| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Trial Status | Before in_development | After completed |
| Field Last Published | Before October 17, 2022 04:05 PM | After December 19, 2025 09:05 AM |
| Field Study Withdrawn | Before | After No |
| Field Data Collection Complete | Before | After Yes |
| Field Was attrition correlated with treatment status? | Before | After No |
| Field Is there a restricted access data set available on request? | Before | After Yes |
| Field Restricted Data Contact | Before | After [email protected] |
| Field Program Files | Before | After No |
| Field Is data available for public use? | Before | After No |
| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Affiliation | Before | After Oesterreichische Nationalbank |
| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Paper Abstract | Before | After Loan guarantees can enhance access to credit, but serving as a private guarantor may also increase financial vulnerability. We examine, through a randomized information experiment in the UK, how providing information about the legal ramifications and risks of loan guarantees affects individuals' willingness to act as guarantors. We find that providing information about legal risks reduces the willingness to guarantee loans, with stronger effects for larger loan amounts. Social preferences influence individuals' willingness to act as guarantors. Information about legal ramifications increases the willingness to grant a guarantee among altruists but decreases it among those high in positive reciprocity. While information about the UK default rate reduces willingness, individuals are less likely to update their expectations for someone they know personally, indicating in-group bias. |
| Field Paper Citation | Before | After Beckmann, Elisabeth, et al. Legal Risks and Social Bonds: How Does Information About Risks Affect the Willingness to Grant a Third-Party Loan Guarantee?. No. 12022. CESifo Working Paper, 2025. |
| Field Paper URL | Before | After https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp12022.pdf |