado de los recursos del municipio que están sujetos a irregularidades.	3
Nivel de gasto del gobierno municipal en combatir el crimen en su municipio.	4
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Note: Hacer la proxima pregunta incluse si el encuestado responde No sabe, No responde

Aleatorizar el orden de las respuestas 1 a 4.

La publicidad y página de Facebook tenía información sobre el uso de recursos del municipio por parte del gobierno municipal que están sujetos a irregularidades, ¿recuerda usted el porcentaje de irregularidades?

0%, entre 1 y 20%, entre 21 y 40%, entre 41 y 60%, entre 61 y 80%, entre 81 y 100%?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción]

0%	1
1-20%	2
21-40%	3
41-60%	4
61-80%	5
81-100	6
No sabe	88
No responde	99

¿Hizo usted algún comentario sobre la información en la publicidad de Facebook?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción]

No	0
Sí	1
No sabe	88
No responde	99

¿Recuerda usted si leyó comentarios de otras personas sobre la publicidad o página de Facebook?

[Encuestador: lea opciones y elija solamente una opción]

No, no había comentarios	0
No, no leí ningún comentario	1
Sí, confirmaban la información	2
Sí, intentaban desacreditar la información	3
Otro	4
No sabe	88
No responde	99

**¿Cuántos votantes en su municipio usted cree que vieron la publicidad o página de Facebook?
0%, entre 1 y 20%, entre 21 y 40%, entre 41 y 60%, entre 61 y 80%, entre 81 y 100%?**

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción]

0%	1
1-20%	2
21-40%	3
41-60%	4
61-80%	5
81-100	6
No sabe	88
No responde	99

EFFECTO DE LA INFORMACIÓN DISEMINADA

Nota: Toda esta sección "EFFECTO DE LA INFORMACIÓN DISEMINADA" sólo debe realizarse a los que respondieron que recibieron un mensaje de WhatsApp o vieron la publicidad o página de Facebook en líneas 291 y 326.

¿La información en el mensaje de WhatsApp y/o la publicidad o página de Facebook lo llevó a cambiar su decisión de voto?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

No	0
Sí	1
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Nota: Si No, No sabe, No responde, saltar a la próxima pregunta.

¿Por qué razones cree usted que la información le hizo cambiar su voto?

[Encuestador: lea opciones y elija todas las opciones mencionadas por el encuestado.]

Cambió mi opinión del candidato o partido	1
Me hizo enojar	2
Pensé que la información haría que otros en mi municipio cambiaran su voto	3
Me hizo poner más atención a las elecciones	4
Me llevó a platicar con otros en mi municipio sobre qué candidato o partido era mejor	5
Me llevó a ponerme de acuerdo con otros en mi municipio sobre por cuál candidato o partido votar	6
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Note: Aleatorizar el orden de las respuesta 1 a 6
Saltar a la próxima pregunta.

¿Con cuántas personas habló usted de la información en el mensaje de WhatsApp y/o la publicidad o página de Facebook? Nadie, Pocos, Muchos, La mayoría en su colonia/localidad, Todos en su colonia/localidad, o La mayoría de su municipio?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Nadie	0
Pocos	1
Muchos	2
La mayoría en su colonia/localidad	3
Todos en su colonia/localidad	4
La mayoría de su municipio	5
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Note: Si "Nadie, No sabe, No responde" saltar a la pregunta que empieza con
"¿Qué tanto cree que cambió usted su voto porque esperaba"

¿Qué tanto cree que estas pláticas lo llevaron a cambiar su decisión de voto en las pasadas elecciones del 1º de julio para Presidente Municipal? ¿Nada, poco, algo, o mucho?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Nada	1
Poco	2
Algo	3
Mucho	4
No sabe	88
No responde	99

¿Qué tanto cree que estas pláticas lo llevaron a a ponerse de acuerdo con otras personas para votar todos por el mismo candidato o partido político en las pasadas elecciones del 1º de julio para Presidente Municipal? ¿Nada, poco, algo, o mucho?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Nada	1
Poco	2
Algo	3
Mucho	4
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Nota: Si Nada, No sabe o No responde, saltar la próxima pregunta.

¿Cuáles son la principales razones que le llevaron a votar por el candidato o partido político por el que se puso de acuerdo en votar con otras personas?

[Encuestador: lea opciones y elija todas las opciones mencionadas por el encuestado.]

Para castigar al candidato o partido político que incurrió en irregularidades	1
Para que los candidatos y partido políticos vean que las irregularidades no van a ser toleradas	2
Porque platicar con otros me hizo ver que ese candidato o partido político era el menos probable de incurrir en irregularidades	3
Porque platicar con otros me hizo ver que ese candidato o partido político era el mejor en muchos aspectos	4
Otro	5
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Note: Aleatorizar el orden de las respuesta 1 a 4

¿Qué tanto cree que cambió usted su voto porque esperaba que otros cambiarían su voto por la información en el mensaje de WhatsApp y/o la publicidad o página de Facebook, incluso si no platicó sobre dicha informacion directamente con ellos? ¿Nada, poco, algo, o mucho?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Nada	1
Poco	2
Algo	3
Mucho	4
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Nota: Saltar la próxima pregunta si responde "Nada, No sabe, o No responde."

¿Cuáles son las principales razones que la manera en que usted esperaba que otros cambiaran su voto le llevó a votar por el candidato o partido político por el que votó en las pasadas elecciones del 1º de julio para Presidente Municipal?

[Encuestador: lea opciones y elija todas las opciones mencionadas por el encuestado.]

Para castigar al candidato o partido político que incurrió en irregularidades	1
Para que los candidatos y partido políticos vean que las irregularidades no van a ser toleradas	2
Porque esperaba que otras personas voten por el candidato o partido político que era el menos probable de incurrir en irregularidad	3
Porque esperaba que otras personas voten por el candidato o partido político que era el mejor en muchos aspectos	4
Otro	5
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Teniendo en cuenta que otros ciudadanos en su municipio pueden tener una experiencia distinta, ¿Cuántas personas de su municipio usted cree que se pusieron de acuerdo en votar por el mismo candidato en las pasadas elecciones del 1º de julio para Presidente Municipal como resultado de la información o pláticas sobre la misma? Muy pocas, Menos de la mitad, Aproximadamente la mitad, Más de la mitad, or Casi todos?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Muy pocas	0
Menos de la mitad	1
Aproximadamente la mitad	2
Más de la mitad	3
Casi todos	4
No sabe	88
No responde	99

¿Cuántas personas de su municipio usted cree que cambiaron su voto en las pasadas elecciones del 1º de julio para Presidente Municipal porque esperaban que otros cambiarían su voto por la información? Muy pocas, Menos de la mitad, Aproximadamente la mitad, Más de la mitad, o Casi todos

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Muy pocas	0
Menos de la mitad	1
Aproximadamente la mitad	2
Más de la mitad	3
Casi todos	4
No sabe	88
No responde	99

¿Quién cree usted que distribuyó el mensaje de WhatsApp y puso la publicidad o página de Facebook? Una asociación civil no-partidista, El gobierno Federal, El gobierno Estatal, El gobierno Municipal, o Un partido político?

[Encuestador: lea opciones elija solamente una opción.]

Una asociación civil no-partidista	1
El gobierno Federal	2
El gobierno Estatal	3
El gobierno Municipal	4
Un partido político	5
Otro	6
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Note: Aleatorizar el orden de las respuestas 1 a 5.

Hacer la próxima pregunta, sólo si la respuesta es "Un partido político"

¿Qué partido político cree usted que distribuyó el mensaje de WhatsApp y puso la publicidad o página de Facebook?

[Encuestador: no lea opciones y elija solamente una opción.]

PAN	1
PRI	2
PRD	3
Partido Verde (PVEM)	4
Partido del Trabajo (PT)	5
Partido Nueva Alianza (PANAL)	6
Movimiento Ciudadano	7
MORENA	8
Partido Encuentro Social	9
Otro	10
No sabe	88
No responde	99

¿Qué tan objetiva le pareció la información en el mensaje de WhatsApp y/o la publicidad o página de Facebook? Para nada objetiva, No muy objetiva, Algo objetiva, Muy objetiva?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Para nada objetiva	0
No muy objetiva	1
Algo objetiva	2
Muy objetiva	3
No sabe	88
No responde	99

En comparación con otra información que haya usted recibido antes de las elecciones del 1 de julio a través de redes sociales o grupos de chat, ¿qué tan objetiva le pareció la información en el mensaje de WhatsApp y/o la publicidad o página de Facebook ?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Mucho más objetiva	1
Un poco más objetiva	2
Ni más ni menos objetiva	3
Un poco menos objetiva	4
Mucho menos objetiva	5
No sabe	88
No responde	99

En comparación con otra información que haya usted visto o escuchado antes de las elecciones del 1 de julio en televisión, radio o periódicos, ¿qué tan objetiva le pareció la información en el mensaje de WhatsApp y/o la publicidad o página de Facebook ?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Mucho más objetiva	1
Un poco más objetiva	2
Ni más ni menos objetiva	3
Un poco menos objetiva	4
Mucho menos objetiva	5
No sabe	88
No responde	99

¿Cuáles de las siguientes opciones describe mejor su opinión sobre la información en el mensaje de WhatsApp y/o la publicidad o página de Facebook?

[Encuestador: lea opciones y elija todas las opciones mencionadas por el encuestado.]

La información me pareció muy útil	1
La información sólo hablaba de irregularidades en uno de muchos de los programas del gobierno municipal	2
Mientras el gobierno haga proyectos, no me importan las irregularidades en el gasto del gobierno municipal	3
La información no me pareció creíble	4
Otras personas desacreditaron la información.	5
Las irregularidades en el gasto del gobierno municipal no me parecen importantes	6
Me pareció propaganda política	7
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Note: Aleatorizar el orden de las respuestas 1 a 7.

RESPUESTAS DE LOS PARTIDOS

Le vamos a preguntar sobre su experiencia durante la campaña de las elecciones que acaban de pasar para Presidente Municipal. Primero piense en el partido del Presidente municipal que gobernaba en su municipio antes de las elecciones.

¿Usted presenció que dicho partido hizo referencia a información sobre irregularidades en el uso de los recursos municipales durante la campaña ...

[Encuestador: lea opciones y elija solamente una opción en cada caso.]

	Sí	No	No sabe	No responde
A través de volantes, espectaculares, actos de campaña y visitas de los candidatos?	0	1	88	99
En medios de comunicación (e.j., periódico, radio, televisión)?	0	1	88	99
En internet y redes sociales (e.j., Facebook y Twitter)?	0	1	88	99

Note: Salte la siguiente pregunta a menos que responda "Sí" en alguno de los casos.

Cuando el partido del Presidente Municipal hizo referencia a la información, ¿le ...

[Encuestador: lea opciones y elija todas las opciones mencionadas por el encuestado.]

Restó importancia a la Información?	1
Llamó la atención o destacó la información?	2
Presentó excusas por la información?	3
Argumentó que todos los partidos son iguales?	4
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Note: Aleatorizar el orden de las respuestas de 1 a 4

Ahora piense en el partido que tenía las mayores posibilidades de ganarle al del Presidente municipal en la elecciones pasadas. ¿Usted presenció que dicho partido hizo referencia a información sobre irregularidades en el uso de los recursos municipales durante la campaña ...

[Encuestador: lea opciones y elija solamente una opción en cada caso.]

	Sí	No	No sabe	No responde
A través de volantes, espectaculares, actos de campaña y visitas de los candidatos?	0	1	88	99
En medios de comunicación (e.j., periódico, radio, televisión)?	0	1	88	99
En internet y redes sociales (e.j., Facebook y Twitter)?	0	1	88	99

Cuando dicho partido hizo referencia a la información, ¿le ...

[Encuestador: lea opciones y elija todas las opciones mencionadas por el encuestado.]

Restó importancia a la Información?	1
Llamó la atención o destacó la información?	2
Presentó excusas por la información?	3
Argumentó que todos los partidos son iguales?	4
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Note: Aleatorizar el orden de las respuestas de 1 a 4.

CAMPAÑA Y COMPRA DE VOTOS

Estamos interesados en la frecuencia con la cual usted presencié distintos elementos de la campaña en las elecciones que acaban de pasar para Presidente Municipal.

Primero piense en el partido del Presidente municipal que gobernaba su municipio antes de las elecciones. en la siguiente escala: para nada frecuente, No muy frecuente, Algo frecuente, o Muy frecuente. Durante la campaña, ¿qué tan frecuentemente el partido del Presidente Municipal?

[Encuestador: lea opciones y elija solamente una opción en cada caso.]

	Para nada	No muy frecuente	Algo frecuente	Muy frecuente	No sabe	No responde
Hizo propuestas a través de volantes, espectaculares, actos de campaña y visitas	0	1	2	3	88	99
Compró votos con regalos, favores o acceso a servicios en su colonia/comunidad	0	1	2	3	88	99
Hizo anuncios de campaña en medios de comunicación (e.j., periódico, radio, televisión)	0	1	2	3	88	99
Hizo anuncios de campaña en internet y redes sociales (e.j., Facebook y Twitter)	0	1	2	3	88	99

Ahora piense en el partido que tenía las mayores posibilidades de ganarle al del Presidente municipal en la elecciones pasadas en la siguiente escala:

Para nada frecuente, No muy frecuente, Algo frecuente, o Muy frecuente

Durante la campaña, ¿qué tan frecuentemente dicho partido ...

[Encuestador: lea opciones y elija solamente una opción en cada caso.]

	Para nada	No muy frecuente	Algo frecuente	Muy frecuente	No sabe	No responde
Hizo propuestas a través de volantes, espectaculares, actos de campaña y visitas	0	1	2	3	88	99
Compró votos con regalos, favores o acceso a servicios en su colonia/comunidad	0	1	2	3	88	99
Hizo anuncios de campaña en medios de comunicación (e.j., periódico, radio, televisión)	0	1	2	3	88	99
Hizo anuncios de campaña en internet y redes sociales (e.j., Facebook y Twitter)	0	1	2	3	88	99

CASILLA

Para concluir, me puede indicar el número de sección electoral en donde su credencial de elector indica que puede votar? (Ese número está en la parte inferior derecha de su credencial de elector)

Sus datos serán confidenciales y usados únicamente para fines académicos.

Respuesta _____ (de 0 a 9999)

No sabe 88

No responde 99

SURVEY FOR FACEBOOK ENGAGERS

CONSENT

Read verbal consent script

Do you want to participate?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Yes	1
No	2

Note: If they are not willing, thank for participation and conclude interview.

EMAIL

We might need you to contact you as part of the study. What is your email?

Your data will be confidential and used only for academic purposes.

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Answer	_____
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Note: If DNK/NA, thank for participation and conclude interview.

ELIGIBILITY QUESTIONS

Which state do you live in?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Answer:	_____
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Note: If state not in sample, or DNK/NA, thank for participation and conclude interview.

Which municipality do you live in?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Answer:	_____
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Note: If municipality not in sample, or DNK/NA, thank for participation and conclude interview.

SOCIAL MEDIA USAGE

How frequently do you use Facebook?

Never, Once a month, Once a week, Few days days a week,

At least once a day all days, or Many times a day?

Never	0
Once a month	1
Once a week	2
Few days days a week	3
At least once a day all days	4
Many times a day	5
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

In the two weeks before the recent elections on July 1st, how often have you discussed politics with family and acquaintances through Facebook?

Never, Every once in a while, Once a week, Several times a week, or Daily?

[Enumerator: choose only one option in each case.]

Never	0
Every once in a while	1
Once a week	2
Several times a week	3
Daily	4
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

DELIVERY OF FACEBOOK AD

Do you recall seeing a Facebook ad about irregularities in the spending of your municipal government in the week prior to the recent elections?

[Pleasem choose only one option.]

No	0
Yes	1
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Note: Jump the next three sections if No, Don't know, or Refused to answer.

What type of information was on the Facebook ad?

[Enumerator: read options and choose all mentioned by the respondent.]

The candidates for Mayor in the recent municipal election	1
The resources received by the municipal government to inves	2
The municipal resources spent that are subject to irregularitie	3
Level of expenditure by the municipal government in fighting	4
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Note: Ask the following question even if Don't know, Refused to answer
Randomize the order of answers 1 to 4.

The Facebook ad had information on the use of municipal resources by the municipal government that are subject to irregularities.

Do you remember the percentage of those irregularities? 0%, between 1 and 20%, between 21 and 40%, between 41 and 60%, between 61 and 80%, between 81 and 100%?

[Enumerator: choose only one option]

0%	1
1-20%	2
21-40%	3
41-60%	4
61-80%	5
81-100	6
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

How many other voters in your municipality do you think saw the information on the Facebook ad?

0%, between 1 and 20%, between 21 and 40%, between 41 and 60%, between 61 and 80%, between 81 and 100%?

[Enumerator: choose only one option]

0%	1
1-20%	2
21-40%	3
41-60%	4
61-80%	5
81-100	6
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

INTERACTION WITH FACEBOOK AD

Did you comment on the Facebook ad?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

No	0
Yes	1
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Note: Skip next 3 questions if No, Don't know, or Refused to answer.

Why did you comment on the Facebook ad?

[Enumerator: read options and choose all mentioned by the respondent.]

To corroborate the municipal government's bad performance	1
To corroborate the municipal government's good performance	2
To share it with other people on Facebook	3
To express doubts about the credibility of the information	4
To denounce that you believed it was political advertising	5
To solicit information	6
To reply to comments by other people	7
To congratulate the work of the NGO disseminating the information	8
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Note: Randomize the order of answers from 1 to 8.

Did other people responder to your comment?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

No	0
Yes	1
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Nota: Skip next question if No, Don't know, or Refused to answer.

Did this other people generally agree or disagree with what you wrote?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Strongly disagree	1
Disagree	2
Neither agree nor disagree	3
Agree	4
Strongly agree	5
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Did you react to the Facebook ad?

[Enumerator: read options and choose all mentioned by the respondent.]

No	0
Yes, I expressed that I liked it	1
Yes, I expressed that I loved it	2
Yes, I expressed that it gave me laughter	3
Yes, I expressed that it gave me enthusiasm	4
Yes, I expressed that I was surprised	5
Yes, I expressed that it made me sad	6
Yes, I expressed that it made me angry	7
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Note: Randomize the order of answers from 1 to 7.

Skip next question if No, Don't know, or Refused to answer.

Why did you react to the Facebook ad?

[Enumerator: read options and choose all mentioned by the respondent.]

To corroborate the municipal government's bad performance	1
To corroborate the municipal government's good performance	2
To share it with other people on Facebook	3
To express doubts about the credibility of the information	4
To denounce that you believed it was political advertising	5
To solicit information	6
To reply to comments by other people	7
To congratulate the work of the NGO disseminating the information	8
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Note: Randomize the order of answers from 1 to 8.

Do you remember having shared the Facebook ad with others?

[Please, choose all that apply.]

No	0
Yes, I shared it with others via Facebook	1
Yes, I shared it with others using another technology (e.g. WhatsApp, SMS, email)	2
Yes, I shared it with others talking about it	3
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Note: Skip next 5 questions if No, Don't know, or Refused to answer.

Why did you share the ad with others?

[Please, choose all that apply.]

Because the information is relevant	1
To congratulate the work of the NGO disseminating the information	2
To seek to persuade others to change their vote choice at the election for Municipa	3
To impress others with your knowledge of politics	4
To start a conversation about politics with others	5
To express doubts about the credibility of the information	6
To denounce that you believed it was political advertising	7
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Note: Randomize the order of answers from 1 to 7.

Did you discuss the information that the Facebook ad contained with the people that you shared the ad with?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

No	0
Yes	1
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Note: Skip all remaining questions in this section if No, Don't know, or Refused to answer.

To what extent do you think that these discussions led you to change your vote?

Not at all, a little, some, or a lot?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Not at all	1
A little	2
Some	3
A lot	4
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

To what extent do you think that these discussions led you to agree with other people to vote for the same candidate or political party?

Not at all, a little, some, or a lot?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Not at all	1
A little	2
Some	3
A lot	4
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Note If Not at all, Don't know, Refused to answer, jump the next two questions

What is the party of the candidate that you agreed to vote for?

[Enumerator: do not read options and choose only one option in each case.]

PAN	1
PRI	2
PRD	3
Partido Verde (PVEM)	4
Partido del Trabajo (PT)	5
Partido Nueva Alianza (PANAL)	6
Movimiento Ciudadano	7
MORENA	8
Partido Encuentro Social	9
Other	10
None	11
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

What was the main reason that your discussions led you to vote for the candidate or political party you agreed to vote with other people?

To punish the candidate or political party whose expenses were subject to irregulari	1
For candidates and political parties to see that irregularities will not be tolerated	2
Because my discussions with others led me to see that such candidate or political p	3
Because my discussions with others led me to see that such candidate or political p	4
Other	5
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Note: Randomize the order of answers 1 to 4

CREDIBILITY OF FACEBOOK AD

Who do you think posted the Facebook ad ?A Non-partisan NGO, the Federal government, the State government, the Municipal Government, or a Political party?

[Enumerator: read options and choose only one option.]

Non-partisan NGO	1
Federal government	2
State government	3
Municipal Government	4
Political party	5
Other	6
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Note: Randomize the order of answers from 1 to 5.

How objective did you find the information on the Facebook ad?

Not at all objective, Not very objective, Somewhat objective, Very objective?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Not at all objective	0
Not very objective	1
Somewhat objective	2
Very objective	3
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Which of the following options describe your views about the information on the Facebook ad?

[Enumerator: read options and choose all mentioned by the respondent.]

The information was very useful	1
The information only related to irregularities in one of many r	2
I care more about which projects were implemented than wh	3
The information did not seem credible to me	4
Other people discredited the information	5
I do not care about irregularities in municipal spending	6
I felt it was political advertising	7
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Note: Randomize the order of answers from 1 to 7.

POSTERIOR BELIEFS

We will now ask you some questions about irregularities in the use of municipal resources by the municipal mayor in office before the election.

Examples of irregularities include unauthorized spending derived from corruption, and the diversion of resources from intended beneficiaries.

On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is "none of the resources" and 10 is "the totality of the resources," what amount of municipal resources do you believe were subject to irregularities?

Answer: _____ (from 0 "none of the resources" to 10 "the totality of the resources")
Don't know 88
Refused to answer 99

If you had to be more precise, what percentage, between 0% and 100%, of municipal resources do you believe were subject to irregularities?

Answer: _____ (from 0% to 100%)
Don't know 88
Refused to answer 99

Note: If no answer from the previous two is different from Don't know or Refused to answer, skip then next question..

On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "completely uncertain" and 10 means "completely certain," how sure are you about these assessments?

Answer: _____ (from 0 "completely uncertain" to 10 "completely certain")
Don't know 88
Refused to answer 99

Other citizens in your municipality might have a different opinion about the municipal resources that were subject to irregularities. What percentage, between 0% and 100%, of municipal resources do you believe that a typical citizen in your municipality thinks were subject to irregularities?

Answer: _____ (from 0% to 100%)
Don't know 88
Refused to answer 99

PAST VOTE AND IDEOLOGY

Even if you do not feel very attached to a particular political party, which political party do you feel closest to?

PAN	1
PRI	2
PRD	3
Partido Verde (PVEM)	4
Partido del Trabajo (PT)	5
Partido Nueva Alianza (PANAL)	6
Movimiento Ciudadano	7
MORENA	8
Partido Encuentro Social	9
Other	10
None	11
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you do not feel very attached to [CORRESPONDING PARTY] and 10 means you feel very attached to [CORRESPONDING PARTY], what degree of attachment do you feel for [CORRESPONDING PARTY]?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Answer: _____ (from 0 "does not feel very attached" a 10 "feels very attached")

Don't know 88

Refused to answer 99

On July 1st, the mayoral elections were held, and as in any other election, there are always people who do not have time to vote and others who are not interested.

Did you or did you not vote during the recent mayoral elections on July 1st?

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Yes 1

No 2

Don't know 88

Refused to answer 99

Note: If No, Don't know, or Refused to answer, skip next question.

Could you tell me which party you voted for in the recent mayoral elections?

Remember that this survey is confidential and only for academic purposes.

PAN 1

PRI 2

PRD 3

Partido Verde (PVEM) 4

Partido del Trabajo (PT) 5

Partido Nueva Alianza (PANAL) 6

Movimiento Ciudadano 7

MORENA 8

Partido Encuentro Social 9

Nullified - Scratched 10

Wrote something 11

Left blank 12

Other 13

Don't know 88

Refused to answer 99

INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS

What is your gender?

Male 1

Female 2

Other 3

Don't know 88

Refused to answer 99

What is your age?

Answer: _____

Don't know 88

Refused to answer 99

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

If still a student, chose the current level of education]

No formal education	0
Incomplete primary school	1
Complete primary school	2
Incomplete secondary/technical school	3
Complete secondary/technical school	4
Incomplete preparatory equivalent	5
Complete preparatory equivalent	6
Incomplete university	7
Complete university or more	8
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

POLLING BOOTH

To conclude, can you please tell me the electoral precinct your voter identification card says you can vote? (This number is in the bottom lower part of your voter identification card).

Your data will be confidential and used only for academic purposes.

Response	_____	(from 0 to 9999)
Don't know	88	
Refused to answer	99	

WHATSAPP NUMBER

As I mentioned earlier, we might need you to contact you as part of the study.

What is the phone number associated to your WhatsApp?

Your data will be confidential and used only for academic purposes.

[Enumerator: choose only one option.]

Answer	_____
Don't know	88
Refused to answer	99

Note: Thank for participation and conclude interview.

ENCUESTA PARA USUARIOS DE FACEBOOK

CONSENTIMIENTO

Leer guion de consentimiento verbal

¿Desea participar?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Sí	1
No	2

Si no esta dispuesto, agradecer por la participación y concluir entrevista.

EMAIL

Puede que tengamos que contactarle como parte del estudio. ¿Cuál es su correo electrónico?

Sus datos serán confidenciales y usados únicamente para fines académicos.

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Answer _____

No sabe 88

No responde 99

Nota: Si no sabe/no responde, agradecer por la participación y concluir entrevista.

CUESTIONES PARA DETERMINAR ELEGIBILIDAD

¿En qué Entidad vive?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Respuesta: _____

No sabe 88

No responde 99

Nota: Si la entidad no se encuentra en la muestra, o no sabe/no responde, agradecer por la participación y concluir entrevista.

¿En qué Municipio vive?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Respuesta: _____

No sabe 88

No responde 99

Nota: Si el municipio no se encuentra en la muestra, o no sabe/no responde, agradecer por la participación y concluir entrevista.

USO DE REDES SOCIALES

¿Qué tan frecuentemente usa usted Facebook?

¿Nunca, Una vez por mes, Una vez por semana, Varios días a la semana, Por lo menos una vez por día, o Muchas veces por día?

Nunca	0
Una vez por mes	1
Una vez por semana	2
Varios días a la semana	3
Por lo menos una vez por día	4
Muchas veces por día	5
No sabe	88
No responde	99

En las dos semanas antes de las elecciones que acaban de pasar el 1º de julio, ¿qué tan frecuentemente habló usted sobre política con su familia o conocidos a través de Facebook?

Nunca, De vez en cuando, Una vez a la semana, Varias veces a la semana, o Diario?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción en cada caso.]

Nunca	0
De vez en cuando	1
Una vez a la semana	2
Varias veces a la semana	3
Diario	4
No sabe	88
No responde	99

RECEPCIÓN DE LA PUBLICIDAD DE FACEBOOK

Antes de las elecciones que acaban de pasar, ¿recuerda usted haber visto una publicidad de Facebook sobre irregularidades en el uso de recursos del municipio por parte de su gobierno municipal?

[Por favor, elija solamente una opción.]

No	0
Sí	1
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Nota: Si No, No sabe, No responde, saltar las tres secciones que siguen.

¿Qué tipo de información recuerda usted haber leído en la publicidad de Facebook?

[Encuestador: lea opciones y elija todas las opciones mencionadas por el encuestado.]

El nombre de los candidatos a Presidente Municipal en las elecciones que acaban de	1
El monto de los recursos recibidos por el gobierno municipal para invertir en infraes	2
El monto usado de los recursos del municipio que están sujetos a irregularidades.	3
Nivel de gasto del gobierno municipal en combatir el crimen en su municipio.	4
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Note: Hacer la proxima pregunta incluse si el encuestado responde No sabe, No responde Aleatorizar el orden de las respuestas 1 a 4.

La publicidad de Facebook tenía información sobre el uso de recursos del municipio por parte del gobierno municipal que están sujetos a irregularidades, ¿recuerda usted el porcentaje de irregularidades?

0%, entre 1 y 20%, entre 21 y 40%, entre 41 y 60%, entre 61 y 80%, entre 81 y 100%?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción]

0%	1
1-20%	2
21-40%	3
41-60%	4
61-80%	5
81-100	6
No sabe	88
No responde	99

¿Cuántos votantes en su municipio usted cree que vieron la publicidad de Facebook?

0%, entre 1 y 20%, entre 21 y 40%, entre 41 y 60%, entre 61 y 80%, entre 81 y 100%?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción]

0%	1
1-20%	2
21-40%	3
41-60%	4
61-80%	5
81-100	6
No sabe	88
No responde	99

INTERACCIÓN CON LA PUBLICIDAD DE FACEBOOK

¿Hizo usted algún comentario sobre la información en la publicidad de Facebook?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción]

No	0
Sí	1
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Note: Saltar las próximas 3 preguntas si "No, No sabe, o No Responde."

¿Por qué hizo un comentario sobre la información en la publicidad de Facebook?

[Encuestador: lea opciones y elija todas las opciones mencionadas por el encuestado.]

Para corroborar el mal trabajo hecho por el gobierno municipal	1
Para corroborar el buen trabajo hecho por el gobierno municipal	2
Para compartirlo con otras personas	3
Para expresar dudas sobre la credibilidad de la información	4
Para denunciar que creía que era propaganda política	5
Para pedir más información	6
Para responder comentarios de otras personas	7
Para felicitar el trabajo de la asociación civil que diseminó la información	8
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Note: Aleatorizar el orden de las respuestas 1 a 8.

¿Alguna otra persona respondió a su comentario?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción]

No	0
Sí	1
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Nota: Saltar la proxima pregunta si el encuestado responde No, No sabe, No responde

Esta(s) persona(s) ¿estaba(n) generalmente en acuerdo o en desacuerdo con su comentario?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción]

Muy en desacuerdo	1
Algo en desacuerdo	2
Ni en desacuerdo ni en acuerdo	3
Algo en acuerdo	4
Muy en acuerdo	5
No sabe	88
No responde	99

¿Usted reaccionó a la publicidad de Facebook?

[Encuestador: lea opciones y elija todas las opciones mencionadas por el encuestado.]

No	0
Sí, expresé que me encantaba	1
Sí, expresé que me gustaba	2
Sí, expresé que me daba risa	3
Sí, expresé que me daba entusiasmo	4
Sí, expresé que me daba sorpresa	5
Sí, expresé que ponía triste	6
Sí, expresé que me enfadaba	7
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Note: Aleatorizar el orden de las respuestas 1 a 7.

Saltar la proxima pregunta si el encuestado responde No, No sabe, No responde

¿Por qué reaccionó a la información en la publicidad de Facebook?

[Encuestador: lea opciones y elija todas las opciones mencionadas por el encuestado.]

Para corroborar el mal trabajo hecho por el gobierno municipal	1
Para corroborar el buen trabajo hecho por el gobierno municipal	2
Para compartirlo con otras personas	3
Para expresar dudas sobre la credibilidad de la información	4
Para denunciar que creía que era propaganda politica	5
Para pedir más información	6
Para responder comentarios de otras personas	7
Para felicitar el trabajo de la asociación civil que diseminó la información	8
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Note: Aleatorizar el orden de las respuestas 1 a 8.

¿Recuerda usted haber compartido la publicidad de Facebook con otra personas?

[Por favor, elija todas las opciones que apliquen.]

No	0
Sí, la compartí con otras personas a través de Facebook	1
Sí, la compartí con otras personas a través de otros medios como WhatsApp, SMS y	2
Sí, la compartí con otras personas platicándoles de la misma.	3
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Note: Si No, No sabe, o No responde, saltar las próximas 5 preguntas.

¿Cuáles son las principales razones por las que compartió la publicidad de Facebook con otra personas?

[Por favor, elija todas las opciones que apliquen.]

Porque la información es relevante	1
Para felicitar el trabajo de la asociación civil que diseminó la información	2
Para persuadir a otros que cambien su voto en la elección de Presidente Municipal	3
Para impresionar a otros con su interés en política	4
Para comenzar una plática de sobre política con otros	5
Para expresar dudas sobre la credibilidad de la información	6
Para denunciar que creía que era propaganda politica	7
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Note: Aleatorizar el orden de las respuestas 1 a 7.

¿Platicó usted sobre la información en la publicidad de Facebook con las personas con quien la comparti

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción]

No	0
Sí	1
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Nota: Saltar todas preguntas de esta sección si el encuestado responde No, No sabe, No responde

¿Qué tanto cree que estas pláticas lo llevaron a cambiar su decisión de voto?

¿Nada, poco, algo, o mucho?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Nada	1
Poco	2
Algo	3
Mucho	4
No sabe	88
No responde	99

¿Qué tanto cree que estas pláticas lo llevaron a a ponerse de acuerdo con otras personas para votar todos por el mismo candidato o partido político?

¿Nada, poco, algo, o mucho?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Nada	1
Poco	2
Algo	3
Mucho	4
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Nota: Si Nada, No sabe o No responde, saltar las próximas dos preguntas.

¿Cuál es el partido del candidato por el que se pusieron de acuerdo en votar?

[Encuestador: no lea opciones y elija solamente una opción en cada caso.]

PAN	1
PRI	2
PRD	3
Partido Verde (PVEM)	4
Partido del Trabajo (PT)	5
Partido Nueva Alianza (PANAL)	6
Movimiento Ciudadano	7
MORENA	8
Partido Encuentro Social	9
Otro	10
Ninguno	11
No sabe	88
No responde	99

¿Cuál es la principal razón que le llevó a votar por el candidato o partido político por el que se puso de acuerdo en votar con otras personas?

Para castigar al candidato o partido político que incurrió en irregularidades	1
Para que los candidatos y partido políticos vean que las irregularidades no van a ser	2
Porque platicar con otros me hizo ver que ese candidato o partido político era el me	3
Porque platicar con otros me hizo ver que ese candidato o partido político era el me	4
Otro	5
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Note: Aleatorizar el orden de las respuesta 1 a 4

CREDIBILIDAD LA PUBLICIDAD DE FACEBOOK

¿Quién cree usted que distribuyó la publicidad de Facebook? Una asociación civil no-partidista, El gobierno Federal, El gobierno Estatal, El gobierno Municipal, o Un partido político?

[Encuestador: lea opciones elija solamente una opción.]

Una asociación civil no-partidista	1
El gobierno Federal	2
El gobierno Estatal	3
El gobierno Municipal	4
Un partido político	5
Otro	6
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Note: Aleatorizar el orden de las respuestas 1 a 5.

¿Qué tan objetiva le pareció la información en la publicidad de Facebook?

Para nada objetiva, No muy objetiva, Algo objetiva, Muy objetiva?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Para nada objetiva	0
No muy objetiva	1
Algo objetiva	2
Muy objetiva	3
No sabe	88
No responde	99

¿Cuál de las siguientes opciones describe mejor su opinión sobre la información en la publicidad de Facebook?

[Encuestador: lea opciones y elija todas las opciones mencionadas por el encuestado.]

La información me pareció muy útil	1
La información sólo hablaba de irregularidades en uno de muchos de los programas	2
Mientras el gobierno haga proyectos, no me importan las irregularidades en el gasto	3
La información no me pareció creíble	4
Otras personas desacreditaron la información.	5
Las irregularidades en el gasto del gobierno municipal no me parecen importantes	6
Me pareció propaganda política	7
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Note: Aleatorizar el orden de las respuestas 1 a 7.

Ahora le vamos a hacer unas preguntas sobre irregularidades en el uso de los recursos municipales por parte de su Presidente municipal que gobernaba antes de la elecciones.

Algunos ejemplos de irregularidades son gastos no autorizados derivados de corrupción y desvío de recursos de las poblaciones beneficiarias.

En una escala de 0 a 10, siendo 0 "ninguno de los recursos" y 10 "la totalidad de los recursos," ¿cuál es la cantidad de recursos del municipio que usted cree estuvieron sujetos a irregularidades ?

Respuesta:	_____	(from 0 "ninguno de los recursos" a 10 "la totalidad de los recursos")
No sabe		88
No responde		99

Siendo más preciso, ¿cuál es el porcentaje, entre 0% y 100%, de recursos del municipio que usted cree estuvieron sujetos a irregularidades?

Respuesta:	_____	(de 0% a 100%)
No sabe		88
No responde		99

Nota: Si no hay respuesta diferente a No sabe o No responde en la pregunta anterior, saltar la próxima pregunta.

En una escala de 0 a 10 donde 0 es "completamente inseguro/a" y 10 "extremadamente seguro/a," ¿qué tan seguro está usted sobre estas percepciones?

Respuesta:	_____	(de 0 "completamente inseguro/a" a 10 "extremadamente seguro/a")
No sabe		88
No responde		99

Otros ciudadanos en su municipio pueden tener una opinión distinta sobre los recursos del municipio que estuvieron sujetos a irregularidades. ¿Cuál es el porcentaje, entre 0% y 100%, de recursos del municipio que usted cree que un ciudadano típico de su municipio cree estuvieron sujetos a irregularidades?

Respuesta:	_____	(de 0% a 100%)
No sabe		88
No responde		99

VOTACIÓN PASADA E IDEOLOGÍA

Incluso si no siente simpatía por un partido político en particular, ¿usted con qué partido político simpatiza más?

PAN	1
PRI	2
PRD	3
Partido Verde (PVEM)	4
Partido del Trabajo (PT)	5
Partido Nueva Alianza (PANAL)	6
Movimiento Ciudadano	7
MORENA	8
Partido Encuentro Social	9
Otro	10
Ninguno	11
No sabe	88
No responde	99

En una escala de 0 a 10, donde 0 significa que siente muy poca simpatía por el [PARTIDO CORRESPONDIENTE] y 10 significa que siente mucha simpatía por el [PARTIDO CORRESPONDIENTE] , ¿qué grado de apego siente por el [PARTIDO CORRESPONDIENTE]?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Respuesta:	_____
No sabe	88
No responde	99

El 1 de Julio hubo elecciones para Presidente Municipal y, como en cualquier elección, siempre hay personas que no tienen tiempo de ir a votar y otras a las que no les interesa.

¿Usted votó en las pasadas elecciones del 1º de julio para Presidente Municipal?

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Si	1
No	2
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Nota: Si No, No sabe, No responde, saltar la próxima pregunta.

¿Podría indicarme por qué partido votó en las últimas elecciones para Presidente Municipal?

Recuerde que es esta encuesta es confidencial y para usos académicos.

PAN	1
PRI	2
PRD	3
Partido Verde (PVEM)	4
Partido del Trabajo (PT)	5
Partido Nueva Alianza (PANAL)	6
Movimiento Ciudadano	7
MORENA	8
Partido Encuentro Social	9
Anuló/Tachó	10
Escribió algo	11
Dejo en blanco	12
Otro	13
No sabe	88
No responde	99

CARACTERÍSTICAS INDIVIDUALES

¿Cual es su género?

Masculino	1
Feminino	2
Otro	3
No sabe	88
No responde	99

¿Cual es su edad?

Respuesta:	_____
No sabe	88
No responde	99

¿Hasta qué grado de educación estudió?

Si es todavía estudiante, elija que el grado que tiene actualmente]

No tiene estudios	0
Primaria incompleta	1
Primaria completa	2
Secundaria/Técnica incompleta	3
Secundaria/Técnica completa	4
Preparatoria Equivalente incompleta	5
Preparatoria Equivalente completa	6
Universidad incompleta	7
Universidad completa o más	8
No sabe	88
No responde	99

CASILLA

Para concluir, me puede indicar el número de sección electoral en donde su credencial de elector indica que puede votar? (Ese número está en la parte inferior derecha de su credencial de elector)

Sus datos serán confidenciales y usados únicamente para fines académicos.

Respuesta	_____	(de 0 a 9999)
No sabe	88	
No responde	99	

NÚMERO DE WHATSAPP

Come le mencioné, puede que tengamos que contactarle como parte del estudio.

¿Cuál es su número de teléfono asociado a su Whatsapp?

Sus datos serán confidenciales y usados únicamente para fines académicos.

[Encuestador: elija solamente una opción.]

Answer	_____
No sabe	88
No responde	99

Nota: Agradecer por la participación y concluir entrevista.