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Field
Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
Respondents choose between two daily contracts offered for a period of ten days: (i) a flat payment contract regardless of the driving behavior (UCT), or (ii) performance-based contract that pays more if no speeding violations occur. A speeding violation is defined as surpassing 50 kph in urban areas of Kampala, according to the GPS device installed in the respondent's motorbike.
Each choice is made under one of the following regimes:
(1) T1 private regime: all choices and the offer of the contract are kept private;
(2) T2 public excuse regime: choices are made privately; the respondent is informed that the contract offered will be made public to his peers;
(3) T3 public with no excuse regime: the respondent is informed that (a) the contract offered will be made public to his peers and (b) the forgone alternative payment (UCT if performance contract picked or vice versa) will also be made public to the peers.
Peers are defined as co-workers operating from the same taxi station.
Under a given regime, each respondent takes nine consecutive choices (henceforth, a set of choices) between the performance-based contract and a UCT. More details are provided below. An additional choice between two fixed payments is also provided.
Each respondent is informed that only one of the choices will be picked at random. Their preferred contract for the randomly picked binary choice (performance vs UCT) will be offered. To maintain incentive compatibility for all binary choices, the respondent is informed that a positive probability to be selected is assigned to all binary choices in the set.
Each respondent is asked to make three sets of binary choice under the three regimes, plus the flat payment vs flat payment choice, for a total of 30 binary choice. The order of the exposure to the regimes is randomized. I exploit both within and across-respondent variation. I intend to run two analysis: one considers the answers to the first regime each respondent is exposed to; the second analysis exploits within-subject variation and controls for the order of exposure to the three regimes.
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After
Respondents choose between two daily contracts offered for a period of ten days: (i) a flat payment contract regardless of the driving behavior (UCT), or (ii) performance-based contract that pays more if no speeding violations occur. A speeding violation is defined as surpassing 50 kph in urban areas of Kampala, according to the GPS device installed in the respondent's motorbike.
Each choice is made under one of the following regimes:
(1) T1 private regime: all choices and the offer of the contract are kept private;
(2) T2 public excuse regime: choices are made privately; the respondent is informed that the contract offered will be made public to his peers;
(3) T3 public with no excuse regime: the respondent is informed that (a) the contract offered will be made public to his peers and (b) the forgone alternative payment (UCT if performance contract picked or vice versa) will also be made public to the peers.
Peers are defined as co-workers operating from the same taxi station.
Under a given regime, each respondent takes nine consecutive choices (henceforth, a set of choices) between the performance-based contract and a UCT. More details are provided below. An additional choice between two fixed payments is also provided.
Each respondent is informed that only one of the choices will be picked at random. Their preferred contract for the randomly picked binary choice (performance vs UCT) will be offered. To maintain incentive compatibility for all binary choices, the respondent is informed that a positive probability to be selected is assigned to all binary choices in the set.
Each respondent is asked to make three sets of binary choice under the three regimes, plus the flat payment vs flat payment choice, for a total of 30 binary choice. The order of the exposure to the regimes is randomized. I exploit both within and across-respondent variation. I intend to run two analysis: one considers the answers to the first regime each respondent is exposed to; the second analysis exploits within-subject variation and controls for the order of exposure to the three regimes. I intend to verify differential treatment by the relevance of speeding as a status signalling according to experiment AEARCTR-0010625 outcome on status.
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