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Field
Trial Status
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Before
in_development
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After
on_going
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Field
Last Published
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Before
January 03, 2023 04:31 PM
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After
January 16, 2024 04:31 PM
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Field
Intervention (Public)
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Before
Subjects for the laboratory experiment are recruited electronically from the university's subject pool and are randomly assigned to one of four treatments. Preference rankings are elicited individually to be used later in group policy selection processes. The treatments consist of four different systems of group policy selection. System disbelief is elicited throughout a number of selection rounds. Socio-economic and individual attitude parameters are collected as correlates. Subjects are anonymously paid a show-up fee plus their earnings from the experiment in cash before leaving the laboratory.
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After
Subjects for the laboratory experiment are recruited electronically from the university's subject pool and are randomly assigned to one of four treatments. Preference rankings are elicited individually to be used later in group policy selection processes. The treatments consist of four different systems of group policy selection. System disbelief is elicited throughout a number of selection rounds. Socio-economic and individual attitude parameters are collected as correlates. Subjects are anonymously paid a show-up fee plus their earnings from the experiment in cash before leaving the laboratory.
**
In a second series of sessions, subjects receive positively and negatively framed messages.
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Field
Intervention End Date
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Before
March 31, 2023
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After
May 30, 2024
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Field
Planned Number of Clusters
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Before
Subjects' individual preference ranking are elicited non-clustered. In the group policy selection phase, subjects are clustered in groups of 5.
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After
Subjects' individual preference ranking are elicited non-clustered. In the group policy selection phase, subjects are clustered in groups of 5.
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Field
Planned Number of Observations
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Before
We plan 10 to 12 clusters in each treatment, i.e. a total sample of 200 to 240 subjects in the treatments.
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After
We plan 10 to 12 clusters in each treatment, i.e. a total sample of 200 to 240 subjects in the treatments.
**
In the second series of sessions, we plan 8 clusters in each treatment and each frame, i.e. an additional sample of 320 subjects.
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Field
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
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Before
We plan 10 to 12 clusters in each treatment, i.e. a total sample of 200 to 240 subjects in the treatments.
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After
We plan 10 to 12 clusters in each treatment, i.e. a total sample of 200 to 240 subjects in the treatments.
**
In the second series of sessions, we plan 8 clusters in each treatment and each frame, i.e. an additional sample of 320 subjects.
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Field
Intervention (Hidden)
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Before
Subjects for the laboratory experiment are recruited electronically (using h-root) from the university's subject pool and are randomly assigned to one of four treatments.
The sequence of events:
1. Elicitation of preference rankings in 20 topic areas (3 options each).
2. Elicitation of beliefs concerning the majority's preference rankings.
3. Subjects are randomly assigned to groups of five.
4. Each treatment implements a different system to select the group's top option for each of the 20 topic areas (each in one of 20 rounds):
• In treatment "Random", the computer makes a random selection with equal probabilities for the three options (p=1/3).
• In treatment "Borda", the computer makes a Borda Count selection based on the elicited preference rankings of all group members.
• In treatment "Dictator", an independent dictator (with a fixed flat payoff) makes a discretionary selection, after receiving the elicited preference rankings of all group members.
• In treatment "Committee", an independent 3-person committee (with fixed flat payoffs) makes a committee majority selection, after receiving the elicited preference rankings of all group members.
5. In each round, before subjects receive information on the selected option, they are asked to reveal their involvement with the topic area and their satisfaction with the treatment's system of selection.
6. After each round, the selection is displayed to the group members. If the selected option corresponds to a subject's top ranked preference, that subject receives the "high" payoff. Otherwise, that subject receives a "low" payoff, which is about one third of the "high" payoff.
7. After all rounds are completed, subjects evaluate their own treatment's system of selection as well as that of each of the other treatments (first introduced at this point). They report their preferences for each of the systems of selection. The preference elicitation is incentivized by the probability of being invited to a future follow-up experiment with the preferred system.
8. In the final stage, subject's report their attitude towards risk and trust. They also complete a short individual cultural values scale and provide a simple set of their socio-economic characteristics.
9. Subjects are anonymously paid a show-up fee plus their earnings from the experiment in cash before leaving the laboratory.
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After
Subjects for the laboratory experiment are recruited electronically (using h-root) from the university's subject pool and are randomly assigned to one of four treatments.
The sequence of events:
1. Elicitation of preference rankings in 20 topic areas (3 options each).
2. Elicitation of beliefs concerning the majority's preference rankings.
3. Subjects are randomly assigned to groups of five.
4. Each treatment implements a different system to select the group's top option for each of the 20 topic areas (each in one of 20 rounds):
• In treatment "Random", the computer makes a random selection with equal probabilities for the three options (p=1/3).
• In treatment "Borda", the computer makes a Borda Count selection based on the elicited preference rankings of all group members.
• In treatment "Dictator", an independent dictator (with a fixed flat payoff) makes a discretionary selection, after receiving the elicited preference rankings of all group members.
• In treatment "Committee", an independent 3-person committee (with fixed flat payoffs) makes a committee majority selection, after receiving the elicited preference rankings of all group members.
5. In each round, before subjects receive information on the selected option, they are asked to reveal their involvement with the topic area and their satisfaction with the treatment's system of selection.
6. After each round, the selection is displayed to the group members. If the selected option corresponds to a subject's top ranked preference, that subject receives the "high" payoff. Otherwise, that subject receives a "low" payoff, which is about one third of the "high" payoff.
7. After all rounds are completed, subjects evaluate their own treatment's system of selection as well as that of each of the other treatments (first introduced at this point). They report their preferences for each of the systems of selection. The preference elicitation is incentivized by the probability of being invited to a future follow-up experiment with the preferred system.
8. In the final stage, subject's report their attitude towards risk and trust. They also complete a short individual cultural values scale and provide a simple set of their socio-economic characteristics.
9. Subjects are anonymously paid a show-up fee plus their earnings from the experiment in cash before leaving the laboratory.
**
In the second series of sessions, step 6. is enhanced by adding a positively or negatively framed message to the round's result.
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Field
Secondary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
correlation between system satisfaction and socio-economic parameters, cultural values as well as risk and trust attitudes
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After
correlation between system satisfaction and socio-economic parameters, cultural values as well as risk and trust attitudes
**
correlation between system satisfaction and the message frames
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Field
Pi as first author
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Before
No
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After
Yes
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