Does information stimulate demand for and supply of high-quality food

Food safety is mostly an unobservable trait that can only be assured through specialized tests, or through other market mechanisms like certification and brand reputation, or through government regulation. For the informal markets in developing countries, the testing costs are high relative to the value of food (but lower compared to the social burden of unsafe food), and the regulatory enforcement and reputation mechanisms are weak resulting in undersupply of food safety attributes. Evidence has shown that some food safety attributes correlate with easily observable food attributes. Provision of such information may enable consumers to ascertain not easy-to-observe safety attributes at a minimal cost resulting in an increase in the demand for these attributes incentivizing the supply of the safety attributes. This study aims to test the effect of informing both traders and consumers on the correlation between the levels of aflatoxin contamination and the integrity of the maize grain kernel on the demand and supply of aflatoxin-safe maize.