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Field
Abstract
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Before
Decades of conflict in rural Colombia – combined with the rough terrain and meager transportation infrastructure that are typical of remote and low-income regions – have eroded market ties between rural farmers and wealthier market centers. This poses a challenge to rural livelihoods and coca eradication, both components of Colombia's 2016 Peace Accords. We use a randomized controlled trial to assess the impact of a market-making program, a supply chain intervention that integrates commercialization with agricultural extension practices to connect farmers to buyers of legal crops. We study the market making program alone and the market making program plus a cash intervention, which more closely mirrors the Colombian government's current practice. Specifically, we ask: (1) what is the effect of a supply chain intervention that connects coca-growing farmers to buyers of alternative crops on the composition and quantity of household income, coca growth, and social outcomes such as self-efficacy, trust, and security, (2) is there a differential effect of implementing the supply chain intervention alongside a cash intervention that guarantees participants a minimum income, and (3) which version of the program is most cost-effective?
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After
Decades of conflict in rural Colombia – combined with the rough terrain and meager transportation infrastructure that are typical of remote and low-income regions – have eroded market ties between rural farmers and wealthier market centers. This poses a challenge to rural livelihoods and coca eradication, both components of Colombia's 2016 Peace Accords. We use a randomized controlled trial to assess the impact of a market-making program, a supply chain intervention that integrates commercialization with agricultural extension practices to connect farmers to buyers of legal crops. We study the market-making program alone and the market-making program plus a cash intervention, which more closely mirrors the Colombian government's current practice. Specifically, we ask: (1) what is the effect of a supply chain intervention that connects coca-growing farmers to buyers of alternative crops on the composition and quantity of household income, coca growth, and social outcomes such as self-efficacy, trust, and security, (2) is there a differential effect of implementing the supply chain intervention alongside a cash intervention that guarantees participants a minimum income, and (3) which version of the program is most cost-effective?
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Field
Last Published
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Before
February 07, 2023 11:21 AM
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After
February 07, 2023 03:33 PM
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Field
Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
We randomize market-making at the level of the vereda (similar to a village). We randomize the cash intervention, which guarantees $550 in total wages to participants, at the individual level. Our sample consists of 1,800 households across 90 veredas in the Guaviare department. We randomly assign 30 veredas to the control group, 30 veredas to receive only the market making intervention, and 30 veredas to receive market making and where households are also eligible for the cash intervention. Within the last group, 10 veredas are randomly designated as "high intensity", where 13 individuals per vereda are randomly selected to receive cash. The other 20 veredas are randomly designated as "low intensity", where 1 individual per vereda is randomly selected to receive cash.
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After
We randomize market-making at the level of the vereda (similar to a village). We randomize the cash intervention, which guarantees $550 in total wages to participants, at the individual level. Our sample consists of 1,800 households across 90 veredas in the Guaviare department. We randomly assign 30 veredas to the control group, 30 veredas to receive only the market-making intervention, and 30 veredas to receive market-making and where households are also eligible for the cash intervention. Within the last group, 10 veredas are randomly designated as "high intensity", where 13 individuals per vereda are randomly selected to receive cash. The other 20 veredas are randomly designated as "low intensity", where 1 individual per vereda is randomly selected to receive cash.
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Field
Randomization Unit
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Before
Vereda (for market making) and household (for cash)
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After
Vereda (for market-making) and household (for cash)
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Field
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
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Before
30 veredas - control; 30 veredas - market making alone; 30 veredas - market making with some households receiving cash (of which 10 veredas are "high intensity" cash and 20 veredas are "low intensity" cash)
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After
30 veredas - control; 30 veredas - market-making alone; 30 veredas - market-making with some households receiving cash (of which 10 veredas are "high intensity" cash and 20 veredas are "low intensity" cash)
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Field
Secondary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
Self-efficacy, trust, and security
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After
Savings, quantity and components of asset stock, investment, self-efficacy, trust, and security
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