Leadership and cooperation in a sequential Prisoners’ Dilemma

Last registered on January 03, 2023
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Leadership and cooperation in a sequential Prisoners’ Dilemma
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0010663
Initial registration date
December 19, 2022

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
January 03, 2023, 4:37 PM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Name
Steffen Lippert
Affiliation
University of Auckland
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Eberhard Feess
PI Affiliation
Victoria University of Wellington
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PI Name
James Tremewan
PI Affiliation
IESEG School of Management
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PI Name
Jamie Martini-Tibbs
PI Affiliation
University of Auckland
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Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2022-12-21
End date
2023-07-31
Keywords
Behavior, Environment & Energy, Firms & Productivity, Governance, Welfare
Additional Keywords
Sequential decision making, cooperation, leadership, Prisonners’ Dilemma
JEL code(s)
C91, C92, D02, D63, D90
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
We analyze theoretically and with an online experiment on Prolific the impact of leadership in a sequential Prisoners' Dilemma. In the exogenous treatment E, one of the two subjects is randomly assigned to the role of the first mover (FM), and the other two the role of second mover (SM). In the transparent treatment T, one of the two subjects (the principal) is asked to decide between the role as FM and SM. The other subject (the agent) is informed about the principal's decision. In the opaque treatment O, the principal is also asked to decide between the role as FM and SM, but the agent is not informed that the order of moves depends on the principal's choice. We have developed a behavioral game theoretical model where subjects have private information on the weight they put on the payoff of their partner in case they cooperate. Our model yields predictions for the impact of the treatments on (i) the principal's choice (for treatments T and O), the frequency of cooperating FMs, and the frequency of SMs who cooperate after the FM has cooperated.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Feess, Eberhard et al. 2023. "Leadership and cooperation in a sequential Prisoners’ Dilemma." AEA RCT Registry. January 03. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10663-1.0
Sponsors & Partners

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Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2022-12-21
Intervention End Date
2023-07-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Our primary outcomes are the pairwise comparisons for the behavior of subjects between two treatments. With these pairwise comparisons, we test the hypotheses derived from our behavioral game theoretical model. These comparisons concern the (i) self selection of principals, the frequency of cooperating FMs, and the frequency of SMs who cooperate after the FM has cooperated. For the principal’s self selection, we have only one hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1 (Self selection): The frequency of principals choosing FM is higher in treatment T than in treatment O.

For FMs, our model yields the following order for the frequency of cooperative choices: The frequency is highest for principals who have self selected to FM in treatments T and O, followed by subjects in treatment E and agents in treatment O, followed by agents is treatment T.

The pairwise comparison of these frequencies yields 10 Hypotheses.

For SMs, our model yields the following order for the frequency of cooperative choices after a cooperative choice by the FM: The frequency is highest for agents in treatments T, followed by agents in treatment and subjects in treatment E, followed by principals in treatment O, followed by principals is treatment T.

The pairwise comparison of these frequencies yields 10 Hypotheses.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Our subjects are asked questions relaed to the dark triad (see #). Our first secondary outcome is the impact of the # on self selection, and on the choice as FM and SM.
Our secondary outcome is the impact of demographics (age and gender).
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We have three treatments:
In the exogenous treatment E, one of the two subjects is randomly assigned to the role of the first mover (FM), and the other two the role of second mover (SM).
In the transparent treatment T, one of the two subjects (the principal) is asked to decide between the role as FM and SM. The other subject (the agent) is informed about the principal’s decision.
In the opaque treatment O, the principal is also asked to decide between the role as FM and SM, but the agent is not informed that the order of moves depends on the principal’s choice.
In all treatments, we apply the strategy method for SMs, that is, they are asked for their choices conditional on whether the FM cooperated or not. Principals as SM in treatments T and O are asked for this only after they have self selected to the role as FM or SM.
Each subject plays only one role, that is, we apply a between-subject design.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Participants will be randomly assigned to treatments and roles (computerized).
Randomization Unit
Individual level randomization.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
No Clusters
Sample size: planned number of observations
We plan to collect # obervations
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
Treatment E: 300
Treatment T: 150 principals, 150 agents
Treatment O: 150 principals, 150 agents
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee
IRB Approval Date
2021-12-02
IRB Approval Number
23528
Analysis Plan