# Pre-Analysis Plan

## 1: Intrahousehold Bargaining Power (IHBP) Game

Outcome variable – IHBP is measured as $WTP_{max}$ (Rs. 300) minus $WTP_i$, the difference between the spouse's potential payout and the participant's foregone Rs. 100 in the final round played, expressed as a percentage of $WTP_{max}$, bounded between 0 and 1.

### *Main specification – Tobit model (censored at 0 and 1)*

Model 1: Y = Dimasa (Di) + Khasi (Kh) + Female (F)

Model 2: Y = Di + Kh + F + Di×F + Kh×F

Model 3: Y = Di + Kh + F + Di×F + Kh×F + Controls (Xi)

### *Robustness checks*

- OLS specification: re-estimate Models 1–3 above by OLS in place of Tobit.
- Propensity score matching: restrict the sample to Karbi and Khasi respondents; match on age, education, occupation, and religion using nearest-neighbor matching with a caliper of 0.05; re-estimate Models 1–3 (Khasi vs. Karbi, Karbi as base category) on the matched sample.
- Parametric and non-parametric tests: two-sample t-test, Mann-Whitney rank-sum test, and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, comparing mean IHBP (i) within each society by gender and (ii) across societies within each gender.

### *Graphs*

- Mean IHBP by society and gender, with error bars.

## 2: Household Public Goods (HPG) Game – Game A Pooled

Game A1 and Game A2 observations will be pooled, with Game A2 (A2) entered as a covariate and, where relevant, the identity of the spouse who allocates/splits the common fund (Sa) will be included. All models below are Tobit regressions, with the dependent variable censored between 0 and 1.

### *2.1 Percentage contribution to the common fund by household*

Model 1: Y = Dimasa (Di) + Khasi (Kh) + Game A2 (A2)

Model 2: Y = Di + Kh + A2 + Controls (Xi)

Model 3: Y = Di + Kh + A2 + Di×A2 + Kh×A2 + Xi

### *2.2 Percentage contribution to the common fund by individual*

Model 1: Y = Di + Kh + F + A2 + Spouse who splits the common fund (Sa)

Model 2: Y = Di + Kh + F + A2 + Spouse who splits the common fund (Sa) + Di×F + Kh×F

Model 3: Y = Di + Kh + F + A2 + Sa + Di×F + Kh×F + Xi

Model 4: Y = Di + Kh + F + A2 + Sa + Di×A2 + Kh×A2 + Xi

Model 5: Y = Di + Kh + F + A2 + Sa + F×A2 + Xi

### *Selection of control variables*

- Control variables will be selected using the LASSO regression method plus any theoretically important control variable (identified from the literature).

Control variables (Xi), to be included will comprise demographic and behavioral variables.

### *2.3 Percentage amount allocated to spouse from the common fund (pamsppool)*

Model 1: Y = Di + Kh + F + A2

Model 2: Y = Di + Kh + F + A2 + Di×F + Kh×F

Model 3: Y = Di + Kh + F + A2 + Di×F + Kh×F + Xi

Model 4: Y = Di + Kh + F + A2 + Di×A2 + Kh×A2 + Xi

Model 5: Y = Di + Kh + F + A2 + F×A2 + Xi

### *2.4 Bivariate probit model – joint determination of contribution and allocation*

Outcome variables: (i) binary indicator for contributing more than 50% to the common fund; (ii) binary indicator for allocating more than 50% of the common fund to spouse.

Model 1: Di + Kh + F

Model 2: Di + Kh + F + Di×F + Kh×F

Model 3: Di + Kh + F + A2 + Di×F + Kh×F

Model 4: Di + Kh + F + A2 + Di×F + Kh×F + Xi

Model 5: Di + Kh + F + A2 + Di×A2 + Kh×A2 + F×A2 + Xi

Statistic of primary interest is rho, the estimated correlation between the error terms of the two equations.