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Temptation and self-control in intrinsic preferences for information

Last registered on January 30, 2023
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Dynamic consistency in intrinsic information preferences
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0010865
Initial registration date
January 26, 2023

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
January 30, 2023, 1:51 AM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country
United States of America
Region

Primary Investigator

Name
Vivek Roy-Chowdhury
Affiliation
University of Cambridge
Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2023-02-01
End date
2023-02-03
Keywords
Behavior
Additional Keywords
Information preferences
JEL code(s)
D83
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
By bringing a test of temptation and self-control preferences to the domain of information acquisition, I collect experimental evidence on whether individuals experience self-control problems relating to information.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Roy-Chowdhury, Vivek. 2023. "Dynamic consistency in intrinsic information preferences." AEA RCT Registry. January 30. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10865-1.0
Sponsors & Partners

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Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2023-02-01
Intervention End Date
2023-02-03

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
The shares of individuals strictly preferring commitments to avoiding or seeing information rather than choosing in the next session (& comparison across treatment arms)
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Preference rankings over choice menus are elicited in round 1 of the experiment using standard procedures. We can identify strict preferences for commitment by extracting those who strictly prefer to not be offered information in session 2 relative to choosing next time.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Share of individuals demonstrating dynamic inconsistency in information preferences (& comparison across treatment arms)
Final consumption of information across treatments
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
We will examine the share of those who strictly prefer (not) to avoid information in session 1, who then go on to (not) access information in session 2.

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
The experiment occurs over two sessions, conducted online.
In session 1, participants make a choice with a small probability of a negative consequence if a selfish action is taken. Afterwards, they discover that in session 2 they will be offered information on whether the consequence did occur. They are then offered commitment devices to seeing or not seeing the information.
In session 2, depending on commitments made in session 1, information is offered to participants and they choose whether to see it or not.
Experimental Design Details
The experiment occurs over two sessions, conducted online.
In session 1, participants decide whether to take a $4 lump sum payment, increasing their total payment for the experiment by about 200%. They are informed that there is a small chance (in reality, 15%) that $15 will be removed from a donation to an international charity if they take the bonus. Afterwards, they discover that in session 2 they will be offered information on whether money was actually removed from the donation due to their action, framed as "opening an envelope". Opening the envelope is assigned a randomly assigned price, to be paid out of the existing bonus. We then elicit participants' preferences over the information menus they will face in session 2: definitely seeing the information, not being offered the information, or choosing next time. Indifferences are encouraged through follow-up questions.
There are two treatments, "Partial" and "NoInfo". In Partial, participants know they will first see a notification telling them there was either a 0% or a 20% chance that money was removed from the charity donation. The information in the envelope then confirms this was or was not the case, conditional on seeing the 20% notification. In NoInfo, the envelope contains the initial notification. Thus, in NoInfo, more information can be avoided via commitment.
In session 2, depending on commitments made in session 1, information is offered to participants and they choose whether to see it or not.
Randomization Method
Randomisation of treatment groups and prices of information is done in javascript (via Qualtrics) during session 1 itself. Randomisation of implemented preferences, preference payments and information content is done in R using session 1 data.
Randomization Unit
Individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
600 individuals
Sample size: planned number of observations
600 individuals
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
50:50 split between the two main treatment arms ("info" and "signal") for those participants taking the bonus.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Roughly 8pp difference between treatments.
Supporting Documents and Materials

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IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics; Director of Research
IRB Approval Date
2022-12-20
IRB Approval Number
N/A
Analysis Plan

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials