The Effect of Voting on Political Preferences

Last registered on April 26, 2023

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
The Effect of Voting on Political Preferences
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0011309
Initial registration date
April 20, 2023

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
April 26, 2023, 5:15 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Wichita State University

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status
On going
Start date
2023-04-11
End date
2023-12-31
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
In this paper, we investigate how voting and electoral outcomes impact voters' evaluations of politicians. A few hypotheses are tested. First, chosen preference theory predicts that the act of voting could lead to a more favorable opinion of the supported candidate in the future in order to resolve internal dissonance. Second, we apply motivated belief in the context of voting. Winning an election is interpreted by voters as evidence that confirms the correctness of their vote. However, losing an election is not calculated the same way. Finally, stronger echo chambers may form among friends and religious groups after their supported candidate wins.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Wang, Siyu. 2023. "The Effect of Voting on Political Preferences." AEA RCT Registry. April 26. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11309-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Subjects are asked to do a real-effort task at the beginning of the experiment. Afterwards, every three subjects are grouped together and share the income they have earned from the task. There are two income sharing plans. One plan is to share income equally among three subjects in a group. While the other plan rewards the two higher performers 40% and the low performer 20% of the total income. In the baseline, subjects rate two income redistribution plans before voting for them. In other treatments, we ask subjects to vote for one of two plans. In the Treatment 1, subjects are asked to rate each plan before and after voting, then we reveal the vote counts and provide an opportunity for every 2 subjects to discuss the outcome. In Treatment 2, subjects have the same task except the voting result is provided before the second rating. In Treatment 3 (optional), both the voting outcome revelation and discussion are conducted before the second favoritism rating.
Intervention (Hidden)
Subjects are asked to do a real-effort task at the beginning of the experiment. Afterwards, every three subjects are grouped together and share the income they have earned from the task. There are two income sharing plans. One plan is to share income equally among three subjects in a group. While the other plan rewards the two higher performers 40% and the low performer 20% of the total income. In the baseline, subjects rate two income redistribution plans before voting for them. In other treatments, we ask subjects to vote for one of two plans. In the Treatment 1, subjects are asked to rate each plan before and after voting, then we reveal the vote counts and provide an opportunity for every 2 subjects to discuss the outcome. In Treatment 2, subjects have the same task except the voting result is provided before the second rating. In Treatment 3 (optional), both the voting outcome revelation and discussion are conducted before the second favoritism rating.
Intervention Start Date
2023-04-11
Intervention End Date
2023-12-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Ratings and voting choice in each treatment
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Subjects are asked to do a real-effort task at the beginning of the experiment. Afterwards, every three subjects are grouped together and share the income they have earned from the task. There are two income sharing plans. One plan is to share income equally among three subjects in a group. While the other plan rewards the two higher performers 40% and the low performer 20% of the total income. In the baseline, subjects rate two income redistribution plans before voting for them. In other treatments, we ask subjects to vote for one of two plans. In the Treatment 1, subjects are asked to rate each plan before and after voting, then we reveal the vote counts and provide an opportunity for every 2 subjects to discuss the outcome. In Treatment 2, subjects have the same task except the voting result is provided before the second rating. In Treatment 3 (optional), both the voting outcome revelation and discussion are conducted before the second favoritism rating.
Experimental Design Details
Subjects are asked to do a real-effort task at the beginning of the experiment. Afterwards, every three subjects are grouped together and share the income they have earned from the task. There are two income sharing plans. One plan is to share income equally among three subjects in a group. While the other plan rewards the two higher performers 40% and the low performer 20% of the total income. In the baseline, subjects rate two income redistribution plans before voting for them. In other treatments, we ask subjects to vote for one of two plans. In the Treatment 1, subjects are asked to rate each plan before and after voting, then we reveal the vote counts and provide an opportunity for every 2 subjects to discuss the outcome. In Treatment 2, subjects have the same task except the voting result is provided before the second rating. In Treatment 3 (optional), both the voting outcome revelation and discussion are conducted before the second favoritism rating.
Randomization Method
Randomization done by computers
Randomization Unit
treatments
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
150-200 subjects
Sample size: planned number of observations
150-200 subjects
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
50-70 subjects per treatment
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Wichita State University IRB
IRB Approval Date
2023-03-21
IRB Approval Number
5402

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials