**Movin’ on up? A Survey Experiment on Mobility Enhancing Policies**

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**Abstract**: We use a nationwide survey experiment in the United States to measure whether information on intergenerational economic mobility or policy-specific arguments influence support for six pro-mobility policies advocated by political entrepreneurs. We find the information treatments do not affect support, but the argument treatments significantly increase support for three of the policies. We also include a behavioral measure by allowing respondents the opportunity to write their U.S. Senators. We find argument treatments significantly increase the likelihood that letters address economic mobility and significantly promote advocacy for that policy in the letter, but no increase in advocacy from the information treatments.

**JEL:** C93, D63, D72, H23, J62, J68

**Keywords**: Intergenerational mobility, survey experiment, redistribution, persuasion

**Declarations of interest**: none

1. **Introduction**

The United States has experienced an increase in income inequality over the last four decades (Piketty et al. 2018). Despite models that predict higher support for income redistribution the higher the level of income inequality (Meltzler and Richards 1981), there is and has been relatively little support for income redistribution in the U.S., especially compared to other developed countries (Ashok et al. 2015; Niehues 2014). While part of the low support for redistribution may be due to misperceptions of the income distribution—Americans tend to underestimate income inequality (Gimpelson and Treisman 2018)—providing the correct information to them does not much affect preferences for redistribution (Kuziemko et al. 2015).[[3]](#footnote-4)

An alternative explanation for low support for redistributive policies is that Americans have either experienced or believe in the “prospect of upward mobility.” If today’s middle and upper class have experienced upward mobility in the past (Piketty 1995), or today’s poor expect to exceed the status of their birth (Benabou and Ok 2001), both experience and anticipation may lower support for redistribution today. There is evidence that intergenerational mobility leads to tolerance of inequality. Shariff et al. (2016) find in cross-country regressions that there is less concern regarding income inequality in countries that have higher father-son intergenerational income mobility. When they experimentally induce beliefs that intergenerational economic mobility is higher among U.S. residents, they also find that those treated find U.S. income inequality less objectionable. Day and Fiske (2017) find perceptions of mobility among subjects in the U.S. are positively correlated with support for the status quo political and economic system. Alesina et al. (2018) examine the relationship between people’s views of intergenerational mobility and their support for policies to enhance equality of opportunity or of outcome across several countries. They find lowering people’s perception of mobility increases support for the general category of “equality of opportunity policies” only among liberal respondents (converting those who already believe, as it were), and has no effect on views of equality of outcome policies (such as progressive taxation or safety net policies), though their treatment does increase subjects’ belief that unequal opportunity is a serious domestic problem.

Their treatment to cause reduced perceptions of mobility is, however, intentionally vague (so as to move perceptions in one direction), and also does not distinguish between relative mobility (where does one end up in the distribution compared to one’s parents) and absolute mobility (is one better off than one’s parents). This latter point is important, as one’s policy views may be more motivated by the ability to do better for oneself irrespective of one’s position (Gilbert 2016), or by positional concerns (Solnick and Hemenway 1998). It is possible that what matters for many voters is not the ability of the poor to move up the distribution of their peers, but to move up relative to their origin.

We examine how information on current levels of intergenerational mobility—both relative and absolute—for mobility-influencing policies affects the support for such policies. Using an online survey experiment, we measure how information about intergenerational mobility affects people’s preferences for redistribution and other activities. Specifically, we test whether the information on relative and on absolute income mobility increases support for redistributive and other mobility-enhancing policies.

In separate treatments, we also expose subjects to condensed arguments for one of these same policies framed in terms of their effect on social mobility. These condensed arguments draw on the key points made by policy proponents who link these policies to mobility in op-eds, briefs, or Congressional testimony. We do this for two reasons. First, as mentioned above, neither Kuziemko et al. (2015) nor Alesina et al. (2018) find evidence that information on inequality or mobility (or shifted perceptions of it) much affect support for any policies that may affect the poor. But Kuziemko et al. do find that their argument for the estate tax increases support for the estate tax. Moreover, Di Tella et al. (2012) find that arguments (even inaccurate ones) can overwhelm the effect of first-hand experience on changing people’s policy beliefs. We consider our argument treatments a natural extension of these findings. And second, going back to McCloskey (1983), there is the idea in economics that rhetoric—argument—matters. Thus, we examine the effect of expressly advocating for a policy as well as information alone.

Measuring the change in respondents’ support for the six mobility-linked policies after they are exposed to the treatments relative to a control on an unrelated topic (recycling), we find that several arguments significantly increase respondents’ support for mobility-enhancing policies. Specifically, arguments for additional cash assistance to the poor, for housing vouchers for low-income families to move to middle class neighborhoods, and for universal pre-kindergarten programs all increase support for those policies significantly more than that of the respondents in the control. Neither information treatment nor the other arguments statistically significantly change policy positions relative to the control, and only one argument (cash assistance) has a weakly significant “spillover” effect on any other policy (minimum wage).

In addition to examining changes in views, we also provide respondents an opportunity to demonstrate behavior related to those views. The last question of the survey is an open-ended prompt for respondents to write a letter to their U.S. Senators. Unlike the previous questions, which respondents must answer in order to receive payment for the survey, they may freely skip this question. Yet roughly one-third of subjects chose to write their senators, and while there are no differences in the proportion of letters written across treatments, there is considerable difference in the content of these letters.

All but one argument treatment (lowering immigration[[4]](#footnote-5)) resulted in a higher proportion of letters mentioning economic mobility, and all argument treatments caused a higher proportion of letters to comment on the specific policy in that argument. Respondents in all treatments are between 3.5 percent (increasing marriage tax credit) and 11.3 percent more (increasing the minimum wage) more likely to mention the policy they were exposed to compared to their counterparts in the control. Additionally, with the exception of two of these policies (the marriage tax credit and reducing immigration), more than three quarters of these mentions advocate forthe policy in question. The information treatments, in contrast, did not increase the likelihood of mentioning economic mobility at all, and were only statistically significantly related to the mention of one policy: subjects in the relative mobility treatment were *less* likely to discuss immigration policy than the control group. Arguments, in short, matter.

Our paper proceeds as follows: in section 2, we describe our experiment and hypotheses. In section 3, we discuss our data, and relate our pre-treatment policy views to the larger literature on support and opposition to redistribution. Section 4 presents the analysis of our experiment; section 5 discusses these results and concludes.

**2. The Survey Experiment.**

We conducted the survey in April 2019. All treatments had the following structure: 1) introduction and consent, 2) background demographic and socio-economic questions, including two questions on their charitable behavior and their view the roles of luck and effort in people’s success, 3) their *initial* views of six mobility-related policies, 4) one of nine randomly-assigned conditions, 5) their *posterior* viewsof the same policies, and 6) an opportunity to write a letter to their U.S. Senators. We provide a copy of the survey with all treatments in appendix B.

**2.1 Data collection**

We posted the survey on Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk) with a description stating that the survey would take roughly 10 minutes, and respondents would receive $1.50 for completing the survey (a $9.00 hourly wage, approximately). Respondents were free to drop out at any time or take up to 24 hours to work on all the questions. In fact, except for roughly 40 respondents who started the survey toward the end of our sampling period and saw we had reached our posted quota, all subjects who started the survey chose to finish it.[[5]](#footnote-6) The median (mean) response time was 6.01 (7.17) minutes.

Several steps were taken to ensure the validity of the results. First, we restricted our sample to those workers Amazon has verified as U.S. residents. We did not, however, choose to work with only “masters qualified” mTurk workers to avoid frequent (if otherwise reliable) survey experiment participants in favor of less experienced respondents.[[6]](#footnote-7) Second, we launched our survey during U.S. business hours to discourage ineligible international respondents. Third, respondents only receive payment contingent upon completing the survey and are required to provide a unique password that is only visible at completion. Finally, aside from the voluntarily answered question on whether to write a letter to their U.S. Senator, we required subjects to answer all questions, and pop-up windows reminded them to complete all questions in each section before continuing.[[7]](#footnote-8) As shown below, our survey is reasonably representative of the U.S. public, with some anticipatable differences given the nature of the mTurk platform.

**2.2 Treatments**

Our experimental design includes eight treatments (two “information” treatments and six “argument” treatments) and a control condition. In all of these, respondents begin by indicating whether they favor or oppose six policies that one or more political actors (elected official or advocacy groups) have linked to improving economic mobility. These six polices are: 1) raising the minimum wage, 2) increasing cash assistance to the poor, 3) providing housing vouchers to move poor people into middle class neighborhoods, 4) universal pre-kindergarten, 5) marriage tax credits to encourage two-parent families for children, and 6) reducing immigration (both legal and illegal). These are not necessarily policies developed by economists nor found to be effective to promote intergenerational economic mobility, but have been framed in terms of current or intergenerational mobility by one or more political entrepreneurs.[[8]](#footnote-9) Following these questions, respondents are randomly assigned into one of the nine conditions (see Table 1).

**2.2.1 Information Treatments**

The information treatments—*Relative* and *Absolute*—use a short interactive task to elicit respondents’ beliefs about either relative mobility or absolute mobility, respectively, though they do not elicit any information on the respondents themselves. The *Relative* task asks respondents to indicate what fraction of children born in the bottom 20 percent of the income distribution in the 1980s end up in each income quintile as an adult today, and also what fraction of children born in the top 20 percent end up in each income quintile today. The *Absolute* task, in contrast, asks respondents to estimate what fraction of children born in each income quintile in the 1980s earn more today than their parents earned when the children were born. Following the respondents’ guesses, we show them how their estimates compare to the actual data from Chetty et al. (2014) for relative mobility and Chetty et al. (2017) for absolute mobility, with the data presented both textually and graphically. We provide examples of part of the *Relative* treatment and its accompanying graph in the appendix (Figure A.1).

We have treatments on relative and absolute mobility because the two measures provide different viewpoints on intergenerational mobility today, and as such may indicate different levels of concern for improving mobility through redistributive policies. Examining the information for both treatments graphically (see Figure A.2. of the appendix), one can tell either a more or less hopeful narrative. The information on relative mobility indicates that few children from the bottom quintile make it to the middle class or better, and few children from the top quintile fail to stay in the top half of the distribution, indicating little mobility *by a relative standard.* But examining the same people from an absolute perspective allows for a different narrative: it shows that *there is upward mobility by absolute standard* for poor children*—*most children of the bottom quintile out-earn their parents, while most children of the top do not.

**2.2.2. Argument Treatments**

In addition to the two information treatments, we have six argument treatments. Each treatment is an explicit argument for one of the six policies styled similarly to how proponents of that policy tie it to economic mobility or poverty reduction in policy briefs, op-eds, or speeches, alongside a graphical presentation of evidence for the policy drawn from policy entrepreneurs’ arguments. Note that we are notclaiming these policies will have the effect of increasing social mobility or decreasing income inequality. Rather, there are proponents of these policies who have framed arguments for each policy in these terms, and we have adapted their arguments and evidence into six treatments. Each of these treatments is similar to the argument for the estate tax in Kuziemko et al. (2015), except that the accompanying visual is always a graph (rather than, e.g., a picture) and the accompanying argument is always framed in terms of increasing social mobility. All treatments are standardized for length (between 159 and 162 words, about the length of a typical abstract); we provide an example in Figure A3 in appendix.

**2.2.3. Treatment Design**

To ensure that it is the content of each treatment, and not the type of activity (interactive guessing or reading arguments) or the length of time that drives the result, we pair each information treatment (*Relative* and *Absolute*) with a placebo argument and each argument treatment with a placebo interactive information task. Following Nickerson’s (2008) use of recycling as a “placebo” (as opposed to an uncontacted control group), we also employ an argument for recycling as a placebo argument for the two information treatments. Similarly, we use an interactive information task about recycling as a placebo for the six argument treatments (specifically, subjects guess what fraction of various products, like lead batteries or newsprint, are recycled). We chose recycling as a relatively “neutral” issue, both on the basis of Nickerson (2008) and of its overwhelming popularity across partisan lines (Pew Research Center 2009), though other survey evidence shows a partisan divide on recycling consistent with differences in the parties toward environmental issues generally (Coffey and Joseph 2013). To ensure consistency in terms of the order of activities, each treatment begins with an interactive task and ends with an argument.[[9]](#footnote-10)

Our *Control* condition, therefore, is the pairing of both the placebo information task and the placebo argument. *Absolute* and *Relative* treatments each start with their respective information tasks; following these tasks, subjects in both treatments receive the placebo argument. Similarly, all argument treatments start with the placebo recycling information task, and then follow with one policy argument and its accompanying graphic. As a result, any comparison between *Absolute* (*Relative*) and *Control* identifies the effect of that information treatment alone on responders’ policy views, while a comparison between any *Argument* treatment and the *Control* identifies the effect of that policy argument on respondents’ policy views. Table 1 summarizes the contents of our treatments.

[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]

**2.3 Hypotheses**

We test whether information on intergeneration mobility affects support for each of the six aforementioned policies. Our naïve hypothesis is that the *Relative* treatment increases support for mobility-linked policies relative to the *Control*. As mentioned above, Cruces et al. (2013) and Karadja et al. (2017) find that sharing information on individuals’ position in the income distribution affects their support for redistribution in the abstract (i.e., not specific policies), though Alesina et al. (2018) do not. The *Absolute* treatment may also increase support for redistributive policies, as most children of the 1980s fail to out-earn their parents.

*Hypothesis 1: Information treatments increase support for mobility-linked policies relative to the Control.*

Despite our naïve hypothesis, there are several reasons why these two treatments may fail to move respondents’ views on redistribution. First, as noted above, the *Absolute* information shows the least well-off children being the most likely to rise above their parents. Despite the fairly obvious interpretation of regression to the mean (which we do not introduce to our subjects), learning this pattern of absolute mobility may temper, rather than bolster, respondents’ enthusiasm for redistribution.[[10]](#footnote-11) Second, Day and Fiske (2019) argue that beliefs about economic mobility (which our treatments aim to influence) affect abstract concerns regarding inequality more than they change support for specific policies. Third, unlike previous studies that correct respondents’ beliefs on their *own* position in the relative income distribution, we supply respondents only with a correction to their belief about the distribution itself. Inasmuch as the canonical models of redistributive preferences are correct, it is one’s own place in the distribution, and not the distribution itself, that matters for supporting redistribution.

Finally, this information should matter to respondents only if it makes them believe mobility is lower than they previously thought. Some recent research indicates that United States residents tend to *underestimate* the level of intergenerational economic mobility in the U.S.[[11]](#footnote-12) (Cheng and Wen 2019, Chambers et al. 2015). If that holds true in our sample, and respondents link their estimate of mobility to their support for mobility-enhancing policies, then updating respondents’ views of the level of economic mobility may lead to reductions in their support for mobility-enhancing policies. Furthermore, when respondents hold accurate beliefs on mobility, then this information will not affect their support for these policies.

*Hypothesis 2: Argument treatments increase support for the mentioned policy compared to the control.*

As one might expect from including only arguments *for* the policies, we expect that an argument for a policy raises support for that policy. The only treatment that consistently affected respondents’ views in Kuziemko et al. (2015) was their argument for the estate tax. Recent work by Alesina et al. (2019) suggests that salience and narratives shape people’s views more deeply than facts alone. They find that anecdotal evidence about a hard-working immigrant has a greater effect on people’s preferences for redistribution than does factual information about immigrants. Additionally, while views on public policy are often correlated across issues, there is no reason *ex ante* to expect an argument to support universal pre-kindergarten to influence one’s views on immigration. Thus, we do not expect “spillover” across policies.

That said, while we chose six policies whose proponents have linked to intergenerational economic mobility and standardized them as best we could, all arguments are not created equal. In particular, the National Academies of Sciences (2019) finds good evidence of the poverty-reducing effect of the minimum wage, housing vouchers, and cash assistance, though it makes no claims about the effect on mobility. There is evidence that cash assistance improves the next generation’s economic outcomes (Aizer et al. 2016) or outcomes that subsequently affect economic mobility (Akee et al. 2010; Cooper and Stewart 2013, 2017).[[12]](#footnote-13) Chetty et al. (2016) find strong evidence of the mobility-enhancing effect of housing vouchers. And results on universal pre-kindergarten indicate both the impact of such programs on early educational outcomes that can affect later learning (Cascio 2019) and the importance of pre-kindergarten for future earnings (see Bartik 2014, chapter 2, for a review).

In contrast, Zimmerman (2011) finds little evidence supporting a link between the minimum wage and economic mobility. Although Chetty et al. (2014) find evidence that U.S. neighborhoods with higher proportions of two-parent families exhibit higher intergenerational mobility, there is little direct evidence linking marriage to mobility, and the National Academy of Sciences’ (2019) review of the evidence finds little to support a link between promoting marriage and poverty reduction. And while Zimmerman (2008) finds that on balance, immigration to the U.S. reduces the wages of the lowest-skilled Americans, there is little to tie levels of immigration to economic mobility.[[13]](#footnote-14)

It is at least possible that respondents are either aware of the differential quality of evidence across arguments or are sufficiently discerning to pick up on the differential quality of the evidence we provide. In either case, this would mean that we only see an impact of our treatments on “well-supported” policies (namely, housing vouchers, universal pre-kindergarten, and to a lesser extent, cash assistance and the minimum wage), and not on our “less-supported” policies (tax credits to support two-parent families and reducing immigration).

**3. Data**

We collected 2,442 responses. As noted above, 43 respondents chose not to complete the survey, and only four of these chose to leave the survey after being assigned to a treatment. Thus, we restrict our analysis to the remaining 2,399 observations. Table 2 presents the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of our sample, both overall and by treatment. In this section, we examine our data for the purposes of both internal and external validity. We first compare our sample to the U.S. adult population where possible, and then discuss our checks for balanced covariates across treatments. Finally, we examine the relationship between our subjects’ support for each policy as a function of covariates and compare these with findings in the literature.

**3.1. Sample characteristics compared to the U.S. population**

The first column of Table 2 presents data on the U.S. adult population from a combination of the 2018 wave of the American Community Survey and also from a wave of the Gallup Poll conducted the same week as our survey.

Our survey sample is similar to the U.S. adult population, with some anticipatable departures consistent with previous research (see Berinsky et al. 2012, Boas et al. 2018, and Heen et al. 2014). The sample has more males and is considerably younger than the U.S. adult population (though our average age is near the overall U.S. median age of 38.2). Our respondents also have a lower income than the national average household income.[[14]](#footnote-15) The sample is about as likely to be married as the national average, though consistent with their youth, they are much more (less) likely to have never married (be widowed or divorced) than the overall population.

Also consistent with previous samples from mTurk, our sample is whiter than American adults today (with fewer Hispanics and African Americans in particular), and considerably more educated. Less than ten percent of our sample has less than a high school education, while over a third of American adults have not completed high school. Also consistent with the age of our sample, our respondents are much more likely to be employed and much less likely to be retired or out of the labor force. Finally, while we have roughly the correct proportion of Democrats, we have relatively too few Republicans compared to the distribution nationally. Thus, our data on average levels of support for these policies are likely biased toward support, though our focus is on the *change* in respondents’ views and not the level of support.

[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]

**3.2. Covariates on predicting the treatment status**

As the rightmost nine columns of Table 2 demonstrate, there are some differences in covariates across treatments. We check the balance of our treatments in two ways. First, we estimate eight separate regressions of how the covariates listed in Table 2 predict assignment to each information or argument treatment relative to the *Control*. That is, we estimate , where if the respondent is assigned to the *Control* and if the respondent is assigned to the particular treatment*.*

Table A.1 (see appendix A) shows the results of these regressions. Covariates are generally balanced between each treatment and the control, save for the proportion of divorced subjects (which is higher in the control than in mostly any other treatment). Most importantly, none of the variables on respondents’ views (political party, charitable giving, and the role of effort and luck in success) are related to assignment to treatment. We also run a multinomial logit of assignment to treatment as a function of covariates (see appendix A, Table A.2), and find similar results—aside from divorced subjects, treatments appear to be well-balanced on observable characteristics. That said, we present our results in section 4 below both with and without covariates.

**3.3. Pre-treatment support for redistributive policies**

Table 3 shows respondents’ average policy views in each treatment prior toexposure to the treatment. Each row represents a treatment, and each column a particular policy; Panel A of Table 3 reports the average of the five-point Likert scale, and Panel B reports the average of a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent “strongly favors” or “favors” the policy, and zero for the remaining three categories (“neutral”, “oppose”, and “strongly oppose”). In Panel B, we see that respondents favor all policies on average, save for reducing immigration, with sizeable majorities favoring increasing the minimum wage, more cash assistance for poor households, and universal pre-kindergarten in particular. These numbers are likely higher than they would be if we had fewer independent and more Republican respondents, but not excessively so (e.g., an NPR/PBS Newshour poll from July 2019 finds that 56 percent of Americans favored increasing the national minimum wage to $15 an hour, and minimum wage referenda in both Missouri and Arkansas—Republican-leaning states—passed with more than 60 percent of the vote in 2018).

[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]

We regress respondents’ policy views for each policy as a function of respondents’ covariates from Table 2, where views are the five-point scale from 1 (strongly oppose) to 5 (strongly favor). We present the results in Appendix Table A.3.[[15]](#footnote-16) Our results are largely consistent with finds from others who examine correlates of preferences favoring redistribution using nationally representative U.S. samples (Alesina and Giuliano 2011, Alesina and La Ferrara 2005) or examining populations elsewhere (e.g., Ravallion and Lokshin 2000).

Similar to Alesina and Giuliano (2011), men are statistically significantly less supportive of half of these policies (the minimum wage, universal pre-kindergarten, and, weakly significantly so, housing vouchers). As Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) find in Russian data on concern for limiting inequality, higher income respondents hold less favorable views of nearly all these policies. And as both Alesina and Giuliano (2011) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) show, whether a person views success as driven by effort or luck has a strong influence on redistributive preferences. We ask subjects on a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 being fully luck and 10 being fully effort, which factor contributes more to a person’s success. Greater belief in effort as determining success is associated with less support for four policies (the minimum wage, cash assistance for the poor, housing vouchers, and universal pre-kindergarten). In contrast, belief in effort determining success is positively correlated with support for tax credits to encourage marriage and restricting immigration. Note that this is not just partisanship, as we control for political party. Finally, like Alesina and Giuliano, we find African Americans in our sample are more supportive of nearly all these redistributive policies than whites.[[16]](#footnote-17) That said, not all our results are in line with previous findings. Contra Alesina and Giuliano, we do not find a relationship between unemployment and redistributive preferences, nor do we find a relationship between education and support for redistribution (though the more educated are less supportive of restricting immigration, even with controls for partisanship).

We also wish to highlight the roles of political partisanship and self-reported charitable behavior. Consistent with current party positions in the U.S., Democrats (Republicans) are more (less) supportive of the minimum wage, cash assistance, housing vouchers, and universal pre-kindergarten, and less (more) supportive of marriage-promoting tax credits and restricting immigration. Those who report being more charitable are also more supportive of all policies save reducing immigration, which they are statistically significantly less supportive of.

In short, it appears that our subjects’ demographics, their views, and the relationship between these are reasonably if imperfectly representative of the U.S. adult population, and that we successfully randomized respondents across treatments. Our experimental data is thus not without external and internal validity. We turn now to our results.

**4. Results**

We first examine the effect of our treatments on respondents’ policy preferences, and then analyze their choice to write a letter to their U.S. Senators.

**4.1 Policy Preferences**

Table 4 presents the differences in respondents’ policy views before and after the treatment, by treatment (rows) and policies (columns). Recall that policy views are a 5-point scale from strongly oppose (1) to strongly favor (5), so positive numbers indicate an increase in support, while negativenumbers indicate an increase in support for a policy. We measure statistical significance here as a pairwise t-test between the pre- and post-view on each policy.

To correct the family-wise error rate for multiple comparisons, we apply Sankoh et al.’s (1997) correction to all p-values in this and subsequent tables, unless otherwise noted.[[17]](#footnote-18) When outcomes are perfectly uncorrelated, this adjustment is equivalent to the Bonferroni adjustment. This is a somewhat more restrictive correction than other multiple comparison corrections, though it only takes into account the number of outcomes and not the number of treatments.

We see limited effects from both information treatments. Aside from the relative treatment leading respondents to become less supportive of reducing immigration by roughly a fifth of a point on the scale (roughly one-sixth of a standard deviation, p < 0.01), there are no statistically significant changes in respondents’ views from either the absolute or relative mobility information treatments.

Two arguments have statistically significant effects (i.e., p < 0.05) in the expected direction. Arguments for increasing cash assistance to poor families and for housing vouchers lead to statistically significant increases in support post-treatment relative to respondents’ pre-treatment views; these correspond to roughly a tenth and a sixth of a standard deviation change in policy views relative to pre-treatment views (from Table 3), respectively. The argument for universal pre-kindergarten also makes respondents more supportive by about a tenth of a standard deviation, though this effect is weakly significant (p = 0.066).

The remaining arguments either fail to influence views on that topic, or, contrary to our expectations regarding policy “spillover”, lead respondents to become less supportive of *other* policies. Specifically, arguments for the minimum wage and for universal pre-kindergarten cause respondents’ support for reducing immigration to fall, while the argument to reduce immigration leads subjects in that treatment to become less supportive of housing vouchers.

[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]

While we do not observe statistically significant changes in views for any policy among members of the control group, their views do not literally remain unchanged. It is for precisely this reason—that respondents’ views may change following brief consideration of a topic—that we included an information-based control condition in our design. For our subsequent analysis, we estimate the following regression:

where *PolicyChange* is the difference in support at the individual level as measured in Table 4, is a set of binary variables for the two information and six argument treatments, and contains the covariates described in Table 2 as well as state-of-residence fixed effects. Unlike the “raw” results above, then, our regressions capture the movement in respondents’ views due to the treatment compared tothe movement in views of respondents in the control (who, as explained above, perform an estimating task and read an argument regarding recycling).

Table 5 presents the effects of our treatments on each policy. The top panel excludes the covariates, while the bottom panel includes them. The results between the two panels are essentially unchanged by the inclusion of covariates. Information on both absolute and relative mobility fails to move respondents’ views relative to the control on any policy. Consistent with the raw results in Table 4, arguments for cash assistance, housing vouchers, and universal pre-kindergarten all cause respondents to become more supportive of those policies. The argument for housing vouchers moves respondents by roughly a quarter of a standard deviation of pre-treatment views on the policy.[[18]](#footnote-19) Only one treatment has any statistically significant effect on support for another policy: the argument for cash assistance weakly significantly increases support for the minimum wage. All other arguments did not lead to statistically significant revisions in positions for our respondents relative to those in the control condition. We turn now to an analysis of respondents’ messages to their U.S. Senators.

[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]

**4.2. Letters to Respondents’ Senators**

At the end of our survey, for all treatments, we asked respondents whether they would like to write a letter to their U.S. Senators. We made it clear that this was entirely optional. Roughly 62 percent of respondents chose to write nothing and end the survey. 921 respondents, however, chose to write something. We describe how we analyze these messages below.

**4.2.1. Letter Content Coding**

We first created a simple binary variable for whether the respondents wrote anything at all, however short or devoid of content (*any letter*). Of the 921 respondents who wrote something, 283 of them wrote messages that were self-evidently not to their U.S. Senators. Some of these were a simple response to the prompt (e.g., “no thank you”) or to us as researchers (e.g., “i like the survey”), or were fundamentally without content (e.g., “Rjiddoseoidjdjdjid”) but were clearly not directed to their elected representatives. Without knowing what treatment these came from, we created an additional binary variable equal to one if the respondent wrote a “substantial” message (i.e., *real message*) and zero otherwise, and then we separated the 283 empty messages (about 27 percent of respondents) from the remaining 638 messages.[[19]](#footnote-20)

Following our initial sorting of the messages, we hired two research assistants to code the content of the remaining 638 messages. These research assistants did not meet with one another, and only knew the prompt for the letter, not the content of the survey nor our hypotheses. The research assistants coded each of the 638 messages on whether the message:

1. Referenced intergeneration economic mobility, income inequality, or poverty?
2. Advocated for any specific policy at all?
3. Advocated against any specific policy at all?

Under the first question (*any mobility*), the research assistants coded the message as either referencing or not referencing mobility, inequality, or poverty. For each of the next two questions, the assistants were provided a list of nine choices. These choices allowed the research assistants to indicate that the respondent did not advocate for (or against) any policy, or that the respondent advocated for (or against) any combination of the six policies, for (or against) “environment-related policies such as recycling”, and an “other” category. In the “other” category, we asked our assistants to describe the policy the respondent discussed in a few words.[[20]](#footnote-21) We instructed them to choose codes for all policies that apply for each message.

We present the percentage agreement between coders as well as two measures of inter-rater agreement —Cohen’s (1960) Kappa and Gwet’s (2008) AC1 as implemented in Stata by Klein (2018) — in appendix Table A.5. While there is some disagreement between sources on the relevant cutoff for acceptable agreement measured by either statistic, most authors view values greater than 0.60 as a reasonable level of agreement (see Wongpakaran et al. 2013, Table A.5). All of our topics—from the catch-all “any mention of economic mobility” to the specific mentions for or against each policy—display very high levels of agreement, and reasonable levels of inter-rater agreement according to the AC1.[[21]](#footnote-22) Based on these high levels of inter-rater agreement, we use the average code of our raters for each variable we define below.[[22]](#footnote-23)

**4.2.2. Analysis of Coded Letter Content**

We regress the binary variables for any writing, writing directed to respondents’ Senators, and writing on mobility, inequality, or poverty in Table 6. The regressions take the same form as those in Table 5, save for the change to the dependent variable. As the first two columns demonstrate, the decision to write anything at all or any “real” message does not differ between the treatments and the control. The third column, however, shows that respondents in most of the argument treatments are much more likely to write on mobility, inequality, or poverty than those in the control. Respondents receiving the marriage tax credit and universal pre-kindergarten arguments are about 7 percentage points (6.6 and 6.9, respectively) more likely to write a mobility-related message than control respondents. Respondents in the minimum wage treatment are about 11 percentage points more likely to write a mobility-related message, and those that read the cash assistance and housing voucher arguments are 14 percentage points (13.8 and 14, respectively) more likely than control to send mobility-related messages.

[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE]

Tables 7 and 8 present regressions on whether the messages include the specific redistributive policies we discuss in the argument treatments and whether the message is in support of the specific policy, respectively.[[23]](#footnote-24)

As shown in the first two rows of Table 7, other than the effect of the relative mobility treatment—it reduces mentions of restricting immigration (relative to the control) by 3.8 percentage points—the information treatments did not influence the content of respondents’ messages. In contrast, respondents in each argument treatment were much more likely to mention the policy advocated by that argument. The effect of the argument on mentioning that policy ranges from 3.5 percentage points more likely than the control (marriage tax credits) to 11.3 percentage points more likely (raising the minimum wage). Additionally, there are a handful of “spillover” effects of one argument on mentions for other arguments: respondents in the cash assistance treatment are also more likely to mention housing vouchers in their messages, while respondents receiving arguments for the minimum wage and for universal pre-kindergarten are less likely than the control to discuss reducing immigration (though the latter effect is weakly statistically significant).

[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE]

Given our framework for coding messages, mentions of a policy are the sum of messages supporting and messages opposing each policy. In Table 8, we see that most of the effect of the experimental treatments on respondents’ writing a message about a policy comes from messages in support of that policy. Aside from the effect of the minimum wage on reducing immigration (respondents receiving the minimum wage argument are 3.7 percentage points *less* likely to favor immigration in their messages than respondents in the control), messages on a policy tend to be in favor of that policy. Almost the entire increase in messages on the minimum wage in the minimum wage treatment (10.6 out of 11.3 percentage points) are respondents in favor of the minimum wage. A supermajority of the increase in messages on cash assistance (7.1 of 9.1 percentage points), housing vouchers (6 of 7.8 percentage points), and universal pre-kindergarten (6.4 of 6.9 percentage points) relative to the control group are also supportive of these programs. Three messages also generated substantial messages in opposition (as a percentage of total messages): the marriage tax credit, reducing immigration, and housing vouchers, though this last difference is weakly significant at best (see Table A.6.).

[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE]

Thus, our argument treatments influenced both respondents’ policy views and the *content* of behavior, if not the quantity of it. Arguments moved respondents toward supporting positions already held by a supermajority of our sample. The arguments also generated significantly more messages related to mobility, but not more total messages. Arguments on each policy led to more messages on these policies, and the bulk of these messages were supportive (though half also generated some opposition). In contrast, our information treatments did not influence respondents’ views or their behavior much at all. We examine the robustness of these results, before finally considering possible explanations for the difference in efficacy of our treatments.

**4.3 Robustness Checks**

Here we consider two potential issues with our results above: response quality and heterogeneous effects by political party. With the former, our results may be due to lower quality respondents from mTurk. With the latter, our results may be driven by effects within just one party (i.e., among Democrats), such that we are “preaching to the choir” in the words of Alesina et al. (2018). We examine each of these in turn.

**4.3.1 Restricting the sample to “better” responses**

While we argue in section 3.1 above that our sample is (with some caveats) reasonably representative of the U.S. adult population and in section 3.3 that the relationship between respondents’ characteristics and their views on the redistributive policies are consistent with prior research, readers may remain concerned that our results suffer due to issues of response quality. One concern is that, while the typical respondent took roughly six minutes to complete our survey, many subjects took less than two minutes—an apparently unreasonably short time to read through the survey. Another is that, though we used the mTurk sample of U.S. residents, respondents outside the U.S. may nevertheless have found a way to participate.

To address both these concerns, we re-estimate our results from Tables 5 through 8 under two restrictions: first, we include only those respondents in the top 75 percent of response times (see Tables A.7. through A.10 in the appendix). This corresponds to taking at least four minutes and 13 seconds (about 4.25 minutes) on the survey. Second, our survey platform (Qualtrics) captures the latitude and longitude of nearly all respondents. We geo-code our respondents and treat those with missing coordinates as outside the United States (as these are likely masking their true location), and restrict the sample to those in the top 75 percent of response times whose coordinates are also within the United States. The first restriction reduces the sample to 1,810 respondents, while the first and second together reduce it further to 1,746 respondents.

What the restrictions do not do, however, is dramatically affect our results. While the weakly statistically significant effect of the cash assistance argument on support for the minimum wage vanishes, the effects of the cash assistance argument and the housing voucher argument on support for their respective policies remain. The effect of the universal pre-kindergarten argument is robust to the restriction on response duration, but not to the additional restriction to U.S.-geocoded responses (Table A.7). Both restrictions have even less of an impact on the results of the content analysis of the letters. The effects we previously identified remain under both restrictions, and are if anything strengthened (as respondents who took longer and whose coordinates fall within the United States were more likely to write messages, and to write them with “real” content) (Tables A.8 through A.10). In short, poor data quality does not appear to be driving our results.

**4.3.2. Analysis by party for views**

Alesina et al. (2018) find that their experiment increased polarization between political parties, as Democrats became more supportive of redistribution while Republicans remained unmoved. Because our sample contains disproportionately more Democrats than the U.S. overall, the reader may be concerned that a similar partisan phenomenon drives our results. It does not appear to do so for respondents’ changes in views, though the results on their behavior are more divided along partisan lines.

We re-estimated our results presented in Tables 5, 7 and 8 for Democrats, independents, and Republicans separately; we include these tables in appendix A in Tables A.12 through A.14, respectively.[[24]](#footnote-25) For the results in Table 5, it is independents, not Democrats, that demonstrate the largest, statistically significant persuasive effects (though note we have not corrected these for multiple comparisons). Furthermore, Republicans are more persuaded by the argument for housing vouchers and universal pre-kindergarten than are Democrats. The policy arguments worked not by preaching to the choir, but by converting non-believers.

This cross-partisan effect on subjects’ views was not, however, reflected in the content of their letters. Across our argument treatments, both Democrats and Republicans exposed to particular arguments were much more likely to mention the promoted policy in a message to their Senators, while independents generally were not (relative to the control group in each case). The increase in messages from Democrats on each policy, however, were nearly unanimously in support of increasing the minimum wage, cash assistance for the poor, housing vouchers, and universal pre-kindergarten, but against tax credits to promote marriage and immigration restrictions. In contrast, though most Republican messages on the minimum wage and on universal pre-kindergarten favored those policies, and they were more likely to write in opposition than in favor of tax credits to promote marriage, Republicans’ messages on cash assistance and on housing vouchers were strongly against both. Thus, while our treatments do affect the views of respondents across the political spectrum, they primarily motivate those already in possession of strong viewpoints on these policies to express their pre-existing views.

**5. Discussion & Conclusion**

We present the results of a survey experiment on Americans’ support for redistributive policies. Supplying our respondents with information on either absolute or relative intergenerational economic mobility did not noticeably affect their policy views, their willingness to write to their elected officials, or the content of what they wrote to said officials. Arguments on specific redistributive policies, however, result in statistically significant increases in support for several policies. In particular, the arguments for increased cash assistance to poor families, housing vouchers for poor families to move to middle class neighborhoods, and universal pre-kindergarten all significantly increase support for those policies. And while all arguments lead to a greater proportion of messages to respondents’ Senators on those topics, the arguments for raising the minimum wage, cash assistance, housing vouchers, and universal pre-kindergarten result in significantly more messages favoring their respective policies.

Furthermore, when we examine the results by party, our results are not driven by strengthening existing partisan differences, but by persuading respondents across the partisan spectrum. Indeed, many of the persuasive effects are largest among Republicans and independents, not Democrats, who are generally ideologically predisposed to redistribution. While the treatment effects on the content of these messages predominantly primes pre-committed partisans to express their views (rather than those with newfound beliefs to express them), the argument treatments nevertheless move the opinions of the previously unconvinced.

But what are we to make of the unresponsiveness of respondents’ views to the mobility information treatments? Past research often finds that individuals’ vote choice is driven by voters’ evaluation not of their own economic position but of the overall economy (Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000), and thus it is somewhat surprising that providing respondents with accurate mobility information has so little impact. We consider several possibilities here.

The first and simplest possibility is that the subjects did not attend to the information provided. While we did not perform a manipulation check, experiments that do so tend either to use treatments without direct quantitative information (Alesina et al. 2018) or check differences in views of mobility using a Likert-scaled opinion measure (Day and Fiske 2017). In contrast, we elicit subjects’ subjective numerical beliefs, and then immediately provide the accurate information with a direct comparison to those beliefs, making the information obvious and salient. Respondents could choose not to believe—but not to avoid—the provided information.[[25]](#footnote-26)

A second possibility is that our respondents did not react much to the information treatment because the information was not that new to them. That is, their *ex ante* beliefs were reasonably accurate. We have examined our respondents’ accuracy regarding relative and absolute mobility. We find that the respondents in the *Relative* condition slightly underestimate both upward and downward mobility, but are overall quite accurate at the task we pose for them. Our respondents in the *Absolute* treatment under- (over-) estimated the proportion of the poorest (richest) children who out-earn their parents, but were much more accurate on the absolute mobility of middle-quintile children. That said, this explanation would imply that those respondents with the largest absolute errors in estimating mobility (be it absolute or relative) have the most room to revise their policy beliefs as well. We have regressed the absolute change in policy beliefs on the absolute errors in both *Relative* and *Absolute* mobility, respectively, and found no economically or statistically significant relationship between the two. Even those for whom the information treatments provide a large correction do not exhibit a larger effect. This insignificant result on information echoes Day and Fiske’s (2019) claim that social mobility beliefs are unlikely toaffect people’s attitudes toward concrete policies, let alone their behavior.

A third possibility is that, according to theory, it is *not* the overall level of mobility, but respondents’ own experience or expectation of economic mobility that should inform their views on redistribution. While Kuziemko et al. (2015) do not find large effects from correcting individual misperceptions of income inequality, Karadja et al. (2017) and Cruces et al. (2013) find that some respondents change their positions on redistribution when experimental treatments correct their original misperceptions. The former finds among Swedish subjects that those who *underestimated* their relative position reduced their support for redistribution (particularly if they were predisposed toward right-leaning political parties), but no effect on those who overestimated their position. The latter finds among Argentinians that those who *overestimated* their position increase their support for redistribution, but effect on those who underestimated their rank in the income distribution. Thus, even the information most directly tied to canonical models of political support for redistribution does not always influence voters as anticipated.

A final possibility, however, is that the information treatments did not affect respondents’ views because those views were not based on information to begin with. Traditional models of voting usually treat people as having some knowledge of how policies map to (self-interested or sociotropic) outcomes, having some idea of how states of the world interact with policies, and then choosing the candidate or policy that maximizes those outcomes. Increasingly, however, there is evidence that people first choose a political affiliation, adopt policy views based upon this partisan identity, and finally seek information supportive of those views (Achen and Bartels 2017). Lenz (2013) documents across several instances in the United States and other western countries that, far from voters first evaluating policy positions and then choosing candidates, voters first choose candidates (often based on partisan identity), and then change their policy positions to match. Gerber et al. (2010) experimentally induce voters that have not declared a political party to do so. While they do not find that experimentally-induced partisan identity affected policy views, it does affect candidate vote choice and retrospective evaluation of recent partisan figures. Barber and Pope (2018) exploit the ideological misalignment of U.S. President Trump with traditional Republican positions in a survey experiment, and find that partisan identification, rather than an internally consistent ideological position, is what drives support on individual issues, especially for low information voters. Even more recently, Akerlof (2020) argues that economists’ failure to listen to the “stories [people tell] themselves at the time they make their decisions” (pp. 413) has led us to insufficiently appreciate the role of narratives—of arguments—in determining human behavior.

By this explanation, voters often pick a side, absorb the worldview contained in that side’s narrative, and then figure out what issues to support based on this story. If processing information through an internally consistent worldview is not what leads voters to their positions in the first place, it is little wonder that providing them with new information does not lead them to revise those positions. That errors in estimating mobility are not associated with the magnitude of policy position changes is consistent with this explanation. Indeed, we also find no statistically significant relationships between respondents’ pre-existing policy views and their estimates of relative or absolute mobility.[[26]](#footnote-27)

Note, however, that this rationale is distinct from Jonathan Swift’s maxim that “reasoning will never make a man correct an ill opinion, which by reasoning he never acquired.” Ultimately, what persuades respondents in our experiment is rhetoric—arguments, not just information. If one wants to influence people's views on a policy, perhaps one needs to lay out a rationale for it—an alternative story, if you will—not give individual facts and expect recipients to update their views using a model of the world that they may not possess.[[27]](#footnote-28) This is consistent with Kuziemko et al.’s (2015) findings on the estate tax, and McCloskey’s (1983) approach to economic methodology. Political elites may be able to influence voters’ positions simply by declaring their own stance (Broockman and Butler 2017; Barber and Pope 2018), but non-elites (i.e., most of us) likely have to rely on piecing together a compelling narrative in support of their desired outcome.

Finally, while subsequent research could improve upon this aspect of our experiment, we note that the policies whose arguments respondents found most persuasive were those tied to better evidence. In a world where there is considerable concern over the spread of “fake news”, it would be good to know the degree to which voters lacking issue expertise can nevertheless discern between high- and low-quality evidence in policy arguments.

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|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Table 1. Treatment conditions** | | |
|  | **Information** | **Arguments** |
| *Control* | Recycling information | Recycling argument |
|  |  |  |
| *Absolute* | Absolute earnings movement across generations | Recycling argument |
| *Relative* | Relative earnings movement across generations | Recycling argument |
|  |  | |
| *Minimum*  *Wage* | Recycling information | Raise the minimum wage |
| *Cash*  *Assistance* | Recycling information | Increase cash assistance to the poor |
| *Housing*  *Voucher* | Recycling information | Provide housing vouchers to the poor to move to middle class neighborhoods |
| *Universal*  *Pre-K* | Recycling information | Provide nationwide universal pre-kindergarten |
| *Marriage*  *Tax Credit* | Recycling information | Provide tax-credits to married two-parent families |
| *Less*  *Immigration* | Recycling information | Reduce legal and illegal immigration |

**Table 2. Experiment sample characteristics by treatment and compared to U.S. population averages**

| Variable | U.S. Adult Population | Total | Control | Absolute | Relative | Minimum  Wage | Cash  Assistance | Housing  Voucher | Universal  Pre-K | Marriage  Tax Credit | Less  Immigration |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Observations |  | 2399 | 267 | 266 | 263 | 267 | 268 | 266 | 268 | 269 | 265 |
| Male | .487 | .531 | .517 | .571 | .532 | .532 | .552 | .519 | .53 | .494 | .536 |
| Age (years) | 47 | 36.468 | 35.783 | 37.038 | 36.019 | 36.723 | 36.347 | 37.105 | 35.56 | 37.197 | 36.438 |
| Family income (,000) | 87.864 | 66.123 | 65.798 | 67.35 | 66.008 | 62.801 | 66.948 | 67.406 | 64.463 | 68.885 | 65.438 |
| Marital Status |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Married | .482 | .476 | .491 | .436 | .513 | .363 | .526 | .515 | .44 | .472 | .532 |
| Widowed | .058 | .015 | .019 | .011 | .004 | .011 | .019 | .015 | .022 | .015 | .015 |
| Divorced | .109 | .068 | .097 | .068 | .068 | .082 | .06 | .064 | .052 | .059 | .064 |
| Separated | .020 | .022 | .007 | .03 | .011 | .022 | .03 | .03 | .022 | .03 | .011 |
| Never married | .331 | .419 | .386 | .455 | .403 | .521 | .366 | .376 | .463 | .424 | .377 |
| Parental Status |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Kids – in home | N/A | .399 | .401 | .432 | .426 | .333 | .429 | .421 | .366 | .383 | .404 |
| Kids – not in home | N/A | .022 | .015 | .011 | .027 | .022 | .019 | .026 | .022 | .041 | .015 |
| No children | N/A | .579 | .584 | .556 | .548 | .644 | .552 | .553 | .612 | .576 | .581 |
| Race & Ethnicity |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| White | .722 | .777 | .805 | .744 | .779 | .742 | .757 | .797 | .799 | .792 | .777 |
| Black | .127 | .098 | .094 | .124 | .095 | .094 | .101 | .098 | .082 | .1 | .098 |
| Native/Pacific Islander | .011 | .01 | .007 | .011 | .011 | .019 | .007 | .011 | .011 | .007 | .004 |
| Asian | .056 | .063 | .049 | .053 | .072 | .082 | .078 | .053 | .063 | .052 | .064 |
| Multiple/other | .084 | .052 | .045 | .068 | .042 | .064 | .056 | .041 | .045 | .048 | .057 |
| Hispanic | .183 | .156 | .187 | .199 | .137 | .127 | .172 | .15 | .149 | .141 | .14 |
| Education |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Less than high school | .117 | .005 | .011 | 0 | .008 | .004 | .007 | 0 | .007 | .004 | .008 |
| High school | .269 | .093 | .09 | .09 | .106 | .094 | .06 | .124 | .093 | .108 | .068 |
| Some college, no degree | .203 | .211 | .165 | .218 | .19 | .243 | .235 | .199 | .231 | .197 | .219 |
| Associate’s degree | .086 | .114 | .109 | .113 | .103 | .12 | .104 | .124 | .119 | .145 | .087 |
| College graduate | .200 | .447 | .464 | .481 | .452 | .442 | .451 | .455 | .422 | .372 | .487 |
| Postgraduate degree | .126 | .13 | .161 | .098 | .141 | .097 | .142 | .098 | .127 | .175 | .132 |

**Table 2. (Continued)**

| Variable | U.S. Adult Population | Total | Control | Absolute | Relative | Minimum  Wage | Cash  Assistance | Housing  Voucher | Universal  Pre-K | Marriage  Tax Credit | Less  Immigration |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Employment |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Full time | .506 | .717 | .715 | .68 | .719 | .727 | .75 | .722 | .728 | .684 | .728 |
| Part time | .099 | .148 | .124 | .192 | .156 | .154 | .138 | .162 | .153 | .149 | .106 |
| Unemployed | .023 | .047 | .06 | .023 | .053 | .045 | .034 | .049 | .049 | .056 | .053 |
| Not in labor force | .208 | .057 | .067 | .06 | .046 | .064 | .045 | .041 | .049 | .078 | .064 |
| Retired | .164 | .031 | .034 | .045 | .027 | .011 | .034 | .026 | .022 | .033 | .049 |
| Political views |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Republican | .43 | .275 | .273 | .305 | .266 | .292 | .269 | .293 | .257 | .264 | .253 |
| Democrat | .45 | .433 | .438 | .395 | .464 | .431 | .448 | .414 | .418 | .428 | .46 |
| Contribute to charity | N/A | 5.842 | 5.67 | 5.808 | 5.776 | 6.075 | 5.619 | 6 | 5.806 | 5.84 | 5.981 |
| Role of luck/effort | N/A | 6.198 | 6.165 | 6.308 | 6.202 | 6.12 | 6.243 | 6.406 | 6.09 | 6.138 | 6.113 |

Sources for U.S. adult population data: Percentage male over age 18, age, (median) family income, marital status, race & ethnicity, and educational attainment (for population 25 years and over), from American Community Survey 2018 1-year estimates. Employment status from Bureau of Labor Statistics’ May 2019 Employment Situation News Release. Political views from the April 1-9, 2019, wave of the Gallup survey (party affiliation plus leaners). Median age of all U.S. residents is 38.2, while 47 is the average age of the U.S. adult population. The part-time employment percentage (0.099) is calculated based on seasonally adjusted persons in May 2019 who work as part time for economic or non-economic reasons. Full time is total the employed percentage less the part-time percentage. We divide “not in labor force” from the Bureau of Labor Statistics between “not in labor force” and “retired” based on proportion of “not in labor force” that was retired in Hipple (2015).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Table 3. Pre-Treatment Policy Views (standard deviations in parentheses)** | | | | | | |
|  | Panel A. Policy Position (1=Strongly oppose, 5=Strongly favor) | | | | | |
| **Treatment (Obs)** | Minimum Wage | Cash Assistance | Housing Voucher | Universal Pre-K | Marriage Tax Credit | Less Immigration |
| Overall (2399) | 3.989 | 3.64 | 3.435 | 3.915 | 3.496 | 3.243 |
|  | (1.161) | (1.160) | (1.204) | (1.092) | (1.151) | (1.251) |
| Control (267) | 3.996 | 3.614 | 3.423 | 3.978 | 3.464 | 3.225 |
|  | (1.145) | (1.169) | (1.175) | (1.107) | (1.158) | (1.245) |
| Absolute (266) | 3.842 | 3.5 | 3.222 | 3.778 | 3.519 | 3.327 |
|  | (1.215) | (1.229) | (1.291) | (1.149) | (1.140) | (1.217) |
| Relative (263) | 3.989 | 3.646 | 3.433 | 4.008 | 3.498 | 3.171 |
|  | (1.190) | (1.153) | (1.186) | (1.070) | (1.172) | (1.283) |
| Minimum Wage (267) | 4.097 | 3.779 | 3.491 | 3.914 | 3.502 | 3.266 |
|  | (1.096) | (1.144) | (1.190) | (1.092) | (1.105) | (1.208) |
| Cash Assistance (268) | 3.858 | 3.575 | 3.354 | 3.892 | 3.504 | 3.201 |
|  | (1.206) | (1.167) | (1.226) | (1.084) | (1.143) | (1.201) |
| Housing Voucher (266) | 4.026 | 3.677 | 3.5 | 3.951 | 3.549 | 3.252 |
|  | (1.114) | (1.096) | (1.192) | (1.047) | (1.129) | (1.210) |
| Universal Pre-K (268) | 4.004 | 3.664 | 3.5 | 3.862 | 3.511 | 3.463 |
|  | (1.113) | (1.118) | (1.176) | (1.151) | (1.133) | (1.252) |
| Marriage Tax Credit (269) | 4.015 | 3.643 | 3.457 | 3.874 | 3.428 | 3.156 |
|  | (1.212) | (1.203) | (1.238) | (1.123) | (1.281) | (1.292) |
| Less immigration (265) | 4.072 | 3.664 | 3.532 | 3.981 | 3.487 | 3.121 |
|  | (1.144) | (1.150) | (1.141) | (0.990) | (1.098) | (1.329) |
|  | Panel B. Percentage choosing strongly support or support | | | | | |
| Overall (2399) | 0.741 | 0.624 | 0.536 | 0.7 | 0.541 | 0.432 |
|  | (0.438) | (0.484) | (0.499) | (0.458) | (0.498) | (0.495) |
| Control (267) | 0.742 | 0.618 | 0.502 | 0.715 | 0.524 | 0.423 |
|  | (0.439) | (0.487) | (0.501) | (0.452) | (0.5) | (0.495) |
| Absolute (266) | 0.707 | 0.568 | 0.477 | 0.658 | 0.545 | 0.459 |
|  | (0.456) | (0.496) | (0.5) | (0.475) | (0.499) | (0.499) |
| Relative (263) | 0.719 | 0.627 | 0.54 | 0.749 | 0.517 | 0.395 |
|  | (0.451) | (0.484) | (0.499) | (0.434) | (0.501) | (0.49) |
| Minimum Wage (267) | 0.757 | 0.667 | 0.539 | 0.689 | 0.551 | 0.431 |
|  | (0.43) | (0.472) | (0.499) | (0.464) | (0.498) | (0.496) |
| Cash Assistance (268) | 0.705 | 0.619 | 0.507 | 0.698 | 0.552 | 0.429 |
|  | (0.457) | (0.486) | (0.501) | (0.46) | (0.498) | (0.496) |
| Housing Voucher (266) | 0.756 | 0.617 | 0.541 | 0.699 | 0.538 | 0.429 |
|  | (0.431) | (0.487) | (0.499) | (0.459) | (0.5) | (0.496) |
| Universal Pre-K (268) | 0.765 | 0.642 | 0.578 | 0.69 | 0.56 | 0.534 |
|  | (0.425) | (0.48) | (0.495) | (0.463) | (0.497) | (0.5) |
| Marriage Tax Credit (269) | 0.766 | 0.628 | 0.572 | 0.677 | 0.532 | 0.383 |
|  | (0.424) | (0.484) | (0.496) | (0.469) | (0.5) | (0.487) |
| Less immigration (265) | 0.755 | 0.634 | 0.57 | 0.725 | 0.547 | 0.408 |
|  | (0.431) | (0.483) | (0.496) | (0.448) | (0.499) | (0.492) |

**Table 4. Differences in Policy Views (5-point scale) Pre- to Post-Treatment**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | Minimum | Cash | Housing | Universal | Marriage | Less |
| Treatments | N | Wage | Assistance | Voucher | Pre-K | Tax Credit | Immigration |
| Control | 267 | -0.075 | -0.060 | -0.067 | -0.037 | -0.037 | -0.049 |
|  |  | (0.135) | (0.366) | (0.349) | (0.815) | (0.903) | (0.753) |
| Absolute | 266 | 0.026 | -0.083 | -0.03 | -0.026 | -0.045 | -0.098 |
|  |  | (0.957) | (0.233) | (0.968) | (0.986) | (0.825) | (0.265) |
| Relative | 263 | 0.008 | -0.023 | 0.023 | -0.065 | -0.042 | -0.205\*\*\* |
|  |  | (1.000) | (0.983) | (0.986) | (0.296) | (0.874) | (0.005) |
| Minimum Wage | 267 | 0.007 | -0.049 | -0.049 | -0.041 | -0.041 | -0.142\*\*\* |
|  |  | (1.000) | (0.769) | (0.747) | (0.674) | (0.833) | (0.005) |
| Cash Assistance | 268 | 0.056 | 0.134\*\* | 0.03 | -0.004 | -0.015 | -0.071 |
|  |  | (0.641) | (0.027) | (0.978) | (1.000) | (0.999) | (0.626) |
| Housing Voucher | 266 | -0.045 | 0.023 | 0.222\*\*\* | 0.045 | 0.038 | -0.060 |
|  |  | (0.735) | (0.992) | (0.003) | (0.776) | (0.960) | (0.716) |
| Universal Pre-K | 268 | -0.041 | 0.026 | 0.004 | 0.127\* | -0.034 | -0.187\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.829) | (0.994) | (1.000) | (0.066) | (0.964) | (0.005) |
| Marriage Tax Credit | 269 | -0.026 | -0.019 | -0.048 | -0.004 | 0.048 | -0.093 |
|  |  | (0.967) | (0.992) | (0.774) | (1.000) | (0.888) | (0.244) |
| Less Immigration | 265 | -0.042 | -0.042 | -0.094\*\* | -0.06 | 0.015 | -0.004 |
|  |  | (0.797) | (0.892) | (0.047) | (0.272) | (0.999) | (1.000) |

Table shows difference (post view less pre view) in average policy view (1 is strongly oppose, 5 is strongly support). P-values on pairwise t-test between pre- and post-views in parentheses, corrected for multiple comparisons using approach detailed in Sankoh et al. (1997). \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 5. Change in Policy Views by Treatment Relative to Control, with and without covariates**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Without Covariates | | | | | | |
|  | (1) | | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Minimum | | Cash | Housing | Universal | Marriage | Less |
|  | Wage | | Assistance | Voucher | Pre-K | Tax Credit | Immigration |
| Absolute | 0.101 | | -0.023 | 0.037 | 0.011 | -0.008 | -0.049 |
|  | (0.048) | | (0.054) | (0.057) | (0.056) | (0.058) | (0.066) |
| Relative | 0.083 | | 0.037 | 0.090 | -0.027 | -0.004 | -0.157 |
|  | (0.052) | | (0.050) | (0.054) | (0.049) | (0.059) | (0.070) |
| Minimum Wage | 0.082 | | 0.011 | 0.019 | -0.004 | -0.004 | -0.094 |
|  | (0.050) | | (0.054) | (0.055) | (0.047) | (0.056) | (0.058) |
| Cash Assistance | 0.131\* | | 0.194\*\*\* | 0.097 | 0.034 | 0.023 | -0.022 |
|  | (0.053) | | (0.058) | (0.059) | (0.053) | (0.060) | (0.066) |
| Housing Voucher | 0.030 | | 0.082 | 0.289\*\*\* | 0.083 | 0.075 | -0.011 |
|  | (0.050) | | (0.054) | (0.065) | (0.052) | (0.065) | (0.064) |
| Universal Pre-K | 0.034 | | 0.086 | 0.071 | 0.164\*\* | 0.004 | -0.138 |
|  | (0.051) | | (0.061) | (0.057) | (0.061) | (0.062) | (0.069) |
| Marriage Tax Credit | 0.049 | | 0.041 | 0.019 | 0.034 | 0.086 | -0.044 |
|  | (0.049) | | (0.049) | (0.056) | (0.051) | (0.065) | (0.063) |
| Less Immigration | 0.033 | | 0.018 | -0.027 | -0.023 | 0.053 | 0.045 |
|  | (0.050) | | (0.055) | (0.052) | (0.047) | (0.058) | (0.072) |
|  |  | |  |  |  |  |  |
| R-squared | 0.004 | | 0.008 | 0.016 | 0.008 | 0.002 | 0.006 |
|  | With Covariates | | | | | | |
|  | (7) | (8) | | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
|  | Minimum | Cash | | Housing | Universal | Marriage | Less |
|  | Wage | Assistance | | Voucher | Pre-K | Tax Credit | Immigration |
| Absolute | 0.099 | -0.013 | | 0.036 | 0.012 | -0.012 | -0.049 |
|  | (0.050) | (0.054) | | (0.058) | (0.057) | (0.059) | (0.066) |
| Relative | 0.082 | 0.040 | | 0.082 | -0.023 | -0.027 | -0.149 |
|  | (0.053) | (0.051) | | (0.056) | (0.050) | (0.060) | (0.070) |
| Minimum Wage | 0.082 | 0.003 | | 0.017 | -0.005 | -0.020 | -0.081 |
|  | (0.052) | (0.055) | | (0.057) | (0.049) | (0.057) | (0.061) |
| Cash Assistance | 0.136\* | 0.204\*\*\* | | 0.096 | 0.047 | 0.028 | -0.021 |
|  | (0.054) | (0.059) | | (0.060) | (0.054) | (0.060) | (0.068) |
| Housing Voucher | 0.015 | 0.098 | | 0.270\*\*\* | 0.088 | 0.056 | -0.007 |
|  | (0.052) | (0.055) | | (0.065) | (0.054) | (0.066) | (0.066) |
| Universal Pre-K | 0.034 | 0.091 | | 0.063 | 0.176\*\* | -0.001 | -0.132 |
|  | (0.053) | (0.062) | | (0.060) | (0.063) | (0.062) | (0.070) |
| Marriage Tax Credit | 0.048 | 0.050 | | -0.003 | 0.040 | 0.073 | -0.018 |
|  | (0.049) | (0.050) | | (0.059) | (0.053) | (0.066) | (0.064) |
| Less Immigration | 0.023 | 0.039 | | -0.041 | -0.026 | 0.054 | 0.044 |
|  | (0.051) | (0.056) | | (0.053) | (0.048) | (0.059) | (0.073) |
|  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| R-squared | 0.035 | 0.041 | | 0.054 | 0.039 | 0.034 | 0.038 |

Notes: The participants report their views on a 1-5 scale (1 is strongly oppose, and 5 is strongly favor). The covariant included in the regression are presented in Table 2 and state-of-residence fixed effects. All N=2399. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1, corrected using Sankoh et al. (1997).

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Table 6. Message Writing by Treatment** | | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| VARIABLES | Any Written  Message | Message to Senator | Mobility-themed  Message |
|  |  |  |  |
| Relative | -0.023 | -0.045 | 0.028 |
|  | (0.041) | (0.037) | (0.025) |
| Absolute | -0.001 | 0.000 | 0.027 |
|  | (0.042) | (0.038) | (0.024) |
| Minimum Wage | -0.023 | -0.001 | 0.108\*\*\* |
|  | (0.042) | (0.039) | (0.030) |
| Cash Assistance | 0.024 | 0.036 | 0.136\*\*\* |
|  | (0.042) | (0.039) | (0.029) |
| Housing Voucher | 0.024 | 0.017 | 0.140\*\*\* |
|  | (0.042) | (0.039) | (0.030) |
| Universal Pre-K | -0.021 | -0.019 | 0.069\*\*\* |
|  | (0.041) | (0.038) | (0.026) |
| Marriage Tax Credit | 0.054 | 0.026 | 0.066\*\*\* |
|  | (0.041) | (0.039) | (0.025) |
| Less Immigration | -0.029 | -0.009 | 0.035 |
|  | (0.041) | (0.038) | (0.025) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 2,399 | 2,399 | 2,399 |
| R-squared | 0.078 | 0.055 | 0.066 |

Notes: Covariates from Table 2 above and state-of-residence fixed effects included in all columns. Dependent variable in column 1 is a binary equal to one if respondent wrote anything in message box for letter to their U.S. Senators. Dependent variable in column 2 is a binary equal to one if respondent wrote an actual message to their U.S. Senators as described in text. Dependent variable in column 3 is average of research assistants’ coding of messages as referencing mobility, inequality, or poverty. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. (These are not corrected for multiple comparisons.)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Table 7. Messages Sent on Specific Topic by Treatment** | | | | | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Minimum | Cash | Housing | Universal | Marriage | Less |
| Treatment\Policy | Wage | Assistance | Voucher | Pre-K | Tax Credit | Immigration |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Absolute | 0.018 | 0.007 | 0.013 | -0.001 | -0.001 | -0.014 |
|  | (0.017) | (0.012) | (0.009) | (0.007) | (0.006) | (0.017) |
| Relative | 0.023 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.010 | 0.003 | -0.038\*\* |
|  | (0.017) | (0.012) | (0.008) | (0.010) | (0.007) | (0.014) |
| Minimum Wage | 0.113\*\*\* | -0.004 | 0.007 | 0.016 | 0.002 | -0.047\*\*\* |
|  | (0.024) | (0.011) | (0.007) | (0.011) | (0.007) | (0.015) |
| Cash Assistance | 0.036 | 0.091\*\*\* | 0.026\*\* | 0.004 | 0.004 | -0.006 |
|  | (0.017) | (0.019) | (0.009) | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.018) |
| Housing Voucher | 0.028 | 0.011 | 0.078\*\*\* | 0.023 | 0.014 | -0.023 |
|  | (0.018) | (0.013) | (0.017) | (0.011) | (0.010) | (0.017) |
| Universal Pre-K | 0.007 | 0.003 | 0.000 | 0.069\*\*\* | -0.002 | -0.028\* |
|  | (0.016) | (0.011) | (0.006) | (0.016) | (0.006) | (0.016) |
| Marriage Tax Credit | 0.030 | -0.003 | 0.011 | 0.021 | 0.035\*\* | -0.005 |
|  | (0.017) | (0.010) | (0.009) | (0.011) | (0.013) | (0.018) |
| Less Immigration | 0.013 | -0.012 | 0.002 | -0.002 | -0.000 | 0.081\*\*\* |
|  | (0.017) | (0.010) | (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.024) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 2,399 | 2,399 | 2,399 | 2,399 | 2,399 | 2,399 |
| R-squared | 0.060 | 0.069 | 0.059 | 0.058 | 0.046 | 0.081 |

Covariates from Table 2 above and state-of-residence fixed effects included in all columns. Dependent variable in each column is the average of the codes of two research assistants on whether respondent wrote message concerning the policy in the column header (1=yes, 0=no). Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1, corrected using Sankoh et al. (1997).


|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Table 8. Messages Sent Supporting a Specific Topic by Treatment** | | | | | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Minimum | Cash | Housing | Universal | Marriage | Less |
| Treatment\Policy | Wage | Assistance | Voucher | Pre-K | Tax Credit | Immigration |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Absolute | 0.017 | -0.003 | 0.003 | 0.000 | 0.000 | -0.011 |
|  | (0.017) | (0.009) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.006) | (0.015) |
| Relative | 0.013 | -0.005 | 0.003 | 0.010 | -0.003 | -0.026 |
|  | (0.016) | (0.009) | (0.007) | (0.010) | (0.005) | (0.013) |
| Minimum Wage | 0.106\*\*\* | 0.000 | 0.005 | 0.015 | 0.004 | -0.037\*\* |
|  | (0.023) | (0.010) | (0.007) | (0.011) | (0.007) | (0.013) |
| Cash Assistance | 0.027 | 0.071\*\*\* | 0.018 | -0.002 | 0.004 | -0.001 |
|  | (0.016) | (0.017) | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.015) |
| Housing Voucher | 0.025 | 0.014 | 0.060\*\*\* | 0.023 | 0.012 | -0.014 |
|  | (0.017) | (0.012) | (0.015) | (0.011) | (0.009) | (0.015) |
| Universal Pre-K | 0.001 | 0.001 | -0.004 | 0.064\*\*\* | -0.006 | -0.018 |
|  | (0.015) | (0.010) | (0.006) | (0.016) | (0.005) | (0.014) |
| Marriage Tax Credit | 0.025 | -0.006 | 0.005 | 0.019 | 0.011 | -0.005 |
|  | (0.017) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.011) | (0.009) | (0.015) |
| Less Immigration | 0.010 | -0.009 | 0.001 | -0.002 | -0.003 | 0.042 |
|  | (0.016) | (0.009) | (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.006) | (0.019) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 2,399 | 2,399 | 2,399 | 2,399 | 2,399 | 2,399 |
| R-squared | 0.062 | 0.072 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.036 | 0.084 |

Covariates from Table 2 above and state-of-residence fixed effects included in all columns. Dependent variable each column is the average of the codes of two research assistants on whether respondent wrote message supporting the policy in the column header (1=yes, 0=no). Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1, corrected using Sankoh et al. (1997).


**APPENDICES**

**Appendix A**


**First Screen**





**Second Screen**



**Figure A.1. Example of *Relative* treatment prompt and follow-up information**







**Figure A.2. Graphics accompanying *Absolute* (top) and *Relative* (middle & bottom) treatments.**

*Top*: Percentage of children who out-earn their parents in the corresponding quintile.

*Middle*: Distribution today of children born in the top income quintile in the 1980s.

*Bottom*: Distribution today of children born in the bottom income quintile in the 1980s.

|  |
| --- |
| Many workers appear to be “stuck” at the lowest earning levels in American society today. Raising the minimum wage can increase the incomes of the lowest-earners in society, which would mean more resources and opportunities available to the children of these low-income workers.    The minimum wage usually remains the same over many years in Figure, which means that as prices rise, the real purchasing power of these families’ income declines. That’s one reason we need to raise the minimum wage to help these families.    Another is that, as productivity and average wages have risen, the minimum wage has not kept pace. If the federal minimum wage had gone up as much as average wages, it’d be over 11 dollars today. And if it had gone up as much as productivity, the minimum wage would be nearly 19 dollars. Children are in low-income families because firms don’t pay their workers enough; the minimum wage will help those families and those children to rise. |
|  |
| **Figure A3. Example of Argument Treatment** |

**Table A.1. Differences in covariates between each treatment and *Control*, by treatment**

|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Absolute | Relative | Minimum  Wage | Cash  Assistance | Housing  Voucher | Universal  Pre-K | Marriage  Tax Credit | Less  Immigration |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Male | 0.068 | 0.020 | 0.018 | 0.039 | -0.008 | 0.001 | -0.011 | 0.026 |
|  | (0.046) | (0.047) | (0.046) | (0.046) | (0.046) | (0.047) | (0.047) | (0.047) |
| Age | 0.006\*\* | 0.003 | 0.005\*\* | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.002 | 0.007\*\*\* | 0.001 |
|  | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| Family income | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.000 | -0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.001 | -0.000 |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Married | -0.169\*\*\* | -0.035 | -0.177\*\*\* | 0.012 | -0.016 | -0.088 | -0.110\* | 0.020 |
|  | (0.058) | (0.061) | (0.057) | (0.062) | (0.061) | (0.060) | (0.060) | (0.062) |
| Widowed | -0.310\* | -0.412\*\* | -0.268 | -0.022 | -0.145 | -0.047 | -0.237 | -0.124 |
|  | (0.160) | (0.162) | (0.193) | (0.177) | (0.166) | (0.165) | (0.170) | (0.179) |
| Divorced | -0.231\*\* | -0.199\*\* | -0.189\*\* | -0.186\* | -0.152 | -0.249\*\* | -0.319\*\*\* | -0.151 |
|  | (0.097) | (0.099) | (0.092) | (0.099) | (0.098) | (0.099) | (0.097) | (0.100) |
| Separated | 0.210 | 0.068 | 0.148 | 0.362\*\* | 0.278\*\* | 0.187 | 0.283\*\* | 0.109 |
|  | (0.130) | (0.196) | (0.141) | (0.156) | (0.135) | (0.154) | (0.137) | (0.221) |
| Kids – in home | 0.127\*\* | 0.069 | 0.008 | 0.038 | 0.048 | 0.022 | 0.065 | 0.013 |
|  | (0.056) | (0.057) | (0.055) | (0.057) | (0.057) | (0.058) | (0.057) | (0.058) |
| Kids – not home | -0.103 | 0.279\* | 0.104 | 0.103 | 0.164 | 0.214 | 0.304\*\*\* | 0.062 |
|  | (0.147) | (0.156) | (0.137) | (0.169) | (0.127) | (0.161) | (0.112) | (0.179) |
| Hispanic | -0.006 | -0.115\* | -0.097 | -0.047 | -0.061 | -0.068 | -0.083 | -0.101 |
|  | (0.059) | (0.062) | (0.063) | (0.059) | (0.063) | (0.062) | (0.063) | (0.063) |
| Black | 0.094 | 0.023 | 0.001 | 0.033 | 0.019 | -0.033 | 0.027 | 0.012 |
|  | (0.073) | (0.079) | (0.080) | (0.078) | (0.077) | (0.084) | (0.077) | (0.079) |
| Native/Pacific Islander | 0.154 | 0.096 | 0.308\* | -0.030 | 0.117 | 0.106 | 0.089 | -0.151 |
|  | (0.193) | (0.215) | (0.169) | (0.228) | (0.236) | (0.213) | (0.274) | (0.299) |
| Asian | 0.068 | 0.121 | 0.154\* | 0.134 | 0.061 | 0.067 | 0.034 | 0.076 |
|  | (0.110) | (0.097) | (0.090) | (0.091) | (0.107) | (0.099) | (0.105) | (0.100) |
| Multiracial/other | 0.122 | -0.006 | 0.064 | 0.036 | -0.021 | -0.049 | 0.004 | 0.060 |
|  | (0.109) | (0.119) | (0.102) | (0.103) | (0.119) | (0.114) | (0.110) | (0.110) |
| Less than high school | -0.534\*\*\* | -0.230 | -0.339 | -0.026 | -0.671\*\*\* | -0.191 | -0.434 | -0.068 |
|  | (0.137) | (0.277) | (0.269) | (0.253) | (0.097) | (0.243) | (0.268) | (0.233) |
| Some college, no degree | 0.059 | 0.001 | 0.077 | 0.191\*\* | -0.031 | 0.067 | -0.032 | 0.153 |
|  | (0.085) | (0.089) | (0.086) | (0.094) | (0.083) | (0.090) | (0.085) | (0.095) |
| Associate’s degree | -0.024 | -0.062 | 0.004 | 0.071 | -0.070 | -0.002 | 0.004 | 0.007 |
|  | (0.093) | (0.101) | (0.095) | (0.103) | (0.093) | (0.101) | (0.095) | (0.107) |
| College graduate | -0.007 | -0.052 | -0.043 | 0.082 | -0.087 | -0.043 | -0.105 | 0.082 |
|  | (0.077) | (0.081) | (0.080) | (0.087) | (0.075) | (0.085) | (0.080) | (0.087) |
| Postgraduate degree | -0.148 | -0.086 | -0.125 | 0.045 | -0.222\*\* | -0.074 | -0.052 | 0.020 |
|  | (0.093) | (0.094) | (0.096) | (0.098) | (0.090) | (0.099) | (0.091) | (0.101) |
| Part time employed | 0.141\*\* | 0.061 | 0.019 | 0.008 | 0.085 | 0.024 | 0.075 | -0.033 |
|  | (0.062) | (0.067) | (0.068) | (0.067) | (0.067) | (0.066) | (0.067) | (0.075) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployed | -0.250\*\* | -0.045 | -0.171 | -0.136 | -0.061 | -0.131 | -0.039 | -0.070 |
|  | (0.106) | (0.101) | (0.104) | (0.111) | (0.108) | (0.102) | (0.098) | (0.101) |
| Out of labor force | 0.048 | -0.106 | -0.012 | -0.136 | -0.129 | -0.106 | 0.023 | -0.022 |
|  | (0.092) | (0.097) | (0.087) | (0.093) | (0.093) | (0.098) | (0.086) | (0.095) |
| Retired | 0.067 | -0.082 | -0.349\*\* | -0.038 | -0.111 | -0.147 | -0.116 | 0.072 |
|  | (0.123) | (0.150) | (0.139) | (0.147) | (0.146) | (0.142) | (0.134) | (0.141) |
| Republican | 0.020 | 0.005 | 0.059 | -0.018 | -0.018 | -0.050 | -0.034 | -0.006 |
|  | (0.058) | (0.064) | (0.060) | (0.063) | (0.061) | (0.063) | (0.064) | (0.064) |
| Democrat | -0.018 | 0.033 | -0.006 | -0.002 | -0.015 | -0.058 | -0.018 | -0.003 |
|  | (0.054) | (0.054) | (0.053) | (0.054) | (0.054) | (0.054) | (0.053) | (0.055) |
| Contribute to charity | 0.001 | 0.004 | 0.016\* | -0.004 | 0.009 | 0.006 | 0.002 | 0.014 |
|  | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) |
| Role of luck/effort | 0.004 | -0.001 | -0.009 | 0.005 | 0.008 | -0.004 | -0.004 | -0.008 |
|  | (0.011) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.011) | (0.012) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) |
| Constant | 0.222 | 0.404\*\*\* | 0.359\*\*\* | 0.298\*\* | 0.356\*\* | 0.537\*\*\* | 0.321\*\* | 0.367\*\*\* |
|  | (0.138) | (0.141) | (0.137) | (0.141) | (0.139) | (0.138) | (0.139) | (0.140) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 533 | 530 | 534 | 535 | 533 | 535 | 536 | 532 |
| R-squared | 0.085 | 0.036 | 0.087 | 0.044 | 0.055 | 0.041 | 0.060 | 0.032 |

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table A.2. Multinomial Logit of Treatment Assignment by Covariates**

|  |  |  | Minimum | Cash | Housing | Universal | Marriage | Less |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| VARIABLES | Absolute | Relative | Wage | Assistance | Voucher | Pre-K | Tax Credit | Immigration |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Male | 0.291 | 0.0783 | 0.0832 | 0.158 | 0.0243 | 0.0124 | -0.0478 | 0.101 |
|  | (0.187) | (0.185) | (0.185) | (0.184) | (0.185) | (0.184) | (0.185) | (0.185) |
| Age | 0.0253\*\* | 0.0107 | 0.0269\*\*\* | 0.0115 | 0.0191\* | 0.00803 | 0.0210\*\* | 0.00702 |
|  | (0.0101) | (0.0102) | (0.00992) | (0.0101) | (0.00996) | (0.0101) | (0.00992) | (0.0102) |
| Family income | 0.00216 | 6.78e-05 | 0.000270 | -0.000103 | 0.00136 | 7.25e-05 | 0.00308 | -0.000872 |
|  | (0.00229) | (0.00234) | (0.00236) | (0.00232) | (0.00231) | (0.00233) | (0.00228) | (0.00235) |
| Married | -0.732\*\*\* | -0.131 | -0.807\*\*\* | 0.0266 | -0.0965 | -0.319 | -0.367 | 0.0887 |
|  | (0.242) | (0.238) | (0.241) | (0.237) | (0.239) | (0.236) | (0.238) | (0.236) |
| Widowed | -1.263 | -1.891\* | -1.208 | -0.161 | -0.601 | -0.130 | -0.767 | -0.398 |
|  | (0.772) | (1.123) | (0.772) | (0.677) | (0.715) | (0.652) | (0.717) | (0.714) |
| Divorced | -1.016\*\*\* | -0.639\* | -0.840\*\* | -0.640 | -0.734\* | -0.979\*\* | -1.042\*\*\* | -0.555 |
|  | (0.384) | (0.385) | (0.368) | (0.393) | (0.388) | (0.401) | (0.392) | (0.389) |
| Separated | 0.936 | 0.317 | 0.642 | 1.432\* | 1.317 | 0.918 | 1.030 | 0.486 |
|  | (0.817) | (0.936) | (0.844) | (0.816) | (0.818) | (0.841) | (0.819) | (0.935) |
| Kids – in home | 0.498\*\* | 0.238 | 0.0952 | 0.141 | 0.151 | 0.0492 | 0.124 | 0.0293 |
|  | (0.224) | (0.220) | (0.224) | (0.218) | (0.220) | (0.221) | (0.221) | (0.219) |
| Kids – not home | -0.146 | 0.845 | 0.453 | 0.315 | 0.606 | 0.466 | 1.107\* | 0.0707 |
|  | (0.791) | (0.655) | (0.675) | (0.698) | (0.656) | (0.674) | (0.616) | (0.731) |
| Hispanic | 0.00420 | -0.388 | -0.485\* | -0.162 | -0.268 | -0.291 | -0.293 | -0.386 |
|  | (0.232) | (0.247) | (0.253) | (0.236) | (0.243) | (0.242) | (0.245) | (0.246) |
| Black | 0.460 | 0.0872 | 0.161 | 0.154 | 0.123 | -0.124 | 0.171 | 0.100 |
|  | (0.294) | (0.307) | (0.310) | (0.303) | (0.306) | (0.316) | (0.303) | (0.305) |
| Native/Pacific Islander | 0.603 | 0.557 | 1.230 | 0.133 | 0.477 | 0.509 | 0.139 | -0.526 |
|  | (0.936) | (0.928) | (0.859) | (1.016) | (0.930) | (0.930) | (1.018) | (1.236) |
| Asian | 0.345 | 0.488 | 0.784\*\* | 0.629\* | 0.243 | 0.333 | 0.179 | 0.326 |
|  | (0.408) | (0.381) | (0.374) | (0.375) | (0.406) | (0.389) | (0.405) | (0.389) |
| Multiracial/other | 0.414 | 0.0144 | 0.443 | 0.274 | -0.0932 | -0.0706 | 0.0708 | 0.315 |
|  | (0.399) | (0.438) | (0.403) | (0.411) | (0.440) | (0.430) | (0.424) | (0.409) |
| Less than high school | -13.86 | -0.681 | -1.266 | -0.0343 | -14.12 | -0.496 | -1.375 | -0.163 |
|  | (548.0) | (0.968) | (1.202) | (0.979) | (560.5) | (0.968) | (1.199) | (0.976) |
| Some college, no degree | 0.264 | -0.0303 | 0.336 | 0.766\*\* | -0.135 | 0.344 | -0.0308 | 0.565 |
|  | (0.357) | (0.350) | (0.352) | (0.381) | (0.341) | (0.351) | (0.347) | (0.373) |
| Associate’s degree | -0.0248 | -0.310 | -0.0327 | 0.305 | -0.277 | 0.0468 | 0.0374 | 0.0171 |
|  | (0.397) | (0.392) | (0.392) | (0.423) | (0.376) | (0.390) | (0.376) | (0.424) |
| College graduate | 0.00957 | -0.263 | -0.156 | 0.296 | -0.424 | -0.150 | -0.452 | 0.278 |
|  | (0.328) | (0.317) | (0.326) | (0.357) | (0.309) | (0.325) | (0.318) | (0.346) |
| Postgraduate degree | -0.598 | -0.407 | -0.623 | 0.145 | -0.987\*\* | -0.299 | -0.224 | 0.000276 |
|  | (0.400) | (0.375) | (0.397) | (0.409) | (0.384) | (0.384) | (0.366) | (0.402) |
| Part time employed | 0.527\*\* | 0.230 | 0.0351 | 0.0815 | 0.221 | 0.0912 | 0.162 | -0.192 |
|  | (0.261) | (0.268) | (0.269) | (0.273) | (0.266) | (0.267) | (0.270) | (0.288) |
| Unemployed | -0.959\* | -0.156 | -0.617 | -0.597 | -0.221 | -0.427 | -0.0946 | -0.170 |
|  | (0.504) | (0.396) | (0.413) | (0.443) | (0.403) | (0.402) | (0.390) | (0.396) |
| Out of labor force | 0.0458 | -0.440 | -0.111 | -0.504 | -0.605 | -0.460 | 0.132 | -0.138 |
|  | (0.375) | (0.400) | (0.369) | (0.400) | (0.410) | (0.391) | (0.353) | (0.368) |
| Retired | 0.191 | -0.344 | -1.682\*\* | -0.208 | -0.681 | -0.576 | -0.362 | 0.267 |
|  | (0.527) | (0.581) | (0.724) | (0.553) | (0.577) | (0.601) | (0.551) | (0.522) |
| Republican | 0.120 | 0.0568 | 0.279 | -0.00853 | -0.0225 | -0.121 | -0.0558 | -0.0803 |
|  | (0.241) | (0.246) | (0.244) | (0.244) | (0.241) | (0.242) | (0.242) | (0.246) |
| Democrat | -0.122 | 0.138 | 0.0201 | 0.0265 | -0.0560 | -0.187 | -0.0565 | 0.0230 |
|  | (0.216) | (0.215) | (0.216) | (0.214) | (0.215) | (0.211) | (0.212) | (0.213) |
| Contribute to charity | 0.00894 | 0.0130 | 0.0620\* | -0.0123 | 0.0367 | 0.0284 | 0.0194 | 0.0441 |
|  | (0.0325) | (0.0325) | (0.0326) | (0.0323) | (0.0325) | (0.0322) | (0.0322) | (0.0324) |
| Role of luck/effort | 0.000296 | 0.00189 | -0.0300 | 0.00762 | 0.0266 | -0.0201 | -0.0233 | -0.0235 |
|  | (0.0452) | (0.0452) | (0.0449) | (0.0450) | (0.0453) | (0.0447) | (0.0449) | (0.0451) |
| Constant | -1.157\*\* | -0.333 | -0.780 | -0.856 | -0.683 | 0.0966 | -0.451 | -0.560 |
|  | (0.566) | (0.555) | (0.557) | (0.576) | (0.550) | (0.552) | (0.549) | (0.572) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 2,399 | 2,399 | 2,399 | 2,399 | 2,399 | 2,399 | 2,399 | 2,399 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table A.3. Pre-Treatment Policy Views as a Function of Covariates**

|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Minimum | Cash | Housing | Universal | Marriage | Less |
| VARIABLES | Wage | Assistance | Voucher | Pre-K | Tax Credit | Immigration |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Male | -0.166\*\*\* | -0.030 | -0.092\* | -0.228\*\*\* | 0.071 | -0.003 |
|  | (0.045) | (0.045) | (0.047) | (0.045) | (0.050) | (0.050) |
| Age | -0.002 | -0.008\*\*\* | -0.010\*\*\* | -0.010\*\*\* | -0.007\*\*\* | -0.001 |
|  | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| Family income | -0.001\*\* | -0.002\*\*\* | -0.002\*\*\* | -0.000 | -0.002\*\* | -0.001 |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Role of luck/effort | -0.066\*\*\* | -0.096\*\*\* | -0.095\*\*\* | -0.035\*\*\* | 0.027\*\* | 0.083\*\*\* |
|  | (0.011) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.011) | (0.013) | (0.013) |
| Contribute to charity | 0.055\*\*\* | 0.069\*\*\* | 0.070\*\*\* | 0.033\*\*\* | 0.029\*\*\* | 0.039\*\*\* |
|  | (0.009) | (0.008) | (0.009) | (0.008) | (0.009) | (0.009) |
| Republican | -0.404\*\*\* | -0.349\*\*\* | -0.212\*\*\* | -0.256\*\*\* | 0.249\*\*\* | 0.610\*\*\* |
|  | (0.068) | (0.065) | (0.068) | (0.065) | (0.063) | (0.065) |
| Democrat | 0.480\*\*\* | 0.410\*\*\* | 0.508\*\*\* | 0.433\*\*\* | -0.062 | -0.334\*\*\* |
|  | (0.052) | (0.051) | (0.053) | (0.052) | (0.056) | (0.058) |
| Married | -0.012 | 0.026 | -0.020 | 0.118\*\* | 0.150\*\* | 0.004 |
|  | (0.058) | (0.057) | (0.062) | (0.056) | (0.063) | (0.065) |
| Widowed | -0.140 | -0.009 | -0.084 | -0.221 | -0.074 | 0.093 |
|  | (0.198) | (0.189) | (0.198) | (0.205) | (0.220) | (0.205) |
| Divorced | -0.044 | -0.022 | 0.043 | -0.034 | -0.003 | 0.161 |
|  | (0.102) | (0.104) | (0.106) | (0.105) | (0.107) | (0.107) |
| Separated | 0.299\*\* | 0.259\* | 0.436\*\*\* | 0.054 | 0.147 | -0.046 |
|  | (0.141) | (0.148) | (0.153) | (0.154) | (0.138) | (0.172) |
| Kids – in home | -0.112\*\* | 0.011 | 0.063 | 0.032 | 0.248\*\*\* | 0.129\*\* |
|  | (0.054) | (0.054) | (0.058) | (0.053) | (0.058) | (0.061) |
| Kids – not home | 0.049 | 0.191 | 0.288\* | 0.279\* | 0.242 | 0.115 |
|  | (0.143) | (0.155) | (0.152) | (0.149) | (0.163) | (0.134) |
| Hispanic | 0.062 | 0.054 | 0.137\*\* | 0.000 | 0.089 | 0.073 |
|  | (0.060) | (0.065) | (0.065) | (0.060) | (0.064) | (0.069) |
| Black | 0.173\*\* | 0.216\*\*\* | 0.232\*\*\* | 0.024 | 0.401\*\*\* | 0.197\*\* |
|  | (0.069) | (0.077) | (0.078) | (0.075) | (0.080) | (0.086) |
| Native/Pacific Islander | 0.310 | 0.108 | 0.585\*\*\* | 0.066 | 0.207 | 0.159 |
|  | (0.235) | (0.244) | (0.195) | (0.172) | (0.197) | (0.219) |
| Asian | 0.053 | -0.103 | -0.007 | 0.030 | 0.204\*\* | 0.178\* |
|  | (0.092) | (0.093) | (0.096) | (0.076) | (0.096) | (0.099) |
| Multiracial/other | -0.060 | -0.141 | -0.112 | 0.088 | -0.126 | -0.232\*\* |
|  | (0.102) | (0.102) | (0.102) | (0.092) | (0.115) | (0.106) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
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|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Less than high school | 0.376\* | -0.205 | 0.260 | 0.204 | -0.253 | 0.292 |
|  | (0.199) | (0.328) | (0.259) | (0.288) | (0.343) | (0.250) |
| Some college, no degree | 0.008 | -0.080 | 0.076 | -0.153\* | 0.003 | -0.306\*\*\* |
|  | (0.088) | (0.085) | (0.093) | (0.084) | (0.091) | (0.093) |
| Associate’s degree | 0.007 | -0.033 | 0.139 | 0.001 | -0.043 | -0.275\*\*\* |
|  | (0.097) | (0.095) | (0.105) | (0.093) | (0.101) | (0.103) |
| College graduate | -0.068 | -0.045 | 0.073 | -0.073 | -0.077 | -0.287\*\*\* |
|  | (0.083) | (0.081) | (0.089) | (0.078) | (0.084) | (0.087) |
| Postgraduate degree | -0.023 | -0.190\* | 0.020 | -0.033 | -0.233\*\* | -0.453\*\*\* |
|  | (0.098) | (0.099) | (0.105) | (0.094) | (0.105) | (0.106) |
| Part time employed | 0.128\*\* | 0.124\*\* | 0.112\* | -0.065 | 0.014 | -0.028 |
|  | (0.060) | (0.061) | (0.064) | (0.062) | (0.067) | (0.069) |
| Unemployed | 0.100 | 0.107 | -0.101 | -0.018 | -0.192\* | -0.145 |
|  | (0.094) | (0.097) | (0.106) | (0.095) | (0.109) | (0.113) |
| Out of labor force | -0.060 | 0.187\* | -0.104 | -0.137 | -0.200\* | -0.134 |
|  | (0.095) | (0.095) | (0.098) | (0.099) | (0.106) | (0.106) |
| Retired | -0.053 | 0.055 | 0.077 | -0.071 | 0.266\*\* | 0.144 |
|  | (0.137) | (0.144) | (0.145) | (0.142) | (0.135) | (0.134) |
| Constant | 4.172\*\*\* | 3.922\*\*\* | 3.508\*\*\* | 3.743\*\*\* | 3.376\*\*\* | 3.193\*\*\* |
|  | (0.230) | (0.215) | (0.240) | (0.253) | (0.228) | (0.285) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 2,399 | 2,399 | 2,399 | 2,399 | 2,399 | 2,399 |
| R-squared | 0.205 | 0.209 | 0.206 | 0.155 | 0.092 | 0.192 |

Dependent variable is 5-point likert scale, with 5=strongly favor and 1=strongly oppose. All regressions include state-of-residence fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table A.4. Change in Policy Support by Treatment Relative to Control, with and without covariates**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Without Covariates | | | | | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | | (5) | (6) |
|  | Minimum | Cash | Housing | Universal | | Marriage | Less |
|  | Wage | Assistance | Voucher | Pre-K | | Tax Credit | Immigration |
| Absolute | 0.045 | -0.000 | -0.026 | -0.011 | | -0.000 | -0.004 |
|  | (0.022) | (0.027) | (0.026) | (0.025) | | (0.029) | (0.029) |
| Relative | 0.026 | 0.011 | 0.011 | -0.023 | | 0.023 | -0.053 |
|  | (0.024) | (0.024) | (0.024) | (0.021) | | (0.029) | (0.030) |
| Minimum Wage | 0.041 | 0.030 | -0.041 | -0.022 | | -0.007 | -0.056 |
|  | (0.021) | (0.025) | (0.028) | (0.021) | | (0.028) | (0.027) |
| Cash Assistance | 0.049 | 0.067\* | 0.022 | -0.008 | | -0.011 | -0.022 |
|  | (0.023) | (0.028) | (0.027) | (0.025) | | (0.028) | (0.029) |
| Housing Voucher | 0.015 | 0.038 | 0.075\* | 0.015 | | 0.004 | -0.004 |
|  | (0.021) | (0.027) | (0.031) | (0.024) | | (0.030) | (0.029) |
| Universal Pre-K | 0.026 | 0.022 | 0.019 | 0.048 | | 0.004 | -0.078\* |
|  | (0.022) | (0.028) | (0.028) | (0.029) | | (0.028) | (0.031) |
| Marriage Tax Credit | 0.019 | 0.011 | -0.015 | 0.004 | | 0.034 | -0.026 |
|  | (0.023) | (0.023) | (0.025) | (0.024) | | (0.029) | (0.029) |
| Less Immigration | 0.022 | -0.004 | -0.042 | -0.023 | | -0.000 | 0.004 |
|  | (0.023) | (0.025) | (0.026) | (0.020) | | (0.030) | (0.028) |
|  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |
| R-squared | 0.003 | 0.005 | 0.011 | 0.005 | | 0.001 | 0.006 |
|  | With Covariates | | | | | | |
|  | (7) | (8) | (9) | | (10) | (11) | (12) |
|  | Minimum | Cash | Housing | | Universal | Marriage | Less |
|  | Wage | Assistance | Voucher | | Pre-K | Tax Credit | Immigration |
| Absolute | 0.043 | 0.002 | -0.034 | | -0.008 | 0.003 | -0.007 |
|  | (0.024) | (0.027) | (0.027) | | (0.026) | (0.029) | (0.030) |
| Relative | 0.028 | 0.016 | 0.000 | | -0.019 | 0.013 | -0.057 |
|  | (0.024) | (0.025) | (0.025) | | (0.022) | (0.029) | (0.029) |
| Minimum Wage | 0.039 | 0.026 | -0.050 | | -0.017 | -0.014 | -0.055 |
|  | (0.022) | (0.025) | (0.028) | | (0.023) | (0.028) | (0.028) |
| Cash Assistance | 0.051 | 0.072\* | 0.013 | | -0.003 | -0.010 | -0.023 |
|  | (0.024) | (0.029) | (0.028) | | (0.026) | (0.028) | (0.030) |
| Housing Voucher | 0.008 | 0.048 | 0.057 | | 0.017 | -0.000 | -0.003 |
|  | (0.022) | (0.027) | (0.031) | | (0.025) | (0.031) | (0.030) |
| Universal Pre-K | 0.028 | 0.026 | 0.007 | | 0.053 | 0.002 | -0.080\* |
|  | (0.023) | (0.028) | (0.029) | | (0.029) | (0.028) | (0.031) |
| Marriage Tax Credit | 0.014 | 0.017 | -0.031 | | 0.006 | 0.028 | -0.027 |
|  | (0.023) | (0.023) | (0.027) | | (0.024) | (0.029) | (0.029) |
| Less Immigration | 0.018 | 0.008 | -0.057 | | -0.024 | -0.001 | -0.002 |
|  | (0.024) | (0.025) | (0.026) | | (0.021) | (0.030) | (0.028) |
|  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| R-squared | 0.030 | 0.047 | 0.052 | | 0.032 | 0.031 | 0.038 |

Covariates from Table 2 above and state-of-residence fixed effects included in all columns. Dependent variable is binary equal to 1 if respondent strongly favors or favors policy & zero otherwise. All N=2399. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1, corrected using Sankoh et al. (1997).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Table A.5. Rater Agreement and Inter-Rater Reliability Measures** | | | | | | | |
|  | Percent Agreement | Cohen's Kappa | Gwet's AC |  |  |  |  |
| Any mobility? | 0.845 | 0.693 | 0.692 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | **For** | | |  | **Against** | | |
|  | Percent Agreement | Cohen's Kappa | Gwet's AC |  | Percent Agreement | Cohen's Kappa | Gwet's AC |
| Minimum Wage | 0.950 | 0.848 | 0.925 |  | 0.988 | 0.687 | 0.987 |
| Cash Assistance | 0.933 | 0.586 | 0.920 |  | 0.978 | 0.640 | 0.977 |
| Housing Vouchers | 0.955 | 0.636 | 0.948 |  | 0.980 | 0.509 | 0.979 |
| Universal Pre-K | 0.969 | 0.798 | 0.963 |  | 0.997 | 0.665 | 0.997 |
| Marriage Tax Credits | 0.984 | 0.729 | 0.983 |  | 0.992 | 0.779 | 0.992 |
| Less Immigration | 0.980 | 0.900 | 0.974 |  | 0.991 | 0.888 | 0.990 |
| Recycling/Enviro. | 0.992 | 0.952 | 0.991 |  | 0.998 | 0.000 | 0.998 |
| Other | 0.807 | 0.498 | 0.692 |  | 0.959 | 0.364 | 0.957 |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Table A.6. Messages Sent Opposing a Specific Topic by Treatment** | | | | | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Minimum | Cash | Housing | Universal | Marriage | Less |
| Treatment\Policy | Wage | Assistance | Voucher | Pre-K | Tax Credit | Immigration |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Relative | 0.010 | 0.010 | 0.003 | -0.000 | 0.006 | -0.013 |
|  | (0.006) | (0.007) | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.004) | (0.007) |
| Absolute | 0.001 | 0.010 | 0.010 | -0.001 | -0.001 | -0.004 |
|  | (0.003) | (0.008) | (0.006) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.009) |
| Minimum Wage | 0.007 | -0.004 | 0.001 | 0.000 | -0.002 | -0.010 |
|  | (0.005) | (0.004) | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.009) |
| Cash Assistance | 0.009 | 0.020 | 0.008 | 0.006 | 0.000 | -0.006 |
|  | (0.004) | (0.009) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.002) | (0.008) |
| Housing Voucher | 0.003 | -0.002 | 0.019\* | 0.000 | 0.002 | -0.009 |
|  | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.008) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.008) |
| Universal Pre-K | 0.005 | 0.002 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.003 | -0.010 |
|  | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.003) | (0.008) |
| Marriage Tax Credit | 0.004 | 0.003 | 0.006 | 0.002 | 0.024\*\* | 0.000 |
|  | (0.004) | (0.006) | (0.004) | (0.002) | (0.009) | (0.009) |
| Less Immigration | 0.004 | -0.004 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.003 | 0.039\*\* |
|  | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.004) | (0.015) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 2,399 | 2,399 | 2,399 | 2,399 | 2,399 | 2,399 |
| R-squared | 0.045 | 0.046 | 0.049 | 0.040 | 0.058 | 0.062 |

Covariates from Table 2 above and state-of-residence fixed effects included in all columns. Dependent variable each column is the average of the codes of two research assistants on whether respondent wrote message opposing the policy in the column header (1=yes, 0=no). Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1, corrected using Sankoh et al. (1997). Robustness tests as performed for tables in the texted are contained in Tables A.11 (excluding some respondents) and A.15 (differences by partisan affiliation).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Table A.7. Robustness Checks on Differences in Policy Views** | | | | | | |
|  | Excluding Fast Respondents (<4.25 minutes) | | | | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Minimum | Cash | Housing | Universal | Marriage | Less |
| Treatment | Wage | Assistance | Voucher | Pre-K | Tax Credit | Immigration |
| Absolute | 0.105 | 0.008 | -0.047 | -0.048 | -0.009 | -0.037 |
|  | (0.055) | (0.061) | (0.063) | (0.060) | (0.070) | (0.081) |
| Relative | 0.040 | 0.072 | 0.057 | -0.059 | 0.019 | -0.084 |
|  | (0.060) | (0.061) | (0.061) | (0.054) | (0.070) | (0.081) |
| Minimum Wage | 0.049 | 0.009 | -0.005 | -0.052 | 0.002 | -0.034 |
|  | (0.056) | (0.062) | (0.059) | (0.052) | (0.068) | (0.074) |
| Cash Assistance | 0.050 | 0.250\*\*\* | 0.132 | 0.010 | 0.082 | 0.091 |
|  | (0.058) | (0.067) | (0.063) | (0.059) | (0.065) | (0.082) |
| Housing Voucher | -0.007 | 0.080 | 0.231\*\*\* | 0.061 | 0.094 | -0.002 |
|  | (0.057) | (0.063) | (0.071) | (0.061) | (0.079) | (0.080) |
| Universal Pre-K | 0.011 | 0.169 | -0.001 | 0.178\*\* | 0.041 | -0.073 |
|  | (0.059) | (0.073) | (0.062) | (0.068) | (0.072) | (0.086) |
| Marriage Tax Credit | 0.064 | 0.056 | -0.064 | -0.027 | 0.140 | 0.027 |
|  | (0.056) | (0.059) | (0.065) | (0.056) | (0.076) | (0.076) |
| Less Immigration | 0.007 | 0.037 | -0.044 | -0.057 | 0.078 | 0.073 |
|  | (0.057) | (0.057) | (0.055) | (0.050) | (0.069) | (0.086) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,810 | 1,810 | 1,810 | 1,810 | 1,810 | 1,810 |
| R-squared | 0.047 | 0.059 | 0.072 | 0.053 | 0.045 | 0.050 |
|  | Excluding Fast Respondents & Non-U.S. Geocoded Respondents | | | | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Minimum | Cash | Housing | Universal | Marriage | Less |
| Treatment | Wage | Assistance | Voucher | Pre-K | Tax Credit | Immigration |
| Absolute | 0.100 | 0.009 | -0.046 | -0.043 | -0.034 | -0.064 |
|  | (0.056) | (0.063) | (0.065) | (0.061) | (0.070) | (0.083) |
| Relative | 0.063 | 0.043 | 0.017 | -0.053 | 0.002 | -0.101 |
|  | (0.058) | (0.059) | (0.058) | (0.056) | (0.070) | (0.080) |
| Minimum Wage | 0.040 | 0.015 | 0.007 | -0.053 | 0.005 | -0.063 |
|  | (0.057) | (0.063) | (0.060) | (0.052) | (0.068) | (0.074) |
| Cash Assistance | 0.049 | 0.253\*\*\* | 0.135 | -0.000 | 0.091 | 0.067 |
|  | (0.060) | (0.068) | (0.066) | (0.060) | (0.067) | (0.084) |
| Housing Voucher | -0.012 | 0.086 | 0.233\*\*\* | 0.062 | 0.082 | -0.041 |
|  | (0.056) | (0.064) | (0.073) | (0.061) | (0.080) | (0.081) |
| Universal Pre-K | 0.007 | 0.153 | -0.015 | 0.130 | 0.042 | -0.092 |
|  | (0.061) | (0.072) | (0.063) | (0.066) | (0.069) | (0.089) |
| Marriage Tax Credit | 0.036 | 0.064 | -0.066 | -0.038 | 0.157 | -0.014 |
|  | (0.056) | (0.060) | (0.067) | (0.057) | (0.079) | (0.077) |
| Less Immigration | 0.002 | 0.037 | -0.040 | -0.062 | 0.083 | 0.062 |
|  | (0.057) | (0.059) | (0.057) | (0.052) | (0.069) | (0.088) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,746 | 1,746 | 1,746 | 1,746 | 1,746 | 1,746 |
| R-squared | 0.045 | 0.054 | 0.077 | 0.054 | 0.046 | 0.052 |

Covariates from Table 2 above and state-of-residence fixed effects included in all columns. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1, corrected using Sankoh et al. (1997).

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Table A.8. Robustness Check on Letter Writing** | | | |
|  | Excluding Fast Respondents | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Treatment | Any Written  Message | Message to Senator | Mobility-themed  Message |
| Absolute | 0.005 | -0.021 | 0.024 |
|  | (0.052) | (0.050) | (0.033) |
| Relative | -0.027 | -0.084\* | 0.018 |
|  | (0.050) | (0.047) | (0.033) |
| Minimum Wage | -0.023 | -0.036 | 0.111\*\*\* |
|  | (0.052) | (0.049) | (0.037) |
| Cash Assistance | 0.048 | 0.045 | 0.170\*\*\* |
|  | (0.052) | (0.051) | (0.039) |
| Housing Voucher | 0.047 | -0.001 | 0.166\*\*\* |
|  | (0.052) | (0.050) | (0.039) |
| Universal Pre-K | -0.018 | -0.042 | 0.079\*\* |
|  | (0.051) | (0.049) | (0.036) |
| Marriage Tax Credit | 0.048 | -0.001 | 0.060\* |
|  | (0.051) | (0.049) | (0.033) |
| Less Immigration | -0.033 | -0.035 | 0.041 |
|  | (0.051) | (0.049) | (0.033) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,810 | 1,810 | 1,810 |
| R-squared | 0.067 | 0.062 | 0.077 |
|  | Excluding Fast & Non-U.S. Geocoded Respondents | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Treatment | Any Written  Message | Message to Senator | Mobility-themed  Message |
| Absolute | 0.002 | -0.022 | 0.023 |
|  | (0.053) | (0.051) | (0.034) |
| Relative | -0.026 | -0.069 | 0.024 |
|  | (0.052) | (0.048) | (0.034) |
| Minimum Wage | -0.030 | -0.032 | 0.113\*\*\* |
|  | (0.053) | (0.051) | (0.038) |
| Cash Assistance | 0.050 | 0.063 | 0.179\*\*\* |
|  | (0.054) | (0.052) | (0.040) |
| Housing Voucher | 0.036 | 0.002 | 0.173\*\*\* |
|  | (0.053) | (0.051) | (0.040) |
| Universal Pre-K | -0.014 | -0.035 | 0.084\*\* |
|  | (0.052) | (0.050) | (0.037) |
| Marriage Tax Credit | 0.055 | 0.014 | 0.069\*\* |
|  | (0.052) | (0.050) | (0.034) |
| Less Immigration | -0.027 | -0.027 | 0.045 |
|  | (0.052) | (0.050) | (0.034) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,746 | 1,746 | 1,746 |
| R-squared | 0.069 | 0.062 | 0.078 |

Covariates from Table 2 above and state-of-residence fixed effects included in all columns. Dependent variables as in Table 6. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Table A.9. Robustness Check on Messages Sent by Topic** | | | | | | |
|  | Excluding Fast Respondents (<4.25 minutes) | | | | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Minimum | Cash | Housing | Universal | Marriage | Less |
| Treatment | Wage | Assistance | Voucher | Pre-K | Tax Credit | Immigration |
| Absolute | 0.026 | 0.002 | 0.017 | -0.005 | -0.001 | -0.024 |
|  | (0.024) | (0.017) | (0.013) | (0.010) | (0.009) | (0.024) |
| Relative | 0.025 | -0.003 | 0.004 | 0.008 | -0.000 | -0.055\*\* |
|  | (0.023) | (0.016) | (0.010) | (0.012) | (0.009) | (0.020) |
| Minimum Wage | 0.125\*\*\* | -0.007 | 0.009 | 0.014 | 0.002 | -0.069\*\*\* |
|  | (0.030) | (0.016) | (0.010) | (0.014) | (0.010) | (0.021) |
| Cash Assistance | 0.046 | 0.109\*\*\* | 0.033\*\* | 0.003 | 0.006 | -0.007 |
|  | (0.024) | (0.026) | (0.013) | (0.011) | (0.010) | (0.025) |
| Housing Voucher | 0.035 | 0.011 | 0.103\*\*\* | 0.023 | 0.018 | -0.038 |
|  | (0.025) | (0.018) | (0.023) | (0.015) | (0.013) | (0.023) |
| Universal Pre-K | 0.007 | -0.001 | 0.000 | 0.085\*\*\* | -0.007 | -0.042 |
|  | (0.023) | (0.016) | (0.009) | (0.022) | (0.008) | (0.021) |
| Marriage Tax Credit | 0.015 | -0.011 | 0.013 | 0.024 | 0.043\*\* | -0.008 |
|  | (0.022) | (0.014) | (0.012) | (0.015) | (0.016) | (0.024) |
| Less Immigration | 0.019 | -0.019 | 0.003 | -0.004 | -0.006 | 0.096\*\*\* |
|  | (0.023) | (0.015) | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.009) | (0.031) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,810 | 1,810 | 1,810 | 1,810 | 1,810 | 1,810 |
| R-squared | 0.072 | 0.078 | 0.073 | 0.071 | 0.056 | 0.101 |
|  | Excluding Fast Respondents & Non-U.S. Geocoded Respondents | | | | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Minimum | Cash | Housing | Universal | Marriage | Less |
| Treatment | Wage | Assistance | Voucher | Pre-K | Tax Credit | Immigration |
| Absolute | 0.023 | 0.004 | 0.015 | -0.004 | -0.001 | -0.030 |
|  | (0.025) | (0.018) | (0.013) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.025) |
| Relative | 0.028 | 0.000 | 0.003 | 0.009 | -0.000 | -0.057\*\* |
|  | (0.024) | (0.017) | (0.010) | (0.013) | (0.009) | (0.021) |
| Minimum Wage | 0.126\*\*\* | -0.005 | 0.008 | 0.015 | 0.002 | -0.071\*\*\* |
|  | (0.031) | (0.016) | (0.011) | (0.014) | (0.010) | (0.022) |
| Cash Assistance | 0.047 | 0.117\*\*\* | 0.031\* | 0.004 | 0.007 | -0.007 |
|  | (0.025) | (0.027) | (0.013) | (0.012) | (0.011) | (0.026) |
| Housing Voucher | 0.036 | 0.013 | 0.104\*\*\* | 0.025 | 0.019 | -0.038 |
|  | (0.025) | (0.019) | (0.024) | (0.015) | (0.013) | (0.024) |
| Universal Pre-K | 0.008 | 0.002 | -0.000 | 0.087\*\*\* | -0.007 | -0.044 |
|  | (0.024) | (0.017) | (0.010) | (0.023) | (0.008) | (0.023) |
| Marriage Tax Credit | 0.018 | -0.008 | 0.013 | 0.025 | 0.045\*\* | -0.008 |
|  | (0.023) | (0.015) | (0.012) | (0.016) | (0.017) | (0.025) |
| Less Immigration | 0.020 | -0.017 | 0.002 | -0.004 | -0.006 | 0.097\*\*\* |
|  | (0.024) | (0.015) | (0.010) | (0.012) | (0.009) | (0.032) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,746 | 1,746 | 1,746 | 1,746 | 1,746 | 1,746 |
| R-squared | 0.070 | 0.081 | 0.075 | 0.071 | 0.058 | 0.104 |

Covariates from Table 2 above and state-of-residence fixed effects included in all columns. Dependent variables as in Table 7. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1, corrected using Sankoh et al. (1997).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Table A.10. Robustness Check on Supporting Messages Sent** | | | | | | |
|  | Excluding Fast Respondents (<4.25 minutes) | | | | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Minimum | Cash | Housing | Universal | Marriage | Less |
| VARIABLES | Wage | Assistance | Voucher | Pre-K | Tax Credit | Immigration |
| Absolute | 0.023 | -0.011 | 0.005 | -0.003 | -0.001 | -0.012 |
|  | (0.024) | (0.013) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.009) | (0.021) |
| Relative | 0.011 | -0.014 | 0.002 | 0.009 | -0.008 | -0.036 |
|  | (0.022) | (0.013) | (0.010) | (0.012) | (0.007) | (0.018) |
| Minimum Wage | 0.115\*\*\* | -0.001 | 0.007 | 0.015 | 0.004 | -0.052\*\*\* |
|  | (0.030) | (0.014) | (0.010) | (0.013) | (0.010) | (0.017) |
| Cash Assistance | 0.032 | 0.082\*\*\* | 0.022 | -0.003 | 0.005 | 0.002 |
|  | (0.022) | (0.023) | (0.012) | (0.010) | (0.009) | (0.022) |
| Housing Voucher | 0.030 | 0.014 | 0.079\*\*\* | 0.024 | 0.015 | -0.024 |
|  | (0.024) | (0.017) | (0.021) | (0.015) | (0.012) | (0.020) |
| Universal Pre-K | -0.002 | -0.002 | -0.004 | 0.079\*\*\* | -0.010 | -0.027 |
|  | (0.022) | (0.015) | (0.009) | (0.021) | (0.007) | (0.018) |
| Marriage Tax Credit | 0.009 | -0.014 | 0.006 | 0.022 | 0.013 | -0.007 |
|  | (0.022) | (0.012) | (0.011) | (0.015) | (0.011) | (0.021) |
| Less Immigration | 0.013 | -0.014 | 0.002 | -0.005 | -0.009 | 0.047 |
|  | (0.022) | (0.013) | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.007) | (0.024) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,810 | 1,810 | 1,810 | 1,810 | 1,810 | 1,810 |
| R-squared | 0.077 | 0.081 | 0.069 | 0.067 | 0.042 | 0.103 |
|  | Excluding Fast Respondents & Non-U.S. Geocoded Respondents | | | | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Minimum | Cash | Housing | Universal | Marriage | Less |
| VARIABLES | Wage | Assistance | Voucher | Pre-K | Tax Credit | Immigration |
| Absolute | 0.021 | -0.009 | 0.006 | -0.003 | -0.001 | -0.018 |
|  | (0.025) | (0.013) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.009) | (0.021) |
| Relative | 0.014 | -0.010 | 0.001 | 0.010 | -0.008 | -0.037 |
|  | (0.023) | (0.013) | (0.010) | (0.013) | (0.007) | (0.019) |
| Minimum Wage | 0.115\*\*\* | 0.002 | 0.007 | 0.015 | 0.004 | -0.053\*\* |
|  | (0.030) | (0.015) | (0.010) | (0.014) | (0.010) | (0.018) |
| Cash Assistance | 0.033 | 0.088\*\*\* | 0.020 | -0.003 | 0.005 | 0.002 |
|  | (0.023) | (0.024) | (0.012) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.023) |
| Housing Voucher | 0.031 | 0.017 | 0.081\*\*\* | 0.026 | 0.016 | -0.024 |
|  | (0.025) | (0.017) | (0.021) | (0.015) | (0.013) | (0.021) |
| Universal Pre-K | -0.001 | 0.001 | -0.004 | 0.081\*\*\* | -0.010 | -0.029 |
|  | (0.023) | (0.015) | (0.009) | (0.022) | (0.008) | (0.019) |
| Marriage Tax Credit | 0.012 | -0.011 | 0.007 | 0.023 | 0.014 | -0.007 |
|  | (0.023) | (0.012) | (0.011) | (0.016) | (0.012) | (0.022) |
| Less Immigration | 0.013 | -0.011 | 0.001 | -0.004 | -0.009 | 0.047 |
|  | (0.023) | (0.014) | (0.010) | (0.012) | (0.007) | (0.025) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,746 | 1,746 | 1,746 | 1,746 | 1,746 | 1,746 |
| R-squared | 0.076 | 0.083 | 0.070 | 0.067 | 0.043 | 0.106 |

Covariates from Table 2 above and state-of-residence fixed effects included in all columns. Dependent variables as in Table 8. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1, corrected using Sankoh et al. (1997).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Table A.11. Robustness Check on Opposing Messages Sent** | | | | | | |
|  | Excluding Fast Respondents (<4.25 minutes) | | | | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Minimum | Cash | Housing | Universal | Marriage | Less |
| TREATMENTS | Wage | Assistance | Voucher | Pre-K | Tax Credit | Immigration |
| Absolute | 0.002 | 0.012 | 0.012 | -0.002 | -0.001 | -0.012 |
|  | (0.005) | (0.011) | (0.008) | (0.001) | (0.003) | (0.012) |
| Relative | 0.013 | 0.011 | 0.002 | -0.001 | 0.008 | -0.019 |
|  | (0.007) | (0.010) | (0.003) | (0.001) | (0.005) | (0.010) |
| Minimum Wage | 0.010 | -0.006 | 0.002 | -0.001 | -0.002 | -0.017 |
|  | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.003) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.012) |
| Cash Assistance | 0.013 | 0.027 | 0.011 | 0.007 | 0.001 | -0.009 |
|  | (0.006) | (0.013) | (0.006) | (0.005) | (0.003) | (0.012) |
| Housing Voucher | 0.005 | -0.004 | 0.024\* | -0.001 | 0.003 | -0.014 |
|  | (0.005) | (0.007) | (0.010) | (0.001) | (0.003) | (0.011) |
| Universal Pre-K | 0.009 | 0.001 | 0.005 | 0.006 | 0.003 | -0.014 |
|  | (0.006) | (0.007) | (0.003) | (0.006) | (0.003) | (0.012) |
| Marriage Tax Credit | 0.006 | 0.003 | 0.008 | 0.002 | 0.030\*\* | -0.002 |
|  | (0.005) | (0.008) | (0.005) | (0.002) | (0.011) | (0.012) |
| Less Immigration | 0.006 | -0.005 | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.004 | 0.049\* |
|  | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.005) | (0.020) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,810 | 1,810 | 1,810 | 1,810 | 1,810 | 1,810 |
| R-squared | 0.055 | 0.058 | 0.066 | 0.055 | 0.070 | 0.083 |
|  | Excluding Fast Respondents & Non-U.S. Geocoded Respondents | | | | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Minimum | Cash | Housing | Universal | Marriage | Less |
| TREATMENTS | Wage | Assistance | Voucher | Pre-K | Tax Credit | Immigration |
| Absolute | 0.003 | 0.013 | 0.009 | -0.001 | 0.000 | -0.012 |
|  | (0.005) | (0.012) | (0.008) | (0.001) | (0.003) | (0.013) |
| Relative | 0.014 | 0.011 | 0.002 | -0.001 | 0.008 | -0.020 |
|  | (0.008) | (0.010) | (0.003) | (0.001) | (0.006) | (0.011) |
| Minimum Wage | 0.011 | -0.006 | 0.000 | -0.001 | -0.002 | -0.018 |
|  | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.004) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.013) |
| Cash Assistance | 0.014 | 0.028 | 0.011 | 0.007 | 0.001 | -0.009 |
|  | (0.007) | (0.013) | (0.006) | (0.005) | (0.003) | (0.013) |
| Housing Voucher | 0.006 | -0.004 | 0.023\* | -0.000 | 0.003 | -0.014 |
|  | (0.005) | (0.007) | (0.010) | (0.001) | (0.003) | (0.012) |
| Universal Pre-K | 0.009 | 0.001 | 0.004 | 0.006 | 0.003 | -0.014 |
|  | (0.006) | (0.007) | (0.003) | (0.006) | (0.003) | (0.012) |
| Marriage Tax Credit | 0.006 | 0.004 | 0.007 | 0.002 | 0.031\*\* | -0.001 |
|  | (0.005) | (0.008) | (0.005) | (0.002) | (0.012) | (0.013) |
| Less Immigration | 0.006 | -0.005 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.004 | 0.050\* |
|  | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.005) | (0.021) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,746 | 1,746 | 1,746 | 1,746 | 1,746 | 1,746 |
| R-squared | 0.057 | 0.060 | 0.073 | 0.057 | 0.072 | 0.085 |

Covariates from Table 2 above and state-of-residence fixed effects included in all columns. Dependent variables as in Table A.6. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1, corrected using Sankoh et al. (1997).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Table A.12. Robustness Check on Differences in Policy Views by Party** | | | | | | |
|  | Minimum | Cash | Housing | Universal | Marriage | Less |
|  | Wage | Assistance | Voucher | Pre-K | Tax Credit | Immigration |
|  | Panel A: Democrats (N=1,038) | | | | | |
| Absolute | 0.121\* | 0.069 | 0.001 | -0.025 | -0.019 | -0.057 |
|  | (0.073) | (0.079) | (0.091) | (0.080) | (0.094) | (0.096) |
| Relative | 0.103 | 0.033 | 0.060 | 0.016 | 0.029 | -0.197\* |
|  | (0.076) | (0.082) | (0.087) | (0.073) | (0.090) | (0.105) |
| Minimum Wage | 0.142\*\* | 0.003 | -0.017 | 0.020 | -0.054 | -0.143 |
|  | (0.071) | (0.075) | (0.081) | (0.069) | (0.079) | (0.093) |
| Cash Assistance | 0.083 | 0.164 | 0.026 | 0.057 | 0.060 | -0.138 |
|  | (0.073) | (0.102) | (0.097) | (0.082) | (0.100) | (0.118) |
| Housing Voucher | -0.050 | 0.128 | 0.168\* | 0.079 | 0.240\*\* | -0.043 |
|  | (0.068) | (0.080) | (0.102) | (0.080) | (0.107) | (0.110) |
| Universal Pre-K | -0.003 | 0.198\* | 0.056 | 0.182\*\* | -0.100 | -0.116 |
|  | (0.091) | (0.108) | (0.093) | (0.091) | (0.107) | (0.126) |
| Marriage Tax Credit | -0.030 | 0.061 | 0.050 | 0.001 | 0.062 | -0.037 |
|  | (0.073) | (0.078) | (0.098) | (0.070) | (0.106) | (0.109) |
| Less Immigration | 0.028 | 0.102 | -0.046 | -0.003 | 0.103 | -0.054 |
|  | (0.072) | (0.088) | (0.079) | (0.069) | (0.095) | (0.110) |
|  | Panel B: Independents (N=702) | | | | | |
| Absolute | -0.071 | -0.002 | 0.030 | -0.115 | -0.103 | -0.103 |
|  | (0.102) | (0.101) | (0.098) | (0.109) | (0.127) | (0.120) |
| Relative | -0.007 | 0.033 | 0.025 | -0.178\*\* | -0.004 | 0.001 |
|  | (0.091) | (0.093) | (0.103) | (0.089) | (0.128) | (0.110) |
| Minimum Wage | -0.023 | 0.152 | -0.058 | -0.052 | 0.036 | -0.023 |
|  | (0.096) | (0.095) | (0.109) | (0.092) | (0.134) | (0.106) |
| Cash Assistance | 0.021 | 0.366\*\*\* | 0.071 | -0.093 | 0.011 | 0.138 |
|  | (0.098) | (0.103) | (0.107) | (0.097) | (0.115) | (0.096) |
| Housing Voucher | -0.037 | 0.155 | 0.366\*\*\* | -0.088 | -0.008 | 0.115 |
|  | (0.101) | (0.104) | (0.123) | (0.090) | (0.120) | (0.116) |
| Universal Pre-K | 0.029 | 0.026 | -0.026 | 0.114 | 0.030 | -0.066 |
|  | (0.092) | (0.096) | (0.114) | (0.115) | (0.116) | (0.111) |
| Marriage Tax Credit | -0.024 | 0.091 | -0.103 | -0.131 | 0.102 | -0.102 |
|  | (0.094) | (0.086) | (0.101) | (0.094) | (0.126) | (0.115) |
| Less Immigration | -0.077 | -0.047 | -0.077 | -0.122 | -0.047 | 0.118 |
|  | (0.099) | (0.085) | (0.101) | (0.089) | (0.115) | (0.110) |
|  | Panel C: Republicans (N=659) | | | | | |
| Absolute | 0.224\*\* | -0.148 | 0.129 | 0.201 | 0.089 | -0.021 |
|  | (0.103) | (0.128) | (0.131) | (0.135) | (0.108) | (0.145) |
| Relative | 0.108 | 0.039 | 0.160 | 0.075 | -0.095 | -0.281 |
|  | (0.129) | (0.111) | (0.133) | (0.127) | (0.129) | (0.178) |
| Minimum Wage | 0.113 | -0.187 | 0.121 | 0.031 | -0.029 | -0.058 |
|  | (0.125) | (0.136) | (0.149) | (0.126) | (0.119) | (0.151) |
| Cash Assistance | 0.346\*\*\* | 0.101 | 0.206\* | 0.214 | -0.036 | -0.018 |
|  | (0.130) | (0.105) | (0.121) | (0.135) | (0.117) | (0.146) |
| Housing Voucher | 0.178 | 0.039 | 0.331\*\* | 0.285\*\* | -0.053 | -0.092 |
|  | (0.116) | (0.128) | (0.138) | (0.127) | (0.129) | (0.136) |
| Universal Pre-K | 0.137 | 0.057 | 0.212 | 0.273\* | 0.071 | -0.169 |
|  | (0.119) | (0.142) | (0.140) | (0.156) | (0.117) | (0.148) |
| Marriage Tax Credit | 0.303\*\*\* | -0.008 | -0.031 | 0.267\* | 0.088 | 0.034 |
|  | (0.108) | (0.128) | (0.130) | (0.144) | (0.139) | (0.125) |
| Less Immigration | 0.120 | -0.012 | -0.025 | 0.072 | 0.066 | 0.056 |
|  | (0.117) | (0.126) | (0.124) | (0.118) | (0.119) | (0.182) |

Covariates from Table 2 above and state-of-residence fixed effects included in all columns. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1, though not corrected for multiple comparisons.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Table A.13. Robustness Check on Messages Sent by Topic by Party** | | | | | | |
|  | Minimum | Cash | Housing | Universal | Marriage | Less |
|  | Wage | Assistance | Voucher | Pre-K | Tax Credit | Immigration |
|  | Panel A: Democrats (N=1,038) | | | | | |
| Absolute | 0.013 | -0.006 | 0.001 | 0.001 | -0.008 | -0.032 |
|  | (0.033) | (0.018) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.006) | (0.021) |
| Relative | 0.033 | -0.014 | 0.004 | 0.019 | -0.005 | -0.027 |
|  | (0.032) | (0.018) | (0.013) | (0.017) | (0.005) | (0.019) |
| Minimum Wage | 0.165\*\*\* | -0.004 | 0.005 | 0.048\*\* | 0.006 | -0.033 |
|  | (0.044) | (0.019) | (0.010) | (0.020) | (0.011) | (0.022) |
| Cash Assistance | 0.047 | 0.102\*\*\* | 0.029\*\* | 0.002 | 0.001 | -0.020 |
|  | (0.033) | (0.031) | (0.015) | (0.010) | (0.007) | (0.023) |
| Housing Voucher | 0.026 | 0.017 | 0.094\*\*\* | 0.019 | 0.009 | -0.026 |
|  | (0.032) | (0.022) | (0.029) | (0.015) | (0.012) | (0.021) |
| Universal Pre-K | -0.013 | -0.006 | -0.011 | 0.086\*\*\* | -0.005 | -0.030 |
|  | (0.027) | (0.019) | (0.009) | (0.028) | (0.005) | (0.021) |
| Marriage Tax Credit | 0.063\* | -0.005 | 0.013 | 0.038\*\* | 0.025\* | -0.002 |
|  | (0.034) | (0.017) | (0.014) | (0.019) | (0.015) | (0.024) |
| Less Immigration | 0.004 | -0.024 | -0.003 | 0.002 | -0.008 | 0.069\*\* |
|  | (0.031) | (0.016) | (0.010) | (0.015) | (0.005) | (0.033) |
|  | Panel B: Independents (N=702) | | | | | |
| Absolute | 0.050 | 0.031 | 0.027 | -0.002 | 0.016 | 0.038 |
|  | (0.034) | (0.026) | (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.021) | (0.031) |
| Relative | 0.026 | 0.016 | 0.003 | -0.023 | 0.010 | -0.024 |
|  | (0.030) | (0.030) | (0.014) | (0.019) | (0.020) | (0.020) |
| Minimum Wage | 0.058 | -0.016 | 0.018 | -0.024 | -0.004 | -0.025 |
|  | (0.035) | (0.025) | (0.021) | (0.022) | (0.015) | (0.024) |
| Cash Assistance | 0.046 | 0.068\* | 0.034\* | 0.006 | -0.004 | 0.040 |
|  | (0.030) | (0.037) | (0.020) | (0.024) | (0.015) | (0.036) |
| Housing Voucher | 0.058 | 0.018 | 0.079\*\* | 0.027 | 0.032 | 0.021 |
|  | (0.035) | (0.030) | (0.036) | (0.031) | (0.026) | (0.027) |
| Universal Pre-K | 0.048 | 0.011 | 0.009 | 0.036 | -0.003 | 0.005 |
|  | (0.032) | (0.023) | (0.019) | (0.028) | (0.017) | (0.022) |
| Marriage Tax Credit | -0.002 | -0.018 | -0.000 | -0.013 | 0.014 | -0.012 |
|  | (0.029) | (0.020) | (0.012) | (0.023) | (0.024) | (0.020) |
| Less Immigration | 0.016 | -0.011 | 0.007 | -0.025 | 0.017 | 0.082\*\* |
|  | (0.026) | (0.023) | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.023) | (0.037) |
|  | Panel C: Republicans (N=659) | | | | | |
| Absolute | 0.004 | 0.013 | 0.026 | -0.007 | 0.005 | -0.036 |
|  | (0.025) | (0.023) | (0.023) | (0.010) | (0.013) | (0.045) |
| Relative | 0.002 | 0.015 | 0.018 | 0.024 | 0.004 | -0.061 |
|  | (0.024) | (0.024) | (0.023) | (0.017) | (0.015) | (0.040) |
| Minimum Wage | 0.101\*\* | 0.000 | 0.015 | 0.008 | 0.014 | -0.094\*\* |
|  | (0.039) | (0.017) | (0.013) | (0.017) | (0.015) | (0.040) |
| Cash Assistance | -0.008 | 0.078\*\* | 0.013 | -0.002 | 0.029 | -0.035 |
|  | (0.021) | (0.033) | (0.016) | (0.011) | (0.022) | (0.043) |
| Housing Voucher | 0.008 | 0.009 | 0.074\*\* | 0.015 | 0.014 | -0.051 |
|  | (0.024) | (0.016) | (0.030) | (0.016) | (0.014) | (0.044) |
| Universal Pre-K | 0.004 | 0.009 | 0.004 | 0.086\*\* | 0.005 | -0.044 |
|  | (0.025) | (0.016) | (0.011) | (0.035) | (0.012) | (0.045) |
| Marriage Tax Credit | 0.001 | 0.025 | 0.031 | 0.016 | 0.084\*\* | -0.002 |
|  | (0.026) | (0.019) | (0.022) | (0.022) | (0.036) | (0.051) |
| Less Immigration | 0.033 | 0.016 | 0.017 | 0.001 | -0.002 | 0.080 |
|  | (0.028) | (0.020) | (0.018) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.059) |

Covariates from Table 2 above and state-of-residence fixed effects included in all columns. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1, though not corrected for multiple comparisons.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Table A.14. Robustness Check on Supporting Messages Sent by Party** | | | | | | |
|  | Minimum | Cash | Housing | Universal | Marriage | Less |
|  | Wage | Assistance | Voucher | Pre-K | Tax Credit | Immigration |
|  | Panel A: Democrats (N=1,038) | | | | | |
| Absolute | 0.014 | -0.006 | -0.000 | 0.001 | -0.005 | -0.023 |
|  | (0.033) | (0.018) | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.005) | (0.014) |
| Relative | 0.033 | -0.014 | 0.003 | 0.019 | -0.003 | -0.006 |
|  | (0.032) | (0.018) | (0.013) | (0.017) | (0.005) | (0.014) |
| Minimum Wage | 0.165\*\*\* | -0.004 | 0.004 | 0.048\*\* | 0.010 | -0.019 |
|  | (0.044) | (0.019) | (0.010) | (0.020) | (0.011) | (0.013) |
| Cash Assistance | 0.047 | 0.103\*\*\* | 0.028\* | 0.002 | 0.004 | -0.011 |
|  | (0.033) | (0.031) | (0.014) | (0.010) | (0.007) | (0.016) |
| Housing Voucher | 0.028 | 0.012 | 0.088\*\*\* | 0.019 | 0.011 | -0.016 |
|  | (0.032) | (0.022) | (0.029) | (0.015) | (0.012) | (0.013) |
| Universal Pre-K | -0.012 | -0.005 | -0.012 | 0.086\*\*\* | -0.002 | -0.017 |
|  | (0.027) | (0.019) | (0.009) | (0.028) | (0.004) | (0.013) |
| Marriage Tax Credit | 0.058\* | -0.005 | 0.013 | 0.038\*\* | 0.001 | -0.009 |
|  | (0.034) | (0.017) | (0.014) | (0.019) | (0.005) | (0.014) |
| Less Immigration | 0.004 | -0.024 | -0.004 | 0.002 | -0.005 | 0.014 |
|  | (0.031) | (0.015) | (0.010) | (0.015) | (0.004) | (0.019) |
|  | Panel B: Independents (N=702) | | | | | |
| Absolute | 0.047 | -0.002 | 0.011 | -0.003 | 0.014 | 0.031 |
|  | (0.033) | (0.019) | (0.016) | (0.020) | (0.021) | (0.023) |
| Relative | 0.006 | -0.004 | 0.006 | -0.022 | 0.002 | -0.011 |
|  | (0.023) | (0.023) | (0.013) | (0.019) | (0.013) | (0.010) |
| Minimum Wage | 0.057 | -0.017 | 0.017 | -0.024 | -0.000 | -0.012 |
|  | (0.035) | (0.025) | (0.020) | (0.022) | (0.014) | (0.010) |
| Cash Assistance | 0.021 | 0.043 | 0.023 | -0.007 | -0.002 | 0.057\*\* |
|  | (0.023) | (0.033) | (0.016) | (0.021) | (0.015) | (0.029) |
| Housing Voucher | 0.042 | 0.017 | 0.059\* | 0.031 | 0.034 | 0.032 |
|  | (0.034) | (0.029) | (0.031) | (0.031) | (0.026) | (0.020) |
| Universal Pre-K | 0.040 | -0.003 | 0.001 | 0.035 | -0.009 | 0.014 |
|  | (0.031) | (0.021) | (0.018) | (0.028) | (0.015) | (0.015) |
| Marriage Tax Credit | -0.001 | -0.022 | -0.003 | -0.012 | 0.005 | -0.008 |
|  | (0.028) | (0.019) | (0.012) | (0.022) | (0.020) | (0.010) |
| Less Immigration | 0.005 | -0.007 | 0.008 | -0.025 | 0.004 | 0.059\*\* |
|  | (0.021) | (0.022) | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.019) | (0.027) |
|  | Panel C: Republicans (N=659) | | | | | |
| Absolute | -0.002 | 0.001 | 0.009 | -0.001 | -0.001 | -0.033 |
|  | (0.022) | (0.004) | (0.015) | (0.009) | (0.011) | (0.045) |
| Relative | -0.007 | -0.004 | 0.012 | 0.026 | -0.007 | -0.060 |
|  | (0.021) | (0.005) | (0.021) | (0.017) | (0.011) | (0.040) |
| Minimum Wage | 0.075\*\* | 0.004 | 0.005 | 0.007 | 0.006 | -0.091\*\* |
|  | (0.036) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.017) | (0.013) | (0.040) |
| Cash Assistance | -0.015 | 0.018 | -0.003 | -0.009 | 0.014 | -0.034 |
|  | (0.019) | (0.016) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.020) | (0.043) |
| Housing Voucher | 0.005 | 0.013 | 0.032 | 0.013 | -0.003 | -0.047 |
|  | (0.023) | (0.009) | (0.021) | (0.016) | (0.011) | (0.044) |
| Universal Pre-K | -0.012 | 0.009 | -0.005 | 0.070\*\* | -0.005 | -0.042 |
|  | (0.018) | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.032) | (0.010) | (0.045) |
| Marriage Tax Credit | -0.014 | -0.001 | 0.008 | 0.010 | 0.035 | 0.001 |
|  | (0.023) | (0.005) | (0.015) | (0.022) | (0.026) | (0.051) |
| Less Immigration | 0.020 | 0.012 | 0.013 | -0.003 | -0.005 | 0.064 |
|  | (0.027) | (0.015) | (0.017) | (0.012) | (0.011) | (0.058) |

Covariates from Table 2 above and state-of-residence fixed effects included in all columns. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1, though not corrected for multiple comparisons.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Table A.15. Robustness Check on Opposing Messages Sent by Party** | | | | | | |
|  | Minimum | Cash | Housing | Universal | Marriage | Less |
| VARIABLES | Wage | Assistance | Voucher | Pre-K | Tax Credit | Immigration |
|  | Panel A: Democrats (N=1,038) | | | | | |
| Absolute | -0.000 | -0.000 | 0.001 | 0.000 | -0.002 | -0.010 |
|  | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.003) | (0.016) |
| Relative | -0.000 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.000 | -0.002 | -0.020 |
|  | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.002) | (0.014) |
| Minimum Wage | -0.000 | -0.000 | 0.001 | 0.000 | -0.004 | -0.014 |
|  | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.003) | (0.017) |
| Cash Assistance | -0.001 | -0.000 | 0.001 | 0.000 | -0.003 | -0.009 |
|  | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.003) | (0.017) |
| Housing Voucher | -0.001 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.000 | -0.002 | -0.010 |
|  | (0.001) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.000) | (0.003) | (0.016) |
| Universal Pre-K | -0.001 | -0.000 | 0.001 | 0.000 | -0.003 | -0.013 |
|  | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.003) | (0.016) |
| Marriage Tax Credit | 0.005 | -0.000 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.024\* | 0.007 |
|  | (0.004) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.014) | (0.019) |
| Less Immigration | -0.001 | -0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | -0.003 | 0.055\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.003) | (0.028) |
|  | Panel B: Independents (N=702) | | | | | |
| Absolute | 0.003 | 0.033\* | 0.015 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.007 |
|  | (0.005) | (0.017) | (0.013) | (0.002) | (0.004) | (0.020) |
| Relative | 0.020 | 0.020 | -0.002 | -0.001 | 0.008 | -0.013 |
|  | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.005) | (0.003) | (0.015) | (0.017) |
| Minimum Wage | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | -0.003 | -0.013 |
|  | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.004) | (0.002) | (0.005) | (0.021) |
| Cash Assistance | 0.025\* | 0.025 | 0.011 | 0.012 | -0.002 | -0.017 |
|  | (0.015) | (0.018) | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.003) | (0.019) |
| Housing Voucher | 0.016 | 0.001 | 0.019 | -0.004 | -0.001 | -0.010 |
|  | (0.012) | (0.007) | (0.016) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.017) |
| Universal Pre-K | 0.008 | 0.014 | 0.008 | 0.001 | 0.006 | -0.009 |
|  | (0.007) | (0.010) | (0.006) | (0.002) | (0.005) | (0.015) |
| Marriage Tax Credit | -0.001 | 0.003 | 0.003 | -0.002 | 0.010 | -0.004 |
|  | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.004) | (0.003) | (0.012) | (0.016) |
| Less Immigration | 0.011 | -0.005 | -0.001 | 0.000 | 0.013 | 0.022 |
|  | (0.015) | (0.006) | (0.004) | (0.003) | (0.014) | (0.026) |
|  | Panel C: Republicans (N=659) | | | | | |
| Absolute | 0.006 | 0.012 | 0.017 | -0.005 | 0.005 | -0.002 |
|  | (0.011) | (0.023) | (0.018) | (0.004) | (0.008) | (0.003) |
| Relative | 0.009 | 0.019 | 0.006 | -0.002 | 0.011 | -0.001 |
|  | (0.012) | (0.023) | (0.011) | (0.003) | (0.010) | (0.002) |
| Minimum Wage | 0.026 | -0.004 | 0.010 | 0.001 | 0.008 | -0.003 |
|  | (0.018) | (0.015) | (0.008) | (0.003) | (0.007) | (0.004) |
| Cash Assistance | 0.007 | 0.060\*\* | 0.016 | 0.006 | 0.014 | -0.001 |
|  | (0.009) | (0.030) | (0.012) | (0.007) | (0.009) | (0.002) |
| Housing Voucher | 0.003 | -0.005 | 0.042\* | 0.002 | 0.016 | -0.004 |
|  | (0.007) | (0.013) | (0.022) | (0.003) | (0.010) | (0.004) |
| Universal Pre-K | 0.016 | -0.001 | 0.009 | 0.016 | 0.010 | -0.002 |
|  | (0.019) | (0.013) | (0.009) | (0.016) | (0.008) | (0.003) |
| Marriage Tax Credit | 0.015 | 0.026 | 0.023 | 0.005 | 0.049\*\* | -0.003 |
|  | (0.013) | (0.019) | (0.016) | (0.006) | (0.025) | (0.004) |
| Less Immigration | 0.013 | 0.003 | 0.004 | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.015 |
|  | (0.008) | (0.013) | (0.007) | (0.003) | (0.007) | (0.015) |

Covariates from Table 2 above and state-of-residence fixed effects included in all columns. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1, though not corrected for multiple comparisons.

APPENDIX B. Complete Survey

Start of Block: Default Question Block

**1. Statement of purpose:** You are invited to participate in a study of public opinion regarding U.S. public policies. We hope to learn your views on a variety of policies that affect everyday Americans. You were selected as a possible participant in this study because you are above 18 years old and you are a U.S. resident.

**2. Description, Including Risks and Benefits:** If you decide to participate, you will answer several questions regarding your views on U.S. public policies. The survey will take around 15 minutes. You will earn $1.50 for completing the survey. Instructions for receiving payment through Amazon Mechanical Turk appear at the end of the survey. You will answer a series of questions about U.S. government policies, see some information about these policies, and also answer some short questions about your own characteristics. There are no expected risks or discomforts associated with the survey questions.

**4. Confidentiality:** Any information obtained in connection with this study will remain confidential and will not be disclosed to the general public in a way that can be traced to you. In any written reports or publications, no participant other than the researchers will be identified, and only anonymous data will be presented. This consent form, with your signature, will be stored separately and independently from the data collected so that your responses will not be identifiable.

**6. Statement that Participation Is Voluntary:** Your participation is totally voluntary, and your decision whether or not to participate will not affect your future relations with Bryant University or its employees in any way. If you decide to participate, you are also free to discontinue participation at any time without affecting such relationships. You will not receive payment, however, if you do not complete the survey.

**7. Persons to Contact:** If you have any questions, please contact **AUTHOR 1 [number, email] or AUTHOR 2 [number, email].** If you have any additional questions later, we will be happy to answer them. **You can email either researcher for a copy of this form.**

**8. Signature Indicating Informed Consent:** Please click below if you have decided to participate. Clicking indicates only that you are at least 18 years of age and have read the information provided above. It does not obligate you to participate, and you may withdraw from the study at any time without consequences.

* I agree to participate in this research (1)
* I decline to participate in this research (2)

Skip To: End of Survey If 1. Statement of purpose You are invited to participate in a study of public opinion regarding... = I decline to participate in this research

End of Block: Default Question Block

Start of Block: demographic

Q1 What is your sex?

Male (1)

Female (2)

Q2 What is your age in years?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Q3 What is your marital status?

Now married (1)

Widowed (2)

Divorced (3)

Separated (4)

Never married (5)

Q4 Do you have any children under the age of 18?

Yes, living with me (1)

Yes, but not living with me (2)

No (3)

Q5 Do you consider yourself to be Hispanic or Latino?

No (1)

Yes (2)

Q6 What is your race (mark all that apply)?

White (1)

Black or African American (2)

American Indian or Alaska Native (3)

Asian (4)

Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander (5)

Other (6)

Q7 Are you a citizen of the United States?

Yes (1)

No (2)

Q8 Were you born in the United States?

Yes (1)

No (2)

Q9 In which state do you currently reside?

▼ Alabama (1) ... I do not reside in the United States (53)

End of Block: demographic

Start of Block: education

Q10 What is the highest degree or level of school that you completed?

None (1)

Less than high school (2)

High school graduate or GED (3)

Some college, no degree (4)

Associate degree (5)

Bachelor's degree (6)

Graduate degree (7)

Q11 Which of these best describes your current employment status?

Employed full-time (1)

Employed part-time (2)

Not employed, actively seeking employment (3)

Not employed, not actively seeking employment (but not retired) (4)

Retired (5)

Q12 Last year, that is in 2018, what was your total family income from all sources, before taxes?

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | | Income (thousands of dollars) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|  | 0 | 10 | 20 | 30 | | 40 | 50 | 60 | 70 | 80 | 90 | 100 | 110 | 120 | 130 | 140 | 150 | 160 | 170 | 180 | 190 | 200 |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Your family's income (1) |  |

End of Block: education

Start of Block: political

Q13 Are you registered to vote in the United States?

Yes (1)

No (2)

Q14 In politics today, do you consider yourself a:

Republican (1)

Democrat (2)

Independent (3)

Something else (4)

Skip To: Q15 If In politics today, do you consider yourself a: = Republican

Skip To: Q15 If In politics today, do you consider yourself a: = Democrat

Q14.1 As of today, do you lean more to...

the Republican Party? (1)

the Democratic Party? (2)

Q15 On economic policy matters, with 0 being liberal and 10 being conservative, where do you see yourself on the spectrum?

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Economic Policy Spectrum (Larger number=more conservative) | | | | | | | | | | |
|  | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Economic Policy () |  |

Q16 On social policy matters, again with 0 being liberal and 10 being conservative, where do you see yourself on the spectrum?

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Social Policy Spectrum (Larger number=more conservative) | | | | | | | | | | |
|  | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Social Policy () |  |

Q17 Looking ahead to the next election for president, if Donald Trump runs for reelection as the Republican candidate, will you definitely vote for Trump in that election, probably vote for Trump, probably vote for the Democratic candidate, definitely vote for the Democratic candidate, or something else?

Definitely Trump (1)

Probably Trump (2)

Probably the Democrat (3)

Definitely the Democrat (4)

Something else (5)

Unsure (6)

End of Block: political

Start of Block: give\_luck/effort

Q18 What is your willingness to donate to charitable causes on a 1-10 scale, where 10 indicates the highest willingness to donate?

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 5 () |  |

Q22 On a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 representing "only luck" and 10 representing "only effort", please indicate which you think determines how well a person does in life, economically speaking.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 0=Only luck | | | | | | 10=Only effort | | | | | |
|  | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 1 () |  |

End of Block: give\_luck/effort

Start of Block: Block 5

Q24 Policymakers have come up with many proposals to help increase economic mobility for more Americans. For each of these policies, please indicate whether you would favor or oppose the federal government adopting this policy to improve economic mobility:

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Strongly favor (1) | Favor (2) | Neither favor nor oppose (3) | Oppose (4) | Strongly oppose (5) |
| Increasing the minimum wage (1) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Providing cash assistance to low income families (2) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Providing housing vouchers for low income families to move to middle-class neighborhoods (3) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Establishing universal pre-kindergarten for all children in the country (4) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Using financial incentives like tax credits to promote raising children in two-parent families (5) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Reducing legal and illegal immigration of low-skilled workers to the U.S. (6) |  |  |  |  |  |

End of Block: Block 5

Start of Block: Relative Info + Recycle Arg (RELATIVE TREATMENT)

Text Now we'd like to ask you some questions about economic mobility in the United States today.

Relative Top 20 Imagine all of the children **born to parents** in the **top 20 percent** of the income distribution in the 1980s here in the U.S. (that is, the children of the highest income families). If we were to take those children as adults today, what percentage of them do you think are in each of the following income groups:

Lowest 20 percent today (1st-20th percentile) : \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ (1)

Second lowest 20 percent today (21-40th percentile) : \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ (2)

Middle 20 percent today (41st-60th percentile) : \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ (3)

Second highest 20 percent today (61st-80th percentile) : \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ (4)

Highest 20 percent today (81st-99th percentile) : \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ (5)

Total : \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Relative Bottom 20 Now imagine all of the children **born to parents in the bottom 20 percent** of the income distribution in the 1980s here in the U.S. (that is, the children of the lowest income families). If we were to take those children as adults today, what percentage of them do you think are in each of the following income groups:

Lowest 20 percent today (1st-20th percentile) : \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ (1)

Second lowest 20 percent today (21-40th percentile) : \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ (2)

Middle 20 percent today (41st-60th percentile) : \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ (3)

Second highest 20 percent today (61st-80th percentile) : \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ (4)

Highest 20 percent today (81-99th percentile) : \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ (5)


Total : \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_


Treatment Text On the last page, you made several guesses about income and economic mobility in the United States. Here are the actual numbers from government statistics and academic research on the topic.

Q53 We asked you to imagine where the children **in the top 20 percent**of the income distribution in the 1980s **ended up today as adults**.   
   
Your guesses **were**   
1. **${Relative Top 20/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/1} %**at the bottom 20 percent today (1-20)   
 2. ${Relative Top 20/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/2}% at the 2nd lowest 20 percent today (21-40)   
3. **${Relative Top 20/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/3}%**at the middle 20 percent today (41-60)   
4. ${Relative Top 20/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/4}% at the second highest 20 percent today (41-60)   
5. ${Relative Top 20/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/5}% at the top 20 percent today (81-100)   
   
The**actual distribution** of the **Top 20% children end up with**:   
1. **11%** at the bottom 20 percent today (1-20)   
2. **12%** at the 2nd lowest 20 percent today (21-40)   
3. **17%** at the middle 20 percent today (41-60)   
4. **24%** at the 2nd highest 20 percent today (61-80)   
5. **36%** at the top 20 percent today (81-100)


Text We also asked you to imagine where the children in the **bottom 20 percent** of the income distribution in the 1980s **ended up today as adults**.   
   
Your guesses were   
1. ${Relative Bottom 20/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/1}% at the bottom 20 percent today (1-20)   
 2. ${Relative Bottom 20/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/2}% at the 2nd lowest 20 percent today (21-40)   
3. ${Relative Bottom 20/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/3}% at the middle 20 percent today (41-60)   
4. ${Relative Bottom 20/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/4}% at the second highest 20 percent today (41-60)   
5. ${Relative Bottom 20/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/5}% at the top 20 percent today (81-100)   
   
The actual distribution of the Top 20% children end up with:   
1. **34**% at the bottom 20 percent today (1-20)   
2. 28% at the 2nd lowest 20 percent today (21-40)   
3. 18% at the middle 20 percent today (41-60)   
4. **12**% at the 2nd highest 20 percent today (61-80)   
5. **8**% at the top 20 percent today (81-100)   
   
Also see the graph below (with lowest 20% on the left, and highest 20% on the right)

Top 20 Also see the graph below (with lowest 20% on the left, and highest 20% on the right)





Q65 **Recycling** The United States produces roughly 250 million tons of trash each year. Most of that trash goes into landfills, which can pollute our water, and wastes valuable materials that could be used again. Recycling saves those materials, reducing the pollution of our air and water, and saving valuable natural resources, too. Overall, only about a third of the solid waste we produce each year gets recycled. While nearly all of some materials—like the lead in car batteries—gets used again, only about 55 percent of aluminum cans and less than 30 percent of plastic water bottles get recycled. Throwing these away not only puts long-lived trash into our environment, it wastes energy, as reusing existing metals and plastics is often more energy-efficient than producing new materials. Recycling is easy in most communities in the United States today. Just separating out the most valuable recyclables, like metal cans, reduces litter, saves energy, protects natural resources, and fights climate change.



End of Block: Relative Info + Recycle Arg

Start of Block: Absolute Infor + Recycle Arg (ABSOLUTE TREATMENT)

Q81 Now we'd like to ask you some questions about economic mobility in the United States today.


Absolute Mobility Imagine all of the children **born to parents** of the income distribution in 1980 here in the U.S. If we were to take **those children as adults today**, what percentage of them do you think **would earn more than their parents**when their parents are in each of the following income groups:

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 0 | 10 | 20 | 30 | 40 | 50 | 60 | 70 | 80 | 90 | 100 |


|  |
| --- |
| Parents in lowest 20 percent (1st-20th percentile) () |
| Parents in the second lowest 20 percent (21-40th percentile) () |
| Parents in the middle 20 percent (41st-60th percentile) () |
| Parents in the second highest 20 percent (61st-80th percentile) () |
| Parents in the highest 20 percent today (81st-99th percentile) () |

Q85 On the last page, you made several guesses about income and economic mobility in the United States. Here are the actual numbers from government statistics and academic research on the topic.

Q86 Your guesses **were**   
1. born at lowest 20 percent: **${Absolute Mobility/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/1} %** earn more than their parents  
 2. born at 2nd lowest 20 percent: ${Absolute Mobility/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/2}% earn more than their parents   
3. born at middle 20 percent: **${Absolute Mobility/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/3}%** earn more than their parents   
4. born at 2nd highest 20 percent: ${Absolute Mobility/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/4}% earn more than their parents   
5. born at top 20 percent: ${Absolute Mobility/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/5}% earn more than their parents   
   
The**actual numbers are**   
1. born at lowest 20 percent: **69%** earn more than their parents   
2. born at 2nd lowest 20 percent: **51%** earn more than their parents   
3. born at middle 20 percent: **45%** earn more than their parents   
4. born at 2nd highest 20 percent: **40%** earn more than their parents   
5. born at top 20 percent: **30%** earn more than their parents   
   
Also see the graph below (with lowest 20% on the left, and highest 20% on the right)



Q91 **Recycling** The United States produces roughly 250 million tons of trash each year. Most of that trash goes into landfills, which can pollute our water, and wastes valuable materials that could be used again. Recycling saves those materials, reducing the pollution of our air and water, and saving valuable natural resources, too. Overall, only about a third of the solid waste we produce each year gets recycled. While nearly all of some materials—like the lead in car batteries—gets used again, only about 55 percent of aluminum cans and less than 30 percent of plastic water bottles get recycled. Throwing these away not only puts long-lived trash into our environment, it wastes energy, as reusing existing metals and plastics is often more energy-efficient than producing new materials. Recycling is easy in most communities in the United States today. Just separating out the most valuable recyclables, like metal cans, reduces litter, saves energy, protects natural resources, and fights climate change.



End of Block: Absolute Infor + Recycle Arg

Start of Block: Recycle info + Recycle Arg (CONTROL—RECYCLE)

Q141 Now we'd like to ask you some questions about waste disposal in the United States today.


Recycling Info Imagine all of the solid waste (or trash) that the United States produces each year. For each of the five categories of goods below, what percentage of each do you think are recycled annually in the United States each year?

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 0 | 10 | 20 | 30 | 40 | 50 | 60 | 70 | 80 | 90 | 100 |


|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Lead-acid Batteries () |  |
| Newspapers/Mechanical Papers () |  |
| Aluminum Beer & Soda Cans () |  |
| Tires () |  |
| Glass containers () |  |

Q144 On the last page, you made several guesses about waste disposal in the United States. Here are the actual numbers from government statistics and academic research on the topic.

Q145 Your guesses **were**   
1. ${Recycling Info/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/1}**%**for Lead-Acid Batteries   
2. ${Recycling Info/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/2}% for Newspapers/Mechnical Papers   
3. **${Recycling Info/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/3}%** for Aluminum Beer & Soda Cans   
4. ${Recycling Info/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/4}% for Tires   
5. ${Recycling Info/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/5}% for Glass Containers   
   
The**actual numbers are:**   
1. **99%** for Lead-Acid Batteries   
2. **67%** for Newspapers/Mechanical Papers   
3. **55%**for Aluminum Beer & Soda Cans   
4. **41%** for Tires   
5. **34%** for Glass Containers.   
 And also see the graph below



Q149 **Recycling** The United States produces roughly 250 million tons of trash each year. Most of that trash goes into landfills, which can pollute our water, and wastes valuable materials that could be used again. Recycling saves those materials, reducing the pollution of our air and water, and saving valuable natural resources, too. Overall, only about a third of the solid waste we produce each year gets recycled. While nearly all of some materials—like the lead in car batteries—gets used again, only about 55 percent of aluminum cans and less than 30 percent of plastic water bottles get recycled. Throwing these away not only puts long-lived trash into our environment, it wastes energy, as reusing existing metals and plastics is often more energy-efficient than producing new materials. Recycling is easy in most communities in the United States today. Just separating out the most valuable recyclables, like metal cans, reduces litter, saves energy, protects natural resources, and fights climate change.



End of Block: Recycle info + Recycle Arg

Start of Block: Recycle info + Policy 1 (mini wage) (MINIMUM WAGE TREATMENT)

Q68 Now we'd like to ask you some questions about waste disposal in the United States today.


Q69 Imagine all of the solid waste (or trash) that the United States produces each year. For each of the five categories of goods below, what percentage of each do you think are recycled annually in the United States each year?

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 0 | 10 | 20 | 30 | 40 | 50 | 60 | 70 | 80 | 90 | 100 |


|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Lead-acid Batteries () |  |
| Newspapers/Mechanical Papers () |  |
| Aluminum Beer & Soda Cans () |  |
| Tires () |  |
| Glass containers () |  |

Q72 On the last page, you made several guesses about waste disposal in the United States. Here are the actual numbers from government statistics and academic research on the topic.

Q73 Your guesses **were**   
1. ${Q69/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/1}**%**for Lead-Acid Batteries   
2. ${Q69/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/2}% for Newspapers/Mechnical Papers   
3. **${Q69/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/3}%** for Aluminum Beer & Soda Cans   
4. ${Q69/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/4}% for Tires   
5. ${Q69/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/5}% for Glass Containers   
   
The**actual numbers are:**   
1. **99%** for Lead-Acid Batteries   
2. **67%** for Newspapers/Mechanical Papers   
3. **55%**for Aluminum Beer & Soda Cans   
4. **41%** for Tires   
5. **34%** for Glass Containers.   
   
And also see the graph below



Q54 **Increasing the minimum wage**  
   
Many workers appear to be “stuck” at the lowest earning levels in American society today. Raising the minimum wage can increase the incomes of the lowest-earners in society, which would mean more resources and opportunities available to the children of these low-income workers.  
   
The minimum wage usually remains the same over many years in Figure, which means that as prices rise, the real purchasing power of these families’ income declines. That’s one reason we need to raise the minimum wage to help these families.  
   
Another is that, as productivity and average wages have risen, the minimum wage has not kept pace. If the federal minimum wage had gone up as much as average wages, it’d be over 11 dollars today. And if it had gone up as much as productivity, the minimum wage would be nearly 19 dollars. Children are in low-income families because firms don’t pay their workers enough; the minimum wage will help those families and those children to rise.



End of Block: Recycle info + Policy 1 (mini wage)

Start of Block: Recycle info+policy2 (cash) (CASH ASSISTANCE TREATMENT)

Q94 Now we'd like to ask you some questions about waste disposal in the United States today.


Q95 Imagine all of the solid waste (or trash) that the United States produces each year. For each of the five categories of goods below, what percentage of each do you think are recycled annually in the United States each year?

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 0 | 10 | 20 | 30 | 40 | 50 | 60 | 70 | 80 | 90 | 100 |


|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Lead-acid Batteries () |  |
| Newspapers/Mechanical Papers () |  |
| Aluminum Beer & Soda Cans () |  |
| Tires () |  |
| Glass containers () |  |

Q97 On the last page, you made several guesses about waste disposal in the United States. Here are the actual numbers from government statistics and academic research on the topic.

Q98  Your guesses **were**  
1. ${Q95/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/1}**%**for Lead-Acid Batteries  
2. ${Q95/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/2}% for Newspapers/Mechnical Papers   
3. **${Q95/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/3}%**for Aluminum Beer & Soda Cans  
4. ${Q95/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/4}% for Tires  
5 ${Q95/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/5}% for class Containers  
   
The**actual numbers are:**  
1. **99%** for Lead-Acid Batteries   
2. **67%** for Newspapers/Mechanical Papers   
3. **55%**for Aluminum Beer & Soda Cans   
4. **41%** for Tires   
5. **34%** for Glass Containers.   
   
And also see the graph below



Q56 **Providing cash assistance to low income families**  
   
Federal cash and cash-like assistance programs, also sometimes called “welfare”, help keep poor families from poverty’s deepest deprivations and allow them to prepare for and find new work. They also improve poor children’s physical, emotional, and cognitive development. Cash welfare is also flexible, allowing families to allocate resources at they need them.  
   
Many researchers have found that cash assistance programs help individuals and families break the cycle of poverty across generations and move up the income distribution. Sometimes cash welfare comes with conditions, like making sure children get to check-ups, or maintaining a certain number of hours of work for parents. But with or without conditions, cash assistance works to improve children’s health and well-being, and move families out of poverty.  
   
The federal government has reduced the amount of cash assistance to America’s poorest families, even as economic growth has stalled (. To help children reach their full potential and pull out of poverty, we need more cash assistance for poor families.



End of Block: Recycle info+policy2 (cash)

Start of Block: Recycle info+policy 3 (voucher) (HOUSING VOUCHER TREATMENT)

Q103 Now we'd like to ask you some questions about waste disposal in the United States today.


Q104 Imagine all of the solid waste (or trash) that the United States produces each year. For each of the five categories of goods below, what percentage of each do you think are recycled annually in the United States each year?

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 0 | 10 | 20 | 30 | 40 | 50 | 60 | 70 | 80 | 90 | 100 |


|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Lead-acid Batteries () |  |
| Newspapers/Mechanical Papers () |  |
| Aluminum Beer & Soda Cans () |  |
| Tires () |  |
| Glass containers () |  |

Q106 On the last page, you made several guesses about waste disposal in the United States. Here are the actual numbers from government statistics and academic research on the topic.

Q107 Your guesses **were**   
1. ${Q104/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/1}**%**for Lead-Acid Batteries   
2. ${Q104/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/2}% for Newspapers/Mechanical papers   
3. **${Q104/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/3}%**for Aluminum Beer & Soda Cans   
4. ${Q104/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/4}% for Tires   
5. ${Q104/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/5}% for Glass Containers   
   
The**actual numbers are:**   
1. **99%** for Lead-Acid Batteries   
2. **67%** for Newspapers/Mechanical Papers   
3. **55%**for Aluminum Beer & Soda Cans   
4. **41%** for Tires   
5. **34%** for Glass Containers.   
   
 And also see the graph below



Q57 **Providing housing vouchers for low income families to move to middle class neighborhoods** Hundreds of studies demonstrate that children’s economic success in adulthood is higher the better the neighborhood they grow up in. The schools, community, neighbors, local amenities, economic opportunities and social norms that make up a neighborhood shape children’s outcomes. Recent research shows that the children of low-income families whose parents move them to higher-income neighborhoods have much better outcomes than those who remain in lower-income neighborhoods. The earlier the child moved to the better neighborhood, the larger the effect on children’s college attainment and their economic mobility as adults. One way to help low-income parents move their children to better neighborhoods is housing vouchers. A high-quality experiment using data on a federal housing voucher program not only shows that they work, but that the increased taxes the next generation of successful children will pay more than compensates for the cost of the voucher. That’s why we need more housing vouchers to help poor families move their children to better neighborhoods.



End of Block: Recycle info+policy 3 (voucher)

Start of Block: Recycle info+policy 4 (pre-K) (UNIVERSAL PRE-K TREATMENT)

Q112 Now we'd like to ask you some questions about waste disposal in the United States today.


Q113 Imagine all of the solid waste (or trash) that the United States produces each year. For each of the five categories of goods below, what percentage of each do you think are recycled annually in the United States each year?

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 0 | 10 | 20 | 30 | 40 | 50 | 60 | 70 | 80 | 90 | 100 |


|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Lead-acid Batteries () |  |
| Newspapers/Mechanical Papers () |  |
| Aluminum Beer & Soda Cans () |  |
| Tires () |  |
| Glass containers () |  |

Q115 On the last page, you made several guesses about waste disposal in the United States. Here are the actual numbers from government statistics and academic research on the topic.

Q116 Your guesses **were**   
1. ${Q113/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/1}**%**for Lead-Acid Batteries   
2. ${Q113/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/2}% for Newspapers/Mechanical papers   
3. **${Q113/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/3}%**for Aluminum Beer & Soda Cans   
4. ${Q113/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/4}% for Tires   
5. ${Q113/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/5}% for Glass Containers   
   
The**actual numbers are:**   
1. **99%** for Lead-Acid Batteries   
2. **67%** for Newspapers/Mechanical Papers   
3. **55%**for Aluminum Beer & Soda Cans   
4. **41%** for Tires   
5. **34%** for Glass Containers.   
   
 And also see the graph below



Q58 **Establishing universal pre-kindergarten for all children in the country** Children in low-income families have less access to high-quality child care and intellectual stimulation, and are often not as ready for school at kindergarten compared to higher-income children. Because initial disadvantages can compound, early deficits can result in fewer opportunities in elementary school, high school, and beyond. Studies from top researchers around the U.S. show the benefits of high-quality early education, like pre-kindergarten, for both academic skills and “non-cognitive” skills like patience and perseverance**.** Universal high-quality preschools, according to some research, can significantly reduce the gaps in reading and math skills between children from low-income and high-income families. Ensuring high quality programs is an essential part of a program like this, which is why it needs to be universal—so everyone has a stake in making sure it’s good. Additionally, making the program universal means children of all income levels can learn from each other, which helps the poorest children get ahead without holding back higher income kids.



End of Block: Recycle info+policy 4 (pre-K)

Start of Block: Recycle info+policy 5 (tax credit) (MARRIAGE TAX CREDIT TREATMENT)

Q121 Now we'd like to ask you some questions about waste disposal in the United States today.


Q122 Imagine all of the solid waste (or trash) that the United States produces each year. For each of the five categories of goods below, what percentage of each do you think are recycled annually in the United States each year?

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 0 | 10 | 20 | 30 | 40 | 50 | 60 | 70 | 80 | 90 | 100 |


|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Lead-acid Batteries () |  |
| Newspapers/Mechanical Papers () |  |
| Aluminum Beer & Soda Cans () |  |
| Tires () |  |
| Glass containers () |  |

Q124 On the last page, you made several guesses about waste disposal in the United States. Here are the actual numbers from government statistics and academic research on the topic.

Q125 Your guesses **were**   
1. ${Q122/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/1}**%**for Lead-Acid Batteries   
2. ${Q122/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/2}% for Newspapers/Mechanical papers   
3. **${Q122/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/3}%**for Aluminum Beer & Soda Cans   
4. ${Q122/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/4}% for Tires   
5. ${Q122/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/5}% for Glass Containers   
   
The**actual numbers are:**   
1. **99%** for Lead-Acid Batteries   
2. **67%** for Newspapers/Mechanical Papers   
3. **55%**for Aluminum Beer & Soda Cans   
4. **41%** for Tires   
5. **34%** for Glass Containers.   
   
And also see the graph below



Q59 **Use financial incentives like tax credits to promote raising children in two-parent families** Family formation affects economic mobility, as unintended pregnancies, unstable relationships, and teen pregnancy often lead to disadvantages that persist across generations. For example, teenage parents and their children often have lower educational achievement. Children of teenage parents and unwed mothers are much more likely to live in poverty. There are many ways to promote family structures that give children the support and opportunities that they need. Many successful programs involve helping couples, and women specifically, have children in a planned, deliberate manner by subsidizing access to contraception. Other successful programs focus on helping low-income and unmarried parents with parenting and relationship skills to reduce family instability, though couple relationship training appears to have effects that “fade out” over time. But since it’s particularly important for children to have two parents in the home according to so much research—because children in two-parent households do so much better—we need to focus more resources on incentivizing unmarried couples with children to marry.



End of Block: Recycle info+policy 5 (tax credit)

Start of Block: Recycle info+ policy 6 (immigrants) (REDUCE IMMIGRATION TREATMENT)

Q130 Now we'd like to ask you some questions about waste disposal in the United States today.


Q131 Imagine all of the solid waste (or trash) that the United States produces each year. For each of the five categories of goods below, what percentage of each do you think are recycled annually in the United States each year?

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 0 | 10 | 20 | 30 | 40 | 50 | 60 | 70 | 80 | 90 | 100 |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Lead-acid Batteries () |  |
| Newspapers/Mechanical Papers () |  |
| Aluminum Beer & Soda Cans () |  |
| Tires () |  |
| Glass containers () |  |

Q133 On the last page, you made several guesses about waste disposal in the United States. Here are the actual numbers from government statistics and academic research on the topic.

Q134  Your guesses **were**   
1. ${Q131/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/1}**%**for Lead-Acid Batteries   
2. ${Q131/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/2}% for Newspapers/Mechanical papers   
3. **${Q131/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/3}%**for Aluminum Beer & Soda Cans   
4. ${Q131/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/4}% for Tires   
5. ${Q131/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/5}% for Glass Containers   
   
The**actual numbers are:**   
1. **99%** for Lead-Acid Batteries   
2. **67%** for Newspapers/Mechanical Papers   
3. **55%**for Aluminum Beer & Soda Cans   
4. **41%** for Tires   
5. **34%** for Glass Containers.   
   
 And also see the graph below



Q60 **Reducing legal and illegal immigration of low-skilled workers** Current U.S. immigration policies enable American corporations to hire too many immigrants—legal and illegal—rather than people born here. This reduces opportunities for U.S. citizens and their children, especially the children of low-income parents. The government should fight illegal immigration and sharply reduce legal immigration from other countries so that native-born U.S. citizens do not face as much competition from foreign workers, and so that U.S. firms will create new good-paying jobs for future generations of U.S. children. With median earnings in America stagnant for decades, it’s important for the U.S. government to focus on the interests of American citizens and their children. Economists argue that restricting immigration hurts economic growth, but they ignore research that shows how increased immigration reduces native-born wages, with the largest impact on low-income wage earners. In order to create opportunities for the next generation of low-income Americans to move up the economic ladder, we need to focus on America’s children, not immigrants.



End of Block: Recycle info+ policy 6 (immigrants)

Start of Block: Policy view after info&arg

Q28 Policymakers have come up with many proposals to help increase economic mobility for more Americans. For each of these policies, please indicate whether you would favor or oppose the federal government adopting this policy to improve economic mobility:

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Strongly favor (1) | Favor (2) | Neither favor nor oppose (3) | Oppose (4) | Strongly oppose (5) |
| Increasing the minimum wage (1) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Providing cash assistance to low income families (2) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Providing housing vouchers for low income families to move to middle-class neighborhoods (3) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Establishing universal pre-kindergarten for all children in the country (4) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Using financial incentives like tax credits to promote raising children in two-parent families (5) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Reducing legal and illegal immigration of high-skilled workers to the U.S. (6) |  |  |  |  |  |

End of Block: Policy view after info&arg

Start of Block: Writing

Q29 ​Writing to your U.S. Senators gives you an opportunity to influence policy in our country. Few citizens email their elected officials, so Senators and their staff take written messages from their constituents very seriously. As we do not collect personally identifiable information, we will not put your name on your letter, but send it to your two Senators with a short note explaining that these are the thoughts of a resident of their state.

Q30 If you want to, please write your thoughts on the topics discussed above in the space provided. When the survey is finished, we will send your responses to your U.S. Senators, based on where you indicated you live on the first page of the survey.

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End of Block: Writing

1. [jared.barton@csuci.edu](mailto:jared.barton@csuci.edu). California State University Channel Islands. One University Drive, Camarillo, CA, 93012. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. [xpan@bryant.edu](mailto:xpan@bryant.edu). Bryant University. 1150 Douglas Pike, Smithfield, RI 02917 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. Evidence from other countries provides a somewhat different picture: see Cruces et al. (2013), Karadja et al. (2017), and Fehr et al. (2019). Note also that while Americans tend to *underestimate* U.S. income inequality, citizens of other countries tend to considerably *overestimate* it in their own countries (Niehues 2014, Gimpelson and Treisman 2018). It is perceived inequality, not accurate perceptions, that drive support for redistribution. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. Recent work by Martinangeli and Windsteiger (2019) shows that highlighting the number of immigrants in Germany has no effect on demand for redistribution among Germans, though this is due to low-income (middle-income) earners increasing (decreasing) support for more progressive taxes (but reversing these roles in terms of higher education spending) when given information on the level of immigration. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. Unfortunately, we cannot do a meaningful analysis of attrition by treatment, as only four of these subjects reached the treatment questions (and thus were assigned to a treatment) before leaving the survey. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. Stewart et al. (2015) estimates the turnover rate on mTurk at roughly 26 percent per quarter, suggesting that workers with the masters qualification are more attentive, but also considerably more experienced, than the typical subject available on the platform. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. This last choice is not uncontroversial, as forcing responses could lead to attrition if respondents would prefer not to answer a question (e.g., on a private or sensitive topic), or to lower data quality. For this reason, we opened with questions on demographic and personal economic characteristics (such as income) that may make some respondents uncomfortable, so that any attrition we do experience may affect the external validity of our data, but not the internal validity of the experiment. As for data quality of the remaining subjects, Albaum et al. (2010) experiment on the use of both forced-answer and the inclusion of “prefer not to answer” options for individual questions. They find the forced-answer treatment has the highest completion rate, and that data quality is most negatively affected not by forced-answer, but by the option to not respond. Furthermore, Smyth et al. (2006) find that forced-choice questions provide higher quality data than “choose all that apply” questions (which allow subjects to choose none of the options), suggesting that forcing a response may lead respondents to consider their answers more carefully. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. Examples of policy entrepreneurs offering such arguments include Boushey (2014) on the minimum wage, Steinberg (2014) on cash assistance to the poor, Sard (2016) on housing vouchers, Jiang (2018) on universal pre-kindergarten, Winship (2014) on marriage tax credits, and the Federation for American Immigration Reform (2010) on reducing immigration. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. As such, respondents in the information treatments perform the mobility-related information task first and then read the placebo argument, while those in the argument treatments first perform the placebo task and then read the mobility-related argument. While it is possible that there is some effect due to the order in which the placebo and mobility content are encountered, the treatment information or the treatment argument effect are always compared to the *Control,* which also preserves the task-argument order*.* [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. We intentionally do not show in this treatment the historical pattern, in which the likelihood of out-earning one’s parents has fallen across the income distribution over time. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. Though see Alesina et al. (2018) and Davidai and Gilovich (2015, 2018), who find that U.S. residents overestimate relative intergenerational mobility, and Nero et al. (2018), who find that Americans’ relative mobility views are roughly accurate. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. Cooper and Stewart’s (2013, 2017) reviews of the literature uncover null and negative findings as well, though the bulk of results suggest a positive influence of parental resources on children’s life outcomes. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. Note here that we are not making claims about the mobility of the immigrants themselves or their children. The effects for the immigrants are likely to be very positive (Weyl 2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. In Table 2, we compare our question on “family” income to the average U.S. household income, as it is not clear that most respondents live in families as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau. That said, our average income in the sample of roughly $66,000 is between the 2018 U.S. median household income of $61,937 and the U.S. median family income of $76,401, though far below the U.S. average family income of $103,185. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. We find qualitatively similar results as those discussed here if we instead use a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent favors or strongly favors a policy and zero otherwise, as in panel B of Table 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. Though see also Ashok et al. (2015), who document a decline in support for redistribution among African Americans over time and provide potential explanations. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. Specifically, we adjust all p-values using the formula , where is the unadjusted p-value for the *i*th policy, , is the total number of outcomes (in this case, six dependent variables), and is the average correlation of all outcomes (dependent variables) other than *i*. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. We obtain qualitatively similar results if we use change in support pre to post with support measured as a binary variable as in panel B of Table 3; we present these results in Table A.4. of the appendix. Changes in views range between four and eight percentage points relative to the change in the control. None of these differences are statistically significant after correcting for multiple comparisons, however, as they do not capture movement within non-supporters or supporters (e.g., from strongly oppose to oppose, or favor to strongly favor). [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. To be clear, we only separated out messages that (a) indicated a disinterest in contacting the Senator, (b) clearly communicated with us, or (c) contained non-word characters. Thus, “real” messages may still be cut-and-paste from Wikipedia, or logically incoherent, but they are not obviously attempting to decline the prompt or to communicate with the experimenters. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. A review of the handful of “other” codes used indicates respondents often conflate state or local and federal government. The set of all messages and our assistants’ message-level codes is available upon request. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. In one instance (against environmental policies), our Kappa statistic is undefined *because of* the high levels of inter-rater agreement combined with the way in which our assistant-raters disagreed. This paradox of Cohen’s Kappa is documented by Zec et al. (2017)—and is why we also present Gwen’s less frequently used, but also less biased measure of inter-rater reliability. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
22. Our results are considerably strengthened if we code a topic as “present” if any assistant coded it as present, and qualitatively similar (though generally not statistically significant) if we code a topic as “present” only if both assistants code it as present. These results are available upon request. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
23. Table A.6 in the appendix contains the results on messages opposing the policies. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
24. Please note that, as the individual sample sizes of each party are much smaller, we do not focus here on the statistical significance of any changes, with or without multiple comparison corrections, but simply whether the effects we see in our overall results are concentrated in any one group. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
25. We also have anecdotal evidence that they did not *desire* to avoid the information. Two subjects emailed us after the survey to thank us for providing the correct information in the recycling information activity. One indicated her disappointment at not knowing the correct answers to these types of questions from past surveys. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
26. We thank an anonymous reviewer for asking us to explore this possibility; the results are available upon request. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
27. An anonymous reviewer points out that both the arguments and the policy questions do not include their relevant opportunity costs, which also likely helps their persuasive impact. Examining how persuasive mobility-framed messages are in light of the relevant tradeoffs is another relevant line of inquiry for future work. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)