AEA RCT Registry

Trial Information

General Information

Title

Self-serving attribution biases economic actions

RCT ID

AEARCTR-0010627

Initial registration date

July 04, 2023

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published

July 10, 2023, 9:17 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Name

Christoph Drobner

Affiliation

Technical University Munich

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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name

Yesim Orhun

PI Affiliation

University of Michigan

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Additional Trial Information

Status

In development

Start date

2023-06-01

End date

2024-12-31

Keywords

Behavior

Additional Keywords

Overconfidence, Self-Serving Attribution Bias, Meritocracy, Motivation

JEL code(s)

C91, D83, D84

Secondary IDs

Prior work

This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.

Abstract

Empirical evidence shows that people attribute good outcomes to their own merits and bad outcomes to external factors that are beyond their control. We will test how this self-serving attribution bias shapes people's beliefs about meritocracy in society and affects downstream consequences for economic actions. We hypothesize that people who experience bad outcomes form more pessimistic beliefs about the meritocracy of society and as a consequence become less motivated to work hard. In contrast, overconfident people who experience good outcomes form more optimistic beliefs about the meritocracy of society and as a consequence become more motivated to work hard.

External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation

Drobner, Christoph and Yesim Orhun. 2023. "Self-serving attribution biases economic actions." AEA RCT Registry. July 10. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10627-1.0

Sponsors & Partners

Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)

The experiment consists of two parts and we randomly choose one part to determine payments.

In Part A, subjects perform a logic test with 10 questions and we elicit their beliefs about scoring in the top half in a group of 20 subjects, including themselves.

Subjects receive two payoffs in Part A. One payoff is provided by evaluator 1, and the other by evaluator 2. Exactly one of the two evaluators is a performance evaluator and exactly one of the two evaluators is a random evaluator. However, subjects are not aware of which evaluator corresponds to each role. The performance evaluator's payoff is determined based on subjects' performance in the logic quiz compared to a group of 20 subjects, including themselves. If their performance ranks in the top half of the group, the performance evaluator pays them $2. On the other hand, if their performance ranks in the bottom half, the performance evaluator provides no payment, resulting in a payoff of $0. The random evaluator determines subjects' payoff by tossing a coin. If the coin toss results in heads, the random evaluator pays them $2. Conversely, if the coin toss results in tails, the random evaluator provides no payment, resulting in a payoff of $0.

Subjects who receive only high payments or only low payments from both evaluators will be redirected to a different survey with a similar expected payoff. Subjects who receive mixed payments will proceed with Part B.

In Part B, subjects can solve up to 25 decoding tasks and they can decide whether they want to continue or stop working after each decoding task. Subjects are paid by the same evaluator 1 from Part A. If evaluator 1 is the performance evaluator, they receive $0.1 for each correctly solved decoding task. If evaluator 1 is the random evaluator, they receive no payoff. Before starting the decoding tasks, we elicit subjects' beliefs about the likelihood that evaluator 1 is the performance evaluator.

The experiment concludes with a survey measure of risk aversion.

Intervention Start Date

2023-06-01

Intervention End Date

2024-12-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)

Performance beliefs
Evaluator beliefs
Decoding task performance score

Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Performance beliefs = probabilistic beliefs about the likelihood that they rank in the top half of the IQ test among a group of 20 subjects, including themselves.
Evaluator beliefs = probabilistic beliefs about the likelihood that evaluator 1 is the performance evaluator.
Decoding task performance score = number of correctly solved decoding tasks.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)

Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

The experiment consists of two parts and we randomly choose one part to determine payments.

In Part A, subjects perform a logic test with 10 questions and we elicit their beliefs about scoring in the top half in a group of 20 subjects, including themselves.

Subjects receive two payoffs in Part A. One payoff is provided by evaluator 1, and the other by evaluator 2. Exactly one of the two evaluators is a performance evaluator and exactly one of the two evaluators is a random evaluator. However, subjects are not aware of which evaluator corresponds to each role. The performance evaluator's payoff is determined based on subjects' performance in the logic quiz compared to a group of 20 subjects, including themselves. If their performance ranks in the top half of the group, the performance evaluator pays them $2. On the other hand, if their performance ranks in the bottom half, the performance evaluator provides no payment, resulting in a payoff of $0. The random evaluator determines subjects' payoff by tossing a coin. If the coin toss results in heads, the random evaluator pays them $2. Conversely, if the coin toss results in tails, the random evaluator provides no payment, resulting in a payoff of $0.

Subjects who receive only high payments or only low payments from both evaluators will be redirected to a different survey with a similar expected payoff. Subjects who receive mixed payments will proceed with Part B.

In Part B, subjects can solve up to 25 decoding tasks and they can decide whether they want to continue or stop working after each decoding task. Subjects are paid by the same evaluator 1 from Part A. If evaluator 1 is the performance evaluator, they receive $0.1 for each correctly solved decoding task. If evaluator 1 is the random evaluator, they receive no payoff. Before starting the decoding tasks, we elicit subjects' beliefs about the likelihood that evaluator 1 is the performance evaluator.

The experiment concludes with a survey measure of risk aversion.

Experimental Design Details

Not available

Randomization Method

Randomization dony by a computer.

Randomization Unit

Individual level randomization.

Was the treatment clustered?

No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters

~1000

Sample size: planned number of observations

~1000

Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms

~250 (evaluator 1 payment: $2, evaluator 2 payment: $2)
~250 (evaluator 1 payment: $2, evaluator 2 payment: $0)
~250 (evaluator 1 payment: $0, evaluator 2 payment: $2)
~250 (evaluator 1 payment: $0, evaluator 2 payment: $0)

Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)

Supporting Documents and Materials

IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name

IRB Health Sciences and Behavioral Sciences

IRB Approval Date

2022-12-10

IRB Approval Number

HUM00224855

Analysis Plan