Patron-Dictator Game: Strategic Interaction between Charities and Donors

Last registered on February 15, 2023

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Patron-Dictator Game: Strategic Interaction between Charities and Donors
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0010594
Initial registration date
December 09, 2022

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
December 13, 2022, 11:19 PM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
February 15, 2023, 12:13 AM EST

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
Research Institute for Socionetwork Strategies, Kansai University

Additional Trial Information

Status
On going
Start date
2022-12-19
End date
2023-12-31
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
In the charity market, donations are generally credence goods. In other words, in the charity market, there is an information asymmetry in that it is difficult for donors to know in advance the extent to which their donations improve recipients' welfare (charitable organizations retain this information). Thus, the dictator game, widely used to measure altruistic preference in laboratory experiments, may not correspond to real-world donation behavior because the recipient's welfare is visible.

This study makes a modified dictator game called the patron-dictator game that incorporates the role of charitable organizations. We conduct two games: the patron-dictator game and a standard dictator game in a lab experiment. Through these experiments, we examine two research questions: (1) the extent to which donation behavior in the Patron-Dictator game, which is similar to the real donation market, differs from that in the standard dictator game; (2) how donation information asymmetries affect donation behavior.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Kato, Hiroki and Youngrok Kim. 2023. "Patron-Dictator Game: Strategic Interaction between Charities and Donors." AEA RCT Registry. February 15. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10594-3.1
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
The patron-dictator game consists of a patron, a dictator, and a receiver. In this game, the patron and dictator make decisions sequentially and determine the allocation of gains among the three players (see analysis plan for detailed game structure).

In addition to conducting the simple dictator game (the DG treatment), we create the following two interventions regarding the order of decision-making of the patron and dictator in the patron-dictator game:

1. First-Moving Dictator (FD): The dictator move first, followed by the patron.
2. Second-Moving Dictator (SD): The patron move first, followed by the dictator.
Intervention (Hidden)
The FD and SD treatments correspond to whether or not donations are credence goods in the real-world charity market. In the FD treatment, the patron can uniquely determine the receiver's gain at the time of the patron's decision, so donations are not credence goods. Conversely, the SD treatment exists asymmetric information because the patron cannot uniquely determine the receiver's gain at the time of the patron's decision, so donations are credence goods. Thus, by comparing the outcomes of FD and SD treatments, we can examine how asymmetric information about the receiver's welfare affects the patron's and dictator's decisions and the receiver's profit. Also, a comparison with the DG treatment test how the presence of a charitable organization (the dictator in the patron-dictator game) affects the patron's behavior and the receiver's benefit.
Intervention Start Date
2022-12-19
Intervention End Date
2023-01-13

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
For consistency, we refer to the role of the dictator in the dictator game as a patron. Our primary outcome is amounts sent by a patron.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
The patron in the two games corresponds to the donor in the real charity market. We compare donor behavior among three treatments.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
1. Allocation of funds provided by patron between dictator and receiver in the FD and SD treatments
2. Receiver's gain
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
The first secondary outcome corresponds to the behavior of charitable organizations in the real charity market. Since the FD and SD treatments reflect the presence or absence of information asymmetry about recipients' welfare in the charity market, we examine how asymmetric information affects the behavior of charities by comparing dictator's behavior between FD and SD treatments. The second secondary outcome is the receiver's welfare. We examine how asymmetric information and the presence of charitable organizations affect the recipient's welfare by comparing the receiver's gain among three treatments.

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
[Fixed] We schedule 9 sessions lasting 90 minutes per session over five days. We recruit up to 33 people per session (32 people per session with the DG treatment). In the beginning, participants take a quiz on the game structure (only FD and SD treatments). Next, they play a one-shot game repeatedly (10 rounds). We make at most 11 groups of three participants for the FD and SD treatments and up to 16 groups of two participants for the DG treatment. After each round, we randomly reassemble the groups and randomly change the roles. Finally, they take a survey of demographics and altruistic preferences.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
[Fixed] We assign the DG treatment to the one session and the FD and SD treatments to the remaining 8 sessions. We equally randomize the two interventions at the session level to balance session dates and times.
Randomization Unit
[Fixed] Experimental session.
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
[Fixed] 9 experimental sessions.
Sample size: planned number of observations
[Fixed] up to 1,040 groups
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
[Fixed] 1. FD treatment: up to 440 groups (4 sessions)
[Fixed] 2. SD treatment: up to 440 groups (4 sessions)
[Fixed] 3. dictator game: up to 160 groups (1 sessions)
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
[Added] Minimum detectable effect sizes are for a two-sided hypothesis test with statistical significance of 0.05 and statistical power of 0.8: 2.1 standard deviation (FD or SD vs. DG); 1.1 standard deviation (FD vs. SD). See the analysis plan in detail.
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
IRB, Research Institute for Socionetwork Strategies, Kansai University
IRB Approval Date
2022-12-02
IRB Approval Number
2022023
Analysis Plan

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Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials