Overconfidence and Biased Beliefs in Gig Economy Jobs

Last registered on August 18, 2023


Trial Information

General Information

Overconfidence and Biased Beliefs in Gig Economy Jobs
Initial registration date
September 29, 2022

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
October 03, 2022, 5:36 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
August 18, 2023, 6:23 AM EDT

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.


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Primary Investigator

Nova School of Business and Economics

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

On going
Start date
End date
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Pay and work hours fluctuate from month to month in many jobs. A particular case -- growing in popularity over time -- is gig jobs on online platforms. Variation in job outcomes is not a problem as long as workers can, on average, understand and predict them accurately. As a result of limited attention or cognitive capacity, or a desire for self-deception, workers may persistently hold inaccurate beliefs that lead to inefficient labor supply decisions. We first test, over three surveys, whether gig workers understand their job outcomes by collecting data on their beliefs and actual job outcomes, such as pay, hours and expenses. We then conduct an experimental randomized information treatment, in which half of workers in our sample receive information about their mistakes in understanding their take home pay. We measure effects over time on both beliefs and labor market decisions.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Pires, Pedro. 2023. "Overconfidence and Biased Beliefs in Gig Economy Jobs." AEA RCT Registry. August 18. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10144-1.2
Experimental Details


In our randomized information treatment, workers receives information on whether they are correctly assessing their take home hourly pay, are given an individualized example on how to calculate expenses and are told that overconfidence is common in many settings. Workers in the treatment group receive this information on the Baseline and Midline surveys. Workers in the control group receives the same information at the end of the Endline survey.
Intervention Start Date
Intervention End Date

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Job outcomes: hours worked, hourly and weekly pay, expenses
Other labor market variables: job search and information on other jobs
Beliefs of job outcomes for oneself and for other workers: hours worked, hourly and weekly pay, expenses
Misperception of job outcomes: difference between beliefs and actual outcomes
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
See pre-analysis plan for more details
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Simple randomization
Randomization Unit
Randomization at the worker level
Was the treatment clustered?

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
Sample size: planned number of observations
Between 400 and 600 workers
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
Between 200 and 300 for each of the treatment and control groups
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Committee for Protection of Human Subjects (CPHS), UC Berkeley
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number
Analysis Plan

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

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