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Field
Abstract
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Before
The establishment and maintenance of social norms is dependent on the behaviors of one’s reference network. By definition, social norms are behaviors that individuals conform to on the condition that most people in their network conform to the same behavior and also expect the individual to conform to that behavior. The belief that others conform to a behavior, known as empirical expectations, is largely dependent on witnessing that behavior in practice. Therefore, witnessing social norm violation should encourage more social norm violation since the empirical expectation for norm compliance has been reduced. Yet, not all peers in a reference network are equal. Those with lower social distance, or ingroup members, should play a more significant role in shaping one’s willingness to comply with a social norm, both positively and negatively.
In this study we conduct an experiment to probe the interaction between group identity and peer behavior. Social distance is established by having participants identify what they see in a well-known optical illusion, with those who see the same image being classified into the same peer group. Participants are tasked with either complying with a rule and suffering a financial loss, or violating the rule to earn more money, but only after they witness the behaviors of previous participants. In particular, we look at how group identification may create contrast effects that do not exist in homogeneous groups in case of simple rules. A contrast effect happens when some observed negative behavior focuses subjects on a rule that prescribes the opposite behavior, inducing greater compliance.
We randomly assign treatments to participants that vary the number of ingroup/outgroup peers as well as number of rule violators and compliers that they witness. More specifically, we will run treatments with 7 peers, varying the number of violators and their group identity. We study the role of minority status in rule compliance, looking for contrast effects. The treatments are herein defined as:
A1: Seven ingroup peers with six who comply and one who violates the rule.
A2: Seven ingroup peers who all comply with the rule.
A3: Six ingroup peers who all comply and one outgroup peer who violates the rule.
A4: Six ingroup peers who all comply and one outgroup peer who complies with the rule.
A5: Six ingroup peers with five who comply, one who violates the rule and one outgroup peer who complies with the rule.
B1: Seven outgroup peers with six who comply and one who violates the rule.
B2: Seven outgroup peers who all comply with the rule.
B3: Six outgroup peers who all comply and one ingroup peer who violates the rule.
B4: Six outgroup peers who all comply and one ingroup peer who complies with the rule.
B5: Six outgroup peers with five who comply, one who violates the rule and one ingroup peer who complies with the rule.
Given our outcome variable is participant compliance with the rule, we are interested in our sample’s rate of compliance in response to any of the ten treatments. In what follows, we clarify our main hypotheses in terms of rates of compliance in response to the treatments defined above:
H1: A1 < A2. This is the “bad apple effect” – 1 violator spoils the bunch.
H2: A2 – A1 > A4 – A3. This is the “contrast effect” – the bad apple effect is reduced when the violator is in the outgroup.
H3: A2 – A1 > B2 – B1. This indicates that bad apple effect is reduced when the decision maker observes in the outgroup.
H4: (B4 – B3) – (B2 – B1) > (A4 – A3) – (A2 – A1). This is the “reverse contrast effect”.
We also make the following auxiliary hypotheses:
AH1. A4 – A3 > A5 – A3. Confirm that the effect expected in H2 is not simply due to a change in the group identity composition but is specific to the “contrast effect”
AH2: B5 – B3 > A2 – A1. Confirm that the effect expected in H4 is not simply due to a change in the group identity composition.
In sum, we hypothesize that Ingroup peers who violate norms will encourage more norm violation than outgroup norm violators will, and ingroup compliers will encourage more participant compliance than outgroup compliance will.
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After
The establishment and maintenance of social norms is dependent on the behaviors of one’s reference network. By definition, social norms are behaviors that individuals conform to on the condition that most people in their network conform to the same behavior and also expect the individual to conform to that behavior. The belief that others conform to a behavior, known as empirical expectations, is largely dependent on witnessing that behavior in practice. Therefore, witnessing social norm violation should encourage more social norm violation since the empirical expectation for norm compliance has been reduced. Yet, not all peers in a reference network are equal. Those with lower social distance, or ingroup members, should play a more significant role in shaping one’s willingness to comply with a social norm, both positively and negatively.
In this study we conduct an experiment to probe the interaction between group identity and peer behavior. Social distance is established by having participants identify what they see in a well-known optical illusion, with those who see the same image being classified into the same peer group. Participants are tasked with either complying with a rule and suffering a financial loss, or violating the rule to earn more money, but only after they witness the behaviors of previous participants. In particular, we look at how group identification may create contrast effects that do not exist in homogeneous groups in case of simple rules. A contrast effect happens when some observed negative behavior focuses subjects on a rule that prescribes the opposite behavior, inducing greater compliance.
We randomly assign treatments to participants that vary the number of ingroup/outgroup peers as well as number of rule violators and compliers that they witness. More specifically, we will run treatments with 7 peers, varying the number of violators and their group identity. We study the role of minority status in rule compliance, looking for contrast effects. The treatments are herein defined as:
A1: Seven ingroup peers with six who comply and one who violates the rule.
A2: Seven ingroup peers who all comply with the rule.
A3: Six ingroup peers who all comply and one outgroup peer who violates the rule.
A4: Six ingroup peers who all comply and one outgroup peer who complies with the rule.
A5: Six ingroup peers with five who comply, one who violates the rule and one outgroup peer who complies with the rule.
B1: Seven outgroup peers with six who comply and one who violates the rule.
B2: Seven outgroup peers who all comply with the rule.
B3: Six outgroup peers who all comply and one ingroup peer who violates the rule.
B4: Six outgroup peers who all comply and one ingroup peer who complies with the rule.
B5: Six outgroup peers with five who comply, one who violates the rule and one ingroup peer who complies with the rule.
Given our outcome variable is participant compliance with the rule, we are interested in our sample’s rate of compliance in response to any of the ten treatments. In what follows, we clarify our main hypotheses in terms of rates of compliance in response to the treatments defined above:
H1: A1 < A2. This is the “bad apple effect” – 1 violator spoils the bunch.
H2: A2 – A1 > A4 – A3. This is the “contrast effect” – the bad apple effect is reduced when the violator is in the outgroup.
H3: A2 – A1 > B2 – B1. This indicates that the bad apple effect is reduced when the decision maker observes in the outgroup.
H4: B4 - B3 > A2 - A1 This is the “reverse contrast effect”.
We also make the following auxiliary hypotheses:
AH1. A4 – A3 > A5 – A3. Confirm that the effect expected in H2 is not simply due to a change in the group identity composition but is specific to the “contrast effect”
AH2: B5 – B3 > A2 – A1. Confirm that the effect expected in H4 is not simply due to a change in the group identity composition.
In sum, we hypothesize that ingroup peers who violate norms will encourage more norm violation than outgroup norm violators will, and ingroup peers who comply will encourage more participant compliance than outgroup compliance will.
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