At least you´ve tried – The value of safety nets in betting against the inner bastard

Last registered on April 26, 2023
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
At least you´ve tried – The value of safety nets in betting against the inner bastard
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0011319
Initial registration date
April 23, 2023

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
April 26, 2023, 5:29 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country
Germany
Region

Primary Investigator

Name
Cheyenne Wübbelmann
Affiliation
Universität Vechta
Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Vanessa Mertins
PI Affiliation
University of Vechta
Contact Investigator
PI Name
Maximilian Hiller
PI Affiliation
University of Vechta
Contact Investigator
PI Name
Devin Kwasniok
PI Affiliation
University of Vechta
Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2023-04-24
End date
2023-05-14
Keywords
Behavior, Health
Additional Keywords
Commitment device, physical activity, monetary incentives, deposit contract, goal-setting, individual goal
JEL code(s)
C93, D91, I12
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
Several studies show a positive effect of deposit contracts on increasing physical activity. To be effective, the commitment device must be accepted by participants. Most studies show that take-up rates in a loss-framed design are very low. Loss aversion explains both the significant effects of deposit contracts and low take-up rates. Therefore, we designed a RCT in which safety nets make the loss-framed incentive more acceptable for participants without reducing the effects of loss aversion on behavior change.

We have developed a between-subject randomized controlled trial to test the effects of safety nets on goal achievement, defined as steps per day. Approximately 300 participants between the ages of 18 and 85 will be randomly assigned to one of four experimental treatments or the control treatment. Each participant will set his own goal (e.g., 9,000 steps per day) to achieve during the intervention period of 20 days. Furthermore, we focus on repeated bets, so that each participant can decide everyday if he wants to accept the challenge the next day. We want to find out how the incentives are optimally designed and whether the prospect of a safety net as well as repeated bets lead first to higher take-up rates and second to a higher goal achievement.

We run the experiment within an ongoing 365-day long study with subjects who are all seeking to improve their physical activity. All participants have been positively health screened, are using a smartphone app (ActiVAtE Behavior) to transmit their steps (main performance measure) in a timely manner and have already provided extensive individual data at the time of the intervention. While all participants indicated in the application questionnaire that they were eager to walk more steps per day, there is a large variation in ex-ante daily steps submitted via a smartphone app over the past 9 months. Since the daily goal is set by the participants themselves, there is also a corresponding variation in individual goals. Furthermore, we have a very rich dataset on each individual, including not only activity data before, during, and after the intervention, but also a wide variety of preferences (measured via economic laboratory experiments) as well as sociodemographic data and individual attitudes and self-reported behavior (measured via questionnaires).
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Hiller, Maximilian et al. 2023. "At least you´ve tried – The value of safety nets in betting against the inner bastard." AEA RCT Registry. April 26. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11319-1.0
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
T0: Control
T1: Safety net 0 (Standard reward; 0% of the origin step goal)
T2: Safety net 1 (50% of the origin step goal)
T3: Safety net 2 (50% and 75% of the origin step goal)
T4: Safety net 3 (Standard deposit contract; 100% of the origin step goal)

In T0, no incentive is present.
In T1 we offer participants a standard reward: Every day a participant opted-in and reaches his individual step goal, he will receive a fixed bonus of 0.25€.
The same reward is offered to participants in the T2 treatment. Furthermore, we offer participants in T2 a deposit contract with a safety net. Every time participants in T2 opted-in and fail to meet 50% of their individual step goal, they lose 0.75€. With the moment they reach at least 50% of their step goal the safety net will be active, and they will neither receive a loss nor a gain. Only if they reach 100% of their step goal, they will receive a fixed bonus of 0.25€.
Participants in T3 lose 0.75€ if they have opted-in and fail to reach 50% of their step goal. If participants in T4 reach 50% their step goal, again a safety net is active, and they lose 0.50€s if they have opted-in and fail to reach 75% of their step goal. With reaching at least 75% of their step goal, the second safety net will be active, and participants will neither receive a loss nor a gain. Again, only if they reach 100% of their step goal, they will receive a fixed bonus of 0.25€.
In T4 we offer participants a standard incentivized deposit contract: Every day participants opted-in and fail to reach their individual step goal they lose 0.75€. When participants in T4 achieve their step goal, the safety net will be active and they will immediately receive a fixed bonus of 0.25€.
Intervention Start Date
2023-04-24
Intervention End Date
2023-05-14

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
goal achievement (number of successful days), steps per day, degree of target achievement, repeated take-up rate
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
average costs per treatment, individual costs per goal
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We conduct a randomized controlled trial to test the effects of safety nets in combination with loss and gain framed monetary incentives on physical activity and individual goal achievement. Physical activity therefor is defined as the number of steps per day and is measured via a smartphone app. The goals are defined by the participants themselves with the indication to set an ambitious goal. Incentive phase will last 20 days. To participate in the incentives, participants in all treatments have to opt-in every day of the 20-day duration. Participants are randomized to one of the following five treatment groups:

T0: ControlT0: Control
T1: Safety net 0 (Standard reward; 0% of the origin step goal)
T2: Safety net 1 (50% of the origin step goal)
T3: Safety net 2 (50% and 75% of the origin step goal)
T4: Safety net 3 (Standard deposit contract; 100% of the origin step goal)

In T0, no incentive is present.
In T1 we offer participants a standard reward: Every day a participant opted-in and reaches his individual step goal, he will receive a fixed bonus of 0.25€.
The same reward is offered to participants in the T2 treatment. Furthermore, we offer participants in T2 a deposit contract with a safety net. Every time participants in T2 opted-in and fail to meet 50% of their individual step goal, they lose 0.75€. With the moment they reach at least 50% of their step goal the safety net will be active, and they will neither receive a loss nor a gain. Only if they reach 100% of their step goal, they will receive a fixed bonus of 0.25€.
Participants in T3 lose 0.75€ if they have opted-in and fail to reach 50% of their step goal. If participants in T4 reach 50% their step goal, again a safety net is active, and they lose 0.50€ if they have opted-in and fail to reach 75% of their step goal. With reaching at least 75% of their step goal, the second safety net will be active, and participants will neither receive a loss nor a gain. Again, only if they reach 100% of their step goal, they will receive a fixed bonus of 0.25€.
In T4 we offer participants a standard incentivized deposit contract: Every day participants opted-in and fail to reach their individual step goal they lose 0.75€. When participants in T4 achieve their step goal, the safety net will be active, and they will immediately receive a fixed bonus of 0.25€.

Prior to intervention phase, participants will receive a survey, where they can claim their individual step goal for the 20-day intervention phase. After randomization, each participant will be contacted via WhatsApp and introduced to the treatment.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Random draw by computer
Randomization Unit
Randomization will be at the individual level
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
350
Sample size: planned number of observations
350
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
70
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Gesellschaft für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung e.V.
IRB Approval Date
2023-04-23
IRB Approval Number
BqGem7Zc
Analysis Plan

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials