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Feeling Unheard - The Rise of System Disbelief

Last registered on January 03, 2023
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Feeling Unheard - The Rise of System Disbelief
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0010597
Initial registration date
December 16, 2022

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
January 03, 2023, 4:31 PM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country
Germany
Region

Primary Investigator

Name
Mathilde Draeger
Affiliation
Otto-von-Guericke-Universität (OVGU) Magdeburg
Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Abdolkarim Sadrieh
PI Affiliation
Otto-von-Guericke-Universität (OVGU) Magdeburg
Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2022-12-15
End date
2025-03-31
Keywords
Behavior, Electoral, Governance, Lab, Welfare
Additional Keywords
JEL code(s)
C91, D70, D91
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
Individuals in a group, who repeatedly experience that their group's policy selection system does not decide in their favor, may feel unheard and increasingly develop system disbelief. System disbelief (i.e. discontent with the performance of the group's policy selection system) may be detrimental to the performance and the welfare of groups in several ways. It may dramatically reduce the psychological well-being of group members, leading to a substantial decrease of their willingness to provide work effort, financial contributions, or cooperative coordination. In extreme cases, system disbelief may lead to anti-social behavior (e.g. arbitrary destruction) and foster the willingness to engage in subversion (e.g. sabotage) or insurgence (e.g. coordinated rebellion). Studying the individual characteristics and the environmental parameters that give rise to system disbelief in a laboratory experiment, our study contributes to understanding the dynamics of discontent with group decision processes and the ensuing destructive behaviors. Thus, our study may provide insights valuable for the design of group decision processes that are welfare enhancing by increasing the resilience towards system disbelief.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Draeger, Mathilde and Abdolkarim Sadrieh. 2023. "Feeling Unheard - The Rise of System Disbelief." AEA RCT Registry. January 03. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10597-1.0
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Subjects for the laboratory experiment are recruited electronically from the university's subject pool and are randomly assigned to one of four treatments. Preference rankings are elicited individually to be used later in group policy selection processes. The treatments consist of four different systems of group policy selection. System disbelief is elicited throughout a number of selection rounds. Socio-economic and individual attitude parameters are collected as correlates. Subjects are anonymously paid a show-up fee plus their earnings from the experiment in cash before leaving the laboratory.
Intervention (Hidden)
Subjects for the laboratory experiment are recruited electronically (using h-root) from the university's subject pool and are randomly assigned to one of four treatments.
The sequence of events:
1. Elicitation of preference rankings in 20 topic areas (3 options each).
2. Elicitation of beliefs concerning the majority's preference rankings.
3. Subjects are randomly assigned to groups of five.
4. Each treatment implements a different system to select the group's top option for each of the 20 topic areas (each in one of 20 rounds):
• In treatment "Random", the computer makes a random selection with equal probabilities for the three options (p=1/3).
• In treatment "Borda", the computer makes a Borda Count selection based on the elicited preference rankings of all group members.
• In treatment "Dictator", an independent dictator (with a fixed flat payoff) makes a discretionary selection, after receiving the elicited preference rankings of all group members.
• In treatment "Committee", an independent 3-person committee (with fixed flat payoffs) makes a committee majority selection, after receiving the elicited preference rankings of all group members.
5. In each round, before subjects receive information on the selected option, they are asked to reveal their involvement with the topic area and their satisfaction with the treatment's system of selection.
6. After each round, the selection is displayed to the group members. If the selected option corresponds to a subject's top ranked preference, that subject receives the "high" payoff. Otherwise, that subject receives a "low" payoff, which is about one third of the "high" payoff.
7. After all rounds are completed, subjects evaluate their own treatment's system of selection as well as that of each of the other treatments (first introduced at this point). They report their preferences for each of the systems of selection. The preference elicitation is incentivized by the probability of being invited to a future follow-up experiment with the preferred system.
8. In the final stage, subject's report their attitude towards risk and trust. They also complete a short individual cultural values scale and provide a simple set of their socio-economic characteristics.
9. Subjects are anonymously paid a show-up fee plus their earnings from the experiment in cash before leaving the laboratory.
Intervention Start Date
2022-12-15
Intervention End Date
2023-03-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
System disbelief (i.e. satisfaction with the group policy selection system)
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
System disbelief is constructed from two self-reported items, measuring satisfaction with the group policy selection system in each round.
Additionally an incentivized system choice at the end of the experiment adds behavioral evidence to the self-reported construct.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
correlation between system satisfaction and socio-economic parameters, cultural values as well as risk and trust attitudes
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Subjects for the laboratory experiment are recruited electronically from the university's subject pool and are randomly assigned to one of four treatments. Preference rankings are elicited individually to be used later in group policy selection processes. The treatments consist of four different systems of group policy selection. System disbelief is elicited throughout a number of selection rounds. Socio-economic and individual attitude parameters are collected as correlates. Subjects are anonymously paid a show-up fee plus their earnings from the experiment in cash before leaving the laboratory.
Experimental Design Details
Subjects for the laboratory experiment are recruited electronically from the university's subject pool and are randomly assigned to one of four treatments.
The sequence of events:
1. Elicitation of preference rankings in 20 topic areas (3 options each).
2. Elicitation of beliefs concerning the majority's preference rankings.
3. Subjects are randomly assigned to groups of five.
4. Each treatment implements a different system to select the group's top option for each of the 20 topic areas (each in one of 20 rounds):
• In treatment "Random", the computer makes a random selection with equal probabilities for the three options (p=1/3).
• In treatment "Borda", the computer makes a Borda Count selection based on the elicited preference rankings of all group members.
• In treatment "Dictator", an independent dictator (with a fixed flat payoff) makes a discretionary selection, after receiving the elicited preference rankings of all group members.
• In treatment "Committee", an independent 3-person committee (with fixed flat payoffs) makes a committee majority selection, after receiving the elicited preference rankings of all group members.
5. In each round, before subjects receive information on the selected option, they are asked to reveal their involvement with the topic area and their satisfaction with the treatment's system of selection.
6. After each round, the selection is displayed to the group members. If the selected option corresponds to a subject's top ranked preference, that subject receives the "high" payoff. Otherwise, that subject receives a "low" payoff, which is about one third of the "high" payoff.
7. After all rounds are completed, subjects evaluate their own treatment's system of selection as well as that of each of the other treatments (first introduced at this point). They report their preferences for each of the systems of selection. The preference elicitation is incentivized by the probability of being invited to a future follow-up experiment with the preferred system.
8. In the final stage, subject's report their attitude towards risk and trust. They also complete a short individual cultural values scale and provide a simple set of their socio-economic characteristics.
9. Subjects are anonymously paid a show-up fee plus their earnings from the experiment in cash before leaving the laboratory.
Randomization Method
Subjects are recruited electronically and randomly assigned to the treatments.
Randomization Unit
Individual subjects are assigned randomly to the treatments.
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
Subjects' individual preference ranking are elicited non-clustered. In the group policy selection phase, subjects are clustered in groups of 5.
Sample size: planned number of observations
We plan 10 to 12 clusters in each treatment, i.e. a total sample of 200 to 240 subjects in the treatments.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
We plan 10 to 12 clusters in each treatment, i.e. a total sample of 200 to 240 subjects in the treatments.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Gesellschaft für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung (GfeW)
IRB Approval Date
2022-12-15
IRB Approval Number
mHp8ZMun
Analysis Plan

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials