How do job seekers react to information about wage and job benefits?

Last registered on March 13, 2023

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
How do job seekers react to information about wage and job benefits?
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0011023
Initial registration date
March 01, 2023

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
March 13, 2023, 8:36 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Bocconi University

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
PI Affiliation
PI Affiliation
PI Affiliation
PI Affiliation

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2023-03-06
End date
2024-12-31
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
We study how job seekers react to information about wages and job benefits using a randomized control trial on a large Swiss online job vacancy platform. By varying the information provided and tracking the behavior of job seekers on the website, we estimate wage elasticities as well as the value of job benefits. In a separate project, we assess the effects of transparency on overall job search and application behavior.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Beerli, Andreas et al. 2023. "How do job seekers react to information about wage and job benefits?." AEA RCT Registry. March 13. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11023-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Some of the job seekers who will visit the job vacancy websites managed by our implementing partner will be able to access simple information about wages and job benefits that are associated with the companies posting job ads on the websites.
Intervention Start Date
2023-03-06
Intervention End Date
2023-05-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
The main objective of our experimental design is to measure how much the interest of job seekers in job ads changes as different wage and job benefit information is displayed. The primary outcomes that we use to measure job seekers’ interest in a job ad are
whether the job seeker clicks and opens the webpage associated with the job ad in order to view extra details about the vacancy and about the firm that posted it;
whether the job seeker applies for the job through the platform.

In a separate project, we plan to use our experimental design to measure how transparency about wage and job benefit information affect the search behavior of job seekers on the platform and the characteristics of the jobs they apply for.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary outcomes that we plan to use to measure job seekers’ interest in a job ad are:
whether the job seeker clicks and opens the webpage associated with the firm posting the job ad;
whether the job seeker clicks and opens the third-party website displaying reviews (from employees) about of the firm posting the job ad;
whether the job seeker adds the job ad to a watchlist;
whether the job seeker clicks and opens the webpage showing the original job ad on the firm’s website.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Job seekers who will visit the job vacancy websites managed by our implementing partner will be randomized in different treatment groups, and some of them will be able to access simple information about wages and job benefits that are associated with the companies posting job ads on the websites.
Jobseekers in the control group will not be shown any extra information other than the one typically displayed on the websites.
Other job seekers will instead be able to see information about the wages that companies posting job ads typically pay for given positions. This information is recovered from a third-party website that collects reviews from the employees of those companies. Specifically, in order to generate random variation in the wages shown across treatment groups, some job seekers are shown average wages while others are shown median wages.
On top of wage information, other job seekers will also be able to see information about some of the job benefits that these companies offer. This information is also recovered from the third-party website. In each of these treatment groups, job seekers are given information about the availability of three benefits (for example, in one group they are given information about flexible working hours, home office, and childcare). Job seekers are shown an icon indicating the presence of a given job benefit in a given company only as long as a given percentage of the reviewers on the third indicated the presence of that benefit. Specifically, in order to generate random variation in the benefits shown across treatment groups, some job seekers are shown that a benefit is present as long as at least 20% of the reviewers indicated its presence, while for others we use a threshold of 50%. Across different treatment groups, we provide information about a total of twelve different benefits (although each job seeker is shown only three): flexible working hours, home office, childcare, parking, public transportation, company car, canteen, food allowance, health services, doctor, coaching, and employee events.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
The randomization of the job seekers into different treatment groups takes the form of an A/B test conducted with Google Optimize over different variants of the job vacancy platform’s websites.
Randomization Unit
The intended randomization unit is a job seeker. More specifically, the randomization is done using the users’ cookie identifier detected by Google Analytics.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
300,000 job seekers
Sample size: planned number of observations
300,000 job seekers
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
We will run our experiment over the course of three months. Each month, we expect about 100,000 job seekers to participate in the experiment. Each month, we will randomize job seekers into eight equally-sized groups. Treatment groups will change from month to month according to the schedule below.

A) March
1) Control group
2) Average wage group
3) Median wage group
4) Average wage, flexible working hours, home office, childcare (20% threshold) group
5) Average wage, parking, public transportation, company car (20% threshold) group
6) Average wage, canteen, food allowance, coaching (20% threshold) group
7) Average wage, childcare, health services, doctor (20% threshold) group
8) Average wage, flexible working hours, coaching, employee events (20% threshold) group

B) April
1) Control group
2) Average wage group
3) Median wage group
4) Average wage, flexible working hours, home office, childcare (20% threshold) group
5) Average wage, flexible working hours, home office, childcare (50% threshold) group
6) Median wage, flexible working hours, home office, childcare (20% threshold) group
7) Median wage, flexible working hours, home office, childcare (50% threshold) group
8) Childcare, home office, flexible working hours, average wage (20% threshold) group

C) May
1) Control group
2) Average wage, public transportation, canteen, health services (20% threshold) group
3) Average wage, company car, doctor, employee events (20% threshold) group
4) Average wage, childcare, food allowance, employee events (20% threshold) group
5) Average wage, flexible working hours, home office, parking (20% threshold) group
6) Average wage, home office, parking, company car (20% threshold) group
7) Average wage, public transportation, food allowance, health services, (20% threshold) group
8) Average wage, doctor, canteen, coaching (20% threshold) group
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
EC Mannheim
IRB Approval Date
2023-02-06
IRB Approval Number
Mannheim: 02/2023