Experimental Design
To test the willingness to cooperate by averting a potential climate disaster jointly, participants play a one-shot risk game in a two-player setting. Both participants are endowed with 15Kina (approx. 5Euros; additional to 2Kina show-up fee) which they can invest into a district climate fund serving as a type of insurance that can protect the players in case of a disaster happening. Communities are used to so-called ‘community funds’ which is why this setting is being used and for a bigger scope extended for the framing. The district climate fund is used for local engagement in climate adaptation measures, for example the conservation and reforestation of mangrove trees, corals or the building of dams. Those adaptation measures have shown to help coastal communities that are affected by sea levels rise and climate change induced disasters such as tsunamis and coastal floodings to detain the water in the short-run. Participants are being told that the experimental game they are engaging in is only a hypothetical situation and their investment in the game’s fund does not lead to the engagement of mangrove conservation and reforestation in reality. Also, the occurrence of a disaster, drawn by a card in the game is only hypothetical and to be imagined only for the game itself.
Once, this is clear to participants, the game is being explained and its understanding is being controlled for through control questions. In the game, the disaster is happening with a 50% probability, which is being determined by a random draw of two cards (‘disaster happening’ vs. ‘disaster not happening’).
In case the card determines that the disaster is not happening, the participants’ payoff is determined by their initial endowment from which their chosen investment level is being deducted. In case the card determines that the disaster is happening, the payoffs of the players depend on the previous investment and thus protection levels. In case both players invest, together they reach full protection and they only ‘lose’ their investment of the community fund. In case only one player invests, they reach a partial protection for both, i.e. some of their endowment is lost and in case no one invests, they both have no protection at all, meaning that nearly all their endowment is lost.
Parameters are chosen as follows: Endowment=15Kina; Payment for Community Fund=7Kina; Destruction no protection=15Kina; Destruction partial protection=8Kina. A previous pilot with a community fund payment of 5Kina has shown very high cooperation levels which is why the value of the cost of cooperation has been increased, so that an increase in cooperation levels to be able to test the different treatments is allowed for.
Leading to the following payoff tables and further to the following expected payoff table:
Table 1: Payoff Matrix in case of the disaster not happening
Reforestation No reforestation
Reforestation 8;8 8;15
No reforestation 15;8 15;15
Table 2: Payoff Matrix in case of the disaster happening
Reforestation No reforestation
Reforestation 8;8 0;7
No reforestation 7;0 0;0
Table 3: Expected Payoff Matrix
Reforestation No reforestation
Reforestation 8;8 4;11
No reforestation 11;4 7,5;7,5
Participants chose their investment level without knowing the investment decision of their playing partner, all they know is whether their playing partner is from their own village or from another village in another constituency, i.e. with another culture and language.
The first treatment variation studies the difference of being observed. As we know from the cooperation literature, being observed normally leads to people contributing more (Grimalda et al. 2016). The Big Man serves as observer as he is the person with the highest degree of authority and normally represents the person of a village who represents the village’s social norms and who most people look up to. He will not interact with participants, i.e. not giving any suggestions but merely observing the participants while taking their decision. The second treatment variation refers to the cooperation partner either being within the same village or from another village with a different language (another constituency but within the same district). This treatment variation triggers the ingroup-outgroup differentiation.
Table 1: Treatment variation
Observation by Big Man No Observation by Big Man
In-group cooperation Treatment 1 Treatment 2
Out-group cooperation Treatment 3 Treatment 4
The experiment will be conducted as a pen and paper lab-in-the-field-experiment in approx. four to six small-scale coastal communities in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, starting 24 April 2023. I continue the lab-in-the-field-experiment until (i) the sample quota (see below) is reached, (ii) I have used all the available budget, or (iii) 19 May 2023.
The experiment is followed by a detailed survey questionnaire which includes various social preference questions, including questions about trust, altruism, fairness perceptions, reciprocity, inequity aversion.
Furthermore, I elicit their beliefs about other people's behavior in this situation, e.g. other game player, another man in their village, another woman in their village, the Big Men, etc.
Lastly, questions are directed towards knowledge and beliefs about climate change as well as the willingness to engage in adaptation projects, specific community-based disaster management engagement, the support for national climate policies and one’s own experience with extreme weather events and potential losses thereof.
No IRB exists at UHH. IRB equivalent approval is in process of being obtained.