What Drives the Willingness to Grant Third-Party Loan Guarantees? Evidence from a Randomized Information Experiment

Last registered on December 19, 2025
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
What Drives the Willingness to Grant Third-Party Loan Guarantees? Evidence from a Randomized Information Experiment
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0010193
Initial registration date
October 10, 2022

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
October 17, 2022, 4:05 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
December 19, 2025, 9:05 AM EST

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Country
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Region

Primary Investigator

Name
Elisabeth Beckmann
Affiliation
Oesterreichische Nationalbank
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Sarah Kiesl-Reiter
PI Affiliation
ifo Institute
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PI Name
Christa Hainz
PI Affiliation
ifo Institute
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PI Name
Söhnke Bergmann
PI Affiliation
Oesterreichische Nationalbank
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Additional Trial Information

Status
Completed
Start date
2022-10-11
End date
2022-11-19
Keywords
Finance & Microfinance, Other
Additional Keywords
third-party loan guarantees, social preferences, financial literacy, expectations
JEL code(s)
D14, G41, G51, G53
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
We study how the provision of information about the legal ramifications and risks associated with a third-party guarantee for a loan affects an individual's willingness to grant such a guarantee. We examine how the effect varies with individuals' (i) expectations about loan default of the borrower and (ii) social preferences. The setting of the study is a survey experiment with a net sample of around 5,000 interviews that will be conducted online. The target population are adults living in the UK. Respondents are randomly assigned with equal probability to one of four different groups, a control group, a salience treatment group, and two salience-and-information treatment groups that differ in the information they are provided with.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Beckmann, Elisabeth et al. 2025. "What Drives the Willingness to Grant Third-Party Loan Guarantees? Evidence from a Randomized Information Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. December 19. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10193-2.0
Sponsors & Partners

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Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Our experimental design consists of a set of questions posed to all respondents regarding sociodemographic characteristics, social preferences and trust. The sample is split into four different groups. A control group, a salience treatment group and two salience-and-information treatment groups. Treatment groups differ with respect to the information provided regarding the legal ramifications and risks associated with third-party loan guarantees.
Intervention (Hidden)
See analysis plan.
Intervention Start Date
2022-10-12
Intervention End Date
2022-11-18

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Willingness to act as a guarantor for bank loans
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
See analysis plan.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Willingness to act as a guarantor for rental payments, Willingness to lend money
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
See analysis plan.

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Randomly assign participants to receive either (i) no treatment, (ii) salience treatment, (iii) salience-and-information treatment A, or (iv) salience-and-information treatment B.
Groups (iii) and (iv) differ with respect to the information provided regarding the risks associated with third-party loan guarantees. Specifically, the difference relates to information provided regarding loan default.
Experimental Design Details
See analysis plan.
Randomization Method
Randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization Unit
Individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
5,000 individuals
Sample size: planned number of observations
5,000 individuals
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
1,250 in control group
1,250 in salience treatment group
1,250 in each of the two salience-and-information treatment groups
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
See analysis plan.
Supporting Documents and Materials

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IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Ethics Commission, Department of Economics, University of Munich
IRB Approval Date
2021-12-20
IRB Approval Number
N/A
Analysis Plan

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Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Yes
Data Collection Completion Date
Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization)
Was attrition correlated with treatment status?
No
Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations
Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

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Program Files

Program Files
No
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Abstract
Loan guarantees can enhance access to credit, but serving as a private guarantor may also increase financial vulnerability. We examine, through a randomized information experiment in the UK, how providing information about the legal ramifications and risks of loan guarantees affects individuals' willingness to act as guarantors. We find that providing information about legal risks reduces the willingness to guarantee loans, with stronger effects for larger loan amounts. Social preferences influence individuals' willingness to act as guarantors. Information about legal ramifications increases the willingness to grant a guarantee among altruists but decreases it among those high in positive reciprocity. While information about the UK default rate reduces willingness, individuals are less likely to update their expectations for someone they know personally, indicating in-group bias.
Citation
Beckmann, Elisabeth, et al. Legal Risks and Social Bonds: How Does Information About Risks Affect the Willingness to Grant a Third-Party Loan Guarantee?. No. 12022. CESifo Working Paper, 2025.
URL
https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp12022.pdf

Reports & Other Materials