Moral Preference of Firms - Privatization of Sanctions

Last registered on October 05, 2022

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Moral Preference of Firms - Privatization of Sanctions
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0010156
Initial registration date
September 30, 2022

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
October 05, 2022, 9:48 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
MIT

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
University of Chicago
PI Affiliation
Harvard University

Additional Trial Information

Status
Completed
Start date
2022-05-19
End date
2022-06-28
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
Our goal is to understand how firm stakeholders want a firm to behave when it is in a position to sanction a sovereign. do they think this is not the company's role to do this? do they think the company should participate to the sanction? how much of their own wealth are they willing to sacrifice for this? do they care about impact?

We conduct a survey on some 3000 US participants, using a survey firm.

We ask how participants would behave as stakeholders of a hypothetical firm. This firm has sizable operations in Russia. In the midst of the war with Ukraine, this hypothetical firm decides to not exit from Russia. Participants are asked whether they are willing to punish the firm as stakeholders. We randomize:
- which stakeholder they are (customer, shareholder, employee). for instance, employees can quit, shareholders can sell their shares, customers can boycott
- what impact they have on the firm by punishing (stock price drops, or not; firm loses on customer, or not, etc.)
- how much it will cost, to participants, to implement this punishment.

Then, we ask how they justify their decision (impact, moral imperative, etc), and information on socio-demographics, on moral values they adhere to, political stance, etc.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Hart, Oliver, david thesmar and Luigi Zingales. 2022. "Moral Preference of Firms - Privatization of Sanctions." AEA RCT Registry. October 05. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10156-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
We conduct a survey on some 3000 US participants, using a survey firm.

We ask how participants would behave as stakeholders of a hypothetical firm. This firm has sizable operations in Russia. In the midst of the war with Ukraine, this hypothetical firm decides to not exit from Russia. Participants are asked whether they are willing to punish the firm as stakeholders. We randomize:
- which stakeholder they are (customer, shareholder, employee). for instance, employees can quit, shareholders can sell their shares, customers can boycott
- what impact they have on the firm by punishing (stock price drops, or not; firm loses on customer, or not, etc.)
- how much it will cost, to participants, to implement this punishment.

Then, we ask how they justify their decision (impact, moral imperative, etc), and information on socio-demographics, on moral values they adhere to, political stance, etc.
Intervention Start Date
2022-05-19
Intervention End Date
2022-06-28

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
what makes people willing to support private sanctions taken by companies? (more exactly in our setting: what makes people willing to punish the absence of sanctions?)
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
people will answer a question: the company decides to stay active in Russia in spite of the war. how much are you willing to:
- sell your shares?
- not buy their products
- quit your job as an employee of the firm
people answer on a scale of 1 to 5

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
once people have answered this question, we ask them further questions to understand their motivations. we also ask questions about moral and political values.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
we also ask people to place themselves in a hypothetical situation where they are shareholders of twitter. they can vote in favor of the Musk takeover, and cash-in a premium, or vote against it. the hypothetical is different, but it appeals to the same set of moral values, so we can compare.

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We conduct a survey on some 3000 US participants, using a survey firm.

We ask how participants would behave as stakeholders of a hypothetical firm. This firm has sizable operations in Russia. In the midst of the war with Ukraine, this hypothetical firm decides to not exit from Russia. Participants are asked whether they are willing to punish the firm as stakeholders. We randomize:
- which stakeholder they are (customer, shareholder, employee). for instance, employees can quit, shareholders can sell their shares, customers can boycott
- what impact they have on the firm by punishing (stock price drops, or not; firm loses on customer, or not, etc.)
- how much it will cost, to participants, to implement this punishment.

Then, we ask how they justify their decision (impact, moral imperative, etc), and information on socio-demographics, on moral values they adhere to, political stance, etc.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
we have 3 layers of randomization:
- type of stakeholder (3 arms)
- cost paid (3 arms)
- impact, or not (3 arms for shareholders, 2 for customers and employees)
Randomization Unit
individual participants, recruited over internet
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
2915 participants
Sample size: planned number of observations
2915 particiapnts
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
- 3 equal sized arms for stakeholders
- 3 equal sized levels of costs
- 2 equal sized impact treatments (3 for shareholders)
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Yes
Data Collection Completion Date
June 09, 2022, 12:00 +00:00
Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization)
2915 participants
Was attrition correlated with treatment status?
No
Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations
2915 participants
Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms
3 arms (customer, shareholder, employees) x 2 arms (no impact, some impact) x 3 cost levels ($0,$100,$500)
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials