Social preferences and responsiveness to bribery - a survey experiment

Last registered on April 26, 2023

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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title

Social preferences and responsiveness to bribery - a survey experiment

RCT ID

AEARCTR-0011315

Initial registration date

April 21, 2023

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published

April 26, 2023, 5:18 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country

Bulgaria

Region

Sofia

Country

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Region

London

Primary Investigator

Name

Iva Parvanova

Affiliation

London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)

Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name

Mylene Lagarde

PI Affiliation

London School of Economics

Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status

In development

Start date

2023-05-15

End date

2023-10-30

Keywords

Behavior, Other

Additional Keywords

Corruption

JEL code(s)

Secondary IDs

Prior work

This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.

Abstract

Bribery as a form of petty corruption is a widespread phenomenon contributing to overburdened provision of public services across low- and middle-income countries. The adverse effects on the quality, equity and trust within these systems are widely acknowledged. There are numerous challenges associated with researching corruption of any type due to its illicit nature. Moreover, observing the quality, timeliness or provider effort of most public services (such as healthcare or education) adds another layer of complexity in determining the real effect of bribery on the delivery of these services. Within this study I propose a novel experimental design which allows me to measure the extent to which bribery is reciprocated. Furthermore, by incorporating varying service provider and recipient characteristics, I will be able to assess the effects on social preferences on this degree of responsiveness. By proposing a cross-cultural experimental set-up, recruiting students from Bulgaria and the UK, I will utilize the underlying discrepancies in bribery prevalence to elicit the interactions between corruption norms and social preferences.

External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation

Lagarde, Mylene and Iva Parvanova. 2023. "Social preferences and responsiveness to bribery - a survey experiment." AEA RCT Registry. April 26. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11315-1.0

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Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)

The intervention aims to assess the effect of social preferences and norms on the likelihood of reciprocating bribery. Through a survey experiment, individuals are randomly assigned to receive alternative messages linked to in- and out-group inequity as well as the possibility of bribe rejection. We will test how these prompts triggering various social and fairness preferences affect the generosity of participants when distributing a scarce resource between two hypothetical individuals (the briber and non-briber).

Intervention Start Date

2023-05-15

Intervention End Date

2023-10-30

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)

The main outcome of the analysis is whether or not the bribe is reciprocated.

Primary Outcomes (explanation)

The corrupt reciprocity will be measured as a binary outcome Y, whereby Y=1 if the bribing recipient received more letters than the non-bribing one and 0 otherwise.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)

Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

We will randomly present participants with information prompts linked to inequality and bribery.
Individuals will randomly be assigned to one of 5 groups:
1) control
2) bribery
3) bribery + in-group inequity
4) bribery + out-group inequity
5) bribery + rejection

Experimental Design Details

Randomization Method

Randomization will happen automatically as respondents begin the survey in Qualtrics.

Randomization Unit

Randomization will take place on the individual level.

Was the treatment clustered?

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters

n/a

Sample size: planned number of observations

Around 450 students (200 students in the UK and 250 students in Bulgaria)

Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms

90 students per treatment arm (control, bribery, bribery + provider inequity information, bribery + recipient inequity information, bribery + rejection)

Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)

Supporting Documents and Materials

IRB