Social class, tax evasion and conditional cooperation

Last registered on October 17, 2022

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Social class, tax evasion and conditional cooperation
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0010158
Initial registration date
October 10, 2022

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
October 17, 2022, 5:15 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Colegio de México

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
Colegio de México
PI Affiliation
Colegio de México
PI Affiliation
Colegio de México

Additional Trial Information

Status
Completed
Start date
2022-10-11
End date
2022-10-17
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
We examine the effect of tax evasion of specific classes on the willingness to pay taxes.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Campos Vásquez, Raymundo Miguel et al. 2022. "Social class, tax evasion and conditional cooperation." AEA RCT Registry. October 17. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10158-1.0
Sponsors & Partners

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Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2022-10-11
Intervention End Date
2022-10-17

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Willingness to pay taxes
(2) Perceived tax rate paid by rich households, measured as the number of pesos paid in taxes for every 100 in income.
(3) Perception of tax evasion of rich households, measured as the number of pesos evaded for every 100 in tax responsibilities.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
measured as the number of pesos the person would be willing to pay in taxes for every 100 in income.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
(1) Perceived tax rate paid by rich households, measured as the number of pesos paid in taxes for every 100 in income.
(2) Perception of tax evasion of rich households, measured as the number of pesos evaded for every 100 in tax responsibilities.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
(1) Measured as the number of pesos paid in taxes for every 100 in income.
(2) Measured as the number of pesos evaded for every 100 in tax responsibilities.

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We design an original survey, asking about perceptions about tax rates and evasion by social class, perceptions on equality of opportunities, preferences for redistribution, satisfaction with public services, tax rates and trust on the government. After the main part of the survey, respondents are showed a message informing them about tax evasion of the rich in Mexico. The respondents are then randomized into three groups (baseline, T1 and T2). Each group, except for the baseline, is presented with a hypothetical scenario and asked about the tax rate they would be willing to pay.
Experimental Design Details
We design an original survey, asking about perceptions about tax rates and evasion by social class, perceptions on equality of opportunities, preferences for redistribution, satisfaction with public services, tax rates and trust on the government. After the main part of the survey, respondents are showed a message informing them that the rich evade more taxes than the rest of the population. The respondents are then randomized into three groups (baseline, T1 and T2). Each group, except for the baseline, is presented with a hypothetical scenario and asked about the tax rate they would be willing to pay. In T1, the tax evasion of the rich is completely eliminated. In T2, that of the poor.
Randomization Method
Randomization done by a computer.
Randomization Unit
Individuals.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
1500 individuals
Sample size: planned number of observations
1500 individuals
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
500 Baseline,
500 T1,
500 T2
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials